Editor's Introduction

As virtually everyone is now prepared to admit, the problem of dealing with the threat of terrorism in an age of extant and potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation is daunting. As conceived by the U.S. government, this problem, in practical policy terms, has two main parts: the military (or "kinetic," as it is called in the Pentagon) parts, and all the other parts.

The kinetic part is easily defined: using the military to kill terrorists "with a global reach," disrupt their infrastructure, and dissuade those who fund terrorists and their state sponsors upon threat (and occasionally actual visitation) of physical injury.

The nonkinetic parts are often euphemized as the "drain the swamp" or, better, the "hearts and minds" problem. These nonmilitary aspects focus on terrorism's motivation and recruitment patterns, the sociology of terrorist groups that leads them to mobilize, compete, and strike; and the underlying social conditions said to feed that motivation and those recruitment patterns.

The kinetic and nonkinetic aspects of the war on terrorism are clearly related. If a potential terrorist realizes that he will very likely fail in his political aims and stand a good chance of dying for his efforts, this, it may be presumed, will reduce his incentive to engage in terrorism.

However, the military side of the war against terrorism is only a necessary, not a sufficient, aspect of the solution. Weapons of mass destruction are activated by *ideas* of mass destruction, and these ideas arise from a complex of historical and social factors. Ideas of mass destruction, however, are not inevitable, and U.S. government policy can be formed to minimize their production and activation.

Such policy concerning the nonkinetic aspects of the war on terrorism is not a sidebar to the war on terrorism but a crucial part of it. If such actions are not taken, the military aspects of the war on terrorism could end up *increasing* the motivation for terrorism and recruitment into terrorist organizations. Clearly, while some potential terrorists will think better of bucking American power, others may be encouraged by some combination of personality traits, religious beliefs, and social context to *seek out* martyrdom in the face of a superior but alien power. This is why overthrowing the Taliban regime and eliminating a regime in Iraq with a long history of support for terrorism (if not specifically for al Qaeda) must be construed as merely a start in the war on terrorism—and not an entirely clear-cut start, at that. To recall Churchill's famous remark, these two campaigns may be "the end of the beginning," but they are unlikely to be seen in historical perspective as anything more than that.

Now, what about that social context? No honest observer can doubt that a range of social and political pathologies afflicts the Muslim and particularly the Arab world. This affliction is attested to most vividly by Muslims and Arabs themselves. Although the motivation for terrorism is obviously related to these pathologies, it is not identical to them. After all, these social pathologies existed *before* terrorism became a serious national security concern of the United States and its allies; so it follows that terrorism is *not* an inevitable by-prod-

uct of such problems. Moreover, it will take generations to deal with the social and political problems of the greater Middle East, but dealing with mass-casualty terrorism cannot wait generations. For practical purposes, then, the problem of terrorism is separable, and must be separated, from the general issue of the social and political modernization of the Muslim and Arab worlds.

Getting at the nonkinetic aspects of the war on terrorism can be conceived as consisting of immediate, midterm, and long-term parts. The essence at all stages, however, appears to be fourfold:

1. Stigmatize the idea of murdering civilians for any political cause whatsoever, just as slavery, piracy, and human ritual sacrifice were so stigmatized in previous generations.
2. Identify and stop the flow of money and other resources at all levels from those who approve of terrorism to those who carry it out, redirecting that money and those resources to positive ends, as possible.
3. Refute, tirelessly and skillfully, the almost endless distortions of U.S. policies and motivations that are promulgated by Islamist propagandists (and others) and that inexorably make Americans and their allies targets of hatred and violence.
4. Work patiently at social, economic, and political reform (generally in that order) in Muslim-majority countries and among Muslim communities outside the Middle East and South Asia where terrorist cadres are known to have arisen.

The way U.S. and allied governments go about these basic tasks may involve many methods. One method has to do with persuasion and pressure at the private diplomatic level, espe-

cially as regards financial flows and other kinds of support for terrorism. This persuasion and pressure are where the kinetic and nonkinetic aspects of the war on terrorism have their most obvious relation. From the very start, the use of force, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, was designed to have both literal and demonstration effects. The demonstration effects were to flow from the literal effects, addressed to regimes such as those in Syria, Sudan, Libya, and Iran, for whom support for terrorism has been at some level not ideological but tactical and opportunistic. This method was one element of the Bush Doctrine, as it came to be called.[1]

At its inception, this intended demonstration effect was much maligned by critics. But look at what has happened. Sudan quickly turned state's evidence in private to the United States, and the significant progress made toward ending Sudan's civil war on reasonable terms owes much to the reduction of Khartoum's demands. In the background to the decisions made by the Sudanese government, there hovered implicitly an American "or else."

The Libyan decision in early March 2003 to do a dramatic about-face on support for terrorism and its WMD efforts looks to be another case in point of the diplomatic power of the American "or else." In this case, British and U.S. diplomacy played a major role in what deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage called "muscular multilateralism."

The Iranian decision to come at least partly clean on its own secret nuclear weapons program, as well as on its deliberate long-standing deception of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), seems to follow in train. Syria remains problematic in many ways, but grabbing al Qaeda operatives

1. See the remarks of Richard Perle, "After September 11: A Conversation," *The National Interest*, no. 65-S (Thanksgiving 2001): 84.

with $23 million and letting this be known, as happened in December 2003, can be interpreted as an insurance policy against being next on the list of an American axis of evil. Many in Washington hope that the regime in Pyongyang will get the message, too.

Power *is* important, and using it to win is *very* important. But much of what is required to win the war against terrorist recruiting and support cannot usefully be thought of as a spin-off of military efforts. Much of what is required is informational in nature. Some has to do with radio, television, and print media aimed at Muslim and Arab audiences. Some has to do with embassy outreach programs and related activities. Partnerships between government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or outright private sector efforts, may make sense for many activities in which heavy and direct government participation may be unwise.

In all these methods, however, energy should be directed toward engaging and supporting religious, educational, intellectual, and cultural elites to stigmatize terrorism in ways that *resonate with indigenous values and metaphors*. The "brand America" method, which relies on Madison Avenue trope, will not work, because it too much reminds listeners of the materialist culture they tend to identify as the problem.

The purpose of this book is to aid in the development not only of general ideas but also of *practical steps* to undermine the fetid intellectual basis that sustains the grotesque notion that terrorism is a legitimate method of political struggle. We can disrupt and minimize recruitment patterns to terrorism organizations, and, less certainly and with more difficulty, we *can* affect the underlying conditions that lead some people to wander in such a direction.

To do so will take a major intellectual effort and then an equally serious effort to operationalize our knowledge. If it is

to succeed, this effort cannot afford two types of vulgarity: that of anti-Muslim stereotyping and that of left-wing political correctness, where unpleasant truths may not be uttered in polite company. Such unfettered efforts are currently taking place in government, to be sure. Unfortunately, these efforts have not been making as much headway as even their champions would like, nor as much as they admit. They need and want help. The secretary of defense said so himself in his famous leaked "snowflake" of October 2003. This book is designed to be an answer, at least in part, to that snowflake, the full text of which is provided at the end of this introduction.

I want to acknowledge the support of the Hoover Institution and the encouragement of its director, John Raisian, in the development and publication of this book as part of its National Security Forum series. A debt of gratitude is also due Tod Lindberg, editor of *Policy Review* and a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, for his discerning editorial counsel. And, of course, I want to thank all the contributing authors who, despite already busy schedules, took the time to prepare essays for this volume.

Rather than put together a standard Hoover Institution collection of ten or twelve essays, each about 5,000 words in length, I have roughly doubled the number of essays and roughly halved their average length. I did this to involve a greater number of perspectives, for many perspectives are needed to do the subject justice. Moreover, as those who have worked in senior government positions know, principal decision makers do not typically read lengthy analytical discourses; they read memos. Therefore, I wanted the essays in this book to be closer to the literary form to which senior decision makers are accustomed, hoping to make it more likely that at least some decision makers will read them.

I also selected authors *all* of whom can work in at least one

Middle Eastern language and whose intimacy with the social settings and political cultures involved is beyond question. I did this, I confess, because of a lingering irritation. There has been a great and natural surge of interest in all things Middle Eastern and Islamic since September 11, 2001, and a horde of clever but often untutored journalists has risen to satisfy that interest. The results have not been particularly edifying. One simply cannot learn the nuances of the Middle East and of Islamic culture in a few days, weeks, or even months under the pressure of a magazine deadline. Those who think they can, or think they have actually done so, only illustrate how truly clueless they are: What they *do* know is so modest that they cannot fathom what they do *not* know. Thus, my decision as to author qualification is not no to journalists (there are some represented here), but rather no to amateurs.

I asked some authors to focus on the diplomatic aspects, some on media and information management, and some on educational and religious aspects of the problem. I asked some to focus on particular countries or questions. I asked all to consider immediate, midterm, and longer-term aspects of the problem. Most of all, I asked all authors to write as though they were addressing senior policy makers; I asked them to write crisply, to the point, and as specifically as the venue allowed. I also asked them to write quickly, so that we would not get stuck, as is so typical, in a drawn-out process that would render many ideas and proposals obsolete before their time.

I got some of what I asked for. But not every writer I invited accepted. Not all who accepted produced an essay. Not everyone was as crisp, as specific, and as quick as I had hoped. This has left some gaps, geographical and thematic, in the result. No essay focuses on Egypt or on Afghanistan, for example, which is unfortunate. Shutting down terrorist finances is

not covered in as detailed a fashion as I had hoped, because little that one can say about this effort in public is worth saying, and what is worth saying cannot be said in public. The same goes for many aspects of intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation across borders.

There is more than I expected in the volume about public diplomacy; there is also more controversy over methods than I expected. The release of the Djerejian Report on public diplomacy, sponsored by secretary of state Colin L. Powell, after this project began but before it was completed, has only raised the prominence of the subject; but alas, obviously, for reasons of timing, the authors in this book were unable to attend fully to that report.[2]

I do not agree with everything said in this book, but I have seen my role as editor as that of intellectual impresario, not as censor. To use a sartorial metaphor, I have chosen the fabrics and defined the kinds of garments to be made, but I have neither crafted nor worn them.

I have also had a difficult time deciding on an order of presentation, not least because those who looked at specific countries did not leave off commenting more generally (which is good), and those who aimed to comment more generally sometimes invoked specific examples (which is also good). Though these are good traits, it makes for tremulous organization of the collection as a whole.

This does not disturb me, however, and it should not disturb you, dear reader. This book's imperfect cohesion reflects well, I think, where the country and the world are with regard to this problem: colloquially put, both are all over the place,

2. The formal title of this report is *Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World* (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Muslim World, October 1, 2003).

which is *part* of the problem. (In any event, beyond this introduction, I decided to put my own two cents into this collection to make up for its frailties, to the extent I can.)

For all of the book's imperfections, the result is still a valuable one. The range and quality of the analyses, the sophistication of the disagreements, and the nuggets of specific proposals in this volume justify the effort exerted to produce it. Moreover, the fact that the collection works as a kind of political Rorschach test has a value of its own. Put this cluster of questions, as I did, before a group of experienced and intelligent men and women from America, Europe, and the Middle East, ask them to be practically minded and swift in their response, and this, exactly, is what you get. Years from now, perhaps, those wiser from experience than we are today will learn something just from that alone. One may hope so, anyway.

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Washington, D.C.
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