Conclusion

Domestic intelligence in the United States today is undermanned, understudied, undersupervised, uncoordinated, technologically challenged, tied too closely to criminal law enforcement, and (the same point, really) dominated by an agency (the FBI) that, because its primary activity is law enforcement, is structurally unsuited to play the central role in domestic national security intelligence—and all this at a time of extreme danger and vulnerability. A terrorist who wants to enter the United States can do so with relative ease either with forged documents or by being smuggled across the Canadian or Mexican borders. The U.S. government has to be able to find, follow, watch, overhear, deceive, bribe, and expose (and not just arrest and prosecute) suspected terrorists plus groups and individuals that assist them by providing safe houses, financing, weapons, or other forms of support. To this end it must collect and compare and analyze masses of data concerning foreign visitors, plants where weapons are made and stores where they are sold, laboratories where lethal pathogens and toxins are stored, locations and shipments of radioactive materials, potential targets, and much else besides. Nor can the threat posed by homegrown terrorists in the era of weapons of mass destruction be ignored.

Reorganizing the FBI cannot be the answer, given the deep tension between criminal investigation and national security intelligence. There is urgent need for a domestic intelligence agency, modeled on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, that would be separate from the FBI and would have no authority
to engage in law enforcement. Such an agency would not draw staff from the FBI; the Bureau would retain its existing intelligence responsibilities and staff.

The recently announced reorganization of the Department of Homeland Security includes creation of a nascent domestic intelligence agency within the department; that nucleus should be expanded into a full-fledged Security Intelligence Service that would focus on (1) building cooperative relationships with the U.S. Muslim community in order to enlist its aid in detecting terrorist activity, (2) surveillance and penetration of suspected terrorist groups, and (3) creating a nationwide “eyes and ears” network of public officers on the alert for possible terrorist plans and acts. The director of the Security Intelligence Service should be dual-hatted by the Director of National Intelligence as his deputy for domestic intelligence. In that capacity he or she would be charged with coordinating all federal domestic intelligence services with each other and with the other intelligence services.