

Chinese Views on the Presumptive U.S. Presidential Candidates Hillary R. Clinton and Donald J. Trump

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This year's presidential election, like past ones, features China and U.S.-China relations as a talking point for candidates from both parties. In the following text we will show that Chinese elite and public views toward Clinton and Trump are varied and divided. Authoritative views tend to be cautious in their commentary on both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. While Trump's perceived straightforwardness, decisiveness, and strength of character have earned him fans in China, the irrational and irresponsible nature of many of his comments is also well recognized and regarded as a potential threat to stable U.S.-China relations. In comparison, while some Chinese analysts view Clinton's more predictable and establishment-based foreign policy beliefs as a positive attribute, most Chinese hold very negative views of Clinton's stance on human rights and maritime security issues, and expect her presidency to pose serious challenges to bilateral relations.

This year (2016) is a presidential election year, and as always, views toward China and U.S.-China relations play a role in the presidential campaigns of both the Republican and Democratic Party candidates.

In many past campaign years, while stressing the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, presidential candidates have generally highlighted the points of contention between Beijing and Washington, especially in the economic, human rights, and (to a lesser extent) national security arenas. These statements and policy platforms have often criticized China (sometimes very sharply) for its alleged transgressions, and proposed various supposedly new or more energetic policy moves designed to elicit more favorable Chinese behavior.

The China issue has frequently been a campaign point for past presidential candidates of both parties. In his 1992 campaign, Bill Clinton used the China issue to criticize the foreign policies of the incumbent George H. W. Bush Republican administration. Clinton used the 1989 government actions in Tiananmen Square to accuse Reagan and Bush of sending "secret emissaries to raise a toast with those who crushed democracy."¹ Similarly, in 2000, part of Al Gore's foreign policy agenda was to strongly support normalized trade relations with China because "it is right for America's economy and right for the cause of reform in China." This gave George W. Bush a point on which to attack Gore.² Again, in the 2012 election, Barack Obama took a shot at China by complaining to the WTO about Beijing's imposition of more than \$3 billion in duties on

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U.S. automobile exports, which the Obama administration regarded as an abuse of trade laws. Other than being a counterargument to Mitt Romney's claim that Obama had not been tough enough on China's trade policies, this was also a way to remind voters that Romney's role as a private equity executive was linked to the outsourcing of American jobs to China.³

This year is no exception to the general pattern of a China focus in the foreign policy arena. Both of the presumptive presidential candidates, Democrat Hillary Rodham Clinton and Republican Donald J. Trump, have addressed China, U.S.-China relations, and U.S. policy toward China at various times in their campaigns, often stressing the problems Beijing poses while offering various supposed new or improved policy solutions. That said, the 2016 presidential campaign arguably provides a particularly interesting example of the China views of presidential candidates. Given her long history as First Lady, U.S. senator, and public political figure, Clinton has an extensive track record of views on China and has in the past generated considerable controversy within that country over her stances. Chinese views on her during the current campaign to some extent reflect that history. In contrast, Trump is a relative newcomer to the national political arena, and has made far fewer comments on China. However he has arguably made up for that deficiency in recent months as an extremely provocative and energetic candidate, offering a variety of controversial statements on China or China-related aspects of U.S. foreign policy.

Thus far, Trump's approach to China has focused primarily on economic issues, although he has also addressed some important Asia relationships as well. His overall stance, as found on his campaign website, asserts that Washington has been weak and ineffective in dealing with Beijing and that his administration would provide unprecedented "leadership and strength at the negotiating table...to bring fairness to our trade with China."⁴

In Trump's view, because of U.S. weakness and lack of resolve, America's "rivals no longer respect us." Obama has supposedly "allowed China to continue its economic assault on American jobs and wealth, refusing to enforce trade rules." Trump argues that Obama has also "allowed China to steal government secrets with cyber-attacks and engage in industrial espionage against the U.S. and its companies."⁵

As the U.S. president, Trump would place China "on notice that America is back in the global leadership business and that their days of currency manipulation and cheating are over." He advocates immediately calling China a currency manipulator once in office, forcing Beijing to uphold intellectual property laws and stop compelling U.S. companies to share proprietary technology with Chinese competitors, and putting an end to China's "illegal export subsidies and lax labor and environmental standards."

To facilitate Washington's negotiating leverage, Trump would lower the corporate tax rate to keep U.S. jobs at home, attack the U.S. debt and deficit so that China cannot use financial blackmail against America, and bolster the U.S. military presence in the East and South China Seas "to discourage Chinese adventurism."⁶

Beyond such “official” views, however, Trump has also expressed various attitudes and ideas toward U.S. foreign policy–related issues, and Asia or China in particular, during media interviews or in campaign speeches.

Perhaps most notably, Trump has expressed reservations about the burden-sharing arrangements underlying current U.S.-Asian alliance relationships. He has reportedly called both Japan and South Korea “free riders” for not entirely covering the cost of U.S. forces based in those countries. As a result of this view, he has shown some receptivity to the idea of the U.S. withdrawing from both countries if they do not take on such costs.⁷

Trump has also advocated for more effective pressure on Beijing to compel Pyongyang to rein in and eventually jettison its nuclear weapons program. And he has indicated that he would be willing to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un if elected.⁸

Despite such tough talk, Trump has also stated: “We desire to live peacefully and in friendship with Russia and China. We have serious differences with these two nations, and must regard them with open eyes. But we are not bound to be adversaries. We should seek common ground based on shared interests. . . . A strong and smart America is an America that will find a better friend in China. We can both benefit or we can both go our separate ways.”⁹

In contrast to Trump, Hillary Clinton generally reflects and affirms the major themes of existing U.S. policy toward China, which is not surprising, given her past prominent foreign policy role as Obama’s secretary of state. In interviews, articles, and statements, Clinton has clearly upheld Washington’s emphasis on encouraging Beijing to be more supportive of international law and the peaceful negotiation of differences while deterring it from tension-producing actions in the South China Sea and elsewhere and cooperating wherever possible. In the economic arena, she has also stressed the need for Washington and Beijing to “work together to ensure strong, sustained, and balanced future global growth.”¹⁰

In a well-known article written in October 2011, Clinton called on both China and the United States to “meet our respective global responsibilities and obligations,” and argued that a thriving China is good for America, and that cooperation is better than conflict.¹¹

Yet that article was also viewed as an early indication of Clinton’s push for what became the so-called U.S. rebalancing or pivot to Asia, which many Chinese view as a move toward greater containment of China (see below). Indeed, Hillary Clinton has a reputation for being more “hawkish” in handling world problems than Obama has been.¹²

Clinton has also sharply criticized Beijing on several issues, describing its actions in and ties with Africa as “new colonialism” and of course has often taken a tough stance toward Beijing on human rights issues, while nonetheless also asserting (as the global financial crisis unfolded in 2008–9) that policies in that arena “can’t interfere on the global economic crisis, the global climate change crisis and the security crisis.”¹³

And, in striking a clear contrast with Trump, Clinton has unambiguously supported U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea, as well as Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. While identifying areas for improvement in those relationships, she has made no mention of the need for U.S. allies to increase their spending in support of U.S. forces in Asia.¹⁴

Inevitably, these at times provocative stances by Clinton and Trump evoke responses from a variety of Chinese observers. This *Monitor* piece examines those Chinese views. As always, they are divided into authoritative, quasi-authoritative, and non-authoritative statements. However, since the positions toward China of U.S. presidential candidates are often highly influenced by the political winds of the campaign and obviously do not constitute U.S. policy, few if any authoritative Chinese sources are available to provide comments on the statements or policy platforms made. As indicated below, the few available authoritative sources are generally rather cautious in their comments. Hence, most of the Chinese views examined herein are from non-authoritative sources. Nonetheless, they provide an interesting indication of Chinese elite (and some public) views on the two candidates, and especially on Trump.

Authoritative Sources

As noted above, authoritative Chinese sources generally adopt a cautious view toward both Trump and Clinton, and usually only express views, if at all, in response to media questions.

Regarding the former candidate, in September 2015, just prior to Xi Jinping's September 2015 state visit to the United States, the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson sought to downplay the need for Beijing to respond to Trump's critical remarks about China (and by implication any other candidate's remarks) made during the campaign, stating:

Everyone has the right to air his or her personal opinion, but it is the policies towards China adopted by the US government and the mainstream opinion of the US people that we value more.

The spokesperson also used the opportunity of the question asked to reaffirm the overall positive attitude of both Beijing and Washington toward their relationship on the eve of the state visit, remarking:

China and the US keep strengthening their practical cooperation on bilateral, regional and global issues, and properly manage sensitive issues or differences in a constructive way. This serves the common interests of both sides, and does good to the whole world....Decades of development of China-US relations proves that despite various voices and disturbances that may occur from time to time, bilateral relations keep moving forward....It is hoped that the two sides can work towards the goal together, make more constructive remarks, do more constructive deeds, make greater efforts to manage and handle differences in a constructive way, expand common ground and narrow differences.¹⁵

In a similar vein, more recently (in late March 2016), the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson referred to Trump's supposed receptivity to a possible U.S. withdrawal of forces from U.S. allies Japan and South Korea, and their acquisition of nuclear weapons as merely "a hypothetical statement."¹⁶

An even more noncommittal remark was made by the Foreign Ministry spokesperson in response to a question concerning Hillary Clinton's April 2016 announcement that she would run for the presidency. He stated:

The US presidential election is an internal affair of the US. Here I'd like to stress that the sound and steady development of China-US relations is in the fundamental interests of the two peoples, and helpful to safeguard peace, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific and the world. We are willing to join hands with the US to strive for constantly new progress in the building of the new model of major-country relationship between China and America.¹⁷

More extensive, and critical, comments from authoritative sources have occurred in response to the views of the presidential candidates, and especially Trump, on economic matters. For example, in April 2016, Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei, reportedly known in China for his directness, asserted that Trump is an "irrational type" (不理性的那类人) and added that were the U.S. to follow Trump's trade policies the U.S. would lose its global leadership position. (如果美国采取特朗普建议的对华贸易政策, 美国“就别想当老大了.”) At the same time, as in the case of the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Lou recognized that rhetoric in a presidential campaign gets heated and often does not reflect the policies an incoming administration would adopt.¹⁸

Non-Authoritative Sources

Most Chinese comments on Trump and Clinton are from non-authoritative sources, as indicated above. Of the two candidates, the greatest commentary by far is directed at Trump.

Some Chinese sources simply comment on Trump's popularity as an indication of the current "anti-politician" sentiment of a large portion of the American public, given his nonpolitical background as a businessman and his criticism of existing U.S. policies toward immigration, Medicare, and gun control.¹⁹

Other Chinese sources use the opportunity afforded by Trump's provocative remarks and the unrest occurring at Trump rallies (which sometimes includes physical confrontations) to comment on the shortcomings and dangers of the U.S. political system, both domestically and toward the world in general.

A notable example is an editorial appearing on March 14, 2016 in *Global Times*, entitled "Trump Opens Pandora's box in U.S." The editor, known for his often sharp criticism of the U.S., asserts that Trump's "abusively racist and extremist" remarks and overall "mischief" has "overthrown a lot of conventional norms of U.S. political life," "opened a

Pandora's box in U.S. society," and "worries the whole world." Specifically, Trump's candidacy allegedly reflects a crisis in the U.S. middle class, centered on the frustrations of his "mostly lower-class white" supporters, and injects a strong element of unpredictability into U.S. politics and society. According to the editor, this raises the prospect of an undefined "institutional failure" for the United States, and of the U.S. becoming "a source of destructive force against world peace." Such problems, he concludes, suggest that Washington should stop "pointing fingers at other countries for their so-called nationalism and tyranny."²⁰

Similarly, another source presents the views of several Chinese scholars on the causes and significance of the Trump phenomenon. Feng Yue (an executive researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) argues that Trump is popular because, unlike most politicians, he directly and bluntly addresses those (undefined) "diseases" of the U.S. political system that reflect its inability or unwillingness to satisfy many social development problems.²¹

Yet another source again links Trump's popularity as a "non-politician" to the inability of the U.S. political system to address domestic problems and the resulting growing divide between political elites and the American public. The author states:

In the past 10 years, American socio-economic problems have been on the rise, racial tensions are worsening, partisan struggles are escalating, and U.S. international influence is on the decline. All of these factors combine to increase public doubt of the ability of elite politicians to lead... In an age in which the rich are getting richer and illegal immigrants are robbing American blue-collars of their opportunities, the public is more likely to agree with Trump's view that the American dream is truly dead.

Notably, this assessment does not condemn Trump for his inflammatory remarks, as many other Chinese observers do, but instead mentions his "straightforwardness, honesty, and the willingness to bear responsibility, which are all leadership qualities that traditional politicians lack."²²

Although obviously not part of China's leading political and intellectual sectors, the Chinese public, and especially netizens, have expressed a wide variety of views on the presidential candidates, and Trump in particular.

A poll of Chinese netizens conducted by *Global Times* in March 2016 indicated that the ordinary Chinese public is very divided on Trump. Of the 3,330 Chinese net users surveyed, 1,800—54 percent—voted in favor of Trump, while 1,530 netizens voted against him. Many of those who voted for Trump undoubtedly like him because they like his reality TV show, *The Apprentice*, which is popular in China. But apparently some Chinese also like him because he is direct and forceful, "honest and sincere," conveying leadership traits of strength and decisiveness that appeal to many. And some Chinese also apparently like his more isolationist view toward foreign policy, which suggests that the U.S. should play a less dominant role in Asia.²³

In contrast, according to some Chinese observers, Hillary Clinton is less popular than Trump because she has an image of being hostile to China, due to her support of the Obama administration's "pivot to Asia" and overall hawkish views on sovereignty disputes involving China, her mainstream "ideological" stress on human rights and democracy promotion, and other critical stances taken.²⁴

The editorial page of *Global Times* expresses roughly the same dislike of Clinton as it does of Trump (see above). The editorial argues that a supposed "accusation" against Xi by Clinton via Twitter is reminiscent of Donald Trump's strategy to win votes, by resorting to "ignominious shenanigans." It accuses Clinton of "using the language of Trump to cast herself in the role of a rabble-rouser" despite "her political acumen as former secretary of state and senator."²⁵

But not all Chinese elites are as unambiguously critical of Clinton. An article appearing in *Global Times* in early 2013, when Clinton ended her tenure as secretary of state, stated:

when Hillary talks about China in her writings, her tone is always positive, focusing more on cooperation than on conflict, but in her speeches, her attitude toward China is constantly changing, switching from coldness to warmth...Hillary not only challenged Chinese interests, but also stimulated China's thinking as a major power. She is truly a formidable opponent deserving of respect.²⁶

An even more positive assessment of Clinton was made by Qian Liwei (钱立伟), a researcher at the influential China Institute of Contemporary International Relations. Qian states that Hillary leaves room for Sino-American cooperation on a lot of issues, including climate change, Afghanistan, global governance, and poverty alleviation in Africa. He believes that Clinton has a good understanding of the foreign policy concepts of Chinese leaders, and that the "new type of international relations" proposed by China was viewed favorably by Clinton. He concludes that Clinton's general policy view toward China is "very rational and sensible," and is not in conflict with the concept of a "new type of international relations."²⁷

Despite such mixed elite assessments, Clinton reportedly was viewed unfavorably by an overwhelmingly high number of Chinese polled by *Global Times* in early 2015.²⁸

And yet a Chinese scholar has observed: "Because the *Global Times* and its readers tend toward the more nationalistic and patriotic end of the spectrum, we should not take this result at face value."²⁹

At the same time, this scholar offered three reasons for why Clinton is nonetheless viewed negatively by most Chinese: her past tough attitudes toward China; the fact that her party, the Democrats, have traditionally been strong on issues such as human rights and trade protectionism; and her pivot to Asia policy, which could bring the two countries into greater conflict. Although he asserts that all three factors "seem to

converge and point to a more turbulent relationship between China and the United States,” he concludes that Clinton’s overall wisdom as a politician could “contribute to a more mature and healthy bilateral relationship between the United States and China.”³⁰

In fact, some segments of the Chinese public reportedly support Clinton, such as China’s feminists.³¹

Regarding foreign policy in particular, non-authoritative sources offer a variety of views on Trump’s approach to the outside world, U.S. foreign policy, and relations with China.

One Chinese scholar cautiously observes that if Trump becomes president, his ability to become a “global threat” will be limited, since “he will face restraint from Congress, the Supreme Court, major interest groups, and public opinion.”³²

In a similar vein, another observer asserts that, while Trump’s “accusations against many countries including China during his campaign cannot be ignored,” his basic pragmatism as a businessman willing to make deals, combined with the practical realities of wielding power, will cause Trump to adopt a more level-headed and reasonable approach to China once elected. Indeed, “he might create a surprise in his China policy, taking a stance to boost bilateral ties regardless of other politicians’ concerns, just as he astonished us during the presidential campaign.”³³

In contrast, other Chinese observers seem less confident that a Trump presidency would reaffirm the practical necessities of U.S. foreign policy and Sino-U.S. relations in particular. While acknowledging the uncertainties of a Trump presidency, a *Global Times* editorial speculates that:

a Trump-led US might be inclined to isolationism and attach more importance to “America First,” and the American economy. Ideology will be downplayed. Washington might engage in more squabbles with its free-riding allies, and tighten up its immigration policy which as a result will upset the Latin Americans. After enjoying massive trade surplus from the US for years, China and Japan will be demanded by Washington to widen market access.³⁴

In a similar but even less ambivalent vein, another Chinese observer asserts that if Trump is elected president the:

decades-long [U.S.-Japan security treaty] will definitely change. Without Washington’s support, Tokyo will be unable to continue intervening in the South China Sea and sustain its influence upon the Asia-Pacific region [and]...Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will have more reasons to revise the pacifist constitution. In this way, the postwar international order will be changed and Japan will be able to participate in warfare.³⁵

Some Chinese observers emphasize what they see as the contrasting views toward foreign policy of the two candidates. While Trump is seen as decidedly non-mainstream and pragmatic but to some extent less predictable, Clinton is viewed as more “ideological” (i.e., an advocate of democracy and human rights) and mainstream or “traditional” overall, as indicated above. As a *Global Times* editorial states:

While Trump is a practical business tycoon subverting US political correctness, Clinton is a former secretary of state and former first lady, representative of US political correctness and the mainstream thoughts.³⁶

Another Chinese source notes that Clinton has “warned the [U.S.] electorate that, under slowing economic growth, China will be more likely to conduct ‘beggar thy neighbor’ actions...[and] has also blamed China for stealing American intellectual property and commercial secrets.”³⁷

Regarding how Beijing should deal with Trump and Clinton, although some observers downplay the importance of their attacks on China as part of the usual political rhetoric and hyperbole of a political campaign,³⁸ others state that China must respond strongly if and when such views turn into policy during the next presidential administration.

For example, Shan Renping (cited above) asserts:

If [Trump] or Hillary starts to attack China, we must attack back. We do not even go soft on American officials, let alone politicians who are still campaigning...[Trump] is still in the stage of paying lip service to a lot of empty ideas. If he can move forward, when necessary, we should show him our true colors and let him know who China really is.³⁹

Another observer states that despite his criticism of China, even Trump will need to maintain cooperative relations with China, since stable bilateral ties are more in line with the U.S. national interest, as the policies of the Bush and Obama administrations indicate.⁴⁰

Several Chinese observers have been very critical of Trump’s call for greater pressure on Beijing to solve the North Korean nuclear problem. A *Global Times* editorial strongly criticizes Trump’s supposed effort to place blame on Beijing for not doing enough by asserting, as many Chinese do, that the root cause of the problem lies with the hostile policies toward Pyongyang of the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The article states:

There is no hope to put an end to the North Korean nuclear conundrum if the US, South Korea and Japan do not change their policies toward Pyongyang. Solely depending on Beijing’s pressure to force the North to give up its nuclear plan is an illusion.⁴¹

Concluding Remarks

The preceding overview of Chinese elite and public views toward Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump suggest that one certainly cannot blithely assert that “the Chinese” have one particular view toward either candidate. Both Chinese elites and the public hold a variety of positive and negative views toward Trump. On the authoritative level, Chinese officials are usually cautious in their assessment of both figures, although there are indications (unsurprisingly) that Chinese officials recognize the likely irrational and irresponsible nature of Trump’s comments on Sino-U.S. economic relations.

While significant numbers of both groups apparently express positive attitudes toward Trump’s supposed honesty or sincerity, directness, decisiveness, and strength of character, and also value his reportedly pragmatic, deal-making approach to politics and foreign policy, others see Trump in a very negative light and potentially a dangerous threat to future stable U.S.-China relations. Yet despite such understandable concerns, it does seem that many Chinese believe that Trump is someone with whom, as president, Beijing will probably be able to deal, or that his more extreme views will be tempered by the limitations inherent in the U.S. political system. And of course Trump’s very qualified support for America’s Asia alliances bolsters such positive Chinese attitudes.

In partial contrast, Chinese views toward Hillary Clinton are less clearly mixed. Clinton’s establishment, largely mainstream, beliefs on foreign policy certainly lead some Chinese to view her possible presidency in a somewhat positive light. However, in contrast to Trump, it seems that most Chinese, elite and public alike, hold very negative views toward Clinton and therefore expect that her presidency will pose more serious challenges to the bilateral relationship. In the final analysis, however, it is almost certain that the Chinese government will focus first and foremost on what either candidate actually does once in office. That said, either candidate, and especially Clinton, will probably deepen the existing already deep level of suspicion that Beijing holds toward the U.S. government, at least until events show otherwise.

Notes

¹ Paul Haenle, “The China Factor in the U.S. Presidential Election: Separating Rhetoric from Action,” Carnegie-Tsinghua, October 17, 2012, <http://carnegietsinghua.org/publications/?fa=49700#3>.

² “Gore Tries to Sway Union on China Trade,” Associated Press, May 23, 2000, <http://articles.latimes.com/2000/may/23/news/mn-33119>.

³ Jeff Mason, “Obama knocks China trade policy, Romney on campaign tour,” Reuters, July 5, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-campaign-obama-idUSBRE8640WM20120705>; see also Tom Cohen, “Obama, Romney duel over China, immigration,” *CNN Politics* (website), September 18, 2012, <http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/17/politics/campaign-wrap/>.

⁴ “Reforming the U.S.-China Trade Relationship to Make America Great Again,” *Trump: Make America Great Again!* (website, hereinafter abbreviated *TMAGA!*), <http://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/us-china-trade-reform>.

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- ⁵ “Donald J. Trump Foreign Policy Speech,” *TMAGA!*, <https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-foreign-policy-speech>.
- ⁶ “Reforming the U.S.-China Trade Relationship to Make America Great Again.”
- ⁷ See Thomas Wright, “Donald Trump wants America to withdraw from the world,” *Financial Times*, March 23, 2016, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/25d0210a-ef80-11e5-9f20-c3a047354386.html#axzz4BgLfCD2n>. For a Chinese summary of these Trump views, see “Trump: The United States will not start a world war over Chinese actions” (不認為美會為中國的行動開啟世界大戰), *Global Times*, March 23, 2016, <http://military.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2016/0323/c1011-28220011.html>.
- ⁸ Tal Kopan, “Donald Trump would speak with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un,” *CNN Politics*, May 18, 2016, <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/17/politics/donald-trump-kim-jong-un-north-korea/index.html>. Trump has stated: “I would put a lot of pressure on China because economically we have tremendous power over China.... The Obama administration has pressured China to do more on its neighbor, but has stopped short of using economic leverage for fear of the consequences.”
- ⁹ “Donald J. Trump Foreign Policy Speech.”
- ¹⁰ Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” *Foreign Policy*, October 11, 2011, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/>; and “Manufacturing,” Hillary Clinton Campaign page, <https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/manufacturing/>.
- ¹¹ Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” *Foreign Policy*, October 11, 2011, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/>. Clinton also stated: “We all know that fears and misperceptions linger on both sides of the Pacific. Some in our country see China’s progress as a threat to the United States; some in China worry that America seeks to constrain China’s growth. We reject both those views. The fact is that a thriving America is good for China and a thriving China is good for America.”
- ¹² For example, see Michelle FlorCruz, “Where Hillary Clinton’s China Policy Would Differ from President Obama’s,” *Asia Society*, May 11, 2016, <http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/where-hillary-clintons-china-policy-would-differ-president-obamas>. FlorCruz states: “A Clinton presidency, analysts believe, would lead to a more assertive U.S. policy toward China.”
- ¹³ “Clinton warns against ‘new colonialism’ in Africa,” Reuters, June 11, 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-clinton-africa-idUSTRE75A0RI20110611>; “Where Hillary Clinton’s China Policy Would Differ from President Obama’s”; “Hillary Clinton: Chinese human rights secondary to economic survival,” *The Telegraph*, February 20, 2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/4735087/Hillary-Clinton-Chinese-human-rights-secondary-to-economic-survival.html>; and Shannon Tiezzi, “Why China Dreads a Hillary Clinton Presidency,” *The Diplomat*, February 10, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/why-china-dreads-a-hillary-clinton-presidency/>. Tiezza writes: “[As Secretary of State] Clinton never seemed to miss a chance to snipe at China while visiting third party countries, whether it was accusing China of ‘new colonialism’ in Africa or warning, from just across the Chinese border in Mongolia, that countries ‘cannot, over the long run, have economic liberalization without political liberalization.’”
- ¹⁴ See “America’s Pacific Century.” Clinton states: “Our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the fulcrum for our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific. They have underwritten regional peace and security for more

than half a century, shaping the environment for the region's remarkable economic ascent. They leverage our regional presence and enhance our regional leadership at a time of evolving security challenges."

¹⁵ "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on September 1, 2015,"

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1292984.shtml. Also see an earlier spokesperson statement for a similar view: "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular Press Conference on April 13, 2015,"

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1254246.shtml.

¹⁶ "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular Press Conference on March 28, 2016,"

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1351332.shtml.

¹⁷ "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular Press Conference on April 13, 2015."

¹⁸ "Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei Takes Aim at Donald Trump's Trade Policies," *Wall Street Journal*, April 18, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-finance-ministerlou-jiwei-takes-aim-at-donald-trumps-trade-policies-1460892988#:uc22dd4tK3_0jA.

¹⁹ For example, see Yi Wen 奕文, "Trump the 'Anti-Political'" ("反政治"的特朗普), *Cover Story* (封面报道), March 23, 2016, pp. 70–71.

²⁰ "Editorial: Trump opens Pandora's box in US," *Global Times*, March 14, 2016, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/973564.shtml>.

²¹ "'Checking Trump': A Detail in American Democracy" ("阻击特朗普": 美国民主的一个细节), *Global Times*, April 14 2016, <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2016-04/8808632.html>.

²² Li Haidong 李海东, "The Trump phenomenon reflects a true America" (特朗普现象折射真实的美国), *Global Times*, March 22, 2016, <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2016-03/8746028.html>. Li is a professor with the Institute of International Relations at China Foreign Affairs University. Also see an earlier article by the same author: Li Haidong, "Candidates will embrace pragmatism over populism," *Global Times*, March 16, 2016, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/974218.shtml>; and see Shan Renping 单仁平, "Trump will continue his legend of 'smelling bad and tasting good'" (特朗普继续'闻着臭吃着香'传奇), *Global Times*, March 17, 2016, <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/shanrenping/2016-03/8720442.html>. The author states that Trump is popular because U.S. political elites "have been out of touch with American reality for too long, and the lower-class supporters of the [Republican] party have chosen to vote for Trump as a form of revenge."

²³ Wei Lai, "[Chinese] Net users divided over Trump," *Global Times*, March 30, 2016, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/976613.shtml>. Also see Christopher Bodden, "As in US, Trump draws strong reactions in China," Associated Press, May 30, 2016, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/c03c7621e206424481a4697d4251e8c3/though-largely-unknown-trump-finds-fans-china>. Also see Vincent Ni, "Donald Trump and China: A complex relationship," *BBC News*, March 26, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35839782>. The author points out that Chinese netizens like Trump for his

“down-to-earth attitude” and outspokenness. Many Chinese people think that Trump will become a good president, and some think that Trump is not as hawkish as he appears to be. For additional comments on the love/hate views of Chinese citizens toward Trump, see Matt Rivers, “Meet Donald Trump’s Chinese fans,” *CNN Politics*, May 12, 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/12/politics/china-trump-fans/>; and Ai Jun, “Washington outsider Trump intrigues Chinese public,” *Global Times*, March 3, 2016, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/971595.shtml>. The author states, “The Chinese people also have had enough of US politicians’ deeds betraying their words when it comes to issues concerning the Sino-US relationship. Some others prefer Trump than his competitors on the bet that he would ‘ruin’ the US soon.”

²⁴ For example, see the views of Wu Xinbo, director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, cited in Wei Lai, “[Chinese] Net Users Divided Over Trump,” *Global Times*, March 30, 2016, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/976613.shtml>. Also see Shannon Tiezzi, “Why China Dreads a Hillary Clinton Presidency,” *The Diplomat*, February 10, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/why-china-dreads-a-hillary-clinton-presidency/> and Ai, “Washington outsider Trump intrigues Chinese public” (endnote 23, above). Ai states, “[Clinton] seems to be less welcomed, given her tough attitude toward Beijing, incessant accusations about China’s human rights record, and her push for the US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific strategy as Secretary of State.” Also see Katie Hunt, “Why China may cheer a Trump presidency and dread a Clinton one,” *CNN Politics*, April 5, 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/05/politics/china-hillary-clinton-donald-trump/>. Hunt states:

Some of the criticism of Clinton seems rooted in the same sexism that colors the opposition towards her in the United States. State media has described her as pushy and ungraceful and mocked her hairstyles and wardrobe choices. Sima Nan, a television pundit sometimes described as China’s Bill O’Reilly, openly calls her a “crazy old woman.” One often quoted comment from Chinese social media platform Weibo recalls her husband’s public infidelity: “If she can’t manage her husband, how can she manage America?”

Also see “‘Warrior’ Hillary adopts a hardline policy toward China” (“斗士”希拉里的“对华强硬”之路), *Phoenix Focus* (凤凰聚焦), April 13, 2015, http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150413/43542028_0.shtml. Hong Kong’s Phoenix TV (凤凰卫视) published this article outlining Hillary Clinton’s toughness when dealing with China, and uses several examples, including her tough talk on China in her 2007 campaign, her toughness toward China during her tenure as secretary of state, her “pivot to Asia” policy, her supposed interference in the East China Sea, her interference in the South China Sea, and her interference in domestic Chinese politics. It states that “Hillary’s ‘warrior’ style has left a deep impression. Her China policy is known for its toughness.”

²⁵ “Editorial: Is Hillary copying Trump to chase votes?” *Global Times*, September 28, 2015, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/944805.shtml>.

²⁶ “Today: Hillary, the departure of a ‘competitor’” (今日：希拉里，一个‘对手’的离去), *Global Times*, February 2, 2013, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/special/Goodbye_Hillary/.

²⁷ “Hillary’s campaign: Sino-U.S. relations reaching a turning point?” (希拉里竞选总统：中美关系走向拐点), *China.com.cn: China Talk* (中国网：中国访谈), http://fangtan.china.com.cn/2015-04/17/content_35353154.htm#fullText.

²⁸ “Do you have a positive view of Hillary Clinton?” (您是否对希拉里·克林顿抱有好感?) *Global Times* poll, April 13, 2015, <http://survey.huanqiu.com/app/debate.php?vid=6479>. The poll, conducted by *Global Times*, had 4,976 participants, about 95 percent of whom voted unfavorably toward Clinton and 5 percent voted favorably. The poll question was “Do you have a positive view of Hillary Clinton?” (您是否对希拉里·克林顿抱有好感?)

²⁹ Dingding Chen, “3 Ways a Hillary Clinton Presidency Would Affect U.S.-China Relations,” *The Diplomat*, April 20, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/3-ways-a-hillary-clinton-presidency-would-affect-us-china-relations/>. Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of government and public administration at the University of Macau.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ See “Why China may cheer a Trump presidency and dread a Clinton one” (endnote 24, above). Hunt states: “Chinese feminists know Clinton from her groundbreaking 1995 speech as First Lady to the United Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing... Clinton has also supported a younger generation of Chinese feminists—describing the 2015 detention of five young feminists ‘inexcusable’ on Twitter and calling President Xi Jinping ‘shameless’ for hosting a meeting on women’s rights while cracking down on feminist activists.”

³² Yang Ning 杨宁 and Yuan Lu 袁璐, “China is a hot topic among U.S. Presidential candidates” (候选人频打‘中国牌’), *People’s Daily*, March 22, 2016, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2016-03/22/content_1662774.htm.

³³ “Candidates will embrace pragmatism over populism” (see endnote 22, above). Also Sun Chenghao, “Trump’s foreign policy mix still uncertain,” *Global Times*, May 19, 2016, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/983901.shtml>. The author, an assistant research fellow with the Institute of American Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, argues that even though Trump’s foreign policy has both realist and isolationist elements, by cautioning against efforts to create democratic states, it definitely strikes a strong contrast with George W. Bush’s “interventionist neoconservative” policy moves. He states, “Trump could commit a more restrained foreign policy that would not go ‘in search of enemies’ and proposed to improve relations with China and Russia.”

³⁴ “Unpredictable Trump could swing either way on China,” *Global Times* editorial, May 4, 2016, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/981347.shtml>.

³⁵ Chen Yang, “A Trump presidency could see US-Japan relations become looser,” *Global Times*, March 27, 2016, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/976299.shtml>. Chen is a PRC citizen and a PhD candidate at the Graduate School of Sociology at Toyo University.

³⁶ “Unpredictable Trump could swing either way on China.” Also see Xiao He 肖河, “Hillary Clinton’s Comeback: 2016” (希拉里·克林顿：2016 重振旗鼓), March, 21, 2016.

³⁷ “China is a hot topic among U.S. Presidential candidates” (see endnote 32, above).

³⁸ For example, see “Candidates will embrace pragmatism over populism” (see endnote 22, above).

³⁹ “Trump will continue his legend of ‘smelling bad and tasting good’” (特朗普继续‘闻着臭吃着香’传奇; see endnote 22, above). The author is a political commentator at *Global Times*.

⁴⁰ “A Trump presidency could see US-Japan relations become looser” (see endnote 35, above).

⁴¹ “Editorial: Trump is dead wrong on NK nuke issue,” *Global Times*, January 8, 2016, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/962495.shtml>. A Chinese observer has also noted the apparent “gleeful attitude” of the North Korean media toward Trump’s alleged threat to withdraw U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula if Seoul does not contribute more financially to the cost of U.S. force there. See “North Korea plays up Trump’s Candidacy,” *Global Times*, June 1, 2016, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/986466.shtml>.