The Challenge of Existential Threats

The security and well-being of the American people and of all humanity are threatened by several global challenges that can only be successfully met through international cooperation. My estimate of the top six: (1) climate change and water scarcity, (2) mass migration caused by armed conflict or climate change, (3) pandemics caused by international travel through regions ravaged by diseases that are resistant to treatment, (4) terrorism generated by organized groups of extremists, (5) massive disruption or physical damage caused by cyberwarfare, and (6) human and environmental devastation caused by use of nuclear weapons. The last of these challenges, unlike the others listed, is almost entirely under the control of a small number of governments, so improving the performance of the US federal government in this area would pay big dividends.

Improving governance in the United States and elsewhere is not just a simple matter of a political choice. Governance of complex military/technical/political public policy issues in these rapidly changing times requires a combination of relevant expertise and leadership at several levels which, in the United States and elsewhere, is often missing in government institutions. The challenge is to create new institutions or reform existing ones so that they have the capacity to manage these complex issues. In this essay, I will draw on the experience of negotiating the limited test ban treaty (LTBT) during the period from 1961 to 1963 to demonstrate the unique role that a small federal agency with a crosscutting mandate and direct access to the president could play under proper conditions. I refer here to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), where I was a staff member with special responsibilities for test ban negotiations from 1961 to 1963.

ACDA’s charter permitted it to acquire and maintain a mix of functional expertise rarely found at that time in government institutions charged with governance in the
area of interstate relations. The charter also made clear that the director of the agency was to advise the president. Critically, two other factors existed: (1) a readiness of the president of the United States to sustain the right of an organization like ACDA to provide and promote independent advice; and (2) the determination of the leadership of ACDA to resist pressures from larger, more powerful federal agencies to conform to their institutional aims and policies so that the president could have options derived from other perspectives.

I must stress here that creating ACDA was not an exercise in creating a “czar” to handle a single complex issue but, rather, an effort to restructure the federal government so as to concentrate critical human resources for an indefinite duration on an area critical to the welfare of the nation. I will return to this point in my afterword.

The Background

By April 1961, President John F. Kennedy, who had then been in office three months, had decided to continue the policies of the Eisenhower administration and seek to negotiate a total, or comprehensive, ban on nuclear test explosions. This had been one of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's goals since 1958, when he had proposed technical talks on the verification of a test ban. The scientists involved in the study included Soviet scientists, and they had concurred in a verification system to monitor nuclear testing. The ensuing negotiations among the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union, the only three nations that had conducted test explosions by 1958, had come close to reaching an agreement in 1960, Eisenhower's last year in office. On February 13, 1960, France conducted its first nuclear test explosion, which Moscow saw as a Western asset. But it was the downing by the Soviets of an American U-2 surveillance overflight of the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960, that killed any remaining chance that Eisenhower could reach an agreement.

The idea of excluding underground explosions from a treaty ban on nuclear tests arose within a short time after the beginning of the negotiations in 1958. The reason was the difficulty in distinguishing between nuclear explosions and earthquakes with then-available sensors. For small-yield explosions it appeared that seismographs might not record them at all if a nuclear explosion was decoupled from the surrounding rock by being detonated in a large cavern. For explosions in the atmosphere, underwater, and in space, a monitoring system consisting of several types of sensors was generally considered adequate for verification purposes. One proposed solution, mostly advanced by Soviet officials, was to negotiate a three-environment treaty and
declare a moratorium on underground tests. Another solution, sometimes advanced by Western leaders, was to declare a moratorium on nuclear tests in the atmosphere while negotiating a verification system for underground tests.

The two sides were not able to converge on a common position on exempting underground tests partly because Moscow thought the United States and Britain would have a technical advantage in testing in that environment. Furthermore, other nations could acquire nuclear weapons by testing underground. Both sides recognized this problem, which would weaken the antiproliferation effects of a test ban treaty. For that reason, among others, both sides attached importance to the effort to negotiate a comprehensive, or total, ban on tests.

**The Creation of ACDA in 1961**

On September 26, 1961, acting at the request of the Kennedy administration, Congress established a new federal agency called the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This was eight months into the Kennedy administration, during which time John J. McCloy, an elder statesman with credentials in both Republican and Democratic parties, had been advising the president on arms control, including the nature of the new agency.

The year 1961 was a terrible year for the Kennedy administration and for East-West relations generally. Early in 1961, an American-sponsored invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro Cubans at the Bay of Pigs ended in disaster. A harsh confrontation between Kennedy and Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev at their summit in Vienna helped to create a toxic atmosphere. In the late summer of 1961, Khrushchev ended a moratorium on all explosive nuclear testing that had been in effect since 1958 by initiating a test series that included a fifty-plus megaton test explosion, the largest nuclear explosion ever. Moreover, Khrushchev approved a proposal of the East German government to build a wall between East and West Berlin. The wall was quickly constructed and stood until 1989.

Khrushchev’s moves to sever the West’s connections with Berlin as a whole were in violation of agreements with the Western Allies. This and the failure of the Vienna summit encouraged Kennedy to build up US conventional forces, as well as nuclear forces. He said he wanted a choice between “holocaust and humiliation.” These events brought the United States and the Soviet Union to a point where war between them seemed to be a serious possibility, with the likely use of nuclear weapons. Both France
and China were also moving toward acquiring their own nuclear weapons capabilities.
The apocalyptic moment seemed to have arrived in October 1962 when Soviet missiles
were detected in Cuba and the Cuban missile crisis erupted. War was narrowly averted,
and luck played a big part in saving the world from a global catastrophe.

Despite these ominous developments, in 1963, just two years after the establishment
of ACDA, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union entered into a treaty that
banned all nuclear test explosions except for those conducted underground. The 1963
treaty was the first fruit of US-USSR negotiated attempts to control nuclear weapons.5
How did this historic turnaround come to pass? One of the reasons was the creation of
ACDA and its intense support for the negotiation of a nuclear test ban treaty, coupled
with Kennedy’s growing interest in a test ban treaty. Another reason was persistent
pressure on Kennedy from British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. ACDA was closely
engaged with the British both in Washington and at the negotiations in Geneva.

The British embassy in Washington enjoyed a very close and confiding relationship
with the Kennedy administration at that time. The British had been the negotiating
partners of the United States in the test ban talks from their beginning and
information about the talks routinely passed back and forth between the two nations
at several levels. The British ambassador, Sir David Ormsby-Gore (later, Lord Harlech),
was a personal friend and confidant of Kennedy from well before Kennedy became
president. Ormsby-Gore also had participated in the test ban talks in Geneva before
becoming ambassador in Washington. He enjoyed a close relationship with Macmillan,
a strong advocate of a total ban on tests. Macmillan’s motivations were suspect in the
State Department, which saw British domestic politics behind Macmillan’s enthusiasm
for a test ban, felt the British were too soft on verification, and worried about West
Germany’s sensitivities regarding its equal standing in NATO. Indeed, the prime
minister was very much against the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal by Germany.
He saw great benefit in a test ban and thought a test ban plus a nondissemination
agreement would prevent that. (This term morphed into “nonproliferation” over time.)
The State Department’s interest in the NATO Multilateral Force had essentially the
same motivation.

ACDA Was There When It Was Needed

American presidents have primary and almost unquestioned authority within the
US government for the formulation and execution of policy in the realm of nuclear
weaponry. But every American president has had to rely on federal departments and
agencies, plus the Congress, to work his will. Not infrequently, presidents broker positions between contending factions within their own administrations. It is usually said that a president “negotiated” this or that agreement when what is meant is that a president caused an agreement to be negotiated and concluded during his term of office.

It is absolutely correct to say that President Kennedy personally caused the limited test ban treaty to be concluded in the sense that, without his personal intervention and his sense of where his priorities lay, a test ban treaty would not have been concluded in 1963, shortly before his assassination in November of that year. It is also correct to say that the president brokered the policy decisions that led to the treaty within his own administration and with the British prime minister, and also with Congress. The final Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water is a case study on how American democracy works.

ACDA deserves much of the credit for the 1963 limited test ban treaty. This is a remarkable thing to say. ACDA was only two years old when the treaty was signed and ratified. Its total complement of personnel was a tiny fraction of that of other agencies involved in the policymaking process (State, Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Atomic Energy Commission, since absorbed into the Department of Energy). But ACDA consistently supported Kennedy’s instinct that a nuclear test ban treaty of some sort would substantially benefit the United States. Kennedy usually mentioned the effect of a test ban on limiting the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations. He thought even an LTBT would have some effect on that issue. Sometimes he mentioned the harmful effects of radioactive fallout and how a test ban would prevent more of it from being released into the human environment. But, inevitably, other national interests competed with the nuclear test ban for attention and for priority.

**The Agenda of Old-Line Agencies**

The departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the CIA each had their own advocates for policies and tactics that would have at least postponed the test ban negotiations during the decisive years of 1962 and 1963. It is entirely possible—I would say likely—that without ACDA, the key decisions that made the limited test ban treaty possible in 1963 would have been postponed to Kennedy’s presumed second term. The same could be said about the effect of Macmillan’s determined pursuit of a test ban, backed by UK Ambassador
David Ormsby-Gore at the British embassy in Washington. Without that external pressure, the agendas of other senior figures in the Kennedy administration might have been given priority in 1963.

Consider the pressures favoring a lower priority for a test ban: Secretary of State Dean Rusk strongly favored a four-party declaration committing the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union not to disseminate nuclear materials or technology to any other nation. In 1963, Rusk was personally and directly engaged in pursuing a nonproliferation declaration, which he hoped would deter or slow China’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon. By 1963, he seemed convinced that a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) was nonnegotiable with Moscow and that China would not accept it. This was a rational and entirely defensible position. Macmillan pushed for both a test ban treaty and a nondissemination agreement. Rusk’s interest in nonproliferation ultimately led to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the next major project of ACDA. The NPT was concluded in 1968. But until April 1963, Kennedy was convinced that two agreements would be more than the traffic would bear and gave priority to the test ban. On March 28, 1963, he wrote to Macmillan, “As a general principle, I dislike the thought of tying one difficult problem to another lest neither one be solved. I am inclined to think that a test ban treaty must stand or fall on its own merits.”

US Ambassador to the USSR Llewellyn Thompson, on June 8, 1961, recommended to Rusk that the US-UK proposal for a ban on atmospheric and undersea tests be revived, but with the “absolute minimum of control posts we consider necessary.” The idea went nowhere at the time. In 1963, Thompson, then the State Department’s chief adviser on Soviet affairs and one of the heroes of the thirteen days of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, was convinced that broad-based, high-level consultations with the Soviet leadership were essential in order to resolve US-Soviet geopolitical differences that had arisen before and since the Cuban crisis. He doubted, with good reason, that the CTBT could be negotiated with the Soviet Union. When the issue arose in 1963 of sending emissaries to Moscow to break the impasse in the Geneva test ban talks, Thompson argued that Khrushchev was too preoccupied with the growing split between China and the Soviet Union to take seriously a renewed effort to revive nuclear test ban negotiations. Other parts of the State Department, particularly the Policy Planning Council and the Bureau of European Affairs, were preoccupied with the Multilateral Force (MLF), a proposal for a multilateral sea-based NATO nuclear weapons force. Reflecting the opinions of the Policy Planning Council and the Bureau of European Affairs as well as his own, Thompson strongly supported the MLF.
In 1960, the State Department’s proponents of a nuclear test ban treaty had been consolidated within the US Disarmament Administration, effectively a bureau of the State Department. Created in the last year of the Eisenhower administration, it was essentially a political response to the criticism from the Democratic Party’s candidate for the presidency—John F. Kennedy—that Eisenhower had not taken arms control seriously enough. This unit became the negotiating component of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency when that was created in 1961, thus removing most of the test ban advocates from the State Department. That group of experienced diplomats then received the strong support of a newly created high-level advocacy team, ACDA Director William Foster and his deputy, Adrian “Butch” Fisher. Each was committed to achieving arms control results and the latter was highly skilled at congressional relations. Another source of strength was the recruiting of a first-class team of scientists, something the State Department lacked.

Other agencies were not heavily invested in the success of test ban negotiations. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara supported a comprehensive test ban treaty, believing that it would be helpful in blocking the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities and that the United States was ahead of the USSR in technology. The Joint Chiefs of Staff supported a comprehensive test ban treaty when the new Kennedy administration decided to introduce a slightly modified new version into the negotiations in Geneva in April 1961. The Joint Chiefs were lukewarm about another modified CTBT that was introduced into the negotiations by America and the United Kingdom on August 27, 1962, but did not object to it. They supported the limited test ban treaty also introduced at that time. By April 1963, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that “any treaty without a detection threshold under which the United States might legally test would not at this time be in the national interest.” They also, as individual heads of their respective services, declared in July 1963 that the LTBT was not in the national interest.

The US Atomic Energy Commission, charged with developing nuclear bombs and warheads and influenced by its national laboratories, had never liked a comprehensive test ban, but its leadership generally had supported a limited treaty. The AEC also supported the idea of using nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the “plowshare program.” The CIA was skeptical about the verifiability of a CTBT but thought the LTBT could be monitored satisfactorily. Based on many negative statements from Soviet officials, CIA Director John McCone believed that Moscow would not accept a limited test ban treaty, a reasonable estimate at that time.
President Leadership

Kennedy’s personal interest in securing some form of a test ban treaty

The decision by Kennedy and Macmillan to introduce draft texts of both a comprehensive test ban treaty and a limited test ban treaty into the negotiations with the Soviet Union in August 1962

The decision by Kennedy and Macmillan in spring 1963 to propose to Khrushchev that they send special emissaries to Moscow to jump-start test ban negotiations

Other actions at the highest political level, of course, also contributed to the successful negotiation of the LTBT. Kennedy’s willingness to suspend tests in the atmosphere as an act of national policy, publicly stated in his speech of June 10, 1963, was one of the principal factors. Substantial congressional support for a ban on testing in the atmosphere was another. In Moscow, the support of influential Soviet scientists for a test ban made it easier for Khrushchev to endorse the LTBT. The decisive split between the Soviet Union and China in 1963 was probably not seen as a disincentive by Khrushchev and may have encouraged him to publicly opt for an agreement with the West on a limited test ban in a speech on July 2, 1963, in East Berlin. But the Cuban missile crisis is generally thought to be the main reason for Khrushchev’s renewed interest in some version of a test ban.

At the level of diplomatic maneuvering, however, Kennedy’s interest in negotiating a treaty to end testing—which led to the decisions to draft and introduce the text of an LTBT in 1962 and to send special emissaries to Moscow in 1963 empowered to negotiate at the highest level—paved the way to the agreement.

The President’s Supporting Staff

The test ban negotiations effectively began in 1958. But not until August 27, 1962, was a three-environment treaty (or limited test ban treaty) actually introduced into the negotiations. It was initiated and drafted by ACDA. The tactics of selling that treaty to the Soviet Union were devised by ACDA in consultation with the British. The central theme of the argument was that the United States and the United Kingdom favored a
comprehensive test ban treaty and were ready to negotiate the monitoring machinery necessary for its verification, including on-site inspection. If that should prove to be impossible because of Soviet refusal to accept inspection procedures, the Western powers would accept a limited test ban treaty as a first step toward a comprehensive test ban. The British, in particular, argued that the LTBT could not become a practical object of negotiation unless the CTBT was seen by the public, and by the Soviets, as a feasible and widely endorsed goal. So, paradoxically, selling the LTBT was predicated on giving preferential treatment in negotiations to a CTBT. This was a key part of the negotiation.

Foster, supported by Fisher, was determined that the new agency should take charge of the test ban negotiations. He was less interested in a limited ban initially, but saw the tactical advantages in having a viable alternative if a total ban could not be negotiated with the Soviet Union. Support for a limited ban came from the American and British delegations in the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in Geneva and from within ACDA. The military and the AEC were more inclined toward a limited ban than a total ban, as was the Congress, but hardly anyone thought it could be negotiated. Thompson was one of those who came to think it was possible, as did I. For several years, Moscow had vehemently turned down the idea whenever it came up. Nonetheless, in the summer of 1962, ACDA’s International Relations Bureau, headed by Ambassador Jacob Beam, a Soviet and Eastern European specialist, took on the task of crafting the first draft of the limited treaty and clearing it with an interagency group.

On learning that ACDA was drafting both a new comprehensive test ban treaty and a limited test ban treaty, Ormsby-Gore told Foster that he hoped the British would be kept informed of the progress of the drafting so that Britain would not be presented with a fait accompli at the end of the process. Foster assured Ormsby-Gore that the British would be kept informed and they set up a channel between staff members of ACDA and the British embassy. Both the International Relations Bureau and the Science and Technology Bureau of ACDA, headed by Frank Long, were involved in these consultations, as well as the director, the deputy director, and the general counsel of ACDA. I was one of the few brought into the compartmentalized Kennedy-Macmillan-Khrushchev exchanges; my contact at the British embassy in Washington was First Secretary Peter Wilkinson.

The ACDA drafting team on both the LTBT and the CTBT included Alan Neidle of the ACDA General Counsel’s Office and Thomas Pickering, then a junior Foreign Service officer assigned to the ACDA International Relations Bureau and later one of America’s
most distinguished diplomats. Neidle did most of the actual drafting of the LTBT, while consulting with me and with others in ACDA about the contents of the treaty. On July 4, 1962, I passed a preliminary draft of the LTBT to Peter Wilkinson, who forwarded the text to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London on the same day. The draft CTBT was also given to the British at various stages for their comment.

The British believed that the Soviets would only accept an LTBT if it was very simple. As the interagency bargaining proceeded in Washington, that was generally the way the thinking evolved. A limited test ban treaty text was introduced by the American and British delegations in the Geneva talks on August 27, 1962, in parallel with the comprehensive test ban treaty. ACDA had drafted the CTBT and steered it through the interagency Committee of Principals during the summer of 1962. That text was quite complex and the details of inspection procedures had occupied most of the time of the Committee of Principals, in contrast to the LTBT, which sailed through without much discussion.

The two treaties were introduced into the Geneva talks accompanied by a declaration by Kennedy and Macmillan that they could accept either text, although their preference was for the comprehensive treaty. Both drafts were immediately rejected by the Soviet Union. The effect of that was to defer any discussion of the language of the LTBT until July 1963, when special emissaries Averell Harriman and Lord Hailsham began to focus on it in talks with the Soviets in Moscow.

As the preceding discussion suggests, three major questions were central to the endgame of the limited test ban negotiations:

1. First, should top priority in US-Soviet negotiations be given to test ban negotiations in 1963 or to other projects?

2. Second, how much weight should be given to the opinions of our ally, the United Kingdom, also a nuclear weapon state and the US partner in the test ban negotiations?

3. Third, how should the United States assess the growing divide between China and the Soviet Union in 1963 as a factor in US-Soviet relations?

Each of these questions was fiercely debated in connection with the proposals to send emissaries to Moscow, especially how to order US national priorities. Khrushchev’s
attitude toward the test ban had vacillated considerably. And China had become a major preoccupation for both the United States and the USSR. These developments quite naturally introduced new factors into the calculus of both nations.

After the U-2 incident in 1960, Khrushchev appeared to have felt that the revelation of the military weakness of the Soviet Union relative to the United States required some reaction by him, and nuclear weapons development became a key part of his policies. During Eisenhower's term, Berlin had been a major source of tension between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States, Britain, and France on the other, and this remained the case during the Kennedy administration. So, in 1963, Khrushchev was facing a two-front crisis, one with the other major communist power, China, in the East, and one with America and its allies in the West. Khrushchev appeared to have lost interest in the test ban negotiations after the 1960 U-2 incident, but the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 changed his attitude. He wrote to Kennedy on December 19, 1962, proposing a US-Soviet meeting to discuss the CTBT. Khrushchev had the impression that a US negotiator had said privately to a Soviet official that the Kennedy administration could accept three on-site inspections of suspicious underground events annually in the USSR. Therefore, Khrushchev said, as a gesture to President Kennedy, the Soviet government would accept a verification system that included a provision for two or three on-site inspections.

Kennedy believed—rightly, I think—that the Senate would never approve a comprehensive treaty with so few on-site inspections after having asked for twenty in the recent past. But Kennedy replied positively to Khrushchev about the idea of a US-Soviet meeting, while demurring on the number of inspections that Khrushchev had mentioned. Because of this miscommunication, trust between Moscow and Washington became severely damaged in the next month. The meetings were held in New York City in January 1963, with British participation, and the result was a diplomatic disaster.

The Soviet representatives had orders, apparently, to discuss only the number of on-site inspections, and only the two or three that Khrushchev had endorsed. The American and British delegations, headed by Foster and Ormsby-Gore, hinted at fewer on-site inspections than the previous Western position and also tried to discuss the locations of “black boxes” (seismographs stationed permanently in the territories of the parties to the agreement) and the mechanics of the on-site inspections. The idea behind the latter effort was to trade quality for quantity, i.e., higher-quality inspections could
permit fewer of them. None of these efforts to broaden the substantive agenda by including more elements made any dent on the Soviets, and the talks broke up at the end of January 1963.

Khrushchev was deeply offended that what he probably thought was his good-faith offer had been rejected. His scientists had been urging him to engage with the West on a test ban and he had done that, at the risk of his standing with the military and the Politburo. His relations with China probably preyed on his mind as well. He made his anger and sense of disillusionment clear to Kennedy and Macmillan, then and later.26

ACDA in the Endgame

Early in 1963, the test ban negotiations had sunk to their lowest depths since the Soviet Union’s fifty-megaton test in 1961, but the period also marked the beginning of the endgame. To revive the negotiations, on March 16, 1963, Macmillan initiated a new round of correspondence with Kennedy. This began a crucial month in the history of the negotiations, a month that began in despair but concluded with a victory for proponents of giving priority to the negotiations to ban nuclear tests. The debates and maneuvering that took place during that crucial month are worth describing in detail for what the events reveal about governance during the Kennedy administration.

In his March 16, 1963, letter, Macmillan asked the president to consider that negotiations in Geneva had become deadlocked and that a new high-level intervention was required. He also raised the issue of trying to negotiate an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons technology to countries not then possessing such technology. The letter hinted at a summit meeting and raised the possibility of sending special emissaries to talk with Khrushchev, specifically mentioning Averell Harriman.27 The latter suggestion had been offered to Macmillan in a message dated March 11 from Ormsby-Gore: “It would be better to send special emissaries, one from Washington and one from London.”28 This last proposal turned out to be highly fruitful.

As a practiced politician, Macmillan naturally had calculated the political benefits for himself in an electorate that favored a test ban. But in published excerpts from his diary and in his demonstrated persistence in pushing his colleagues in London as well as Kennedy toward a resumption of the effort to ban tests, his sincerity was very clear. He thought nuclear weapons were inhumane and immoral. He expressed the same thoughts as had Winston Churchill and, later, Ronald Reagan in seeing nuclear
deterrence as an evil that should ultimately be ended. He recorded in his diary that he wept for joy on hearing that the LTBT had been initialed in Moscow.

The prime minister's March 16 letter was received with considerable skepticism in the State Department. Ambassador Thompson wrote to Secretary Rusk that he was "suspicious" of this initiative. His memorandum, dated March 21, 1963, advised the secretary to recommend a reply that would reject the idea of a summit meeting and suggest that Khrushchev would be too preoccupied with the growing split with China to think seriously about the test ban negotiations.29

Ormsby-Gore had met with Kennedy privately about Macmillan's letter on March 21, but Kennedy and Rusk followed Thompson's advice. On March 28, 1963, a letter was dispatched to Macmillan that essentially adopted Thompson's views. Ormsby-Gore described it as a "disappointing document." He suggested that Macmillan send Kennedy his own draft of a letter to Khrushchev and suggested that the prime minister telephone the president about it.30 Macmillan, quite naturally, saw the Department of State as harboring "hostility" toward him but sought to put the best face he could on Kennedy’s reply, particularly its inclusion of a draft letter for Macmillan and Kennedy to send to Khrushchev. This draft letter became the key to what followed.

Encouraged by Ormsby-Gore, Macmillan sent a second letter to Kennedy on April 3, 1963, in which he enclosed a revised draft of the proposed letter to Khrushchev.31 On April 10, 1963, ACDA Director Foster sent to McGeorge Bundy, the president's assistant for national security affairs, a draft letter to Macmillan that enclosed a proposed letter to Khrushchev. I was the author of the memo to Macmillan and the draft letter to Khrushchev. As is noted in Foreign Relations of the United States, the ACDA letter differed from Macmillan's draft letter to Khrushchev:32

... principally in the almost total de-emphasis of the summit proposal, its avoidance of a connection between the issues of the test ban and non-proliferation, and its suggestion that the United States and the United Kingdom might take up with Khrushchev the proposal of the neutral nations at the ENDC for a larger number of inspections spread over a longer time period.

These were the issues that were discussed and negotiated in subsequent exchanges between London and Washington. At this point, President Kennedy, pursuing Ormsby-Gore's suggestion that he and Macmillan talk directly by telephone,
decided to get personally involved in the negotiating process. Kennedy and Macmillan, encouraged by Bundy and supported by Bundy-Rusk side negotiations, essentially took over the drafting process until their letter was dispatched to Khrushchev during the evening hours in Washington on April 15, 1963. But all was not smooth sailing by any means.

This high-level negotiation began on April 10, when Bundy sent the ACDA letter for Macmillan, with its attached letter to Khrushchev, to Philip de Zulueta, the prime minister’s private secretary for foreign affairs. Bundy advised the prime minister’s office that the president would telephone Macmillan to discuss the letter to Khrushchev. Bundy explained that the president had not had time to read either document.

The record of that telephone call in Britain’s National Archives is dated April 11, and it took place in the morning in Washington. It is available, verbatim, in the National Archives in Britain, but not in any US archives, so far as I can discover. Kennedy focused on a change he wanted to make in the draft letter to Khrushchev that Macmillan had sent to him on April 3, essentially to water down the mention of a summit meeting. He drew on the ACDA draft and, on the same day, April 11, followed up with a written communication proposing an additional change drawn from the ACDA letter.

The resulting letter, a blend of British and American thinking, was then shown to Secretary Rusk, who had just returned from Europe on April 11. Rusk and Thompson had favored sending an emissary, preferably Rusk, to Moscow to discuss outstanding US-Soviet issues. Rusk also was intensely interested in negotiating a nondissemination agreement among the four nuclear weapons states: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. Rusk was in Paris from April 7–11 and there discussed a draft nondissemination declaration with Lord Home, the British foreign secretary, and Maurice Couve de Murville, the French foreign minister. He met with Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to the United States, in Washington on April 12. The discussions left Rusk sensing that a nondissemination declaration might be possible, while a four-party test ban treaty was not. Kennedy eventually agreed to language in the test ban letter to Khrushchev that gave such a declaration equal footing with a test ban treaty in terms of their desirability but still proposed that emissaries visit Moscow to discuss a test ban treaty. The final language on summitry and nondissemination was worked out in telephone conversations between Bundy and Rusk, the last of these on April 15. Macmillan acquiesced in the compromise language.
The competition among senior officials regarding the purpose of emissaries was also resolved by proposing two missions: a US-UK team for the test ban and a US official for US-Soviet issues. Rusk would become the designated official for the latter. The letter regarding broad US-Soviet discussions was sent to Khrushchev by Kennedy on April 11, and handed by Thompson to Dobrynin the same day. Thompson had already talked with Dobrynin about the idea on April 6. Khrushchev replied positively to that letter on April 30 and his letter was handed to Thompson by Dobrynin on April 29.

By that time, Khrushchev had received the joint Kennedy-Macmillan letter, which had been delivered to him in Moscow on April 24. When the American and British ambassadors met with Khrushchev on April 24 to deliver the letter, Khrushchev was still preoccupied with the fruitless talks in New York and devoted most of the discussion to recriminations. US Ambassador to the USSR Foy Kohler's report of the conversation was fairly pessimistic and that was certainly justified by the tenor of Khrushchev's remarks. This and other Soviet actions prompted Thompson to write to Rusk, with copies to Bundy and George Ball, an undersecretary of state, on April 24, 1963: “It seems clear . . . that Khrushchev is not going to move on the test ban issue at this time. This and other evidence suggest that Khrushchev has probably given his agreement to further tests by the Soviet Union.”

When Khrushchev replied to the Kennedy-Macmillan letter on May 8, the letter was replete with complaints but clearly accepted the proposal for emissaries to visit Moscow. As it turned out, Khrushchev agreed to have test ban talks first, followed by the general issue talks. Subsequent letter exchanges between Kennedy and Macmillan and Khrushchev confirmed that the test ban mission would begin on July 15.

The National Security Council (NSC) met for half an hour on July 9 to consider the instructions for the Harriman mission to Moscow. It was clear that everyone thought the LTBT was the only realistic outcome. Other points included: (1) AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg confirming that the definition in the LTBT text would permit US underground testing; and (2) General Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reporting that the chiefs individually had taken the position that an LTBT was not in the national interest. He asked for a review of the treaty in order to take account of developments during the past year. McNamara opposed this and Rusk said that the United States must take the position that an atmospheric test ban is in the national interest and the time to review that is past. Kennedy continued that discussion with Rusk, McNamara, and Taylor in his office after the NSC meeting.
Two dramatic exercises in public diplomacy at the summit level took place in June and July, which cemented the priority for the LTBT. On June 10, 1963, Kennedy delivered his now-famous American University speech, in which he spoke movingly of US-Soviet relations and the necessity of peace. Khrushchev was deeply moved by that speech, in which Kennedy said that the United States would refrain from testing in the atmosphere. Foster had favored a moratorium on atmospheric testing to curb the radioactive contamination of the environment. He recommended this to the president twice, once in a letter in September 1962 and again in a letter dated December 7, 1962.42 Carl Kaysen, Bundy’s deputy, was sympathetic to the idea. In December 1962, he thought that a moratorium limited to calendar year 1963 might be feasible and explored that idea with the AEC and other agencies, who endorsed it with conditions. Kaysen briefed Bundy on the proposal in a memorandum dated December 26, 1962.43 Khrushchev’s December 19 letter proposing new meetings on a CTBT resulted in the moratorium idea being deferred until Kennedy inserted it in his June 10, 1963, speech at American University. Kennedy also announced in that speech that Khrushchev had accepted the British-American proposal to send special emissaries to Moscow to discuss the test ban issue with Khrushchev, the priority goal which ACDA had strongly backed.

On July 2, 1963, in a speech in East Berlin, Khrushchev stated that Moscow could accept a ban on tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space, and did not link that to a moratorium on underground tests.44 This was the first time the Soviets had ever taken that position. And so the stage was set for the Moscow talks, which began on July 15 and ended successfully on July 25.

Lord Hailsham led the British delegation and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko led the Soviet delegation. Khrushchev met with the delegations at the beginning and end. It was clear even before they went that the limited test ban treaty would be the most likely outcome and that is what happened. The text was based on the LTBT text introduced at the Geneva talks on August 27, 1962.

Two related incidents deserve mention here parenthetically, mainly because they could have derailed the Moscow talks. The first incident occurred in June 1963, when US sensors picked up signals from what might have been an atmospheric nuclear test in the Soviet Union. The State Department and the British disagreed about what to do about it. Thompson suggested a public statement from the White House and a message to Soviet foreign minister Gromyko, while Macmillan counseled silence. Kennedy accepted Macmillan’s advice and the matter passed.45
The second incident took place during the Moscow meeting in July. Kennedy was worried that if the French continued to conduct atmospheric nuclear tests, the limited test ban treaty might never come to pass or, if successfully negotiated, might be undermined. Khrushchev already had threatened a Soviet reaction if the French continued testing. Accordingly, Kennedy wrote to President Charles de Gaulle, essentially offering technical support to the French testing program if the French suspended atmospheric testing. It is fortunate that de Gaulle rejected the offer. If the Soviets had learned of US support for a French nuclear weapons program, they would have very likely concluded that France was acting as a surrogate for the US testing program. As the French weapons program proceeded, the United States reportedly did provide support, secretly.

Implications for Governance

To sum up, the answers the Kennedy administration gave to the three questions posed to it at the beginning of 1963 were:

1. Priority in negotiations with Moscow—among the test ban, the nondissemination declaration, and the high-level review of outstanding US-Soviet issues—would be given to the test ban.

2. Prime Minister Macmillan’s views on test ban issues would be given very considerable weight, to the extent that Kennedy often deferred to Macmillan’s views, disputing only the prime minister’s desire to hold out the hope of a summit meeting as an imminent possibility.

3. Although recognizing the growing Sino-Soviet split as a factor in Khrushchev’s decision-making, Kennedy accepted the British view that it was better to press ahead with an offer to send emissaries to Moscow than to assume that London and Washington knew what was in Khrushchev’s mind.

By July 1963, the world had passed through the Cuban missile crisis and the split between Moscow and Beijing was reaching its peak. In fact, Khrushchev timed the meeting on the test ban to take place after he had talked with a Chinese delegation in Moscow. Scientists in the Soviet Union had also been pressuring Khrushchev to accept a limited test ban treaty. World conditions are always critical to progress in cooperative security between rivals. But it is also important to recognize that ACDA prepared the ground for the outcome by advocating that a limited test ban treaty should be drafted...
and introduced into the negotiations. When the time was ripe, the text was ready and could be concluded in just a few days.

The point to underscore here is that a policy priority that the president favored was supported strongly with ideas and actions by an agency that had been set up by the president for the specific purpose of giving a higher priority to nuclear arms control and other aspects of cooperative security. Without that support, policy priorities and tactics favored by the traditional departments would have almost certainly carried the day, making it unlikely that a test ban treaty would have been concluded in 1963. Ironically, the White House almost always referred to papers from ACDA as being “State Department” papers. The two agencies got along well, but there were rather sharp differences between ACDA and State from time to time.

The lesson is that governance is very often a matter of being prepared for a future time when conditions are ripe for decisive action and of taking steps in the near term to build the foundation for later decisions. Without a future-oriented mind-set in the system that foresees the need to set up the pieces necessary to solve a strategic problem, successful governance in responding to foreseeable challenges is almost impossible, since otherwise the outcome is left to a chancy universe. This lesson also applies to the other global challenges cited in the opening paragraph of this paper. A preoccupation with the present that ignores threats looming ahead can only lead to catastrophe.

**The Nuclear Threat Is Still with Us**

The LTBT was the first of a series of nuclear restraint agreements between the USSR/Russia and the United States. Unlike the essentially bilateral structure of 1961–63, at the outset of the Trump administration in January 2017, the nuclear threat was manifested by three levels of state and nonstate interactions that could result in the use of nuclear weapons:

- Global nuclear competition among Russia, China, and the United States

- Real or potential regional nuclear competition in the Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia

- Extremist terrorist groups with the will and the resources to acquire and use fissile materials or to acquire a nuclear bomb already manufactured by one of the states possessing nuclear weapons
The Obama administration successfully negotiated a New START treaty between Russia and the United States and persuaded the Senate to consent to its ratification in 2011. New START required reductions in nuclear forces monitored by an on-site verification system that permitted confirmation of its obligations. The treaty has been faithfully carried out by both sides. But the nuclear competition between Russia and the United States continues unabated, taking the form of building new nuclear delivery systems. There is no immediate prospect of negotiating deeper reductions in the American and Russian nuclear forces. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 is in jeopardy because of Russian deployments of a system banned by the treaty: ground-launched cruise missiles. Other nations also are testing and deploying missile systems that both Russia and the United States are prohibited from building, a situation that calls into question the continued viability of the US-Russia INF Treaty. Ballistic missile defense also remains a controversial and divisive issue for the United States, Russia, and China, in both Europe and Asia.

In the Middle East, the United States—together with Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China—successfully negotiated an agreement with Iran that should block that nation from building a nuclear weapon for many years. The Iranians, however, continue to develop missiles, in violation of UN resolutions, and face new sanctions because of this. Political change in the Middle East since the conclusion of the agreement has mostly been in a negative direction, including confrontation between Sunni-led nations and Shiite-led Iran, much of it related to Syria. Russian military intervention in Syria has posed new dangers of armed conflict. Turkey has moved in the direction of authoritarian government and has become closer to Russia.

In South Asia, political and economic relations between India and Pakistan have improved somewhat under the leadership of prime ministers Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and Narendra Modi of India. Pakistan remains unstable, however, in the face of attacks by domestic extremists, while many in Pakistan’s military leadership still see India as the country’s primary threat. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons building program continues to add nuclear weapons to an already substantial stockpile. Nuclear conflict has to be seen as a realistic possibility between the two countries.

The Obama administration followed a policy of “strategic patience” in dealing with North Korea. The result was that no negotiation or other type of engagement that might prevent North Korea’s continued production of nuclear weapons was in place throughout most of the two terms of the Obama administration. Meanwhile, the
North Korean nuclear weapons stockpile grew to the point where it may now possess as many as twenty nuclear warheads. North Korea’s fifth explosive nuclear test was conducted in September 2016; it launched a satellite on a three-stage ballistic missile in February 2016. It continues to flight-test ballistic missiles. A ballistic missile with a range that would permit an attack on all of Alaska was tested on July 3, 2017. Although Japan and South Korea seem relatively content to rely on the American nuclear deterrent, pressure is being placed on both governments by domestic critics in those countries who favor acquiring nuclear arms. President Trump has called for a policy of pressure and engagement with North Korea and hopes China will apply maximum pressure on Pyongyang.

The Obama administration introduced the concept of Nuclear Security Summits, of which four were held as of April 2016. These and other efforts to thwart terrorists from acquiring fissile materials, along with New START and the Iran agreement, are the most consequential of President Obama’s legacies in the nuclear arena.

Much remains for future administrations to do. The threat of the use of nuclear weapons in combat is probably higher than during the Cold War. The threat comes from sources that the United States cannot very well control. And the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, one of the strongest bulwarks against nuclear proliferation, remains unratified by the United States.

**Should a New ACDA Be Created?**

Effective April 1, 1999, ACDA was abolished as an independent agency and its personnel and functions were absorbed into the State Department. I chaired the task force that designed the initial blueprint for accomplishing this. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, ACDA enjoyed unique advantages. It had the ear of the president. Its staff included talented and experienced professionals from several areas of expertise. Its leadership was focused on issues with which presidents were closely engaged. ACDA’s independence was not prized by everyone. Secretary of State James Baker told me in 1992 that he favored merging the agency with State. He added that he did not think his judgment was influenced by bureaucratic rivalry.

President Trump has asked for advice about restructuring the executive branch. Should the Trump administration create a new agency to help presidents deal with the existential nuclear threat with which the nation is confronted?
It is obviously not an open-and-shut case that a small agency that can provide advice and negotiating assets to the president would be useful. It certainly was worthwhile during much of ACDA’s existence, but the president will need to weigh the pros and cons. There is a possibility of muddying lines of authority and undercutting the ability of cabinet officers to carry out a coherent international security strategy. Career development is a problem in a small agency with a limited mandate. A small agency also can be captured by interests bent on subverting the original intent of the president and Congress, which I believe happened to ACDA at times.

The Congress would have to be consulted, of course, and decisions made about the scope of the agency’s mandate. If a new agency ever is considered, my own version of a very broad mandate is described below.

To assist the national leadership in anticipating and dealing with the nuclear threat to national survival, a cabinet-level agency should be established whose director would be a statutory member of the National Security Council. The title of the agency would be the National Nuclear Threat Reduction Agency (NNTRA). The director would be supported by a staff of scientific, technical, military, and foreign affairs experts. The nominee for this position would be subject to confirmation through the advice and consent of the Senate. The agency would be responsible for identifying major external nuclear-related threats to the well-being and survival of the United States and its people and for formulating recommendations for the president and the National Security Council to deal with such threats. At the direction of the president, the agency may be charged with consulting and negotiating with other national governments and international agencies regarding cooperative security measures to prevent or mitigate the effects of nuclear threats to humanity.

Two existing entities of the federal government could serve as the core of a National Nuclear Threat Reduction Agency. The National Nuclear Security Administration, or parts of it, could be removed from the Department of Energy and adapted to this purpose. Its current functions include maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile, responding to nuclear emergencies, and working to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. The other entity is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in the Defense Department, which also has responsibility for preventing proliferation.48

Finally, small agencies can provide an important service if they inspire other agencies of government to pay more attention to the issues a small agency was created to deal
with. I believe this was the case with ACDA. Other agencies established their own offices to handle arms control, partly to compete with ACDA’s influence.

**Afterword: Administrative Behavior**

To return to the title of this essay, I am very mindful that my writing may be seen as “a study in bureaucratic maneuvering” rather than a study in governance. In truth, I have tried to lay the groundwork for a scholarly study of governance, using the case of ACDA in 1961–63 as the basis. I am following the advice of Professor Herbert Simon, a Nobel Prize laureate who was teaching at Carnegie Mellon University when I joined the faculty there in 1989. In an article entitled “The Proverbs of Administration,” published in the *Public Administration Review* in its Winter 1946 issue, Simon argued that “principles of administration” which were being used at the time to guide decisions regarding organizational structure were useless in the absence of an understanding of the conditions under which the “principles” were being applied.49 He said, “It is to these conditions which underlie the application of the proverbs of administration that administrative theory and analysis must turn.”

That thinking caught on and other scholars subsequently conducted studies of the underlying conditions with which personnel in organizations were dealing in order to understand how the organization really worked.

One of the most influential of these studies was conducted by Herbert Kaufman, professor of political science at Yale and later a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. His book, *The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior*, was published in 1960.50 It is based on interviews with individual forest rangers who explained exactly what they did. From this, Kaufman was able to project a picture of how the US Forest Service actually worked.

My essay on what people were doing in ACDA on one specific issue at one point in time obviously is not the end of a study of ACDA but, rather, a beginning. I hope it may stimulate further research of the type that Simon advocated and carried out and which Kaufman’s work exemplifies.

When President Kennedy first spoke about organizing for arms control in March 1960, he cited gaps in planning for peace that needed to be filled and said planning for peace was as essential as planning for war. His proposal was for “a U.S. Arms Control Research Institute.” There are still gaps that need to be filled in our understanding of
how to deal with new threats, like cyberattacks, and old threats, like the thousands of nuclear weapons that should be dismantled. No government is working very hard at trying to beat these swords into plowshares and no single agency of government is likely to change public attitudes. But Kennedy was right to think that being prepared when the time is ripe for action is a useful function of government.

NOTES


9 Ibid. Document 33, Memo from the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk.

10 L. E. Thompson Papers, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. Memorandum from Llewellyn E. Thompson to Secretary Rusk and Under Secretary Ball, March 21, 1963. Numeric Files Box 408Z (1).

11 Thompson wrote to Dean Rusk on August 25, 1964, arguing that giving assurances to Moscow that control over nuclear use would not be ceded to the MLF “would damage important U.S. interests,” mostly

12 This group included Ronald I. Spiers, Vincent Baker, Lawrence Weiler, and William Gehron.

13 Virginia Military Institute holds the papers of William Foster, which show a man motivated by moral considerations to work for an end to nuclear testing.


15 Ibid., Document 318, Summary Record of the 515th Meeting of the National Security Council.

16 Ibid., Documents 134 and 180.

17 Ibid., Document 134.

18 Ibid., Document 292, Memorandum of telephone conversation between Secretary of State Rusk and ACDA Deputy Director Fisher, June 8, 1963.


22 The National Archives, Geneva tel. to FO No. 503, August 16, 1962, FO371/163102.

23 The National Archives, Tel. no. 1573, June 12, 1962, from Ormsby-Gore to 371/163098.


26 Ibid., Document 106.


33 The National Archives, Telegram no. 3538, from FO to Washington, April 11, 1963, FO371/171216.


36 Ibid., Document 275, Telegram from Kennedy to Macmillan, April 15, 1963. This telegram proposes the language on a summit and on nuclear proliferation. The editors’ notes following the text describe the Rusk-Bundy drafting activities.

37 Ibid., Document 274.


40 Ibid., Document 285.

41 Ibid., Document 318.


44 York, “Sakharov and the Nuclear Test Ban.”

45 John F. Kennedy Library, Telegram, de Zulueta to Bundy, June 22, 1963. Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Box 300.


49 These “principles” included specialization, limited span of control, hierarchy of authority, and grouping workers for purposes of control, according to purpose, process, clientele, and place.

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The Flora Family Foundation, through a generous grant to the Hoover Institution, made it possible for me and my associates to undertake the lengthy research that underlies this paper. I am deeply grateful for the foundation’s support.

In writing this paper, I realized once again the immense debt of gratitude that we all owe to so many dedicated public servants who labored during the Kennedy administration, 1961–63, to end the practice of detonating atomic bombs in the atmosphere and begin the process of cleansing the environment of radioactive debris. A few of them are identified by name in this paper, including my colleagues at ACDA, in particular. But I do not want to leave the impression that ACDA staff and leadership single-handedly made progress on the test ban possible, and so I must stress that there were many civil servants and members of the armed forces in other agencies of government who were strong supporters of the limited test ban treaty. I will cite one by name because his work in the Pentagon was indispensable in gaining the support of the Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is Capt. Edward Kline, USN (Ret.), with whom I have exchanged many reminiscences in recent years about the Kennedy era as each of us experienced it.

Among my current friends and colleagues, I will mention, first of all, three historians who guided me through archival research and reviewed my drafts more than once. They are William Burr, National Security Archives, George Washington University; Kenneth Weisbrode, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey; and James Graham Wilson, Office of the Historian, Department of State. If this paper measures up as a contribution to history, it is because of their advice and insights. Its shortcomings can only be blamed on me. I appreciate their unstinting help and value their friendship.

Although I was deeply involved in the activities described in this paper, I realized that memory alone cannot be the basis for serious studies of historical events, and so I consulted relevant archives in the United States and in the United Kingdom.

I visited the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, and conducted research there with the advice and help of Bill Burr. I received enormously useful help from scholars and archivists who conducted extensive research on my behalf elsewhere, especially: The National Archives of Great Britain; Michael Hopkins of the University of Liverpool and William King at the London School of Economics; at the John F. Kennedy Library, Lena Andrews, MIT; Maura Porter and Michael Desmond of the Kennedy Library; and at the Adams Center for Military

I enjoyed my association with these scholars and know that the world will hear much more from them in the future. At the Hoover Institution, whose Hoover Press showed its interest in this project from the start, Andrew Clark provided me with major assistance. His work in organizing the references was especially important. Susan Southworth was essential at critical moments in producing several drafts of the paper and keeping the project on track to its conclusion. Chris Dauer, Associate Director of Marketing and Strategic Communications, and Barbara Arellano, Senior Publications Manager, Hoover Press, supplied the confidence and encouragement that I needed from time to time. I am grateful for all that Hoover has done to bring this vessel into port.

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Synopsis

Public policy issues involving a complex mix of problems, exemplified today by climate change and the threat of nuclear war, require governance by institutions whose mandates and cultures embrace technological expertise as well as diplomatic and military skills. This paper is a case study of how such an institution operated during the Kennedy administration to deal with the growing threat of radioactive debris in the environment and the threat of nuclear proliferation, and also put US-Soviet relations on a new trajectory. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty might not have been concluded during the Kennedy administration had the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency not been established in 1961.

About the Author

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James Goodby participated in some of the first international security negotiations with the Soviet Union after World War II and in negotiations that helped create the international order in the Euroatlantic Community at the end of the Cold War. His latest book is Approaching the Nuclear Tipping Point: Cooperative Security in an Era of Global Change, Rowman & Littlefield (Forthcoming).