PART I
In order to avoid the destructive beggar-thy-neighbor strategies that emerged during the Great Depression, the postwar Bretton Woods regime attempted to prevent countries from depreciating their currencies to gain an unfair and sustained competitive advantage. The system required fixed, but occasionally adjustable, exchange rates and restricted cross-border capital flows. Elaborate rules on when a country could move its exchange rate peg gave way, in the post-Bretton Woods world of largely flexible exchange rates, to a free-for-all where the only proscribed activity was sustained unidirectional intervention by a country in its exchange rate, especially if it was running a current account surplus. For more normal policies, a widely held view at that time was that each country, doing what was best for itself in a regime of mobile capital, would end up doing what was best for the global equilibrium. For instance, a country trying to unduly depreciate its exchange rate through aggressive monetary policy would see inflation rise to offset any temporary competitive gains. However, even if such automatic adjustment did ever work, and our paper does not take a position on this, the global environment has changed. Today, we have:

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The views represent those of the authors and not of the Reserve Bank of India, IMF, or any of the institutions to which the authors belong.
• Weak aggregate demand, in part because of poorly understood consequences of population aging and productivity slowdown
• A more integrated and open world with large capital flows
• Significant government and private debt burdens
• Sustained low inflation.

The pressure to avoid a consistent breach of the lower inflation bound and the need to restore growth to reduce domestic unemployment could cause a country’s authorities to place more of a burden on unconventional monetary policies (UMP) as well as on exchange rate or financial market interventions/repression. These may have large adverse spillover effects on other countries. The domestic mandates of most central banks do not legally allow them to take the full extent of spillovers into account and may force them to undertake aggressive policies so long as they have some small, positive domestic effect. Consequently, the world may embark on a suboptimal collective path. We need to reexamine rules of the game for responsible policy in such a context. This paper suggests some of the issues that need to be considered.

THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM

All monetary policies have external spillover effects. If a country reduces domestic interest rates, its exchange rate also typically depreciates, helping exports. Under normal circumstances, the “demand creating” effects of lower interest rates on domestic consumption and investment are not small relative to the “demand switching” effects of the lower exchange rate in enhancing external demand for the country’s goods. Indeed, one could argue that the spillovers to the rest of the world could be positive on net, as the enhanced domestic demand draws in substantial imports, offsetting the higher exports at the expense of other countries.
Matters have been less clear in the post-financial crisis world and with the unconventional monetary policies countries have adopted. For instance, if the interest rate-sensitive segments of the economy are constrained by existing debt, lower rates may have little effect on enhancing domestic demand but continue to have demand-switching effects through the exchange rate. Similarly, the unconventional “quantitative easing” policy of buying assets such as long-term bonds from domestic players may certainly lower long rates but may not have an effect on domestic investment if aggregate capacity utilization is low. Indeed, savers may respond to the increased distortion in asset prices by saving more. And if certain domestic institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies need long-term bonds to meet their future claims, they may respond by buying such bonds in less distorted markets abroad. Such a search for yield will depreciate the exchange rate. The primary effect of this policy on domestic demand may be through the demand-switching effects of a lower exchange rate rather than through a demand-creating channel. (See, for example, Taylor 2017 for evidence on the exchange rate consequences of unconventional monetary policy in recent years and the phenomenon of balance sheet contagion among central banks.)

Other countries can react to the consequences of unconventional monetary policies, and some economists argue that it is their unwillingness to react appropriately that is the fundamental problem (see, for example, Bernanke 2015). Yet concerns about monetary and financial stability may prevent those countries, especially less institutionally developed ones, from reacting to offset the disturbance emanating from the initiating country. It seems reasonable that a globally responsible assessment of policies should take the world as it is, rather than as a hypothetical ideal.

Ultimately, if all countries engage in demand-switching policies, we could have a race to the bottom. Countries may find it hard
to get out of such policies because the immediate effect for the country that exits might be a serious appreciation of the exchange rate and a fall in domestic activity. Moreover, the consequences of unconventional policies over the medium term need not be benign if aggressive monetary easing results in distortions to asset markets and debt buildup, with an eventual disastrous denouement.

Thus far, we have focused on exchange and interest rate effects of a country’s monetary policy on the rest of the world. A second, obviously related, channel of transmission of a country’s monetary policy to the rest of the world in the post-Bretton Woods system has been through capital flows. These have been prompted not just by interest differentials but also by changes in institutional attitudes toward risk and leverage, influenced by sending country monetary policies. Figure 1.1.1, for example, shows that post-global crisis capital flows to EMs have been large. This is despite great reluctance on the part of several EMs to avoid absorbing the inflows.

As a consequence, local leverage in emerging economies has increased (figure 1.1.2). The increase could reflect the direct effect
of cross-border banking flows, changes in global risk aversion stemming from source country monetary policy (Rey 2013; Baskaya et al. 2017; Morais, Peydro, and Ruiz 2015), the promise of abundant future liquidity on borrowing capacity (see Diamond, Hu, and Rajan 2017, for example), or the indirect effects of an appreciating exchange rate and rising asset prices, which may make it seem that emerging market (EM) borrowers have more equity than they really have (see Shin 2016, for example).

The unintended consequence of such flows is that they are significantly influenced by the monetary policies of the sending countries and may reverse quickly—as they did during the Taper Tantrum in 2013. This means that they are not a reliable source of financing, which then requires emerging market central banks to build ample stocks of liquidity (that is, foreign exchange reserves) for when the capital flows reverse. Moreover, the liquidity insurance provided by emerging market central banks to their borrowers is never perfect, so when capital flows reverse, they tend to leave financial and economic distress in their wake. Capital flows,
driven or pulled back by the monetary policy stance in industrial countries, create risk on the way in and distress on the way out. They constitute both a costly spillover and a significant constraint on emerging market monetary flexibility.

The bottom line is that simply because a policy is called monetary, unconventional or otherwise, it may not be beneficial on net for the world. That all monetary policies have external spillovers does not mean that they are all justified. What matters is the relative magnitude of demand-creating versus demand-switching effects and the magnitude of other net financial sector spillovers, that is, the net spillovers (see Borio 2014; Borio and Disyatat 2009, 292; Rajan 2013 and 2014, for example).

Of course, a central contributor today to policy makers putting lower weight on international spillovers is that almost all central banks have purely domestic mandates. If they are in danger of violating the lower bound of their inflation mandate, for example, they are required to adopt all possible policies to get inflation back on target, no matter what their external effect. Indeed, they can even intervene directly in the exchange rate in a sustained and unidirectional way, although internationally this could be seen as an abdication of international responsibility according to the old standards. The current state of affairs means that central banks find all sorts of ways to justify their policies in international fora without acknowledging the unmentionable—that the exchange rate may be the primary channel of transmission and external spillovers may be significantly adverse. Unfortunately, even if they do not want to abdicate international responsibility, their domestic mandates may give them no other options. In what follows, we will examine sensible rules of monetary behavior assuming the domestic mandate does not trump international responsibility.
PRINCIPLES FOR SETTING NEW RULES

Monetary policy actions by one country can lead to measurable and significant cross-border spillovers. Such spillovers can influence countries to undertake policies that shift some of the cost of the policy to foreign countries. This temptation to shift costs can create inefficiencies when countries set their policies unilaterally. If countries agree on a set of new rules or principles that describe the limits of acceptable behavior, it can reduce inefficiencies and lead to higher welfare in all the countries. This does not mean countries have to coordinate policies, only that they have to become better global citizens in foregoing policies that have large negative external effects. We had such a rule in the past—no sustained unidirectional intervention in the exchange rate—but with the plethora of new unconventional policies, we have to find new, clear, and mutually acceptable rules.

What would be the basis for the new rules? As a start, policies could be broadly rated based on analytical inputs and discussion. To use a driving analogy, policies that have few adverse spillovers and are even to be encouraged by the global community could be rated green; policies that should be used temporarily and with care could be rated orange; and policies that should be avoided at all times could be rated red. To establish such ratings, the effects of any policy have to be seen over time, rather than at a point in time. We will discuss the broad principles for such ratings in this section. We will then discuss whether the tools economists have today allow empirical analysis to provide a clear-cut rating of policies. (To preview the answer, it is “No!”) We will then argue that it may still be possible to make progress, once broad principles of the sort discussed in this section are agreed on.

A number of issues would need to be considered in developing a framework to rate policies.
• Should a policy that has any adverse spillovers outside the country of origin be totally avoided? Or should the benefits in the country of origin be added to measure the net global effects of the policy? In other words, should we consider the enhancement to global welfare or the net spillovers to others only in judging policy?

• Should the measurement of spillovers take into account any policy reactions by other countries? In other words, should the policy be judged based on its partial equilibrium or general equilibrium effects?

• Should domestic benefits weigh more and adverse spillovers weigh less for countries that have run out of policy options and have been stuck in slow growth for a long time? Should countries be allowed “jump starts” facilitated by others?

• Should spillovers be measured over the medium term or evaluated at a point in time?

• Should spillovers (both positive and negative) be weighted more heavily for poorer countries that have weaker institutions and less effective policy instruments?

• Should spillovers be weighted by the affected population or by the dollar value of the effect?

Some tentative answers follow.

In general, policies that have net adverse outside spillovers over time could be rated red and should be avoided. Such policies obviously include those that have small positive effects in the home country (where the policy action originates) combined with large negative effects in the foreign country (where the spillovers occur). For example, if unconventional monetary policy actions lead to a feeble recovery in some of the advanced countries leading to small positive effects on exports to emerging markets, but large capital flows to, and asset price bubbles in, the EMs, these policies could be rated red. Global welfare would decrease with this policy.
If a policy has positive effects on both home and foreign countries, and therefore on global welfare, it would definitely be rated green. Conventional monetary policy would fall in this category, as it would raise output in the home economy and create demand for exports from the foreign economy. A green rating for such policies would, however, assume that the stage of the financial and credit cycle in the home and foreign economies is such that financial stability risks from low interest rates are likely to be limited.¹

It is possible to visualize other policies that have large positive effects for the originating country (because of the value of the policy or because of the country’s relative size) and sustained small negative effects for the rest of the world. Global welfare, crudely speaking, may go up with the policy, even though welfare outside the originating country goes down. While it is hard to rate such policies without going into specifics, these may correctly belong in the orange category: permissible for some time but not on a sustained basis. Even conventional monetary policies to raise growth in the home economy could fall in the orange category if countries are at a financial stage where low interest rates lead to significant financial stability risks in the home and foreign economies.

Clearly, foreign countries may have policy room to respond, and that should be taken into account. Perhaps the right way to measure spillovers to the foreign country is to measure their welfare without the policy under question and their welfare after the policy is implemented and response initiated. So, for instance, a home country A at the zero lower bound may initiate quantitative easing (QE) and a foreign country B may respond by cutting interest rates to avoid capital inflows and exchange rate appreciation. The spill-

¹. One example of what could be rated green is the framework suggested by Taylor (2017) wherein countries would announce their rules-based monetary policies— with opt-outs in cases of emergency. Such a framework would have the added benefit of allowing countries to set reasonable reaction functions to source country policies.
over effects of QE would be based on B’s welfare if QE were not undertaken versus B’s welfare after QE is initiated and it responds.

A policy could also be rated green if it acts as a booster shot for an economy stuck in a rut and if it can jump-start that economy (for example, Lars Svensson’s proposal for Japan to engage in exchange rate targeting in order to alter inflationary expectations), but creates temporary negative spillovers for the foreign economy. Even if there are temporary adverse spillovers on foreign countries, the policy—through its effect on home economy growth and demand for foreign goods—can eventually provide offsetting large positive spillovers to the rest of the world. Of course, it is important that the home economy, after receiving the booster shot and picking up growth, not follow policies (such as holding down its exchange rate longer term) that minimize positive spillovers to other countries. A policy rated red on a static basis could thus be deemed green based on commitments over time. This also means that policies should be rated over the medium term rather than on the basis of one-shot static effects.

What we have just argued is that countries stuck in a rut for a long time and with few other options should temporarily be allowed policies that may have adverse spillovers. But what if the policy is sought to be employed over the medium term? Here, “rut” is a relative term both over time and across countries. If a stagnant, rich country is allowed a free pass, should historically stagnant, and therefore poor, countries have a permanent pass to do whatever is in their best interests? It would be difficult to carve out exceptions to developed countries based on relative stagnation, or deviations from trend growth, without admitting a whole lot of other exceptions.

In this vein, poorer countries typically have weaker institutions—for example, central banks with limited credibility and budgetary frameworks that are not constrained by rules and watchdogs. As a result, their ability to offset spillovers with policies is typically more
limited. Furthermore, poorer citizens live closer to the minimum margin of sustainability and poorer countries typically have weaker safety nets. So there is a case for weighting spillovers to poor countries more. However, it will be difficult to determine precisely what weight to place. Nevertheless, this facet could be kept in mind in deciding how to rate a policy when it is on the borderline.

A related problem is whether spillovers should be measured in aggregate monetary terms or in “utils” weighted by population. Once again, determining utilities may be hard, so perhaps at first pass it may be better to evaluate the dollar value of spillovers without attempting a further translation in utilities. This will certainly facilitate adding up across countries and over time to see the net effect of policies.

Overall, whether policies are rated red, green, or orange would depend on a number of factors such as the stage of the financial and business cycle in the home and foreign countries; whether the policy action constitutes a booster shot to jump-start the economy or gives only a mild boost and has to be employed for a sustained period; whether standard transmission channels are clogged to warrant the use of unconventional policies; whether the foreign country has room to adopt buffering policies; whether the spillovers affect poor countries which have weak institutions and less room to respond, etc.

Finally, some examples of policies that could be rated could include the following.

- Direct or “evident” exchange rate manipulation, e.g., through massive intervention in the foreign exchange market which aims to depreciate a country’s exchange rate or not let it appreciate, or keep it “undervalued” relative to some benchmark.
- Other indirect policies that have similar beggar-thy-neighbor effects. Unconventional monetary policies could potentially belong to this category.
- Policies that can have financial sector spillovers such as capital flows, high credit growth, and asset price bubbles. These could also be considered as generating large adverse spillovers through the financial system. Low interest rate policies for long periods in advanced economies could fall in this category.

In sum then, at first pass it may be reasonable to consider the following for such policies.

a) Focus on spillovers over time.
b) Measure spillovers as the welfare of a receiving country if a policy is implemented, after it undertakes policies in response, less its welfare if the policy were not implemented.
c) Allow policies that do not impose net adverse external spillover effects over time and discourage policies that do have net adverse external spillover effects over time, with some tolerance for a subset of policies that have large domestic benefits and are intended to be carried on for a short while.
d) Do not carve out exceptions for any country, regardless of its stage in the business cycle.
e) Give more weight to spillovers to poor countries at the margin.
f) Measure spillovers in dollar terms.

Before concluding this section, let us address five common reactions to any suggestion of rules of the game.

Central banks already take into account spillback effects of their policies, even if they have a domestic mandate. This is true, but the spillback effects (the partial consequences of their policies as they flow back to the source country, for example, through lower growth and thus lower imports of trading partners) may be only a fraction of the spillover effects. What matters for the world as a whole is that countries internalize spillover effects.
Central banks already discuss their policies at various forums and strive to communicate and be transparent. Yes, but open communication and transparency still are tantamount to saying, “It’s our policy, and your problem.”

Taking spillover effects into account would make policy making, which is already hard, overly complicated and impossible to communicate. Yes, but presumably countries already take spillover effects into account, which involves estimating policy reaction functions of other countries. How much more complicated will it be to take spillover effects into account?

Rules will constrain only the systemically important central banks. Probably, though smaller countries will also have obligations. It is a reality that the consequences of monetary policy are asymmetric and depend on a country’s importance. Often, this is a source of privilege and power. We are suggesting some commensurate obligations.

Any rules will affect a central bank’s ability to deliver on its domestic mandate. True, which is why we will eventually have to explore how domestic mandates sit with international obligations in this integrated world. In many other areas of international interaction (e.g., carbon emissions), we rarely argue that a country is free to do what is best domestically even if it imposes costs on the rest of the world. It cannot be that monetary policy gets a free pass simply because monetary mandates were put in place when spillovers were less of a concern.

Before we discuss how we could move forward, let us discuss what we can glean from the literature. A more technical description of the principles that could guide us in setting new rules of the game is provided in the appendix.
THE STATE OF THE LITERATURE

Of course, even if we have agreement on broad principles of rating, we need to measure the effects of policies. Unfortunately, the state of the art here is more art than science. Models may reflect the policy biases (unconscious or otherwise) of those devising them and are at a sufficiently early stage that it would be difficult to draw strong conclusions from them. Perhaps, therefore, more empirical analysis (rather than theoretical models) on the lines of Kamin (2016) should be emphasized and seen as an input to a dialogue, with the analysis being refined as we understand actual outcomes better.

Simulation of Spillover Scenarios: Global Models

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has used several global models, such as GIMF, FSGM, and GPM, to simulate different spillover scenarios. These are dynamic general equilibrium models with many regions and many sectors. These models are used to measure spillovers from monetary policies in advanced countries. The US Federal Reserve has also developed a multicountry dynamic general equilibrium model called SIGMA, which has also been used for analysis of spillovers.

Easy monetary conditions in advanced economies can lead to capital inflows, exchange rate appreciation, rapid credit growth, and asset price bubbles in emerging markets. On the other hand, monetary normalization or a rise in interest rates in advanced economies can cause capital outflows and exchange rate depreciation in the EMs. Several spillover scenarios can be simulated using these global models. These scenarios include, for example, a growth-driven exit with complications where long-term interest rates

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jump up as monetary policy is tightened and capital outflows from emerging markets are intense; and an exit without growth where monetary policy is tightened despite a lack of growth momentum in the United States. In these scenarios, emerging economies could see growth fall below the baseline.

While these global models provide a useful framework to understand spillovers, they are already complicated, with multiple sectors, regions, and parameters, even without realistic depictions of institutional or financial sector vulnerabilities. Moreover, the predictions from these models are not sufficiently clear-cut and often depend on the underlying assumptions. The choice of scenarios that are played up prominently in policy documents could be influenced by the desired answers. We need to understand far more about the reliability of these models and their sensitivity to alternative assumptions before countries will trust them to be applied for policy judgments.

Two-country Models of International Policy Spillovers

There is also a strand of literature that considers policy spillovers in two-country frameworks. For example, Haberis and Lipinska (2012) consider how monetary policy in a large, foreign economy affects optimal monetary policy in a small, open economy (“home”) when both economies are close to a zero lower bound. They show that more stimulatory foreign monetary policy worsens the home policy maker’s trade-offs between stabilizing inflation and the output gap when home and foreign goods are close substitutes. An exchange rate channel of monetary transmission is key to the argument. A looser foreign policy leads to a relatively more appreciated home real exchange rate, which induces large expenditure-switching away from home goods when goods are highly substitutable—just at a time (e.g., at the zero lower bound, or ZLB) when home policy is trying to boost demand for home
(2011), Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2009), and Erceg and
Linde (2011), among others, also study spillovers in two-country
models. Fujiwara, Sudo, and Teranishi (2010) and Eichengreen
et al. (2011) study explicit policy coordination. Eichengreen et al.,
for example, argue that monetary spillovers at the ZLB should be
internalized in a coordinated global monetary policy. Ostry and
Ghosh (2013), however, note that real-world examples of interna-
tional policy coordination are rare. They argue that the most com-
pelling reasons why we do not see more coordination in practice
are asymmetry in country size, disagreement about the economic
situation and cross-border effects of policies, and often policy mak-
ers’ failure to recognize that they face trade-offs across different
objectives.

More recently, Bernanke (2015) lays out a simple two-country
model of spillovers to show that a flexible exchange rate can largely
insulate emerging markets from both internal and external shocks
in the medium run. He argues that even the existence of finan-
cial stability spillovers does not invalidate the basic implication
of the “trilemma,” that exchange rate flexibility can help insulate
domestic output from foreign monetary policies; and any remain-
ing spillovers should be tackled by regulatory and macropruden-
tial measures. We agree that a flexible exchange rate and targeted
macroprudential policies are usually the best tools available for
containing any building vulnerabilities that may threaten a devel-
oped country’s growth or the stability of its financial system. There
may, however, be limits to their use, especially in emerging mar-
kets where monetary and fiscal institutions have modest credibil-
ity or, relatedly, where there is a high extent of dollarization (see,
for example, Akinci and Queralto 2018). For instance, the well-
documented “fear of floating” in emerging markets (see Calvo and
Reinhart 2000) is not because policy makers are not sufficiently
conversant with modern macroeconomic theory but because the
different political and institutional environments in an emerging market make it costlier to follow policy advice that works well in a developed country.

Spillovers and policy coordination have also been considered extensively in the international trade literature. Bagwell and Staiger (2002), in their pioneering work, develop a two-good, two-country general equilibrium model to analyze terms of trade spillovers from tariff policies and to provide a rationale for policy coordination among countries. A large number of papers build on the approach in Bagwell and Staiger to understand spillovers and externalities in international trade.

The simple two-country models provide a useful framework to understand the mechanisms through which policies in one country can affect others, but they may be less suited for “measuring” spillovers. Therefore, in what follows, we discuss several econometric models that have been used in the literature on spillovers.

Structural VARs

There is a significant body of evidence that uses structural VARs (vector autoregression) to analyze spillovers. The identification in such models is based on sign restrictions or through the heteroskedasticity method introduced by Rigobon and Sack (2003). IMF (2014) and IMF (2015), for example, estimate a structural VAR using long-term bond yields and stock prices for the United States, the United Kingdom, the euro area, and Japan (G4) using daily data and sign restrictions for identification of the shocks. The dynamic interactions between the dependent variables and external shocks are then modeled using a panel VAR, estimated with monthly data. The dependent variables include local long-term sovereign yields, the nominal effective exchange rate, and industrial production. The external shocks are the G4 money or real shock. The results show that money and real shocks have different spillover implications.
Money shocks cause a significant co-movement in long-term bond yields, whereas the real shock implies a much smaller co-movement of yields. While the real shock has an overall benign spillover on EMs, the money shock has adverse spillovers on EMs. Yue and Shen (2011) instead exploit heteroskedasticity in the bond market data and estimate an SVAR to study international transmission of shocks across advanced economies. Employing daily data on ten-year government bond yields for the United States, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom over the period 1989–2010, they find that shocks to US long-term markets exert a significant influence on foreign bond yields. On average, nearly 30 percent of the shock to US bond yields is directly transmitted to foreign bond yields.

**Global Vector Autoregression Model**

The global vector autoregression (GVAR) model was developed by Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004) and by Dees et al. (2007). For each country, the conventional VAR model is extended with the addition of a set of foreign variables. These variables are constructed as weighted averages of the same variables of all the country’s trading partners. All individual countries’ VAR models are collected and estimated as a single VAR model. The dynamic properties of the model are then used to analyze how shocks are propagated across countries. IMF (2014), for example, uses GVARs to analyze the spillover implications of a potential slowdown in EMs. Cashin, Mohaddes, and Raissi (2012) also use GVARs to analyze spillovers from macroeconomic shocks in systemic economies to the Middle East and North Africa region, as well as outward spillovers from a GDP shock in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and MENA (Middle East and North Africa) oil exporters to the rest of the world. Chen et al. (2015) instead use a global vector error correction model (GVECM) to study the impact of US quantitative easing on both emerging and advanced economies.
The GVECM framework is similar to GVAR, the only difference being that it accounts for co-integration between the variables in the model using an error correction term. Chen et al. (2015) find that the estimated effects of US QE are diverse. While the US monetary policy contributed to overheating in Brazil, China, and some other emerging economies in 2010 and 2011, it supported the respective recoveries in 2009 and 2012, pointing to unevenly distributed benefits and costs of monetary policy spillovers.

Factor Augmented Vector Autoregression Model (FAVAR)

FAVAR is another econometric methodology similar to VAR which has been used in the literature to measure spillovers. The methodology was developed by Aasveit, Bjørnland, and Thorsrud (2013). It is a standard VAR augmented with two unobserved factors. The unobserved factors are identified and estimated by employing the principal component method. To identify the vector of structural shocks, a combination of zero and sign restrictions is used. IMF (2014), for example, uses a FAVAR framework to analyze the spillovers of a slowdown in EM growth to commodity prices. The framework is applied to identify specific oil-demand as opposed to oil-supply shocks where production data are available at a monthly frequency.

Event Studies

A rising body of literature uses event study methodology to analyze the international transmission of shocks. The methodology pools events such as monetary policy announcements made by the FOMC and evaluates market reactions in emerging markets around these events. Several studies also assess the importance of macroeconomic fundamentals and other country characteristics in the transmission of shocks to financial markets in EMs. Although
there is some debate about whether these studies accurately capture long-run effects (after all, they are predicated on the market reacting “efficiently” to the long-run consequences of policy), these studies generally find that countries with stronger macroeconomic fundamentals are affected less during the episodes of volatility, relative to countries with weaker fundamentals.

Other Empirical Studies

A growing literature on transmission of unconventional monetary policies to emerging markets examines correlations in market outcome variables across countries. Hofmann and Takáts (2015), for example, referring to a range of country-specific studies, conclude that interest rates and asset prices have become increasingly correlated globally during the period of unprecedented monetary easing by the major advanced economies. Both the short- and long-term interest rates of EMs have been heavily influenced by those in the advanced economies, particularly the United States. Rey (2013, 2014), more generally, provides evidence for strong common movements in gross capital flows and credit growth around the world.

Recently, Kamin (2016) in an ongoing study uses some back-of-the-envelope estimates to provide evidence for an exchange rate channel of monetary transmission in the United States. He shows that a US monetary easing that lowers US Treasury yields by 25 basis points causes the dollar to depreciate by 1 percent. However, he finds that while a 25 basis point decline in yields lowers foreign output by 0.05 percent through the “demand switching” channel, it increases foreign output through the “demand creating” channel by exactly the same magnitude. More studies along these lines, perhaps by academics (see more on this below), should be encouraged and should be seen as inputs into a policy dialogue.
Spillovers from Exchange Rate “Movements”

Studying the effects of exchange rates is a hardy perennial of international macroeconomics. But nearly all the empirical research is focused on the impact on the country whose exchange rate changes. There is less evidence, however, on the effect of exchange rate movements on the exports of competitor countries, which in its adverse manifestation is dubbed the “beggar-thy-neighbor” effect. In a world besieged by accusations of “currency wars” and “negative spillovers,” owing to the extensive recourse to unconventional monetary policies and exchange rate depreciations, measuring this effect is important.

Competitor country effects from exchange rate changes have been discussed in the literature, albeit without much systematic empirical examination of the phenomenon. For example, de Blas and Russ (2010) theoretically examine third-country effects of relative price shocks. Feenstra, Hamilton, and Lim (2002) conjecture that China’s significant devaluation in 1994 curtailed export growth for South Korean chaebols. Similarly, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) survey the evidence for contagion through a trade channel, where sudden devaluation by one country may spread crisis to other countries that compete with it in a common export market.\(^3\)

Summary of the Empirical Literature

To summarize, there is a fast-growing empirical literature on estimating spillovers. A large body of the literature, however, seems to have focused on analyzing the international transmission of outcome variables like government bond yields or exchange

\(^3\) See also Avdjiev, Koch, and Shin (2017) for international spillovers of exchange rate movements through the financial sector.
rates rather than measuring cross-border spillovers from specific policies.

Where studies have tried to measure spillovers from specific policies, *identifying* the spillover effects remains a challenge. Identifications through sign restrictions or through heteroskedasticity methods are essentially statistical techniques and may not have much economic interpretation. Event studies help in identification, but data on market variables at very high frequency (e.g., intraday data used typically in advanced economies around particular events) may not be readily available for many EMs.

It is also hard to choose between different empirical models such as SVAR, VECM, event studies, and panel frameworks to draw policy implications. A comparison of the results from different models, and perhaps methodologies like Bayesian model averaging, could be employed to get a comprehensive overview of cross-border spillovers from country-specific policies.

Given this state of the art, it might not be wise to use the analysis as anything more than a basis of discussion to rate policies. Instead, many policies will fall in the orange zone, with much of the discussion about how further adjustments can take them well and truly into the green zone. Experience—and postmortem analysis—may indicate some policies should truly have been classified red. Over time, analysis plus experience can allow a sharper rating of policies.

**HOW TO PROCEED?**

The next crucial questions are: Who should assess spillovers? What would be an appropriate forum to discuss spillover effects from specific policies and the ratings of these policies? How should we proceed?
A Group of Eminent Academics

Given the constraints and political difficulties under which international organizations operate, it may be appropriate to start with a group of eminent academics with reasonable representation across the globe and have them assess the spillovers and grade policies.

International Meetings

Perhaps the next step would be an agreement to discuss policies and their international spillover effects at meetings such as those of the IMF Board, the International Monetary and Financial Committee, the Bank for International Settlements, and the G20. The discussion would be based on background papers, which would be commissioned from both traditional sources like the IMF and nontraditional sources like the group of academics and EM central banks.

These papers would attempt to isolate the nature of spillovers as well as their magnitude and attempt a preliminary classification of policy actions. Almost surely, there will be a lot of fuzziness about which color to attribute to a wide range of recent policies. But discussion can help participants understand both how the policies could be classified if we had better models and data and how the models and data gathering can be improved.

Country Responsibilities before Formal Rules

When policies are being discussed so as to get better understanding, no policies that affect the international monetary system should be off the table. Importantly, simply denoting a policy with the label “monetary” should not give it an automatic free pass because it falls under the central bank’s domestic mandate. What will be
important is not the policy maker’s mandate, professed intent, or instruments, but actual channels of transmission and outcomes, including spillovers.

Policy makers will respond to the background papers by stating and explaining their policy actions, attempting to persuade the international community that they fall in the green and orange zones.

International Conference

As the international community builds understanding on what constitutes sensible rules of the game and how to label policies in that context, perhaps an international conference may be warranted to see how the community’s understanding of beneficial rules can be implemented. At that time, a discussion of how a central bank’s international responsibilities fit in with its domestic mandate may be warranted. While recognizing the political difficulty of altering any central bank’s mandate, the conference will have to deliberate on how international responsibilities can be woven into existing mandates. It will have to decide whether a new international agreement along the lines of Bretton Woods is needed or whether much can be accomplished by small changes in the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, accompanied by corresponding changes in mandates of country authorities.

Role of the Fund

What role would the Fund play? The obligations of members and the authority of the Fund are derived from the Articles of Agreement. Section 1 of Article IV makes clear that IMF members are under general obligation “to collaborate with other members of the Fund to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates.” The meaning of “general obliga-
tion” is unclear in the Articles but could be “relied upon as a basis for the Fund to call on its members to take specific actions or to refrain from taking specific actions” (IMF 2006). Article IV further states, “In particular, each member shall . . . (iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain unfair competitive advantage over other members . . . ” Furthermore, the Principles for the Guidance of Members’ Exchange Rate Policies (originally 1977, amended in 2007) note, “Members should take into account in their intervention policies the interests of other members, including those in whose currency they intervene.”

Although the Articles of Agreement or the Principles do not define “manipulation” in any detail, IMF (2007) narrows the scope of manipulation by noting that “manipulation of the exchange rate is only carried through policies that are targeted at—and actually affect—the level of exchange rate. Moreover, manipulation may cause the exchange rate to move or may prevent such movement.”

In practice, it may be difficult to determine if a policy is targeted at attaining a level of exchange rate. Direct policy actions such as intervention in the foreign exchange market or indirect policies such as monetary, fiscal, and trade policies or regulations of capital movements, regardless of the intent or purpose, can also affect the level of the exchange rate and can be interpreted as “manipulation.” The interpretation of the Articles of Agreement could perhaps be broadened in scope to include a wider range of policies which can primarily have effects on the exchange rates, and therefore beggar-thy-neighbor consequences.

While the Articles of Agreement include members’ obligations in relation to exchange rate policies, global financial stability implications of country-specific policies are not touched upon anywhere in the Articles. Members’ obligations are considered only in relation to domestic growth objectives. For example, based on the Articles, a country with a weak economy can pursue loose
monetary policies to stimulate output and employment. Despite the implications of such policies for financial stability in other countries, the country would argue that its policies are in line with Article IV, Section 1(i) which allows each member to “direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability . . .” More generally, the Fund’s Articles may need altering based on the discussion of the rules of the game.

Moreover, although broader surveillance by the Fund of its members’ exchange rate policies and other policies with significant financial sector spillovers (and perhaps public statements about such policies) can have signaling effects, countries are not obligated to follow Fund advice unless in a program. The more pertinent question, therefore, might be: What can the Fund really do once its executive board determines that a particular country is in violation of its obligations under the new rules of the game? An optimistic view is that the clear focus on the downsides of the particular country’s actions for the rest of the world will lead to political and economic pressures from around the world that make the country cease and desist. The clearer the eventual rules of the game, the more likely this outcome will be. Realistically, though, the world’s experience with moral suasion (or name and shame) as a way to get countries to behave has, at best, been mixed. Regardless, we are so far from agreed rules that contemplating enforcement at this point seems premature.

CONCLUSIONS

As this paper suggests, there is much that needs to be pinned down on the international spillovers from domestic policies, especially as regards the international monetary system. Given the undoubted importance of cross-border trade and capital flows and the disruptions created by financial market volatility, it does seem an im-
portant issue to discuss. Nevertheless, with economic analysis of these issues at an early stage, it is unlikely we will get strong policy prescriptions soon, let alone international agreement on them, especially given that a number of country authorities—like central banks—have explicit domestic mandates.

This paper therefore suggests a period of focused discussion, first outside international meetings and then within international meetings. There can be no more important issue to understand and discuss than the international spillovers of domestic policies. Such a discussion need not take place in an environment of finger-pointing and defensiveness, but as an attempt to understand what can be reasonable, and not overly intrusive, rules of conduct.

As consensus builds on the rules of conduct, we can contemplate the next step of whether to codify them through international agreement and we can see how the articles of agreement of multilateral watchdogs like the IMF will have to be altered and how country authorities will interpret or alter domestic mandates to incorporate international responsibilities.

Obviously, any attempt to strengthen international rules in the current environment where countries are growing increasingly nationalist, and turning away from international responsibilities, could be seen as optimistic at best and naïve at worst. We must, however, keep in mind two developments that make reform urgent. First, the increase in cross-border flows makes the world ever more integrated. Second, the world is becoming multipolar. The system worked in the past despite the absence of rules because it had one hegemon, the United States, which broadly influenced behavior in the system. As the economic world becomes more multipolar, and as rising powers reject the current system as well as the past understanding of rules as overly favorable to the dominant powers of the past, the risk of conflict over behavior increases. With no single hegemon to police the system, it will probably work better if there are broadly accepted rules that bind every large player. This
paper is an attempt to start the dialogue toward reaching consensus on an acceptable set of rules.

References


APPENDIX

The new rules could be based on the effects of specific policies on the weighted average of welfare of individual countries. Countries’ populations could potentially be used as weights.

Assume there are 2 countries: X and Y, and 2 time periods: 1 and 2. X takes a policy action in period 1. The effect of X’s policy on global welfare can be specified as follows:

\[ dW = a \cdot dW(x) + (1 - a) \cdot dW(y) \]

(1)

\[ dW(x) = dW_1(x) + dW_2(x) \]

(2)

\[ dW(y) = dW_1(y) + dW_2(y) \]

(3)

d\(W_k(x)\), and d\(W_k(y)\) denote the effect of X’s policy on welfare of countries X and Y in period \(k\), where \(k = 1, 2\).

Below we consider some principles which could allow policy makers and relevant authorities to grade policies as green, red, or orange.

Case 1. X’s policy action is rated green

If \(dW(x) > 0\), \(dW(y) > 0\), and \(dW > 0\), such a policy would clearly be desirable and should be rated green. Conventional monetary policy could fall in this category, as it would raise output in the home economy and create demand for exports from the foreign economy.

Next, take the case when there are temporary negative spillovers for Y such that \(dW_1(y) < 0\). The policy, however, through its effect
on home economy growth and demand for foreign goods, can provide offsetting positive spillovers to Y in period 2, such that $dW_2(y) > 0$. There may be temporary negative effects for Y through increased volatility in period 1 such that $dW_1(y) < 0$. But $dW(y) = dW_1(y) + dW_2(y) > 0$.

In this case, the policy could also be rated green. This would be the case if the policy, e.g., an unconventional monetary policy, acts as a booster shot and can jump-start a large home economy and create significant positive spillovers for foreign economies through a large increase in the demand for their exports.

Case 2. X’s policy action is rated red

If $dW(x) < 0$, $dW(y) < 0$, and $dW < 0$, such a policy would clearly be undesirable and should be rated red.

Next, take the case when $dW(x) > 0$, but the magnitude of $dW(x)$ is small, such that the positive spillover effects for Y through higher growth and increased demand for export are weak and the negative effect through increased volatility in Y dominates. $dW_1(y) < 0$, $dW_2(y) > 0$ but small in magnitude, such that $dW(y) = dW_1(y) + dW_2(y) < 0$. In this case, the policy could also be rated red.

This would be the case if, for example, unconventional monetary policy actions lead to a weak recovery in X and only small positive effects on exports to Y but large capital inflows and asset price bubbles in Y. In this case, the policy could also be rated red. Global welfare would decrease with this policy.

Case 3. X’s policy action is rated orange

Assume a policy action is such that $dW(x) > 0$, but $dW_1(y) < 0$, $dW_2(y) < 0$, and $dW(y) < 0$ i.e., although there may be large positive effects in X, there are sustained negative effects in Y. In this case, even if $dW = dW(x) + dW(y) > 0$, such a policy could belong to the orange category. For example, conventional monetary policies in X to raise growth could fall in the orange category if X and Y are
at a stage of financial cycle where low interest rates resulting from loose monetary policies could lead to significant financial stability risks in X and Y. Even though the large positive effect in X could dominate any financial stability risks in X, that would not be the case in Y, which would experience sustained negative spillovers. Such a policy would be rated orange.

Finally, take three examples of policies that could be graded based on the above rules. The three examples are described below.

1. Country X depreciates its exchange rate vis-à-vis Y or prevents appreciation using direct intervention; 3 countries: X, Y, and Z, 2 periods 1 and 2.

   Period 1: X gains as a depreciation of its exchange rate makes its exports more competitive. Y loses due to cheap imports from X which affect domestic output and employment; a third country—say Z—also loses as demand switches away from Z toward X.

   Period 2: Growth in X increases demand for exports from Y and/or Z. Y and Z benefit.

   If the elasticity of growth with respect to exchange rates is very high in X, such that it gives a booster shot to X, and also leads to a large increase in demand for exports from Y and Z, this policy could be rated green. If, however, there are supply constraints in X, which leads to a very weak recovery in X, and a small increase in exports from Y and Z, then the beggar-thy-neighbor effects in Y and Z would dominate. Therefore, this policy could be rated red. It could be rated orange if there are sustained beggar-thy-neighbor effects in Y and Z; even if global welfare improves due to a large increase in output in X, the sustained negative effects in Y and Z would put this policy in the orange category.

2. Country X uses more subtle or indirect policies (e.g., conventional/unconventional monetary policies) which also affect the
exchange rate. The effect on global welfare of these policies could be estimated in a similar way as in the case of direct exchange rate policies.

3. Country X uses policies which lead to a depreciation of the exchange rate in X, but which are also associated with large capital inflows into Y and Z, and could have implications for financial stability in Y and Z and therefore on global financial stability. The change in global welfare would comprise two components in this case: change in trade balance and change in financial stability. Financial stability could be measured by a summary measure such as credit growth. The change in trade balance and financial stability would first be converted into an index between 0 and 1, before they are summed up.

More precisely, the effect of X’s policy on global welfare in period could be specified as follows:

\[ dW = a \times dW(x) + b \times dW(y) + (1 - a - b) \times dW(z) \]

\[ dW(n) = dITB(n) + dICG(n) \]

where \( n = x, y, z \). \( ITB \) and \( ICG \) denote the index of trade balance and credit growth, respectively. The policy could then be graded based on the same principles as discussed in Case 1.

**ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION**

There are several issues that may need to be considered in order to grade policies in the case of the three examples described above. Some of these issues are described below:

How do we deal with undervaluation versus depreciation? Large depreciations could have “beggar-thy-neighbor” effects, even if the exchange rate is not “undervalued” vis-à-vis some bench-
mark. Moreover, the determination of the benchmark itself is not straightforward.

How do we take into account the fact that Y and Z could use other policies (e.g., loosening of monetary policy) to compensate for the loss in exports and welfare in period 1? Should we evaluate the global welfare effects from X’s policies, ceteris paribus, or should we take into account the effects of “retaliatory” policies? As discussed above, the spillover effects could be based on Y and Z’s welfare if the policy was not undertaken versus Y and Z’s welfare after the policy is initiated and it responds.

How should we measure exchange rate depreciation? The real effective exchange rate (REER)? Should the measure of REER take into account the increasing importance of global value chains? A depreciation of the exchange rate would give a lower boost to exports and welfare for countries whose exports use imported intermediates intensively.

Should we use a composite measure of financial stability rather than credit growth?

Should we use a simple sum of trade balance and credit growth or a weighted sum? Weights could depend on country characteristics.
DISCUSSANT REMARKS

Thomas J. Sargent

There are many interesting things to discuss in the paper and in Raghu's talk. I would change the title to “Equilibrium International Monetary Policies” for reasons I learned from my late Hoover colleague George Stigler and that I want to describe here. One beautiful thing about this paper is the struggle between Raghu and his coauthor that surfaces in diverse sections of the paper. It is an old intellectual battle that I want to elaborate. George Stigler said, “A war can ravage half a continent and raise no new issues in economic theory.” Many of the issues that are discussed in this paper have been with us a long time. I want to talk about these in light of contributions by my late Hoover colleagues Milton Friedman and George Stigler, my present Hoover colleague John Taylor, and also a one-time good friend of Herbert Hoover.

Start with Milton Friedman. Friedman emphasized the importance of distinguishing between temporary and permanent actions. Friedman is famous for stressing the limits of monetary policy. His 1967 presidential address to the American Economic Association surprised many people who had perceived Friedman to be someone who thought monetary policy was very powerful. In his presidential address, Friedman denied that. He asserted that monetary policy could have at most temporary, variable, and hard-to-predict effects on real variables, including every real variable in sight: output, unemployment, real interest rates, and real exchange rates. He said that the most monetary policy could accomplish—and only a particular monetary policy, namely a systematic, predictable, and permanent monetary policy—was to affect inflation rates and price levels in predictable ways. But such a policy couldn’t affect real variables like output, unemployment, or real interest rates for long or in ways that we could understand.
Friedman also said that rules were better than discretion, continuing a tradition dating back to the framers of our Constitution. Also in common with one theme of Rajan’s paper, Friedman confessed and professed ignorance of macroeconomic structures. Friedman’s work displayed a persistent ambivalence toward formal quantitative analysis based on expected utility and control theory. With L. J. Savage, Friedman wrote one of the key papers about expected utility in economic analysis. But Friedman refused to use expected utility when he did quantitative macroeconomic analysis. He said that he didn’t know enough about the structure of the economy to employ expected utility for macroeconomic analysis, this despite the fact that Friedman was a great econometrician and statistician. Friedman said that distributed lags were long and variable (although he never quite said exactly what that meant). As a consequence, Friedman was very cautious in using his empirical findings. This same caution stemming from model specification doubts is a theme of Rajan’s paper too.

But research progresses. After Friedman, research technologies improved. Things became more rigorous. Intellectual children of Friedman arrived with rational expectations wings (or horns). Rational expectations theory has a rigor and discipline that brought a tight operational sense in which distributed lags would be variable (because they depend on government policy functions). And rational expectations brought restrictions and discipline on our theories of beliefs. Big players here were Lucas, Ned Prescott, John Taylor, and Lars Hansen.

This brings me to the notion of equilibrium strategies—a key component of Rajan’s paper. This concept can be thought of as extending and formalizing Friedman’s notions of permanent versus temporary actions, as well as conveying a tighter and more convincing formulation of the idea that rules are better than discretion. Another key idea brought by recent technical advances in the Chicago/Hoover tradition is Lars Hansen’s work on robustness.
That work formalizes Friedman’s ideas about not trusting models and adjusting decisions in light of that distrust. What do you do when you don’t trust your model? And what do you do when there is a set of models out there, all of which you distrust? What should you do? How should you make policy? There are really interesting remarks in Rajan’s paper about how to manage such distrust. Actually, I’ll just read it: “We make the case that models reflect the policy biases of those devising them.” That’s a deep and profound remark that we should talk more about. I’m not going to talk more about it here, but that could be the subject of another conference about policy making and robustness to model doubts.

In another Hoover tradition, please allow me now to talk about some monetary history. I offer these words in the spirit of Stigler’s remark. Stigler didn’t make that remark about wars ravaging half a continent out of the blue. He knew a lot of history. In reading Rajan’s paper, it is natural to recall a sweep of monetary history. After World War I, in the 1920s, Great Britain, with great difficulty, set up a gold exchange standard based on the pound. In that system, the UK pound functioned as an international reserve currency for much of Europe and beyond. That lasted from 1921 to 1931. It collapsed in 1931 after some big shocks that we’re still struggling to understand. After 1931, until 1939 or 1945, there were exchange rate disorders and enhanced trade barriers. Those exchange rate disorders and enhanced trade barriers were correlated and were probably mutually influencing each other. There followed huge shocks to the fiscal backings of many currencies during World War II. That set the stage for the United States dollar to replace the British pound as reserve currency. That was what Bretton Woods confirmed by setting up a gold exchange standard centered in Washington, a fixed exchange rate based on the US dollar. It prevailed from ’44 to ’71. Lurking underneath all of these things are price-level politics driven by debt deflation theories and realities, both domestically and internationally. Why is the price level important? Here is an impolite and
politically incorrect answer in the form of an old Fed insider saying what you can say in the hallway but never in public: the job of monetary policy is to make bad loans into good loans. And how do you do that? You redistribute from creditors to debtors by manipulating the price level. That trick is as old as the hills.

Monetary history is full of examples of conflicts of interest both within and across countries. A curious witness to these conflicts is how Robert Skidelsky changed the title of the third volume of his biography of John Maynard Keynes. The original British title was Fighting for Britain, 1937–46. Fighting for Britain against whom? The United States. The book was about Keynes representing British interests against the United States in struggling over which country was going to pay more financially for the war. Who was going to bear the fiscal burden? Whose soldiers were going to die? Keynes lost argument after argument to the Americans. The publishers thought that they could not sell books with Skidelsky's UK title in the United States, so they changed it to Fighting for Freedom.

I conclude by showing you a message that was written in the depths of the Great Depression by someone who had been a very good friend of Herbert Hoover, actually someone who wanted Herbert Hoover to be president when they were friends during World War I. The document that I want to show you was written in ’33, a time when Milton Friedman was in high school or junior high school and hadn’t written the economics I described earlier. Please read the words carefully. The author said, “I would regard it as a catastrophe amounting to a world tragedy, if this conference called to bring about a real and permanent financial stability and greater prosperity, should in advance of any serious effort to consider these broader problems, allow itself to be diverted by a proposal of purely artificial and temporary experiments affecting monetary exchange rates of a few nations only.”

(The following is especially for Mike Bordo and Ned Prescott, who love history too.) The writer of the following words had a
sense of humor, so don’t miss the pun: “The world would not long be lulled by the specious fallacy.” (The author is talking against the background of a long history of specie standards.)

Herbert Hoover’s (former) friend proceeds to say, “The sound internal economic system of a nation is a greater factor of its well-being than the price of its currency in changing the terms of currencies of other nations.” The author is saying that it’s not temporary exchange rate stabilizations, it’s fundamentals. This sounds like a Hoover Institution economist. What are the fundamentals required to render things healthy? Reduced costs of government. Government revenues sufficient to cover government financial obligations including servicing government debts. The government budget constraint is front and center. Government debt is a tax anticipation certificate. That’s what this author is saying. He goes on to say: “Let me be frank in saying that the United States seeks the kind of dollar which a generation from now will have the same purchasing and debt-paying power as the dollar value we will hope to attain in the near future.” The author declares that he is not merely an inflation targeter. He’s a price-level targeter. The author’s key advisers were price-level targeters too. The author goes on to say, “That objective means more to the good of other nations than a fixed ratio for a month or two in terms of the pound or franc.” The author is talking about permanent strategies, not temporary actions. He is talking this way when Milton Friedman is still a schoolboy and before John Taylor was born.

Who was the author I have quoted? It is Franklin D. Roosevelt. And the text is Roosevelt’s notorious “bombshell message” in which he torpedoed the so-called London Financial Conference. He said, “Our broad purpose is the permanent stabilization of every nation’s currency.” Then he said, “The restoration of world trade is an important factor, but here also temporary exchange fixing is not the answer.” What’s striking about these passages is Roosevelt’s emphasis on fundamentals. The so-called bombshell message is
badly maligned in many history books, but read it for yourself. The reasoning is sound and timely today.

Let me just close by asking: What do we make of all this? First, the issues that Roosevelt raised were widely talked about within and across countries back in ’33; we’re still talking about them today. This brings me back to the quote from Stigler with which I started. Let me tell you a story about George Stigler and Milton Friedman that will take us to a question that underlies Rajan’s paper. The question is: Are prevailing government policies equilibrium objects? Being equilibrium objects means that they’re determined by people pursuing their best interests within a coherent system in which each person’s decision rule influences other persons’ constraints. There’s a beautiful theme or struggle that runs through Rajan’s paper, and it’s a very old theme. Raghu takes both sides of this argument. Maybe the struggle is between the two coauthors of Raghu’s paper but it is probably actually also inside both authors. The struggle goes back to Walter Bagehot. There’s a passage in Lombard Street in which Bagehot pits evolution against purposeful institutional design. Bagehot was writing about the British banking system. He contrasted the existing British system with what he said a well-designed system would actually be. He outlines an ideal system based on competitive banks with no lender of last resort and remarks that it would be a very different system than the existing one. Bagehot then asks: Would I recommend immediately adopting the well-designed system? Surprisingly, he says no. His reason is that the existing system had evolved out of a long process that rendered it stable and resistant to changes. Bagehot says that would-be reformers are whistling in the wind. Bagehot says we have to accept the institutions that history has given us.

Despite the main theme and the recommendations in Rajan’s paper, his talk reveals that he appreciates Bagehot’s position. I quote Rajan verbatim: “We are prisoners of our institutions. Take the world as it is, not as you want it.” Rajan said that, but he didn’t put
it in his slides or his paper. So there’s a wonderful struggle, which I think is beautiful, and it shows how daunting and enduring the problem is.

Rajan is not the first person to have this struggle, so I’m going to conclude with this story about George Stigler and Milton Friedman. This unfolded at a small dinner I attended at the Hoover Institution. Friedman and Stigler were old friends since their graduate school days. George Stigler was a person who thought along with Rajan that we are prisoners of our institutions. We should study them but accept that they’re equilibrium institutions. Forget about trying to change them. That’s what Stigler thought and Friedman, of course, knew that. At that dinner, Stigler said, “Milton, do you consult for business firms?” Friedman said, “No, I never consult.” Stigler asked, “Why?” Friedman said, “I have nothing valuable to tell a business firm. Business firms are doing the best they can. They optimize. They know much more than I do, so they’re well run.” Whereupon Stigler asked, “Okay, Milton, then why on Earth are you always trying to tell governments what to do?”
GENERAL DISCUSSION

JOHN COCHRANE: That was great. I’m going to abuse my rights as moderator to get the questions going. If I can think of one thing that distinguishes the two views I just heard, it would be the answer to this question: Japan has been for twenty-five years at 0 percent interest rates, very slight deflation, and slow growth. Raghu talked about things Japan could do to jump-start its way out of this apparently monetary malaise. Tom said that monetary policy doesn't have permanent effects on output, so whatever growth disappointments Japan has had are not monetary. So has Japan been living the Friedman rule, optimal monetary policy, 0 percent rates, and slight deflation, for twenty-five years, and its problems are real? Or are Japan’s problems monetary? And if so, do monetary difficulties really last twenty-five years, most of them with very low unemployment?

RAGHU RAJAN: On that, I think I would agree with the thrust of your question. Japan, if any, has real problems rather than monetary problems. In fact, if you look at Japan’s growth, given the shrinkage of the labor force in recent years, it’s pretty good. It’s pretty reasonable. And to some extent that gets at my point, which is even if monetary policy has very limited effects, the fact that there’s some goal you want to achieve makes you push very hard on something which has very little influence to the point that you risk political disruption, which has serious economic effects. That really is the thrust of my point, that you may not have much in the effects on real activity through all that you’re doing, but because of actual or perceived effects elsewhere, there is a political reaction. You know, that fantastic quote about Roosevelt—well, one of the things that emerged from his action at that conference, is that the conference broke up. And to some extent you had the entire thirties, where there was great suspicion of each other during that period, and to some extent, the
Bretton Woods. However much you may complain about the fixed exchange rate system, etc., at least there was a system that people respected. And all I’m arguing is that it may be time—fully respecting that we know very little—it may be time to start thinking about whether we need a system, whatever that system will be, and whether the current system is enough.

And to Tom Sargent’s point about equilibria, yeah, of course equilibria are a result of evolution, but part of that evolution is debate.

JOHN COCHRANE: You are part of that evolution.

MICHAEL BORDO: I have a very simple question. If every country followed a monetary rule, like the Taylor Rule, then why do you need coordination?

RAGHU RAJAN: I’m not advocating coordination. In fact, I’m saying there really is no need for it. And I’m advocating something less constrained than John. I’m advocating limits to whatever you do so that certain policies that have large spillover effects may be ruled out, and within that range, do whatever you want. Now John is going one step further and saying, forget those policies, but within the range of allowable policies, I want something like a Taylor Rule. I haven’t got to where John is, but that could be something that people agree to. So, I’m not advocating by any means, in fact I was ridiculing the statement that we call each other and find out what’s optimal for you. But that’s what I’d do.

SEBASTIAN EDWARDS: One of the points that was made—and I’d like to get the reaction both from Raghu and from Tom—was pursuing price-level targeting as opposed to inflation targeting. And that connects very well with Tom’s comments. As he pointed out, what FDR wanted to do—partially based on Irving Fisher’s proposal of a “compensated dollar”—was to target the price level; bring prices back to their 1926 level. This was tried in the thirties by Sweden. So the question for Raghu is whether it would make a difference, in your view, in terms of policy coordination
if we would switch mostly to price-level targeting as opposed to inflation targeting.

And the second point I want to make very briefly is related to what Tom said about how little we know about certain relations. In fact, in 1933, until three days before or four days before the “bombshell” that FDR wrote, people thought that he was for coordinating and stabilizing the exchanges. And there is a beautiful—I encourage you to look at it—clip on the Internet where we see Raymond Moley, the economic adviser, going to visit FDR on the Amberjack (he’s sailing on his yacht) to get instructions on what to do in London. And what FDR tells him is, go and stabilize the exchanges. And then, no one knows who he talks to, and completely changes his views, and decides that stabilizing the dollar is the wrong policy. And so, which model the policy maker sides with may make a huge difference, I think, and that is something which should be taken into account, I believe, in your view, Raghu.

Raghu Rajan: I leave the bulk of the response on price-level targeting to Tom. My own sense is that how the public’s expectations of inflation gets formed is another area we know very little about. My worry is some of our models seem to suggest that once we shift to a different objective, those expectations get formed fairly quickly, and follow this new objective, and that solves a lot of problems. And my worry was always: How do I get even a simple message across to the public? I found it very, very hard. So, I’m not sure it’s so easy to change those expectations, which makes a lot of difference in how effective price-level targeting will be. And whether there are various versions of it, how you can convey the import of what to expect to the public may be more difficult. But I’ll leave the broader response to Tom.

Thomas Sargent: There’s a skeleton in the closet about coordination, namely, John Kareken and Neil Wallace’s Quarterly Journal of Economics paper in the early eighties challenging Milton
Friedman’s view that markets do a good job of setting exchange rates. Under plausible conditions about demands for money, Kareken and Wallace showed that exchange rates are indeterminant. Their reasoning was basically the same reasoning that tells us that markets alone can’t determine the exchange rate between nickels and dimes and that is why a government has to set that exchange rate. In a class of models with fiat currencies, there’s room for only one fiat currency in the world; with multiple currencies there’s a continuum of equilibrium exchange rates. Kareken and Wallace infer from this situation that monetary authorities across countries must coordinate implicitly or explicitly. The Kareken-Wallace analysis haunts all monetary models of the exchange rate. Models break exchange rate indeterminacy in somewhat dirty ways, often by doing implausible or unnatural, strange things with money in utility functions of agents residing in different countries. For example, I’m an American, so I love dollars but not pounds. You’re British, so you love pounds, not dollars. Assumptions like that, or similar ones for cash-in-advance constraints, are used to break exchange rate indeterminacy. So if those devices are fragile, the force for coordination comes out. And that’s all in a flexible price model. In a sticky price model, forces for coordination are in many ways even stronger.

GITA GOPINATH: The point that both of you raised, I guess Tom raised more so, is that we just don’t understand how monetary policy affects real variables. There are kind of long lags, so it’s unclear. But there’s another transmission that’s unclear, which is the impact of monetary policy on exchange rates. We’ve been playing with these models for a long time, and usually with these models, if you put any kind of monetary variable on the right-hand side to explain exchange rate behavior it does poorly at forecasting it. So this then leads to the question, especially for the dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, it’s very hard to pinpoint
and say, “This particular appreciation has to do with monetary policy and not something else.” So, given that we live in that world, how are we going to measure what it means to say, “Okay, now this is expenditure switching-driven policy rather than increasing overall demand?” And so, what are your thoughts on that?

RAGHU RAJAN: Well, I’m going to refer you to John Taylor, who sort of shows a little more of an effect of these unconventional policies and balance sheet measures on exchange rates. But I agree completely with you that different studies show different degrees that these policies can affect exchange rates. And I think that there are issues over what horizon—is it temporary, permanent, etc.? So, I don’t want to stake all of this on: Does it actually have an effect? I think it is enough to have a perception of having an effect. Because the reaction of other central banks sometimes relies on that perception. I would argue that during this post-crisis episode, some central banks—I won’t name them—have been taken kicking and screaming into quantitative easing. They didn’t want to do it, but others were doing it, and they were being accused of not doing the right thing.

And so, to the extent that there’s a perception, it could have an effect on policy. Now if the policies are irrelevant, they don’t make a difference. But I think the policies do have an effect on, for example, capital flows and the effects elsewhere, and they have an effect on the political discussion. Oh, you’re initiating a currency war . . . or not. The discussions have been relatively mild. But as we get into the realm of populist nationalism, I think these can get stronger, which is why some clarity about what each one is trying to do and some respect for the limits of that might be useful.

THOMAS SARGENT: I think what you said was really important about how uncertain we are about important dimensions. A message that is a big part of John Taylor and Volcker Wieland’s work is
that just because we don’t know everything, doesn’t mean we
don’t know anything. Characterizing uncertainty in terms of
probability distributions of outcomes is a most important part
of our jobs.

PAUL TUCKER: Raghu, it seems to me—both today and since you’ve
first raised this—that you’re really talking about monetary pol-
itics rather than monetary economics. And I’m sympathetic to
that, in that when Ben Bernanke and others in the Fed responded
to you and Brazil in the way they did, I can remember thinking,
“Oh, they may not have noticed that the world is changing, with
India and others becoming powerful players in global politics.”
But if one does think of it through the lens of monetary politics,
it seems to me that there are some challenges to the prescrip-
tions you make. So, your red line was: if a policy measure has a
small effect at home, meaning a small economic effect, but nasty
effects abroad, then the policy maker shouldn’t do it. But what
if the small economic effect at home has a big political effect at
home, in terms of, say, sustaining political stability? Sometimes,
it’s necessary for macroeconomic policy makers to do things that
will demonstrate to the country that they’re trying, in order to
underpin the broader system and consent in the system of gov-
ernment. My challenge to you, then, is that in a sense I would—
I’m going to overstate it—drop the economics in presenting your
concern and instead think about it purely in terms of monetary
politics, and then explore the different dimensions of the mone-
tary politics. That, it seems to me, whether you do it or I do it, it’s
eventually going to be done, because the shifts in the geopolitical
order are going to have implications for the international mon-
etary and financial system. And they are as likely to be designed
in state departments as they are in treasury departments, and
much more likely in either of those than in central banks.

RAGHU RAJAN: Great point. I couldn’t agree with you more. I mean
the specific example you raised is to my mind what has driven
in some countries the extent of accommodation, that we need to be seen to be doing something, given the broad sense that nothing else is going on and that the establishment has given up on people like us. I have to agree that monetary politics has been a central feature here, and it works on both sides of the border.

JOHN COCHRANE: If I can push back, Raghu, “we” doesn’t have to be the central bank. I do notice a great deal of central bank aggrandizement here. There’s nothing “we” can do that actually works, but we need to show that we are “doing something.” Maybe central banks should leave ineffective or symbolic actions to the Treasury or the president.

RAGHU RAJAN: So, I don’t want to be seen as a wuss agreeing with every comment, but I agree with that also, which is that central banks have also taken upon themselves too much by arguing that they’re the only game in town. And in fact, by limiting themselves, it may actually allow others to feel that sense of responsibility and take up more. So, again, I think this is why I’m saying these are complicated issues that need to be examined more closely. And it may be that rules might work in taking off some of the responsibility. I’ve done what I could—at this point, I’ve run into the rules, so you guys take over. That could work.