The 19th Party Congress: Ringing in Xi Jinping’s New Age

Joseph Fewsmith

The 19th Party Congress and the First Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee, immediately following the congress, endorsed sweeping changes in China’s leadership, including the makeup of the Politburo and its standing committee. The theme of the congress was “never forget the [party’s] original mission,” a theme emphasized when the new Politburo Standing Committee traveled to Shanghai to the site of the First Party Congress, held in 1921, and repeated oaths of loyalty to the party. The congress made clear that the party is in charge of China and Xi Jinping is in charge of the party. Xi Jinping’s name and “thought” were written into the party’s constitution, and Xi Jinping made clear that his “new age” was to be demarcated from Deng Xiaoping’s “new period.” A new, more centralized leadership emerged from the congress, presiding over what it clearly intends to be a more disciplined party.

After months of speculation, the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist party finally convened in Beijing on October 18-24. The 2,280 delegates convening in the Great Hall of the People were greeted by a three-and-a-half hour political report by General Secretary Xi Jinping. Party members gathered together to watch the speech on television, as did school children, some as young as kindergarten. Not everyone was able to stay awake during the marathon address; the 91 year-old former party general secretary Jiang Zemin nodded off more than once, as did some of the delegates. When he was done, Xi returned to his seat on the dais, shaking hands with his predecessor Hu Jintao and only then greeting the man who had elevated him to his position, Jiang Zemin, an obvious breach of protocol that had people on social media chattering.

Chinese party congresses are held every five years, and the pattern in recent years has been for a party leader to yield his position, if not always his power, to his successor every ten years. The congresses that fall between leadership handovers tend to be less interesting, the highlight being the naming of successors. Thus, the 15th Party Congress in 1997 positioned Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao to take over from Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, while the 17th Party Congress in 2007 put Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang in line to replace Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. So the 19th Party Congress should have been about naming successors to Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, but the congress did not touch the question of leadership succession. It nevertheless more than lived up to the anticipation with which it was greeted.

In the months prior to the congress, speculation revolved around four questions. The first was whether or not Wang Qishan, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) and head of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), would retire. Wang, born in 1948, turned 69 this year. According to the “rule” (never formally adopted) that allows people aged 67 to be appointed to another term, but that those aged 68 or over have to retire (referred to in Chinese as 七上八下), Wang should retire. But he
has been a close ally of Xi’s and played a critical role in the campaign against corruption. Would Xi violate the retirement norm and keep Wang on the PBSC, or would he retire? Speculation was heightened by allegations from the fugitive Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui that Wang, contrary to his Mr. Clean image, was in fact corrupt.

Second, people wondered whether the premier, Li Keqiang, might be replaced. With the establishment of the Leadership Small Group on Comprehensive Deepening of Reform, chaired by Xi Jinping, it became apparent that Li’s role in managing the Chinese economy was much diminished from that of his predecessors. So it seemed possible that Xi might replace him with somebody more to his liking, perhaps even Wang Qishan.

Third, as suggested above, would Xi, like his predecessors, name a successor? During his first term, Xi had seemed more ambitious and politically more powerful than either Jiang Zemin in his first term or Hu Jintao throughout his time in office, thus making his retirement in five years seem less likely. But not to name a successor would seem to throw much of the apparent institutionalization of Chinese politics in the post-Mao era out the window. The regular changing of power seemed to be an important feature of the institutionalization of Chinese politics that many people said typified contemporary Chinese politics. Unlike most authoritarian systems, China appeared to many to have solved the problem of succession, passing power from one generation to another in an orderly fashion.

Finally, would Xi get his name in the party constitution, and, if so, in what form? It has been the norm that leaders or their identifying ideological ideas would be enshrined only after a leader retired. Speculation was heightened by a(x) allegations from the fugitive Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui that Wang, contrary to his Mr. Clean image, was in fact corrupt. But the rumor mill was suggesting that Xi would get his name into the revised party constitution early, perhaps including his “thought.”

**Politburo Standing Committee**

The Congress closed on October 24, approving a new Central Committee and amendments to the party constitution. On the 25th, the First Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee met to select the general secretary, Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee, Secretariat, Central Military Commission (CMC), and CDIC. As expected Xi Jinping was elected – unanimously - for his second term. Following the retirement norm, five members of the old Politburo Standing Committee, including Wang Qishan, did indeed retire. Recently, the *South China Morning Post* has reported that Wang has been attending PBSC meetings as a non-voting member and may be named vice president of the PRC in March, but we will have to see if this report is borne out over time.

The five were replaced by:

- Li Zhanshu, Xi’s old friend from when both were secretaries in adjoining counties in Hebei and former head of the General Office;
- Wang Yang, the former party secretary of Chongqing and Guangdong who joined the Politburo (but not its Standing Committee) in 2012 and who has spent the last five years as vice premier in charge of economic relations;
• Wang Huning, the former Fudan University professor who was brought to Beijing by Jiang Zemin and has served as head of the Policy Research Office and speech writer and policy advisor not only for Jiang but also for Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping;
• Zhao Leji, the former party secretary of Shaanxi province who was elected to the Politburo in 2012 and put in charge of the Organization Department; and
• Han Zheng, the party secretary of Shanghai who was elected to the Politburo in 2012.

Thus, Xi followed the basic norms that have been established in recent years; those who should have retired did retire, and those who replaced them were all elevated from the body of the Politburo, as in past years.

Table 1: The Politburo Standing Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Xi Jinping</th>
<th>General Secretary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Li Keqiang*</td>
<td>Premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Zhanshu*</td>
<td>NPC?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Yang*</td>
<td>CPPCC?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Huning*</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhao Leji*</td>
<td>Head, CDIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han Zheng</td>
<td>Executive Vice Premier?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Asterisks indicate leaders age-eligible to remain on PBSC in 2022, assuming the age limit of 67 is adhered to. The positions that will be officially announced at the spring meeting of the National People’s Congress are head of the National People’s Congress, head of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and Executive Vice Premier. Who will take these positions has not been determined; the positions listed above are based on widespread rumors.

But Xi did not follow the practice of elevating people from the Politburo according to age. On the contrary, three of the oldest members of the Politburo, all aged 67, were all skipped over in order to elevate those named above. Two of those skipped over, Liu Qibao and Zhang Chunxian, were allowed to retain seats on the Central Committee, a highly unusual practice. Previously, only former party chief Hua Guofeng was allowed to retain his Central Committee seat after stepping down from the Politburo, and that decision was no doubt based on Hua’s unique role as Chairman Mao’s successor. The other 67-year-old who was skipped over was Li Yuanchao, Hu Jintao’s close associate who worked as head of the Organization Department under Hu and seemed a possible selection for the PBSC in 2012. There have been repeated rumors that Li might face investigation, but he has escaped that fate, at least so far. Nevertheless, being forced to retire completely suggests that he has not found favor with Xi or others high in the political hierarchy. The last Politburo member to be dropped before reaching the retirement age was Li Tieying in 2002. Five of the seven PBSC members are age-eligible to remain on the Standing Committee in 2022, making the issue of whether Xi Jinping will retire or not perhaps the outstanding issue to be decided five years from now.
One way of looking at the new PBSC is as a body that draws from the three main political networks in Chinese politics. Li Zhanshu and Zhao Leji are close to Xi. Li Keqiang and Wang Yang are associated with Hu Jintao’s Communist Youth League group, and Han Zheng is a protégé of Jiang Zemin, though he has apparently worked well with Xi both in Shanghai and in the Politburo. Wang Huning was brought to Beijing by Jiang Zemin, but has worked closely with Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, suggesting he has served all three as an “honest broker,” providing policy advice in an honest fashion. Just as important, he has no political base of his own, never having served as a local administrator. In this way, he is nearly unique—the only other policy intellectual to join the Politburo Standing Committee was Chen Boda, Mao’s political secretary, who joined in 1969. Pulling together people who have been associated with different networks in China does not mean that the new PBSC is composed of three “factions.” On the contrary, it is clear that Xi will dominate, even more than he did in his first term, but that he is being inclusive in the Chinese tradition of drawing on the “five lakes and four seas” (五湖四海). “Inclusion” does not mean “check and balance;” it is more of a consolation prize acknowledging the importance, if not the power, of a group.

The Politburo

Perhaps even more interesting is the makeup of the broader Politburo, the regular members not on the Standing Committee. An unusually large number of seats needed to be filled. Five members of the outgoing Politburo were promoted to the Standing Committee, another six had to retire for reasons of age, three more were dropped (two to the Central Committee), and Sun Zhengcai, the young party secretary of Chongqing who was once thought to be a candidate for successor, was suddenly purged last July, for a total of fifteen open seats. At least ten of the people promoted to fill these seats worked with Xi in the past and can be counted as close associates.

There are now nine people on the Politburo who will be are eligible for promotion to the Standing Committee at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, seven of whom are closely associated with Xi. It thus seems clear, whether Xi decides to step down in five years or not, that he will continue to have an outsized influence on Chinese politics for years to come. The fact that this Party Congress produced no obvious successor makes it more likely, but not inevitable, that Xi will continue in his current capacity for a third term.

Table 2: The Regular Members of the Politburo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hu Chunhua*</td>
<td>To be determined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ding Xuexiang*</td>
<td>Director, General Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Min'er*</td>
<td>Secretary, Chongqing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Qiang*</td>
<td>Secretary, Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Hongzhong*</td>
<td>Secretary, Tianjin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang Kunming*</td>
<td>Head, Propaganda Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Xi*</td>
<td>Secretary, Guangdong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cai Qi*</td>
<td>Secretary, Beijing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chen Quanguo* | Secretary, Xinjiang
---|---
Guo Shengkun | Secretary, Politics and Law Commission
Chen Xi | Head, Organization Department
Yang Xiaodu | Minister of Supervision
Liu He | Chair, Leading Group on Finance and Economics
Xu Qiliang | Vice Chair, CMC
Zhang Youxia | Vice Chair, CMC
Wang Chen | Secretary-general, NPC; Secretary, Organs under State Council
Sun Chunlan | To be determined
Yang Jiechi | State Councillor

Note: Asterisks indicate age-eligible to remain on Politburo or be promoted to PBSC in 2022.

It should be noted that there are four special municipalities whose party secretaries routinely sit on the Politburo. Beijing is the most important of these cities, and in June 2017, Xi’s protégé Cai Qi replaced Guo Jinlong, a close associate of Hu Jintao. Chongqing had been governed by Sun Zhengcai until he was suddenly detained last July and subsequently charged with “attempting to seize state power.” He was replaced with Xi’s close protégé, Chen Min’er. In Tianjin, Li Hongzhong replaced Huang Xingguo in May 2017. Huang had been acting party secretary since December 2014, an unusually long time to serve in an acting capacity, no doubt indicating that his tenure was likely to be brief, as it proved to be when he was charged with corruption. Li Hongzhong seemed an unusual choice to replace Huang. Li had started out as a protégé in Jiang Zemin’s network, and never worked for Xi. But he was the very first provincial secretary to declare for Xi as “core” in early 2016 when a number of provincial party secretaries made their loyalties clear. Finally, in Shanghai, Han Zheng continued on as party secretary until after the party congress. With Han being promoted to the PBSC, Xi appointed his close associate Li Qiang to replace him. Thus, Xi has managed to fill at least three of these important positions with his protégés. In addition, Xi replaced Hu Chunhua, party secretary of Guangdong, with another close associate, Li Xi. It seems likely that Hu will be named a vice premier, giving him higher status but less power.

Some Politburo choices reflect interesting developments. Cai Qi never served on the Central Committee, even as an alternate, so his elevation is outside normal channels. The same is true of Yang Xiaodu. Yang spent many years in Tibet (1976-2001) before becoming deputy mayor in Shanghai, then head of the Shanghai Party Committee’s United Front Work Department and head of its Discipline Inspection Commission. In 2014 he moved to the center as CDIC deputy secretary, and now sits on the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Standing Committee of the CDIC. He also heads the Ministry of Supervision and the State Anti-Corruption Bureau. Yang Jiechi is the first foreign policy specialist to sit on the Politburo since Qian Qichen, who was a member of the Politburo from 1992 to 2002, suggesting the importance of Sino-U.S. relations to Xi.
Guo Shengkun’s appointment appears to be an anomaly. He appears to have a close relationship with Zeng Qinghong (according to the Internet, Guo’s wife’s grandmother was Zeng Qinghong’s mother’s younger sister11) and he came up through Jiang Zemin’s network, replacing Meng Jianzhu as Minister of Public Security and now as head of the Politics and Law Commission. This is an important position, but it appears to be outside Xi’s direct control. This arrangement appears to reflect either the limits of Xi’s power or an alliance with Zeng Qinghong.

The Secretariat

Under the Politburo, the Secretariat is the most important body for the implementation of Politburo or Standing Committee decisions. It is routinely made up of representatives of important party and state bodies, usually seven in number. The military used to have a representative on the Secretariat, but Xu Caihou, who served 2002-2007, was the last military person to serve on the Secretariat.

The First Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee named the Secretariat as follows:

Table 3: The Secretariat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wang Huning</td>
<td>In charge of ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ding Xuexiang</td>
<td>Head, General Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Xiaodu</td>
<td>Minister of Supervision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Xi</td>
<td>Head, Organization Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guo Shengkun</td>
<td>Secretary, Politics and Law Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang Kunming</td>
<td>Head, Propaganda Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You Quan</td>
<td>Executive secretary of the Secretariat and head of the United Front Work Department</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of these seven people, Ding Xuexiang, Chen Xi, and Huang Kunming have to be counted as particularly close to Xi Jinping, and Wang Huning has worked very closely with Xi over the past five years, as he did Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao before Xi. Yang Xiaodu worked very closely with Wang Qishan as deputy chair of the CDIC. You Quan previously served as deputy secretary general of the State Council (2008-20012) and was named head of the United Front Work Department on November 7, following the congress. Again, Guo Shengkun appears an anomaly.

The Central Military Commission

Of the eight members of the 18th CMC (that is, the members below the chair and two vice chairs), one was promoted to vice chair (Zhang Youxia), one (Wei Fenghe was retained as a member. Four more retired, and two others – Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang12 -- were apparently detained for investigation. As Table 4 shows, the new CMC provided for only four regular members, and these open slots were filled by Wei Fenghe, Zhang Shengmin, Miao Hua, and Li Zuocheng. Of these, only Wei Fenghe and Miao Hua
had been on the 18th Central Committee (normally a prerequisite for promotion to the CMC), while neither Zhang Shengmin nor Li Zuocheng had even been an alternate Member of the 18th Central Committee, an extraordinarily rapid promotion that reflects the extraordinary changes being made in China’s military hierarchy.

Table 4: The 2012 ad 2017 Central Military Commissions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2012 CMC</th>
<th>2017 CMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xi Jinping</td>
<td>Chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fan Changlong</td>
<td>Vice chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xu Qiliang</td>
<td>Vice chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Wanquan</td>
<td>Minister of national defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fang Fenghui</td>
<td>Chief of Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Yang</td>
<td>Political Commissar, Guangdong MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhao Keshi</td>
<td>Director, Logistics Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Youxia</td>
<td>Director, General Armaments Dept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Shengli</td>
<td>Commander, PLAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Xiaotian</td>
<td>Commander, PLAAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei Fenghe</td>
<td>Commander, 2nd Artillery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constitutional Changes

There were many questions going into the congress as to whether Xi Jinping would get his name in the party constitution and, if so, where. The preamble of the constitution lays out the ideological heritage of the CCP, saying that the party “takes Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, the important thinking of the “Three Represents, and the Scientific Development Outlook as its guide to action.” Now “Xi Jinping’s thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for the new age” has been added to this genealogy.\(^\text{13}\) This phrase may not be as pithy as “Mao Zedong Thought,” but it clearly puts Xi in the pantheon of great leaders – and Xi certainly has time to rewrite this phrase if he wants to. Jiang Zemin, the author of the “three represents” remains unnamed, as does Hu Jintao, the progenitor of the “scientific development outlook.” Moreover, Xi’s apotheosis comes while he is still very much in office. Deng did not get his name in the constitution until after his death, and Jiang did not get his “three represents” in the constitution until after he left office. Hu Jintao’s “scientific
“development outlook” was written into the constitution after his first term, but it was only elevated to the “guide for action” section as he left office. So writing Xi’s name and theory into the preamble of the constitution at this point in his career marks a degree of influence and dominance not shared by any other leader since Mao.

On October 27, the new Politburo held its first meeting. Members pledged loyalty to Xi as the “leader” (领袖) an honorific previously used only for Mao and Deng. The first of a series of authoritative People’s Daily Commentator articles following the Congress declared that the party should make “great efforts to focus on the fact that [Xi] is the party’s leader (领袖) who is worthy of being supported by the whole party and loved by the people.” If Deng Xiaoping worked to reduce the focus on individual leaders in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, Xi is moving in the opposite direction. Collective leadership appears a quaint relic of the past.

Explaining Xi’s Rise to Dominance

It is thus quite clear that, despite following the norms of retirement at 67 and promotion from the Politburo to its Standing Committee, Xi dominated the congress. When Xi was designated successor ten years ago and then took over as general secretary five years ago, it was widely believed that he was a relatively weak, conciliatory figure, surrounded by the cautious protégés of Jiang and Hu. Indeed, Xi seems to have been chosen as successor in part because he was a “princeling” and thus presumed to be more committed to the preservation of the party, as indeed he is, and because he had no obvious political base. There was every reason to believe that he would proceed carefully and grow into his job over time. After all, he had been chosen over the more nakedly ambitious Bo Xilai because he (Xi) seemed to be the lower-keyed official who could unite different groups within the party. It was widely reported at the time that Zeng Qinghong had told the congress, “Xi Jinping is someone we can all accept” (习近平是我们大家都可以接受的), an opinion with which other party leaders evidently concurred. Just as Jiang Zemin had hemmed in Hu Jintao, it looked like Jiang, and maybe Hu, could control Xi. From this perspective, Xi’s rise to the top of the CCP and domination of the political system is surprising and certainly out of synch with all the narratives of institutionalization, the apparent progressive diminution of each political leader, and understandings of balance among different wings of the party and dominant families. How can this be explained?

The 19th Party Congress is best viewed as the culmination of a five-year process in which Xi moved quickly to shake up the political system, assert political power, and articulate new themes. But Xi’s rise must be dated from even before his elevation at the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Before that congress, the political wheels were spinning quickly, if mostly out of sight. On March 15, 2012, Bo Xilai, the controversial son of party elder Bo Yibo and party secretary of Chongqing, was removed from office. The Bo case is extremely complicated, involving the murder of Neil Haywood, apparently by Bo’s wife Gu Kailai, an explosive dispute with his police chief Wang Lijun leading to Wang’s sudden effort to take refuge in the US Consulate in Chengdu, and an apparent plot to “seize state power.”
Initially the Bo Xilai case was reported in the official press as a case of corruption and with the assertion that “no person is above the law.” But it soon became evident that much more was involved.

The second shoe dropped on September 1, 2012, when Ling Jihua, the head of the General Office and Hu Jintao’s closest aide, was suddenly moved to head the far less powerful United Front Work Department. As soon became evident, Ling was being punished for covering up the death of his son, Ling Gu, who had crashed his Ferrari into a pillar on Beijing’s fourth ring road, killing not only himself but one of the two women with whom he was driving (the other was seriously injured). Apparently, the cover-up was coordinated by Zhou Yongkang, the Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of the Political and Legal Commission.

Another element was not made public until sometime later, namely the reported collusion between Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, and Xu Caihou, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Guo Boxiong, the other vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, was apparently also involved. Thus, when the party published a series of quotes from Xi Jinping at the beginning of 2016, the following accusation from Xi appeared:17

> In recent years, we have investigated high-level cadres’ serious violation of discipline and law, especially the case(s) of Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Xu Caihou, Ling Jihua and Su Rong. Their violation of the party’s political discipline and political rules was very serious; it had to be viewed seriously. These people, the greater their power and the more important their position, the more they ignored the party’s political discipline and political rules, even to the extent of being completely unscrupulous and reckless (肆无忌惮, 胆大包天)! Some had inflated political ambitions, and violated the party’s organization to engage in political conspiracies (政治阴谋), to immorally (勾当) violate and split the party!

These charges were repeated, with some variation at the Sixth Plenum in September 2016, where Xi laid out a number of sins party cadres had committed in recent years. He noted: “Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, Ling Jihua and others seriously violated party discipline and law. Not only were their serious economic problems exposed, but their serious political problems were also exposed.”18

The second crisis the party faced was dysfunction. This was clearly visible when numerous articles in the PRC press and PRC-controlled Hong Kong press explored the “political ecology” of Shanxi politics, Ling Jihua’s native province, exposing the chains of relationships and corruption that linked people in powerful local networks, such as the coal rich areas of Yuncheng and Lüliang, all the way up to the provincial party standing committee in Taiyuan. These local factions were strong enough to resist Beijing’s efforts to break them up. For instance, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission in Beijing sent Jin Daoming was sent to run the provincial Discipline Inspection Commission (DIC) in Shanxi. Whether he tried to control corruption or willingly fell into the local networks is not known, but he was caught in the campaign against corruption in 2014. Similarly,
Tang Tao was transferred to Shanxi to run the Organization Department and Wang Jianming was sent from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (indeed, the anti-corruption department) to manage the province’s Political-Legal Commission. The appointment of all these outsiders to run critical departments in Shanxi suggests a major effort to bring the province to heel long before Xi’s campaign against corruption began.

But their efforts had little effect. One reason was that retired officials retained a great deal of influence. When they were in office, they worked hard to cultivate successors, and when they retired they retained influence with their successors. When outsiders are appointed to high office, as Jin, Tang, and Wang were, they do not know their way around the networks and often have to rely on the advice of retirees. And rather than help them clean up the very networks through which the retirees retain their influence, they obstruct the efforts of outsiders to exert influence. Although Shanxi seems to be an egregious example of local networks of power, perhaps because of its natural resource-based economy, it is surely not the only such province in China.¹⁹

The third crisis the party faced was that of legitimacy. The crisis of legitimacy was not new. As Pan Yue, the son-in-law of veteran military leader Liu Huaqing, a journalist, and later vice minister of environmental protection, put it in a provocative essay posted on the Internet, it no longer sufficed to claim legitimacy on the basis of the revolution. It was apparent, Pan said, that the party was simply not as supported by the people as it had been; this was, he said, a sort of “passive negation” of the party’s legitimacy.²⁰

Jiang Zemin struggled with these questions. In 1997 he put forth the importance of “rule of law” (法治) at the 17th Party Congress,²¹ and four years later, on the party’s 80th anniversary he articulated the theory of the “three represents.” The party, he explained, was transitioning from a revolutionary party to a ruling party and needed to have rule of law and to represent the newly emergent productive forces (otherwise known as entrepreneurs), the long-term interests of the vast majority of the people, and advanced culture.

When Xi Jinping took office, he confronted the legitimacy issue head on. Xi Jinping made this very clear as soon as he came to power. His first public appearance after being named secretary general was at the exhibition of “The Road to Renaissance” (复兴之路) at the National History Museum in November 2012. This exhibit tells the story of China being exploited and abused by the Western powers – which it was – until the Chinese Communist Party led the nation to “stand up.” What is extraordinary about this exhibit, in my opinion, is the emphasis placed on the “victim narrative.” It is as if China had not emerged as a great power. The exhibit warns that if the party does not retain its sense of mission and if vigilance is not maintained, China could once again become an “appendage” of Western economic imperialism. This seems difficult to believe.

Shortly thereafter, in Xi’s first trip outside Beijing, he went to Guangdong where he gave a speech, soon leaked to the press, asking how a great party like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had disappeared from history. It was all because it had lost its “ideals and convictions,” he said.²² This obsession with the fate of the Soviet Union and the CPSU has been a constant theme of Xi and those around him.
Finally, there was a sense among the political elite and politically sensitive intellectuals that the decade of the Hu-Wen leadership had been a lost decade. As Deng Yuwen, previously deputy editor of the Central Party School’s *Study Times* put it, “It cannot be denied that this decade has seen the festering or creation of immense problems.” Deng continued, “the decade of Hu and Wen has seen no progress, or perhaps even a loss of ground” with regard to several issues, including the economic structure, environment, “ideological bankruptcy,” and political reform.23

This judgment is perhaps unfair. Hu and Wen had done quite a bit to build China’s welfare state. They had also cooled off the tensions in the Taiwan Strait after Jiang Zemin had recklessly set some sort of a deadline for the Taiwan’s reunification. They might well have done more, but political power was very much divided in that period, with Jiang Zemin continuing to hold the ultimate say, despite his retirement in 2002.

One can say these four issues – the succession crisis, party dysfunction, the legitimacy issue, and the sense that the country had been drifting – all came together in September 2012 when the death of Ling Gu was revealed to the leadership and his father, Ling Jihua, was suddenly moved from his critical position as head of the General Office to the much less sensitive position as head of the United Front Work Department. Four days later, Xi cancelled a meeting with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and disappeared for two weeks. It was rumored that he had hurt his shoulder swimming. Whatever athletic injuries he might have encountered, he was certainly very busy with other matters. Given the chronology of events, it seems logical to assume that he used these two weeks to gain party approval to move strongly against Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua, Xu Caihou and corruption in general. Whether those consulted had any idea what their approval would lead to is hard to imagine. Xi’s campaign against corruption began almost immediately after the 18th Party Congress.

The Central Committee

Xi obviously dominated the leadership of the CCP – the Politburo and its Standing Committee, the Central Military Commission, and the Secretariat. It is more difficult to trace relationships between the leadership and members of the Central Committee, but we can note the scope of change. First of all, before the congress even opened, Xi’s campaign against corruption had taken its toll. Altogether 17 full members of the Central Committee were investigated and removed from the Central Committee before the 19th Party Congress opened. Never in the reform era had there been such a purging of the Central Committee, even following Tiananmen. Previously the high water mark was set by the 17th Party Congress when four people were removed from the Central Committee: Bo Xilai, Liu Zhijun, Yu Youjun, and Kang Rixin. Before that, the norm was one or two people being removed. So the impact of the campaign against corruption was extensive (there were also 17 alternate members of the Central Committee removed for corruption).

There were 205 people elected as full members of the 18th Central Committee and 161 elected as alternates. Of the 205 full members, only 78 retained seats on the 19th Central Committee (38 percent). And only 32 people were promoted from the list of alternate
members (20 percent). That meant that 94 were freshly appointed to the new Central Committee, giving Xi Jinping extraordinary latitude in reshaping the Central Committee.

Once again, women were grossly under represented; only 10 women were named as full members (5 percent) and 23 as alternate members (14 percent) of the Central Committee. Minorities fared nearly as poorly, with 11 minorities been named as full members (5 percent) and 29 as alternate members (18 percent).

In addition to the party’s top leadership, the Central Committee can be thought of as falling into four main parts: those who run the central party apparatus, those serving in the State Council (the government side of the party-state system), the provincial party and state leadership, and the military. In addition, there are usually a few people from educational or other circles. Leading up to the congress, the provincial leadership had been almost wholly changed. Of the 62 provincial party secretaries and governors, only seven had not been changed before the congress opened, and some of them for obvious reasons. For instance, You Quan, party secretary of Fujian, was about to get a nice promotion to the Secretariat. Hu Chunhua would be removed from his position as party secretary of Guangdong after the Congress for a position still not publicly announced, and the same goes for Han Zheng, party secretary of Shanghai.

There was some juggling between the different categories of the Central Committee. For instance, the 18th Central Committee had 31 people working in central party positions. Most of these people were in the CPPCC (13) or United Front Work Department (7), while others were in the Central Party School, the Organization Department (Chen Xi was deputy head, a position that does not normally warrant a seat on the Central Committee), and the Central Party Literature Research Office. The 19th Central Committee has fewer people in the CPPCC (3) and fewer in the United Front Work Department (6), so the total number with purely party jobs was reduced to 16. The extra positions were shifted to the State Council system, which forms the heart of the administrative order.

The most interesting changes came among those representing the PLA in the Central Committee, where sweeping changes were made. The changes to the Central Military Commission were discussed above, but it was obvious that the sweeping changes made in PLA representation on the Central Committee reflected an effort to root out the influence of former vice chairmen, Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, both cashiered for corruption, and to carry out a major reform in the organization of the PLA. Since Xi’s military reforms were announced in 2015, over 100 senior military officers have been charged with corruption.

Including the members of the CMC, there were 40 PLA members on the 18th Central Committee (20 percent of the 205 full members). Of the 29 full members of the Central Committee not on the CMC, all but three were either retired or investigated (Yang Jinshan and Tian Xiusi were taken in for investigation). Of the 27 who retired, 11 retired early, that is, before they had reached the retirement age of 65. So of the 40 military
members of the Central Committee, including those on the CMC, only six were retained, a turnover of 85 percent.

The 19th Party Congress elected 37 PLA people as full members of the Central Committee (18 percent). Of the 31 military people elected to the 19th Central Committee who were not part of the CMC, only three were retained from the 18th Central Committee, and only four were promoted from the alternates list. So 24 members were named directly to full membership. Thus, of the 37 military members on the 19th Central Committee as full members, 27 (73 percent) are serving on the Central Committee in any capacity for the first time.

The sweeping nature of changes was obvious in the list of alternate members as well. There were 23 people from the PLA who served as alternate members of the 18th Central Committee, 19 of whom were age eligible to be promoted to the Central Committee (that is, born in 1953 or later). But two of those people were under investigation, so there were 13 people who were passed over and dropped from the alternate list. In other words, of the 23 PLA people who were alternate members of the 18th Central Committee, only 4 (Gao Jin, Yi Xiaoguang, Yang Xuejun, and Wang Ning) were retained on the 19th Central Committee, each as a full member. All the others (83 percent) were dropped.

The End of the Dengist Era

As suggested above, Xi has been highly sensitive to the issue of legitimacy. As his November 2012 visit to the history museum and its exhibit on “The Road to Renaissance” showed, Xi is deeply invested in a historical narrative in which China was bullied and humiliated by the West until the Chinese Communist Party, slowly and painfully, found the proper revolutionary road, came to power, and has eventually led the country to wealth and power. Xi’s report to the 19th Party Congress reiterates this world view (section two), suggesting that if this revolutionary mission, and the dedicated and disciplined party that brought it about is forgotten, then China could once again be plunged into the humiliation from which it had so recently emerged. The major theme of the congress was “never forget our original mission” (不忘初心), and to emphasize this, right after the congress, Xi led the PBSC to visit the site of the party’s First Congress in Shanghai and to South Lake where the meeting, interrupted by secret police, continued in Jiaxing county, Zhejiang.

This historical narrative – and the time that has passed since the founding of the People’s Republic as well as the tremendous gains that have been made since Mao Zedong’s death – raise awkward questions about the role of Mao and how to define his role. The party dealt with this issue in 1981 when the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee passed “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China.”

It concluded, “Comrade Mao Zedong was a great Marxist and a great proletarian revolutionary, strategist and theorist. It is true that he made gross mistakes during the ‘Cultural Revolution,’ but if we judge his activities as a whole, his contributions to the
Chinese revolution far outweigh his mistakes. His merits are primary and his errors are secondary.” According to the Resolution, Mao Zedong Thought expresses the “collective wisdom of the whole party,” not just Mao as an individual, and Mao had made serious mistakes, particularly in launching the Cultural Revolution, but these mistakes were those of a “great proletarian revolutionary.”

The 1981 history resolution was supposed to put the question of Mao to rest. Mao should not be repudiated in toto, as more liberal members of the party wanted, but his “leftist” errors had to be criticized harshly, both to legitimize the return to power of those purged during the Cultural Revolution and to justify the party’s turn from class struggle to economic construction (a shift endorsed by the party’s watershed Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978). Tensions between the “conservative” wing of the party and the “liberal” wing persisted through the 1980s, but the history resolution, despite its ambiguities, held firm.

But these tensions have never gone away, and indeed have grown more serious as a new generation has grown up in a more prosperous China, enjoying a scope of personal freedom their parents, and certainly their grandparents, could never have imagined.

In January 2013, Xi gave a talk to new members of the Central Committee (those inducted at the 18th Party Congress) in which he stated that the spirit of that congress could be summed up in one point: the need to uphold and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics. But in reaffirming the Dengist path, Xi gave it a new twist. He pointed out,

In carrying out the construction of socialism by our party, leaders, and people, there have been the two periods, [namely that] before reform and opening and [that] after reform and opening up. These two periods are mutually related but also have major differences, but in essence they are our party’s, leaders’, and people’s practical explorations in carrying out the construction of socialism. Socialism with Chinese characteristics was opened up by the new period of reform and opening, but it was opened up on the foundation of the socialist fundamental system that had already been established and the more than 20 years in which construction had been carried out. Although the ideological direction, orientation, and policies of these two historical periods carrying out socialist construction had major differences, they cannot be cut apart. Even more, they are not in opposition. One cannot use the historical period following reform and opening to negate the historical period prior to reform and opening, and one cannot use the historical period prior to reform and opening to negate the historical period following reform and opening.

Then, in November, on the day before the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee opened, the party seemed to lay down an authoritative interpretation of the history issue when the People’s Daily published a full-page article by the CCP Central Party History Research Office entitled, “Correctly view the two historical periods, before
and after reform and opening.” The article argued forcefully, “We must fully affirm the results of exploration and the tremendous achievements in the historical period before reform and opening.” It was very careful not to violate the parameters of the 1981 history resolution, saying that the Cultural Revolution “brought untold disasters to the party, state, and the people of all nationalities,” but it nevertheless warned against “deliberately negating Comrade Mao Zedong’s mistakes in his later years, much less completely negating Comrade Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought.” On the contrary, the “two historical periods” (i.e., before and after reform) “are never separated from each other, let alone fundamentally opposed to each other.”

The importance of correct understanding, the article said, was not just a matter of understanding history but was a “political issue in reality”—“failure to properly handle the important political issue will create serious political consequences.” Specifically, the article invoked the specter of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which seems to be a particular obsession of the current leadership. “One important reason for the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the complete negation of the history of the Soviet Union and the CPSU, the negation of Lenin and other leading figures, and the practice of historical nihilism, which confused people’s minds.”

The discussions on the two “thirty year” periods not only reveal Xi’s understanding of modern Chinese history, defining his approach to legitimacy, but also set the stage for his own “thirty year” period. Indeed, at the time of these discussions, many people thought that Xi was preparing for a new period dominated by him. With the 19th Congress endorsing the “new age” (新时代)—Deng’s period has often been referred to differently as the “new period” (新时期)—it is clear that Xi is indeed drawing a line between his era and Deng’s (the period of Jiang and Hu is simply ignored).

A major feature distinguishing between the two eras is the approach toward party building and the concentration of power. Deng, an old revolutionary and army man, certainly wanted to restore discipline in the party after the Cultural Revolution. A three-year rectification campaign, the 12th Party Congress and a Party Representative Meeting in 1985 remade the leadership at all levels, ousting Cultural Revolution era cadres and putting in place younger, better educated and more reform-minded cadres.

Perhaps the most distinctive part of Deng’s prescription for reform on the political side was his notion that the party should not be overly centralized and should constrain itself to party matters—deciding policies—while the government implemented them. There should be a division of labor; party and state should be separated (党政分开). Perhaps Deng’s most radical proposal in this regard was his demand to remove party cadres from state-owned enterprises. This proposal was excised from his 1980 speech, “On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,” when it was first published in 1983 and only restored in 1987 when the speech was republished in People’s Daily in the lead-up to the 13th Party Congress.
Deng wanted the party separated from the state so party cadres could “concentrate their energies on our Party work, on matters concerning the Party’s line, guiding principles and policies. This will help strengthen and improve the unified leadership of the Central Committee, facilitate the establishment of an effective work system at the various levels of government from top to bottom, and promote a better exercise of government functions and powers.” So separating party and state would strengthen both and make governance more effective.

Deng also complained about the over-centralization of power. He argued that “centralized party leadership” often turned into “leadership by individuals.” “[S]trengthening centralized leadership” inevitably led to power being concentrated in the “hands of a few secretaries, especially the first secretaries, who direct and decide everything.” Over-concentration of power, in Deng’s view, inevitably impaired “democratic life” in the party and disrupted the proper functioning of “democratic centralism.”

The idea of separating party and state reached its highest point in Zhao Ziyang’s report to the 13th Party Congress, in which he proposed removing “party fractions” (党组) from government offices. Zhao’s proposals were quietly shelved after Tiananmen, but the notion of separating party and state was never repudiated and indeed often cropped up in discussions of “inner-party democracy” (党内民主).

Xi’s effort to strengthen discipline, recentralize power, and minimize the distinction between party and state was reflected in his report to the 19th Party Congress. In his report, Xi called for “firmly uphold[ing] the party’s leadership in all work. Party, government, military, people, and intellectuals, whether north, south, east or west, the party leads in everything.” The party, of course, has always led in everything, but this is the first time that this injunction has been written into the party constitution. Coming off a period in which the difference between party and state has been emphasized, at least in theory, re-emphasizing the leadership of the party in this way is jarring. In his report, Xi went on to emphasize that cadres need to “strengthen their political consciousness, their consciousness of the overall situation, the consciousness of the core (核心意识) and their consciousness of lining up (看齐意识).” “We must work harder,” Xi said, “to uphold the authority and centralized, unified leadership of the Central Committee…. .”

The report went on to say that organs with similar functions in the party and government at the local level would be merged. No details were given, though the report did say, in seeming contradiction, that the autonomy of local government would be enhanced. This seems contrary to the political logic that has prevailed in the past. Normally when discipline is strengthened at higher levels, it is similarly tightened at lower levels; a centralization at the top of the system tends to be reflected in the strengthening of party leadership at lower levels.

Xi has made it clear since he became general secretary that he does not approve of voting, and he put that belief into action at this party congress. In the summer of 2007, the Central Committee met in Beijing for an informal meeting at which they cast straw ballots recommending people for the 25-person politburo. This vote was non-binding.
Perhaps it had no impact on the line-up that was announced that fall at the 17th Party Congress, but it was the first time that “inner-party democracy” had been tried out at such a level. The experiment was repeated five years later, even being expanded to recommend people for the 7-person Standing Committee. Again, we do not know if this straw poll had any impact on the leadership that emerged from the 18th Party Congress, but it suggested the legitimacy of leading cadres of the CCP expressing their opinion on the party’s leadership.31

This year, however, this experiment with straw polls was dropped. As Xinhua explained:

The 17th and 18th Party Congresses explored using meeting recommendations, but because they gave too much weight to votes, there were some problems. Some comrades in the course of these meeting recommendations simply marked their ballots, leading to voting arbitrarily, missing the sense of the public [good], and even the casting of ballots based on relationships (关系) and personal feelings (人情). The center has already investigated and found that Zhou Yongkang, Sun Zhengcai, Ling Jihua and others used these meeting recommendations to attract votes and buy votes and [engage in] extra-organizational activities.

Instead, Xi Jinping personally interviewed 57 current and retired leaders. In addition, other top leaders solicited the views of 258 high-ranking cadres and generals. In addition, top generals at the CMC talked with 32 senior military leaders about military representation on the Politburo.32

Implications

The 19th Party Congress signaled a new era in Chinese politics. It marked the culmination of a five-year process in which Xi Jinping has reshaped both the personnel of the CCP leadership and the norms by which it operates. Looking at the people who make up the PBSC, the broader Politburo, the Secretariat, the CMC, and the Central Committee, it is evident that Xi has brought about more extensive change than any other party congress in the reform era. Xi has come to dominate Chinese politics in a way that no other leader, with the possible exception of Deng Xiaoping, has been able to do in the reform era.

Deng Xiaoping may have defined his era of reform and opening, but he had Chen Yun and others to contend with. Jiang Zemin gradually gained strength over his years in power, but he was never strong enough to pass power on to his preferred candidate, Zeng Qinghong. On the contrary, in accordance with Deng’s instruction, Jiang relinquished party leadership, if not real power, to Hu Jintao. Hu Jintao seemed to want to pass power to his protégé, Li Keqiang, but was stymied by Jiang and others at the 18th Party Congress who wanted to pass power to a “princeling.” This oscillation of power reflected the different wings and interests within the party and provided, however unintentionally, greater scope for discussion and even a degree of intraparty democracy.

That era has passed. Politics can take strange and sudden turns, but for the foreseeable future, it appears that Xi Jinping will dominate Chinese politics, either directly or
indirectly. And when he decides to retire, he will likely pass power to a person of his own choosing. But centralization does not provide a favorable foundation for the passing on of power, especially if that power is held for a long time. It is difficult to raise up a successor; any potential successor who accumulates sufficient power to really take over is likely to be seen as a challenger to the leader. This is the “successor’s dilemma,” and it is not easy to escape. Xi Jinping will, no doubt, leave his mark on Chinese politics, but he may also leave a power vacuum when he goes.

Qualifications need to be made to broad statements like “Xi has come to dominate Chinese politics.” The party congress demonstrates that Xi has been able to reshape the personnel through which China is governed. But it is evident that Xi faced tremendous resistance in doing so. Obviously Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua, Xu Caihou, Guo Boxiong and over 100 senior PLA leaders resisted, or were perceived to have resisted, Xi’s assertion of power. Is such resistance over? Will other people or interests rise up to resist? Xi has asserted the primacy of the party, inserting “the party controls everything” into the party constitution for the first time. Why was it necessary to insert such an all-encompassing assertion? What trend is Xi trying to resist? The pluralization of society? The emergence of interests and expertise outside party purview? And why did the congress emphasize Xi Jinping’s personal leadership? Why was that necessary? Were there forces in the party and society that needed to be reminded of Xi’s leadership? And will the assertion of party and personal leadership stem the centrifugal forces these assertions seem directed at?

Xi adhered to some norms – the retirement age and the promotion of people from the Politburo to the PBSC – but he has violated many other norms. Certainly China faced a major crisis of corruption, but Xi used the CDIC not only to attack corruption but also to eliminate political opponents. He promoted people rapidly to high positions, including the Politburo and CMC, without going through the normal step-by-step promotion process. Politburo members were forced to retire early as were members of the Central Committee. Efforts to promote intraparty democracy were reversed.

Perhaps these were one-off measures that will bring about a more disciplined and cleaner politics. Maybe new and more enduring norms can be established. But it seems just as likely that these forceful uses of political power will continue, and not only in the Xi Jinping era.

Finally, what will the centralization of power means in terms of policy? Will the emphasis on party mean a diminution of the state and the basic concomitants of state bureaucracies – expertise and law? Will calls to merge some state-owned enterprises with private enterprises lead China away from market-oriented economics, or can strengthened political power drive through needed reforms? Will the centralization of power kill political and social innovation at the local level? Or can it protect the autonomy of local government as Xi’s report says? Will it retard interactions with the outside world as China pursues indigenous innovation and an agenda of cultural self-confidence? These are just a few of the questions Xi’s New Age has raised.
NOTES

1 I would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Xiao Sun.


3 On the various ways in which a leader might get his name or ideas in the party constitution, see Alice Miller, “Xi Jinping and the Party’s ‘Guiding Ideology,’” China Leadership Monitor, No. 54 (Fall 2017), available at https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm54am.pdf.

4 “Wang Qishan Still Attending top Communist Party Meetings and in line for China’s vice presidency,” South China Morning Post, December 1, 2017.

5 According to Chinese sources, Zhao’s father, Zhao Shoushan was close to Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun back in the revolutionary days. Zhao Shoushan was a general in the revolution and later served as governor of Shaanxi.

6 Li Keqiang became a member of the Secretariat of the Communist Youth League (CYL) in 1982, where he worked closely with Hu Jintao, then party secretary of the CYL. Wang Yang’s career is different. He worked only in the Anhui provincial CYL, rising to the top of that organization in 1984. He no doubt would have had contact with Hu Jintao, who became Secretary of the CYL in 1984, but the relationship would not have been as close as that between Li and Hu. Moreover, Wang’s talents were noticed by others, most notably Zhu Rongji. Zhu said of Wang, “His age is not great, but his courage is not small.” Reportedly, when Deng Xiaoping was returning from his “Southern journey” in 1992, he stopped in Hefei and requested to meet Wang Yang. See “‘少帥’汪洋使徒轨迹” (The path of ‘Young Marshal’ Wang Wang’s official career), retrieved from http://news.sohu.com/20091231/n26930985.shtml.

7 Chen Min’er, born in 1960, joined the propaganda department of Shaoxing in 1984, rising to become head of that department only three years later. After a year at the Central Party School in 1995-1995, Chen was appointed party secretary of Shaoxing. A year later, he moved to Ningbo as deputy mayor. In 1999, he became head of the Zhejiang Daily Newspaper Group, and in 2001 was named head of the Zhejiang provincial
propaganda department. Xi Jinping was transferred to Zhejiang in late 2002. He was apparently impressed by Chen’s work, for Chen stayed on as head of the propaganda department until 2007, when he was promoted to deputy governor. In 2012, Chen was transferred to Guizhou as acting governor, then governor. He became party secretary of Guizhou in 2016 before being transferred to Chongqing in 2017. See https://baike.baidu.com/item/陈敏尔.

8 Li Hongzhong was born in Liaoning and quickly rose as a secretary in the Shenyang municipal government. In 1988 he was transferred to Huizhou in Guangdong, rising to deputy party secretary and mayor in 1995. In 2000 he was appointed party secretary of Huizhou, and the following year became deputy governor of Guangdong. This was when Li Changchun was secretary of Guangdong. Li was replaced by Zhang Dejiang, another close follower of Jiang Zemin, in October 2002. Li continued to serve under Zhang until 2003, when he moved to Shenzhen as acting mayor, then mayor. He became party secretary of Shenzhen in 2005, then moved to Hubei as acting governor in 2007. After being confirmed as governor, Li moved up to party secretary in 2011. He was appointed party secretary of Tianjin in 2016. See https://baike.baidu.com/item/lihongzhang 李鸿忠.

9 Li Qiang was born in Rui’an, Zhejiang in 1959. He served in various party positions, becoming deputy director of the Zhejiang provincial government office in 1998. In 2002, he became party secretary of Wenzhou. In 2004, he became secretary general of the provincial party committee under Xi Jinping. As Xi left for Shanghai and then the Politburo, Li rose to be secretary of the Politics and Law Commission, and then, in 2013 to become governor of the province. In 2016, he was appointed secretary of Jiangsu. See https://baike.baidu.com/item/李强/10810185.

10 Li Xi was born in 1956 in Gansu. In 1982, he joined the Gansu propaganda department as a secretary. In 1986, he became organization department chief of Gansu. By 1996 he was head of the provincial organization department. In 2004, he was transferred to Shaanxi province as secretary-general and member of the provincial party standing committee. From 2006-2011, he was party secretary of Yan’an city, moving to head Shanghai’s organization department in 2011, where he served directly under Xi Jinping. In 2014, he became governor of Liaoning, and in 2015 was named party secretary of Liaoning. See https://baike.baidu.com/item/李希/7584.

11 See, for instance, http://news.creaders.net/china/2013/03/19/1243816.html.

The English text of the new constitution may be found at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725945.htm. The Chinese text may be found at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/28/c_1121870794.htm.

14“中共中央政治局召开会议” (The CCP central politburo convenes meeting), 人民日报 (People’s Daily), October 27, 2017.

15 “让中国特色社会主义展现更强大的生命力” (Let socialism with Chinese characteristics display even greater vitality), 人民日报 (people’s daily), October 29, 2017, p. 7.

16 See, for instance, Li Cheng (李成), “习近平让自己成为被广泛接受的领导人” (Xi Jinping lets self become a leader who is widely accepted), available at https://www.brookings.edu/zh-cn/on-the-record/习近平让自己成为被广泛接受的领导人/.

17 习近平关于严明党的记录和规矩论述摘编 (Selected comments by Xi Jinping on Strictly and impartially [upholding] party discipline and rules) (Beijing: 中央文献出版社 and 中国方正出版社, 2015), pp. 28-29.


20 Pan Yue (潘岳), “对革命党向执政党转变的思考” (Thoughts on a revolutionary party’s turn toward a ruling party), available at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_71f450050100qbqx.html

21 Liberal commentators were heartened at the time because Jiang used the expression 法治 rather than 法制. The former expression is usually translated “rule of law,” though there is no indication that the CCP ever intended to implement anything resembling Western concepts of rule of law. The latter expression often translated “rule by law.”


25 The resolution can be found at https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm

26 “毫不动摇坚持和发展中国特色社会主义在实践中不断有所发现有所创造有所前进” (Unhesitatingly uphold and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics; have some new discoveries, some new innovations, and some advances in the course of practice), 人民日报 (People’s Daily), January 6, 2013.

27 Central Party History Research Office (中共中央党史研究室), “Correctly view the two historical periods prior to and after reform and opening up” (正确看待改革开放前后两个历史时期), People’s Daily (人民日报), November 8, 2013.

28 These paragraphs are borrowed from my “Mao’s Shadow,” *China Leadership Monitor*, 43 (Spring 2013).


30 Ibid., p. 311.


32 “领航新时代的坚强领导集体——党的新一届中央领导机构产生及时” (The strong leadership collective that will guide the new age – an account of how the new central leadership organs were produced), Xinhua news agency, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/26/c_1121860147.htm. See also Wang Xiangwei, “How Xi Jinping Revived Old Methods by Abandoning Intraparty Democracy,” *South China Morning Post*, November 5, 2017.