VI. Applying Recommended Policies to Specific Cases

IN THE PRECEDING discussion a broad and strengthened anti-proliferation policy has been outlined, based on the principles of rolling back nascent nuclear weapons capabilities and scaling back the nuclear weapons holdings of declared nuclear weapon states, relying heavily on diplomatic tools backed up by military strength. The following discussion addresses the question of how those principles and other recommendations offered in this book might be applied in specific cases. The cases to be examined are China, North Korea, Iran, Israel, India and Pakistan. In each case, a multilateral context will be essential to the success of anti-proliferation policies.

Very frequently, in the history of U.S. non-proliferation diplomacy, there has been a tendency to focus on the single issue of nuclear weapons and to ignore all the other aspects of the relationship. Ukraine, seen by the United States almost exclusively in non-proliferation terms in 1992, was a case in point, and North Korea is too. Iran comes close to that situation, and India and Pakistan received that treatment for awhile. Now, the pendulum has swung too far in the opposite direction as regards India and Pakistan, and U.S. policy has only rarely addressed the potential of a positive contribution to non-proliferation by Israel. Because the potential proliferant makes security decisions in a broader context than non-

proliferation considerations, the United States also should deal with the issue in a broad strategic context.

The discussion below describes policies that the United States should pursue within such a context.

China

As one of the nuclear weapon states, as so defined in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, China shares the responsibilities assigned to nuclear weapon states by the treaty. China's record regarding transfers of nuclear materials and technology in recent years has been good. However, China gave Pakistan considerable help in establishing that country's nuclear weapons program. It was also somewhat lax in earlier years before tightening its controls over exports of missile-related technology.

"Scale-back," rather than "rollback," is the way to think about China's own nuclear forces. This refers in particular to its short-range missiles and to possible future plans for modernizing and expanding its long-range ballistic missiles. The continuing deployment of short-range, though conventionally armed, ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan, for example, is an incitement to an arms race as well as a destabilizing element in East Asia. So far, China has been quite restrained in its deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); this nuclear force consists of some two dozen missiles, none in a high state of readiness. The future may be a different story.

China probably could build up its long-range nuclear forces quite rapidly, given its strong economy and available technology. Some forecasts anticipate a force of mobile ICBMs, armed with several hundred multiple,

independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). This would be a formidable force and it would challenge India to build up its forces. The situation also would raise concerns in Japan, Pakistan, and the Korean Peninsula. China's decisions about its future nuclear forces will play a key role in efforts to prevent a nuclear arms race in Asia, and to combat the spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations and to terrorist groups.

U.S. actions and policies inevitably will be key factors in what China does. If the United States describes China as a potential peer adversary, as was the case at an early stage in the current Bush administration, the Chinese will react accordingly. They may, anyway, since their aspirations probably include becoming a global military power at some stage. But there is no point in egging them on.

The ongoing U.S. ballistic missile defense program will have a direct impact on force developments in Asia. As the United States proceeds with its program, without question, China will insist on maintaining its deterrent force at levels necessary to compensate for the U.S. program. The extent of China's nuclear modernization, in both quantity and quality, can and will be determined by what the Chinese see the United States doing. If U.S. actions, as well as U.S. statements, make it clear that there is no need for the Chinese to overreact for reasons of their national security, this would be the best outcome for all concerned.

China thus far has been content with a modest force of long-range strategic weapons—far less than most predictions of a larger buildup dating back more than thirty years. But China's technical and industrial ability and national commitment to maintain a retaliatory capability at higher levels, if necessary, is not in doubt.

The United States should engage China in a dialogue through a Consultative Group for Strategic Security created for this purpose, similar to the group established by the Bush-Putin Declaration of Moscow. This U.S.-China group should address issues important to both, such as confidence-building, improving transparency and stability, strengthening early warning against accidental missile launch, and enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Engaging with China in this fashion should provide a better basis for U.S. program decisions. China's decision-making also could be better informed through this process, especially if it included sound technical judgments that avoided exaggerated performance claims about the proposed ballistic missile defense systems.

North Korea

Anti-proliferation policies pursued in the past in the case of North Korea (DPRK) have emphasized denial but also incentives. The so-called "Perry process," an effort led by William Perry, former secretary of defense during the Clinton administration, was an example of this, as was the 1994 U.S.–North Korea Agreed Framework. Coercive diplomacy, including the threat of force and application of sanctions, also has been tried. These policies have succeeded in slowing North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs but not in stopping them.

North Korea illustrates the limited utility of force in rolling back nascent nuclear weapons capabilities. If hostilities occurred, North Korean military forces massed just north of the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea could inflict massive damage on Seoul, the largest

population center of South Korea. In addition, popular opinion in South Korea has turned against the idea that force should be used to destroy North Korea's nuclear potential. Fear of U.S. military power no doubt influences North Korea's actions and will continue to do so. An element of coercion, backed by U.S. military force, will inevitably be a part of the U.S.-DPRK equation. But it is not likely to be sufficient to stop North Korea's nuclear programs.

The 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework acknowledged that a broad political and economic program of cooperation would be necessary to dismantle, conclusively, North Korea's nuclear weapons program. That broader program lacked political support in the United States, and North Korean behavior was not helpful. The launch of a ballistic missile over Japan in 1998 did not exactly spur on North Korea's partners to implement the Agreed Framework. And so the program was not fully implemented. At some point in time, the North Korean leadership decided to hedge its bets and to open up an alternative route to a nuclear weapons capability in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

North Korea has come closer to acquiring a robust arsenal of nuclear weapons than any of the other potential proliferants. But the lessons of previous anti-proliferation efforts in North Korea, and elsewhere, suggest that the best hope of stopping North Korea's nuclear weapons programs lies in a broad settlement of long-festering problems in and around the Korean peninsula, rather than in a narrow focus just on North Korea's nuclear programs.

As one step in targeted diplomacy in halting North Korea's nuclear programs, it may be necessary to negoti-

ate a non-use of force commitment between the United States and North Korea in the context of a freeze and dismantlement of all North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. Reinstatement of the obligations of the Agreed Framework would be accompanied by the return of IAEA inspectors with the authority to inspect the elements of a gas centrifuge facility that North Korea has acquired. At some early point, the issue of removing the plutonium, including all spent fuel rods, from North Korea must be addressed, and North Korea's nuclear weapons facilities and program dismantled.

It would be a serious mistake to allow the process to stop there. The North Korean leadership is primarily interested in survival and seems to be aware that economic changes will be necessary for that to happen. Unless the leadership becomes firmly committed to that route and convinced that it will be safe to pursue it—or the present government collapses under the weight of its domestic failures and abuses—the leadership will persist in its development of a nuclear weapons capability. Crisis will follow crisis until military action or acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapon state are the only alternatives.

The Bush administration has called for a multilateral discussion of the security issues pertaining to North Korea and its environs. This approach makes sense. It provides the multilateral context that is all-important to anti-proliferation policies. In the North Korean case, a broad program of economic cooperation involving North Korea must proceed on a multilateral basis. And security guarantees should ultimately include North Korea's neighbors—South Korea, above all. Since North Korea poses a threat to its neighbors, guarantees must be a two-way street.

Some issues probably can only be resolved through trilateral talks between the United States and South and North Korea aimed at revising the system created by the armistice agreement of 1953. Most likely Russia, China, and Japan will also play a prominent role in the diplomatic steps leading to a peace treaty and to other obligations undertaken among the parties, although not all the obligations will be of concern to every party. A new basis for a U.S. military presence in the Korean peninsula may also need to be devised, one perhaps modeled on NATO's "Partnership for Peace." Other nations should also be included in a new security mechanism for Northeast Asia. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization could be a model for this.

This book is not the place for detailed discussion of these elements of a settlement. The point here is that the goal of non-proliferation can be achieved in Northeast Asia but that it must be part of a broader and more multilateral process than in the past. Each of the longer-term items in the Agreed Framework relating to the normalization of relationships between the United States and North Korea needs to be reviewed to determine whether specific dates for implementation are possible. And they should be placed squarely in an ongoing multilateral peace process in Northeast Asia.

Are the U.S. Congress and the American public ready for this? With presidential leadership, perhaps so, especially since the alternative very likely will be not only a nuclear-armed North Korea but also the entry of Japan and South Korea into the ranks of nuclear-weapon states. This would affect China, which would affect India, which would affect Pakistan. An Asian arms race rivaling the

Cold War's U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race could be the result.

Iran

Iran is positioning itself to become a nuclear weapon state by developing the essential infrastructure, including skilled technical people. The American response has been to rely on denial policies. So far, those efforts have not succeeded in blocking Iran's programs. Russia, despite heavy U.S. pressure, has continued to assist Iran's nuclear power programs, arguing that Iran is entitled to this under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that, with enforcement of IAEA provisions for verification, Russia does not envisage a nuclear weapons threat arising in Iran. Recently Russia has begun to press Iran to accept the IAEA Additional Protocol. In the background of this controversy are Russia's interest in building influence with an important neighbor, its interest in strengthening its own economy, and its perception that it too often has been cut out of civilian nuclear power programs. The self-serving hand of MINATOM is also evident.

Unlike the case of the nuclear weapons program in North Korea, there is no evidence that Iran has acquired the nuclear material necessary to build a bomb. The evidence suggests that it will be a few years before Iran will be in a position to fabricate a nuclear weapon unless it succeeds in acquiring the material from another nation. With time available to head off Iran's becoming a nuclear weapon state, the exercise of targeted diplomacy is in order. It should involve a multilateral effort, as in the case of North Korea, not just a U.S. campaign.

Any analysis of Iran's possible motivations in acquiring nuclear weapons would probably conclude that the country has real security problems, which nuclear weapons might address, and that national prestige might also be a factor. And again in contrast to North Korea, it is possible that Iran's leadership has not made up its collective mind about acquiring nuclear weapons, even though the infrastructure is being carefully put in place.

Incontrovertibly, Iran lives in a dangerous neighborhood. To its north is Russia, a country with which Iran once had territorial disputes and with which it still has disputes concerning oil in the Caspian Sea. To its east is nuclear-armed, and unstable, Pakistan. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal may very well be influencing thinking in Tehran regarding nuclear weapons. Also in the east, a highly volatile Afghanistan still sunk in the mire of warlordism is far from reassuring. To Iran's south lies Saudi Arabia, potentially due for internal change with an uncertain outcome, and sponsor of Wahhabism, a very different form of Islam from that practiced in Iran. And to its west is Iraq, with whom Iran fought a bitter eight-year war, whose dictator, Saddam Hussein, was well on the way to acquiring nuclear weapons, and whose influence probably is still felt in Tehran. Farther afield is nuclear-armed Israel, victim of Iran-sponsored terrorism, and therefore no friend. And across the sea lies the "Great Satan," the United States, considered by the conservative Iranian leadership to be the archenemy. And, of course, the United States is the preeminent nuclear weapon state. Beyond all this, Iran sees itself as a major regional power which, in itself, creates a certain demand for advanced weaponry.

What could targeted diplomacy do about such a messy

situation? How could Iran's legitimate security concerns, which presumably are driving its interest in nuclear technology, be alleviated? Some things were done which should be a relief to Iran but which will also generate additional security concerns. Those were the Bush administration's removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, and its campaign to unseat Saddam Hussein and end Iraq's nuclear aspirations. The successful conclusion of that campaign has eliminated a major source of Iran's security concerns. But now, instead of a hostile and ambitious Saddam Hussein, Iran sees the "Great Satan" on its doorstep, in the west as in the east. It sees powerful American forces poised to deal with the next member of Bush's "axis of evil." There is talk already of "marching on Tehran" and charges that Iran is aiding Al Qaeda and the Taliban and meddling in Iraq. The need to acquire nuclear weapons may appear in the minds of Iran's leaders to be more urgent than ever.

But Iran is another example of a nation where a U.S. preventive or preemptive military attack would be highly unlikely. There is little likelihood that support would be extended from any quarter to the United States if it contemplated such an attack. Instead, the reaction of America's friends and allies, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, would almost certainly be hostile. The reaction in Western Europe would be negative and would deny the United States the support it needs to achieve its broader goals in the Middle East. Here again is a case where a nuclear proliferation problem has to be addressed in the context of accommodating the strategic interests of the United States, of the potential proliferant, and of the neighboring states.

How to achieve this? The most immediate need would be to reassure Iran that U.S. forces in the Middle East can serve Iran's interests. It will be impossible to realize the possible benefits of a U.S. troop presence in the Middle East unless U.S. policy toward Iran is radically changed, and, correspondingly, Iran's policy in support of terrorists. Iran's influence with Iraq's Shiites, of course, also will affect the prospects for a rapprochement. Given some good-faith moves on the part of the Tehran government, the United States should temper its "axis of evil" rhetoric and work to reestablish its links with that government while continuing to support democratic factions—not an easy task. Otherwise, U.S. objectives in the Middle East, including its anti-proliferation objectives, will not be realized.

In return, Iran, which has accepted IAEA safeguards, should be obligated to accept the Additional Protocol discussed earlier, which would strengthen IAEA authority to carry out challenge inspection of suspect facilities. Russia and Britain are pushing Iran hard on this issue. Iran should renounce any plans to reprocess spent fuel rods to acquire weapons-grade plutonium. Iran also should abandon its uranium enrichment program. If this is done, the United States should be willing to provide technical assistance in the energy field to Iran.

At some point in the next several years, security ties with Iran should be developed, including arms sales as compensation for forgoing nuclear programs. Iran, of course, must also take steps to make that politically possible for the United States. And that means that Iran must finally drop any support for terrorist activities. In that context, U.S. sanctions regarding many aspects of trade with

Iran also would be dropped, though embargoes relating to their ability to develop nuclear weapons would be maintained.

All this probably would prove to be insufficient to convince Iran to forgo a nuclear weapons capability if the United States alone were Iran's negotiating partner. But this does not appear to be the case, and coalition diplomacy has now come into play in order to convince Iran that it will have no support in its quest for nuclear weapons.

A second step to move Iran away from its present course would be to involve Israel in this effort. Israel's evident status as an undeclared nuclear weapon state probably is one of the factors motivating Iran in this direction. The changes in Iraq and the political changes within the Palestinian Authority may make it possible for Israel to return to some ideas it has entertained in the past. An Israeli-backed proposal for a nuclear weapons–free zone in the Middle East, to be monitored by a strengthened International Atomic Energy Agency, and guaranteed by the United States, might be a decisive step in persuading Iran not to become a nuclear weapon state. But this will inevitably await progress in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Bush administration hopes that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime will lead to the spread of democracy in the Middle East. Maybe it will, but Western-style democracy will be a long time in coming to all, or even most, of the states of the region. A more realizable, shorter-term goal would be to use the altered circumstances in the Middle East to reverse the trend toward nuclear proliferation, there and elsewhere. Iran, under the

control of the conservative clergy, will resist this but democratic change seems to be on the way. When that develops more fully, a more creative U.S. policy toward Iran could make a big difference.

Israel

Israel has never acknowledged acquiring nuclear weapons, but the general assumption is that it has built a substantial stockpile of them as its ultimate defense against hostile neighbors with populations greatly outnumbering its own, and replete with organizations that deny its right to exist. In any event, the existence of such a stockpile is accepted by governments in the Middle East as a fact and their policies are based on that proposition. The interest shown by Iraq and Iran in acquiring nuclear weapons partly derives from that assessment, as well as from their sporadic ambitions for regional dominance and their hostility toward each other. The quest to block the spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East will never be completely successful until the Israeli nuclear weapons capability is addressed in a way that satisfies the perceived security and political needs of both Israel and its neighbors.

As in every other known case of nuclear proliferation, decisions by Middle Eastern countries to build nuclear weapons cannot be divorced from the strategic context in which the motivation to acquire them was formed. In Israel's case the hostility shown by most Arab states obviously was the motivating factor, reinforced by the experience of war and terrorism.

A truce in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and its res-

olution along the lines of the two-state model being pressed by the Bush administration, is an absolute requirement for a successful U.S. anti-proliferation program in the Middle East. American national interests require vigorous prosecution of the "road map" project sponsored by the United States and several other governments, which is designed to lead to the establishment, within a relatively brief time-span, of a Palestinian state.

Absent real progress on this front, the problem of nuclear weapons will not be settled in the Middle East, and repeated "preventive" military actions will be deemed necessary, either by Israel or by the United States. The problem will not end with the departure of Saddam Hussein from the stage. The new security situation created in the Middle East by the intervention of U.S. military forces in Iraq presents all the major actors in Middle Eastern politics with an unparalleled opportunity to resolve the nuclear dilemma, or at least to begin negotiations to achieve that goal.

This is a good time to begin raising the question of eliminating all nuclear weapons from the Middle East, in the aftermath of the Saddam Hussein era, while the United States has a strong presence in the area, and while talks are under way with the new government of the Palestinian Authority to implement the road map presented to Israel and the Palestinians. Raising the nuclear issue would not be a distraction. Instead, it would help create a more positive environment from which Israel would benefit.

If it is to consider joining in discussions about a nuclear-free Middle East, Israel would require a credible security guarantee from the United States. In the context of a broad settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it

should receive one. The Palestinian Authority may ask for NATO or U.S. peacekeeping troops to oversee a settlement of the border and other elements of a settlement. This approach deserves and needs serious consideration.

If these things come to pass, it is not so inconceivable that Israel would agree to a nuclear-free Middle East. Previous Israeli governments have been ready to think about this concept, so it is not a new and radical idea. Furthermore, UN Security Council Resolution 687, adopted in 1991, contains a recommendation that the goal should be a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. This would lead to a verified abandonment of all nuclear ambitions by all of Israel's neighbors, including Iran, if given appropriate security assurances. The key to this, however, would be the continuing strong support of Israeli security by the United States, and not just promises given by other nations to remain non-nuclear.

Is this utopian? Not when the enormous seismic shock of the U.S. action in Iraq is fully recognized. Not if the interests of the Arab states and Iran are taken into account in a broad settlement of issues preventing peace in the Middle East. And certainly not in comparison with the concept of remaking all of the Middle East to conform to the democratic image that President Bush has said is his goal. In the end, this kind of settlement would be the best consequence of the huge risks taken by the Bush administration in the Iraqi intervention.

India and Pakistan

Rollback, in the case of India and Pakistan, is not likely to be achieved short of major changes in their relationships

with each other. Furthermore, given India's justifiable claim to a global power status, significant changes probably would have to be effected in nuclear relations among the declared nuclear weapon states in order for India to renounce nuclear weapons.

But India and Pakistan could become partners of the United States in an anti-proliferation campaign. It is not too late for that. At the moment, it appears that the two countries have not deployed ballistic missiles mated with nuclear warheads. In some respects, their nuclear weapons have not been completely operationalized. There is still ample scope for arranging their nuclear forces and their policies in a way that would contribute to the rollback policy advocated in this book.

What would have to be done? First, both India and Pakistan should publicly and unequivocally uphold all of the non-transfer provisions of the NPT. They should also hew rigorously to the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and, in addition, support enhanced monitoring capabilities for the IAEA. Since missile technology is also a critical factor in relations between them and other nations, each nation should accept the restrictions of the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Second, they should cap their nuclear weapons development programs where they now are. No further nuclear test explosions should be conducted. Ideally, they should both adhere to the CTBT, but U.S. ratification will be the minimum necessary to achieve that, and even that may not be enough. Actions to make the current nuclear test moratorium more stable and verifiable, as suggested earlier, should be pursued with both countries.

Third, they should implement the Lahore Declaration

issued on February 21, 1999, by Prime Minister Vajpayee of India and then prime minister Sharif of Pakistan. It was an important statement of intent, which could still be a useful basis for reducing tension and enhancing cooperation between the two countries. Unfortunately, India and Pakistan entered yet another of their periodic military crises before much could be done to implement the declaration. All of the confidence-building measures described in the Lahore Declaration should be put into effect without delay. They deal with notifications of ballistic missile flight tests, measures to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, continuing their moratorium on nuclear test explosions, preventing incidents at sea, upgrading communications links, and establishing consultative mechanisms. Such measures are even more essential when tensions are running high between the two countries.

And fourth, India and Pakistan should offer to join in regional stability arrangements with China. This could include transparency and confidence-building measures, cooperation in early warning, measures to avoid hair-trigger launch status for ballistic missiles, and, perhaps, agreements regarding ceilings on nuclear force levels

The argument of this book is that non-proliferation objectives are best attained in a context that recognizes the broad strategic interests of the countries involved, and in a multilateral framework. This presumes that the United States will press for a serious anti-proliferation policy, including rollback or scale-back of nuclear weapons. The current Bush administration has been willing to keep the nuclear weapons issue off the table so long as India and Pakistan do nothing to put it there. That has

satisfied all parties for the moment but it leaves the future very uncertain.

The Bush administration's interest in having Pakistan and India join the United States as partners in the fight against international terrorism has led to support for them in material ways. This has met some of the security concerns and some of the status questions of the two countries, and the United States should continue to work with them to enhance their security and their economic development. The element of strategic nuclear restraint must play an important part in the relationships sooner rather than later. President Bush reportedly has pressed Pakistan's President Musharraf very hard regarding Pakistan's support for North Korea's nuclear program. Neither American nor Indian nor Pakistani interests would be served by actions that stimulated a nuclear arms race in Asia. None of them would benefit from actions that made it easier for other potential proliferants to acquire nuclear weapons. These considerations should become a stronger element in the U.S.-Pakistani-Indian agenda.

To encourage such policies, the United States should offer to help in constructing an early warning system in South Asia, linking it to China, if possible. The United States should consider inviting China, Pakistan, and India to participate with it in air-and-missile defense cooperation. As recommended above, the United States should also work to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in its own defense policies, which might influence China, and thus India, and thus Pakistan, as well.

Effective safety, security, and command and control arrangements for Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons within a regime of nuclear restraint are as important to

the United States as they are to India and Pakistan. They would lessen the risk of accidental or unauthorized attacks that could escalate into destabilizing regional conflict damaging to U.S. interests. The United States should include these issues in the broad nuclear agenda suggested above, and not separately from it.

The United States should not recognize India and Pakistan as de jure nuclear weapon states. This would do great damage, perhaps fatal harm, to the NPT. Would tacit recognition of India and Pakistan as de facto nuclear weapon states by the United States weaken the NPT and the regime surrounding it? It is a clear and important U.S. interest that India and Pakistan commit themselves to the antiproliferation program recommended above. This would involve a more overt U.S. acceptance of India and Pakistan as de facto nuclear weapon states than ever before. It is worth the price.