IN THE EARLY 1990s, during the heady months that followed the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the world’s diplomats, statesmen, and journalists competed to describe and define the shape of the new, post–Cold War world. The straightforward set of rules that had governed American foreign policy since the 1940s no longer applied. Our “friends” were no longer defined by their anticommunism, and our “enemies” were no longer defined by their affiliation with the Soviet Union. Many of the institutions created during the Cold War suddenly seemed irrelevant—NATO among them—and many of the specialists who had worked in these institutions suddenly found themselves at loose ends.

Some of the responses to the new situation were philosophical. Optimists like Frances Fukuyama claimed that we had reached the “End of History”: liberal democracy and capitalism had triumphed, ideological struggle was over for good.
Pessimists like Samuel Huntington predicted the opposite: the onset of new “civilizational” wars between the West, Islam, and the Confucian world. Almost unnoticed, a very, very few people—oddballs like Gary Hart and Peggy Noonan—predicted that international terrorism would soon threaten American society, replacing the threat of nuclear war.

In the event, most of the institutional and political responses to the new situation had very little to do with any of these schools of thought. Instead, they developed *ad hoc*, in response to crises like the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or the Balkan wars. If American policymakers had any philosophy at all, it was usually a rather superficial version of Fukuyama’s optimism: the world is getting safer, and our job is to help it get safer faster. During what will now be remembered as the post–Cold War era—the long decade that stretched from November 1989 to September 2001—many practitioners of foreign policy did not think much about new threats that might face the United States. Instead, they argued about what it meant to conduct foreign policy in a world without any central threat at all.

As a result, there was no real organizing American diplomatic principle to speak of. True, George Bush Senior invented the phrase the “New World Order.” But he had no policy to go with it: once the Gulf War ended, the coalition he had built to fight it quickly fell apart. Bill Clinton did have plenty of policies, but no philosophy with which to link them. “Nation-building” was the phrase sometimes used to talk about American policy in the Balkans and in Haiti. “Democracy-promotion” is perhaps more accurate. In practice, this meant that all around the world—in China, in Russia, in Malaysia, all over Africa, and above all in Serbia—the United States lectured and scolded and promoted its system, complaining about the closure of opposition newspapers, protesting the incarceration of
opposition leaders. The State Department issued annual assessments of other countries’ human rights records. NATO spent some of its time debating the pros and cons of enlargement, and even more of its time organizing peace-keeping operations in the Balkans. At the same time, more tasks were shifted onto the backs of multilateral institutions, the U.N. in particular, which were not prepared to shoulder the burdens of managing the world.

Some of these policies were not new. The United States had been promoting human rights abroad at least since the era of Jimmy Carter. In the past, however, democracy-promotion was part of the Cold War, and could be justified at home and abroad on those grounds. Promoting democracy for its own sake turned out to be more difficult, politically, than might have been expected. Professional diplomats hated it. One told me recently of the relief he feels, knowing he will no longer have to spend his days pushing American values down other peoples’ unwilling throats. Congressmen hated it too, since they could never explain to their constituents where the American national interest lay in Kosovo. The business community couldn’t understand why the oppression of Tibet need disrupt their trade with China. Ordinary Americans could never follow the intricacies of democracy-promotion, and have, as a result, consistently refused to read, think, or even speak about foreign affairs for the past decade.

But even human rights activists hated the inconsistencies of U.S. foreign policy. Everyone knew that the United States complained far more about the anti-democratic policies of indebted Kenya than it did about the far nastier anti-democratic policies of oil-rich Saudi Arabia. Everyone knew that the United States placed sanctions on India and Pakistan for possessing nuclear weapons, but not on Israel. Democracy-pro-
motion pleased no one, not even those who spent all their time promoting it.

In retrospect, it is now clear that the high point, as well as the last hurrah, of the post–Cold War decade was the Community of Democracies conference. Organized under the patronage of then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, it took place in Warsaw, in June 2000, and was attended by dozens of foreign ministers, from South Korea, from Benin, from Eastern and Western Europe. Her goal, Albright explained, was to persuade the world’s democracies to start voting together and promoting their joint interests in international institutions, much as geographical caucuses do within the U.N. That sounded innocuous enough—but the conference was a flop. The meetings consisted of empty rhetorical exchanges. The conference statements were bland and predictable. In the planning stages, the delegates argued bitterly over who qualifies as a democracy, a question that was in the end resolved by American diktat, creating enormous resentments. The Russians refused to send a high-level representative; the Iranians were furious that they had been excluded. The conference received no media coverage whatsoever—at least until the French walked out. Refusing to sign the final declaration, the French foreign minister argued that the caucus would be nothing but another means for the United States to promote its interests abroad. Off the record, others agreed.

But the real trouble with Albright’s ill-fated conference was the policy behind it. Democracy, it turned out, was too vague and ill-defined for diplomats and politicians to promote: it was like trying to promote “niceness,” or “peace.” All of which explains, in part, the breathtaking speed with which democracy-promotion is now being dismantled, and the mind-boggling rapidity with which the new paradigm, the War on Terrorism—the New New World Order—is now falling into place.
Clearly, the administration had more immediate concerns in the autumn of 2001—the war in Afghanistan, the international investigation of terrorist financing—but these will pale, in the long term, beside the foreign policy revolution which has only just begun.

**THE BEGINNINGS OF A LONG WAR**

To be fair, not all of the diplomatic changes that occurred in the autumn of 2001 are the direct result of the events of September 11. From the time of his election, George W. Bush’s administration had a very different foreign policy agenda from that of its predecessors. More interested in self-defense, less interested in self-promotion, the new government had, by the autumn of 2001, already begun to prepare the American public and the rest of the world for a long debate about missile defense. In effect, the administration was already thinking about fighting terrorism, albeit a very specific, missile-guided sort of terrorism. This was not enough to prepare the United States for the attacks on New York and Washington, but it did mean that when the attacks occurred, the Bush administration was able to turn American foreign policy around very quickly. But the situation itself also made the government’s task easier. Suddenly, the War on Terrorism, like the Cold War, provided the administration with both a practical and a philosophical guide to foreign policy, of a kind that the United States had not had since 1989.

Within days, the first building blocks of the New New World Order fell into place. Immediately, we had new allies, selected not for the quality of their free press but for the degree of cooperation they seemed likely to provide for the duration of what is going to be a long struggle against a new kind of enemy. Notably, they include Russia and China, two states with which we had previously been at odds. They also include
Russia’s Central Asian satrapies, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, both of whom have allowed us to use their territory for military purposes, something that was once unthinkable.

We also have new, more intense, and sometimes more complicated relationships with some of our older friends. Most obviously these include Western Europe and Israel (as I will explain in more depth), but there are others as well. Our relationships with India and Pakistan, for example, are suddenly both warmer and more difficult. Pakistan has already received huge injections of aid and support. During the war in Afghanistan, Pakistani officials worked more closely with their U.S. counterparts than they ever had in the past. At the same time, because there are strong links between al-Qaeda and Muslim separatists in Kashmir, the Indian government immediately offered its bases to the United States after September 11. As a result, when tensions between the two countries began to rise in the wake of a Kashmiri terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001, the United States found itself in an unfamiliar position. On the one hand, we were prisoners of our own rhetoric, bound to sympathize with the Indian victims of terror. On the other hand, we were in the unfamiliar position of dependence upon Pakistani troops, whose help we needed to patrol the Afghan-Pakistani border. In the past, we would have stayed as far away as possible from such a conflict. Now, we were drawn in, by both sides, by our own interests. It isn’t impossible to imagine such a thing happening again, in north Africa, say, or the Middle East.

Our institutions are changing too. The purely theoretical and rather dull military debates of the past decade—along the lines of “should we be prepared to fight one large war or two small wars”—have suddenly given way to very concrete, very practical discussions about how to best defend Americans at home, and how to track down terrorists abroad. NATO has
ceased to be a comfort club for Eastern European countries waiting to get into the European Union. Dusty, forgotten bits of the State Department—the Nuclear Non-Proliferation bureaucracy, for example—have already begun to receive more attention, more money, more influence, while others will be downgraded. Given the new terrorist threats to world leaders, for example, it would not be unreasonable to abandon the bloated, unnecessary, G7 summits altogether.

The role and relative importance of multilateral institutions has already changed too. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the American government instinctively looked not to the EU and the U.N., but to Britain’s Prime Minister Blair, France’s President Chirac and Prime Minister Jospin, Germany’s Chancellor Schroeder. No one wanted to talk to Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy spokesman. The U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, was hardly a major player in the first stages of the Afghan conflict either: when a real war needs to be fought, U.N. troops can’t do it, and the EU’s nonexistent army wasn’t much help either. More broadly, all talk of a “post-patriotic” or a “post-nationalist” world—in which transnational institutions would gradually take over the management of the world’s affairs—now seems redundant as well. In the wake of September 11, the nation-state suddenly looks like the only political institution capable of waging the long war against the terrorist threat.

These changes are permanent—although not everybody knows it yet. In the wake of the Taliban’s collapse, many Americans began to relax, to hanker after a return to “normality” and the old days of “the economy, stupid.” But it is too early to relax. The Taliban were toppled, but terrorism did not disappear along with them. Nor will it disappear, not in this generation, or even in the lifetime of anyone old enough to read this sentence. It has become clear, for starters, that Osama bin La-
den’s al-Qaeda is no small group of plotters, but rather a net-
work of tens of thousands of trained fanatics, “spread through-
out the world like time bombs, set to go off without warning,”
in the words of President Bush.

Nor is al-Qaeda likely to prove the last organization of its
sort. The peculiar attributes of Western capitalism—its ten-
dency to disrupt traditional ways of life, its materialism, its
cosmopolitan nature—have produced enemies in the past. Par-
allels have been drawn between the Nazi cult of heroic sacrifice,
Japanese kamikaze pilots—and the Afghan who told a British
newspaper in the early days of the war that “Americans love
Pepsi-Cola, but we love death.” Capitalism, of which America
has become the symbol, will also continue to produce enemies
in the future, and they will not necessarily live in distant parts.
Among the al-Qaeda prisoners whom the American army held
 captive in Guantanamo Bay were men from the Arab world,
from Africa, from South Asia—and from Western Europe.

Indeed, the very existence of these Europeans, three Brit-
one and up to seven Frenchmen, disproves the thesis that lay
at the heart of democracy-promotion, the traditional thesis of
benign global liberalism: that the more people of different cul-
tures come into contact with one another, the more they will
find common economic and other interests, and the more likely
it is that they will remain at peace. These ten European terror-
ists were not just similar to us: they were us. Just like the al-
Qaeda activists who started dreaming of destroying the World
Trade Center from their universities in Hamburg, the ten Euro-
peans in U.S. captivity chose to fight the West not because
they were ignorant of the West, but because they knew it all
too well.

If, in the future, others of their ilk choose to keep up that
fight, the technology is already available. By this, I don’t mean
that al-Qaeda’s plans to make chemical weapons were probably
already well advanced, or that nuclear technology is now readily available, although all of that is true. I mean, rather, that the attacks of September 11 were not the result of recent advances in fiber optics or information technology: it has been possible to use an airplane to hit a large building for the better part of a century. The explosives that suicide bombers are using to terrorize West Jerusalem aren’t exactly of recent invention either. While the latter don’t necessarily kill vast numbers of people, they’ve seriously damaged the Israeli economy, not to mention the Israeli psyche, shaping Israeli politics and security policy for years to come. Any group of ideologically driven people could, with sufficient numbers, achieve the same in New York City—starting tomorrow.

Debate about whether all this is good or bad will, of course, continue. Writing in the online journal Slate, for example, William Saletan pointed out that maintaining close relationships with unpleasant regimes will ultimately cast doubt upon our claim to be fighting against terrorists, and in favor of “progress and pluralism,” just as they once cast doubt on our claims to be promoting democracy. Others, by contrast, have rejoiced in the end of democracy-promotion. “We cannot re-engineer other societies, and we risk enormous resentment when we try,” wrote Claudia Rosett in the Wall Street Journal.

Much of the general public, however, is likely to approve of the new foreign policy. Like the Cold War, the War on Terrorism appeases the idealism of Americans: we are, after all, fighting to rid the world of an evil. But it also appeals to our realism. No intellectual contortions are required to explain why the fight against Osama bin Laden is well within the sphere of America’s national interest. At least for the moment, the “body-bag syndrome”—America’s inclination to retreat rapidly from any conflict that might actually kill an American—has vanished.
NEW COMPLICATIONS AND
OLD STICKING POINTS

But although the logic of the War on Terrorism is straightforward, the events of September 11 have not suddenly made the world into a simple place. One of the dangers of the New New World Order is that it appears, like the Cold War, to make the world appear less complicated than it actually is. They may seem straightforward, but all of our new policies, our new friendships, and our new enemies bring with them new dangers. To counter them, we will need to think very creatively indeed. After a decade in which foreign policy was considered virtually irrelevant—a decade in which the CIA virtually failed to hire any Arabic speakers—there is no guarantee that our foreign policy establishment will rise to the task.

Oddly, it is our friendships, both new and old, that may cause us some of the most formidable problems. As I say, this is going to be a long war. While it is being fought, we will need allies, and some of them will seem very strange. As was the case during the Cold War, we have already begun relationships with countries whose political systems are radically different, even inimical to ours. Our new contacts with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, for example, are unlikely to prove mere alliances of convenience: although the war in Afghanistan proved short, the country still needs to rebuild itself. For that, its neighbors may have to be roped in to help. Yet at the same time, in a world of instant communications and satellite television, it is no longer possible for anyone to hide the differences between our system of government and the Uzbek system. Countries cannot be isolated from the world now, as they could be twenty or thirty years ago. Differences will be exposed, and they will matter. This caution applies to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as
One of the great surprises of the terrorist attacks of September 11 was the instant, dramatic, and profound impact they clearly made upon the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. He not only announced his support for any American retaliation, he made an essential material contribution as well, offering the United States use of Russian-controlled bases in Central Asia, as well as access to Russian intelligence sources in Afghanistan. These decisions were clearly Putin’s, and Putin’s alone. The Russian population’s support for the American War on Terrorism is lukewarm. The Russian security establishment remains largely opposed to the United States, as it always has been, and some of its members are clearly agitated by Putin’s policy.

Yet Putin’s decisions were not taken out of admiration for President Bush or fondness for America either. As a friend of mine in Moscow put it, “The events of September 11 were so advantageous to the Russian government, you might think they flew the airplanes themselves.” While one might not want to take counterintuitive conspiracy theories that far, it is true that a number of Russia’s more ambitious foreign policy goals do suddenly appear within reach. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been looking for an international role, preferably to be played on an equal footing with the United States. Overnight, a role has defined itself: Russia will be America’s partner in the international fight against terrorism. As a result, American criticism of Chechnya will soften, and has done so already. Neither the creation of a missile defense system nor NATO expansion will grind to a permanent halt, but both will now take place only after extensive official consultations with Russia. At a post–September 11 meeting with Lord Robertson, the secretary-general of NATO, Putin seemed to give his bless-
ing to the idea of expansion. What he appears to want, above all, is for NATO to ask politely for his stamp of approval.

On the face of things, this looks like a success: for the past ten years, successive U.S. administrations have tried to lure Russia into international institutions, to tempt it into becoming an “ordinary” power instead of a rogue state. Overnight, that’s exactly what’s happened. Russia seems eager to play our game, join our institutions, help fight our war. And yet—there is still no evidence that either Russia’s economy or Russia’s system of values has come any closer to ours. Our new relationship appears to depend largely on the attitude of the president, and does not yet reflect a deeper Russian-American kinship. Down the line, Russia’s mixed motives may even bring us trouble. It will, for example, be difficult for President Bush to maintain that this is not a war against Islam, if one of his most important allies believes that this is a war against Islam. Russia’s behavior in Chechnya will invariably embarrass us too. Putin may believe that he is fighting terrorists, but Russian soldiers believe they are fighting the Chechen nation. Civilian casualties are common, the destruction of property is widespread. How will we explain our silence on Chechnya to the Islamic members of our anti-terrorist coalition?

But then, down the line, some of our other, closer, older allies may bring us trouble as well, as a wide range of conflicting currents strain the trans-Atlantic relationship. Our own feelings about Europe appear, at the moment, decidedly mixed. On the one hand, we did not need Europe’s military assistance in Afghanistan at all. On the contrary, some have begun to wonder whether Europe’s military weakness, caused by decades of underinvestment and poor leadership, will not make European soldiers an actual liability in future conflicts.

On the other hand, we still need European allies in other ways, and will go on needing them in the future. We need them
to help in tracking the flows of terrorist money, as well as in
capturing and deporting the terrorists themselves, many of
whom are based in Europe. We need European help in rebuild-
ing Afghanistan. We may also need European moral and logis-
tical support in any future war in Iraq or North Korea. Further
down the line, we will need European support in promoting
our vision of global capitalism and international free trade.

But if we are ambivalent about Europe, it is no less ambiv-
alent about us. True, government leaders and the European
public immediately expressed horror and sympathy in the wake
of September 11. Over subsequent weeks, however, the Eu-
ropean media expressed a good deal less solidarity. The New
Statesman, an influential, pro-Blair, moderately left-wing British
journal, opined that “Americans would do well to ask them-
selves why, despite what should be an enormous propaganda
advantage in beaming their way of life to every corner of the
globe, their ideals and values have signally failed to inspire the
Third World young in the way that Marxism did and Islam now
does,” and even laid some of the blame for the events on the
American voters who had the gall to choose George Bush over
Al Gore and Ralph Nader. Similar views appeared in the
French, Spanish, and Italian press.

These were not majority sentiments to begin with, but they
are slowly gaining currency among European politicians, build-
ing on a fundamental anti-Americanism that has never really
disappeared. As a result, there were first a few small incidents,
lukewarm words from the French prime minister, Lionel Josp-
pin, stonewalling from Belgian police who were asked to help
share information with Americans investigating al-Qaeda. Re-
sentment of perceived American unilateralism then burst into
the open following the publication of photographs of America’s
al-Qaeda prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, and the news that the
United States did not intend to abide by the Geneva Conven-
tion on POWs in its treatment of them. American carelessness was partly responsible: as it turned out, there was no reason for the United States not to hold a tribunal, declare the prisoners “unlawful combatants”—which they were—abide by the Convention and be done with it. But the anger was magnified, both by resentment and by partisan politics. It was not accidental that the loudest criticism of the Republican administration came from the more left-leaning members of the European press, and from the left-wing political leaders who now run most of Western Europe.

Paradoxically, the strongest American ally in Europe is in some ways the most potentially ambivalent of all. Since the afternoon of September 11, when he spoke of Britain standing “shoulder to shoulder” with America, British Prime Minister Tony Blair has taken on the role of America’s greatest ally. Yet Blair is not supporting the United States, as many Americans believe, merely out of loyalty to the United States or to the old Anglo-American special relationship. What motivates Blair is something different: his semi-mystical, quasi-religious, and rather ill-defined belief in the unique possibilities of international cooperation. It isn’t a consistent position—he has been notably uninterested in involving the European Union in the anti-terrorist effort—but it is deeply felt nevertheless. “There’s a coming together,” he said in a speech he made to his party soon after September 11: “The power of community is asserting itself. I have long believed this interdependence defines the new world we live in. We can’t do it all. Neither can the Americans. But the power of the international community could, together, if it chose to.”

While Blair’s deep devotion to an almost nineteenth-century form of international idealism doesn’t necessarily weaken the British-American alliance, it does mean that he, like other Europeans, has an agenda that Americans don’t have. He is a
devotee of the international legal system—he was one of the first critics of the American prison camp in Guantanamo Bay—and may perhaps decide it needs louder defending. Or perhaps he’ll decide, at some later date, that U.S. policy in Afghanistan—or Iraq—is not contributing as much to the growth of “interdependence” as he thought it would. Because Blair is fighting this war for his own reasons, and not for America’s reasons, he may be less than enthusiastic if it takes a direction that doesn’t suit his vision. At some point we may all find out that we are not quite such good friends as we thought.

But then, the complications that could arise from our relationship with some other long-time American allies—the Israelis—are much greater. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Ariel Sharon, the Israeli prime minister, drew the parallel between Palestinian terrorism and the terrorism of Osama bin Laden very bluntly: “Arafat is our bin Laden,” he said on the day of the attacks. A series of suicide attacks in Israel in the weeks that followed the U.S. attacks confirmed this sense, at least within Israel and the United States, and it is unlikely to go away. In his State of the Union address, President Bush himself specifically placed Hamas and Hezbollah, both active in Israel, both quietly tolerated by Arafat, among the terrorist groups whose training centers the United States must destroy. As I write this, it seems only a matter of time before the United States cuts off Arafat for good—a position unthinkable before September 11.

Outside the United States, the mood is quite different. Internationally, Arafat is hardly an admired figure. Yet neither he, nor the terrorists he tolerates, are perceived to be the sole cause of the Middle Eastern conflict either. Many in Europe believe that Israel’s occupation of the West Bank in general, and the Israeli settlement policy in particular, are also responsible for continuing strife in the region. Many Israelis believe
the same: some in the Israeli army have even begun to argue that the occupation of the West Bank is corrupting Israel’s own soldiers. This rapidly growing gap in perceptions of the Middle East leaves an open field for diplomatic, ideological, and military conflicts and misunderstandings of all kinds. If the United States wholeheartedly identifies itself with Israel, it risks being perceived around the world as the enforcer of a “colonial” regime. On the other hand, if the United States is engaged in a war on international terrorism, how can it make exceptions for the suicide bombers of West Jerusalem?

Although these issues are thrown into particularly sharp contrast by the harsh realities of the Middle East, they could emerge elsewhere too. Wherever we choose to fight terrorism—whether in Israel, in the Philippines, in Colombia, in Northern Ireland—we will also be drawn into local conflicts that have their own history, their own dynamic, their own logic. In Afghanistan, we were able to engage in a “neutral” war against what was clearly a terrorist regime. In future, we may start out a military engagement intending only to fight terrorism—and rapidly discover that our mere presence implicates us in whole welter of other, unwanted issues. Over the coming months and years, it is not only our friends who will confuse us. On the contrary, I have left the subject of “our new enemies” for the end because it is in some senses the most difficult of all.

**OUR NEW ENEMIES**

The problem is evident from the confusion over the definition of the enemy itself. We are fighting terrorists—but which ones? George Bush has spoken of a war against “terrorism with a global reach.” I assume that means “terrorism that can reach the territory of the United States.” He has also, as I say, mentioned Hezbollah and Hamas, although not yet the Basque
separatists, the Tamil Tigers, or the IRA. But why the distinction? And what if it turns out (as it has already) that the terrorists we are fighting have made common cause with some of the terrorists we are not fighting? Al-Qaeda has almost certainly funded indigenous terrorist groups in Kashmir, and this has already led us into involvement in some tricky negotiations in South Asia. Al-Qaeda has also funded indigenous terrorist groups in China: down the line, that may put us in the very strange position of aiding the Chinese government as well.

Confusion will also result from the difficulty of isolating terrorism from other international scourges. We are fighting terrorists—but how do we fight an enemy that has no army? In the case of Afghanistan, a military option was available—thanks to the Northern Alliance’s eagerness to cooperate. The same could prove true in the nations President Bush has also identified as the “Axis of Evil,” Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. When planes and bombs can be used against such countries, they should be used, not only because they work but because they will deter others.

Completely different, however, and far more difficult, will be the war against terrorists who live and operate in countries we cannot bomb, such as Britain and France. In the modern world, terrorism has the same organic relationship with organized crime that communism had with the secret police. Terrorists make use of the same shell companies, the same offshore accounts, and the same money-laundering operations as the Colombian drug kings and the Italian mafia, surviving not within states but on their fringes. Unraveling all that will also involve us in the financial affairs of many other nations, as it already has done. Dozens of banks and financial and government institutions have already been involved in the hunt for al-Qaeda funding, sometimes in strange combinations. In the wake of September 11, an Indian banker of my acquaintance,
working for a branch of an American bank in Warsaw, spent several days trolling his accounts for evidence of terrorist activity. He did so because his company requested it. If his bosses did not happen to be American, would we be able to count on his participation?

The nature of our new opponents means we need to start thinking—now—about new ways to fight them. By itself, unilateral military activity will not be enough, although I realize that some now believe otherwise. By acting decisively in Afghanistan, the argument goes, President Bush has made unilateralism work for the United States. If our allies don’t like it, we don’t care. If our opponents don’t like it, let them fight harder.

In fact, this argument draws the wrong lessons from our military success in Afghanistan. That war was won thanks in part—but only in part—to the overwhelming military might of the United States. Without the cooperation of other countries, notably Russia and Pakistan, we would not have been able to exercise that military might to such good effect. Without allies among the Afghan Northern Alliance and some Pashtun groups, we would at the very least have faced much higher U.S. casualties. In fact, the war was a diplomatic and intelligence success as much as it was a military success.

Over the coming decades, we need to develop the same mix of policies to deal with the wide mix of threats we now face. What we need is not arrogant unilateralism, in other words, but intelligent unilateralism. Intelligent unilateralism means that we do not deliberately antagonize friends, or start unnecessary conflicts. Intelligent unilateralism also means that we relearn the importance of selling ourselves abroad, both to our allies and to our enemies. Our long-term security now depends directly not just on our ability to develop and pay for better weapons but on our ability to organize our friends and manip-
ulate our enemies, on our diplomacy, and on our judicious rather than our overwhelming use of military force.

Intelligent unilateralism will also require us to become interested in a whole host of issues that we have hitherto ignored. Over time, I predict we will ourselves be interested not only in other peoples’ nuclear programs but in their immigration and asylum policies; in their police forces; and above all in their education systems. The Taliban, after all, were the product of the Pakistani madrassahs. If we want postwar Afghanistan to be a moderate Islamic state, we may have to interest ourselves in what children learn in Afghan schools. Our failure to interest ourselves in what was taught in Saudi schools may well help explain the growth of al-Qaeda itself.

Of course, by “interesting ourselves in others’ policies” I do not mean that we should simply continue our old methods of democracy-promotion, with added bells and whistles. American involvement abroad can no longer be perceived as a form of do-goodism or charity, which everyone in the United States feels to be unnecessary and everyone outside the United States finds to be hypocritical. In the new era, we are no longer selling democracy for its own sake, but exporting security, both for our sake and for the sake of other potential victims. We aren’t counting independent newspapers, we are—or should be—trying to ensure that Saudi children do not grow up believing that the United States is solely responsible for their economic failure and intellectual frustration. The president himself has called for a “new effort to encourage development and education and opportunity in the Islamic world,” and the administration has quietly pledged millions of dollars to fund education in Afghanistan.

To carry out an intelligent unilateralist policy, what we also need is not merely better weapons but better intelligence operatives, ones who are capable of working with local people.
We also need better ways of speaking to foreigners. The old, outmoded, or defunct institutions—Radio Free Europe, USIA—would be insufficient in a world where the most influential medium is satellite television, even if they still functioned as they once did. During the Afghan war, U.S. officials initially refused to appear on Al-Jazeera, the Arabic-language satellite television station. A few weeks after the bombardment began, however, they changed their policy, and rightly so: the appearance of American diplomats, speaking fluent, classical Arabic, apparently marked a turning point in Arab perceptions of the war.

Still, a few Arabic-speaking officials are unlikely to change the hearts and minds of a generation. If the launch of the Soviet Union’s first satellite convinced the American government to begin promoting the teaching of science and math, the events of September 11 should now convince the American government of the need to promote the teaching of languages and history, especially those of the “exotic” peoples and nations of which we know little. And not just the government: The education of Americans for the new era is a matter for individuals, for universities, and above all for our provincial and insular media.

The choice is a stark one: If we do not learn better ways of dealing with the outside world, then the outside world will, once again, come to us.