The Soviet Preparation for Reykjavik: Four Documents

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The Documents

The four documents attached to this memorandum come from the Kataev papers, which are lodged at the Hoover Archive. (The translations are by Natalya Porfirenko of the Hoover Institution.) At the time of the Reykjavik meeting, Vitalii Kataev was deputy chief of the Defense Industries Department in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. An engineer by training, he had worked in the "Yuzhnoe" missile design bureau in Dnepropetrovsk. He joined the Central Committee staff in 1974. Besides holding the position of deputy chief of a department, he was also head of a special section in the Defense Industries Department dealing with disarmament. He was thus intimately involved in the formulation and coordination of Soviet arms control policy.

Document 1, *Material on Nuclear-Space Arms in Preparation for the Meeting with R. Reagan*, is much longer than the others. It was evidently prepared as background for the Soviet position. The most interesting elements are perhaps the assessments of the relative standing of Soviet and American R&D

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with respect to nuclear weapons and ballistic missile defense. (Kataev Collection, Box 2.)

Document 2, *Thoughts for the meeting with R. Reagan*, draws heavily on Document 1 in the recommendations it makes. (Kataev Collection, Box 1.)

Document 3, *Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, was written after Document 2. Among the signatories are: the head of the Politburo commission for overseeing negotiations and Central Committee secretary responsible for the defense industry, Lev Zaikov; the head of the KGB, Viktor Chebrikov; the defense minister, Sergei Sokolov; two Central Committee secretaries Anatolii Dobrynin and Aleksandr Yakovlev; and the first deputy minister of foreign affairs, Anatolii Kovalev. (Kataev Collection, Box 1.)

Document 4, *Key Positions*, sets out the Soviet position for Reykjavik. Attached to this document are the directives that the Soviet Union hoped would be issued by the General Secretary and the President to the Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State, if the meeting proved successful. Also attached is the draft resolution for the Politburo approving the key positions and the directives. (Kataev Collection, Box 1.)

The Context

The best way to provide the context for these documents is to look briefly at the account given of the Soviet preparation for Reykjavik by Anatolii Chernyaev, Gorbachev's foreign policy advisor.[1] The idea of the Reykjavik meeting came to Gorbachev in August, when he was on vacation in the Crimea. He was frustrated by the slow progress at the negotiations in Geneva and wanted to breathe new life into the process of arms reduction.

1. A. S. Cherniaev, *Shest' let s Gorbachevym* (Moscow: Kul'tura, 1993), pp. 105–117.

Gorbachev instructed Chernyaev to ask the Foreign Ministry to work out the specifics for a meeting with Reagan, but Chernyaev was very disappointed with the result. He told Anatolii Kovalev, first deputy foreign minister, that the most important thing was "big politics," not the details of negotiation.[2]

A few days before Gorbachev left for Reykjavik, the Politburo met to discuss draft directives that had been prepared by Marshal S. F. Akhromeev, Georgii Kornienko, and Yulii Vorontsov. On the day before the Politburo meeting, Chernyaev gave Gorbachev his own assessment of the draft by Akhromeev and his colleagues. It was not favorable. He did not think that the draft would serve Gorbachev's purpose of stunning Reagan with daring proposals. The Soviet position, he thought, should start with strategic weapons, not with nuclear tests and space. Gorbachev should repeat his commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons, and renew the proposal to cut strategic weapons by 50 percent in the first stage. Then should come medium-range systems: Gorbachev should propose elimination of all medium-range missiles in Europe and leave the British and French forces to one side. The ABM issue should not be linked, in the first instance, with the issue of reductions in strategic arms, but rather with the banning nuclear tests: "if there are no tests, there will be no SDI."[3]

At the Politburo meeting, Gorbachev rejected the Akhromeev-Kornienko-Vorontsov draft and adopted most of Chernyaev's suggestions. According to Chernyaev's notes, Gorbachev summed up the Politburo meeting as follows: "Our main goal now is to prevent another new stage in the arms race from taking place. If we do not do that, the danger for us will grow. By not retreating on some specific, even very im-

2. Ibid. p. 107.
3. Ibid. p. 111.

portant questions, from what we have stood firm on for a long time, we will lose the main thing. We will be drawn into an arms race that is beyond our strength. We will lose, because now for us that race is already at the limit of our possibilities."[4]

Some Comments

Document 1 (*Material on Nuclear and Space Weapons*) may be the initial document prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Chernyaev was so unhappy with, but it might also have been prepared by another agency. Document 2 (*Thoughts for the Meeting*) seems, from internal evidence, to correspond to the draft instruction prepared by Akhromeev and his colleagues. It is not clear where Document 3 (*Central Committee*) fits into the policy process. It includes the proposal to eliminate all medium-range missiles in Europe, but it still leads with the nuclear testing and space issues. Chernyaev's influence on the Soviet position at Reykjavik is evident from Document 4 (*Key Positions*).

These documents show how much evolution there was in the position Gorbachev would take at Reykjavik. He and Chernyaev were deeply involved in the process of preparing that position, and they were willing and able to override important institutional interests in defining it. Nevertheless, the fact that there was a Politburo resolution approving Gorbachev's negotiating points probably means that he could not go beyond them.

SDI and the Soviet responses to it receive a good deal of

4. Ibid. pp. 112–113. These notes correspond to the minutes of the Politburo meeting given in *V Politburo TsK KPSS . . . Po zapisiam Anatoliia Cherniaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiia Shakhnazarova (1985-1991)* (Moscow: Al'pina, 2006) pp. 85–87. The minutes of the Politburo meeting in English can be found, along with other relevant documents, in *The Reykjavik File* at the National Security Archive (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm).

attention in these documents, but there is little technical criticism of the U.S. program, apart from some muted comments in Document 1. Kataev later regretted that Soviet specialists did not pay sufficient attention to the critical analyses of SDI by "several groups of American scholars at Stanford and Cornell universities, at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, at the IBM Corporation, including S. Drell, F. Long, R. Garwin."[5]

DOCUMENT 1

Material on Nuclear-Space Arms in Preparation for the Meeting with R. Reagan

I. Ban on nuclear testing

1) Possible proposals for a bilateral moratorium on nuclear testing by the USSR & the USA.

a) Propose to the USA that it conclude an agreement on a bilateral moratorium on nuclear testing by the USSR and the USA (preferably before the end of our own moratorium) for any period of time. Moreover, immediately after the start of the moratorium begin negotiations on the total banning of nuclear tests. The longer the moratorium—the better; it will reduce the advantages attained by the USA during our unilateral moratorium.

b) If the US refuses to join the moratorium starting January 1, 1987, propose that it agree to a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing or a bilateral moratorium in one or two years.

This time interval will allow us to conduct tests, on a speeded-

5. Vitalii Kataev, "Kakoi byla reaktsiia v SSSR na zaiavleniia R. Reigana o ravertyvanii rabot v SShA po SOI," Kataev Collection, Box 7, CD — COI, p. 5.

up schedule, in accordance with our existing program of nuclear arms modernization and eliminate the lag created as a result of our unilateral moratorium, especially in the development of weapons based on new principles. The test yield threshold of 150 kilotons (kt) will be respected under this arrangement.

c) For the purpose of softening the negative reaction of world public opinion to the resumption of nuclear tests by the USSR for the aforementioned one to two years, we can offer to lower the yield threshold of our tests to a level that limits the possibility of developing strategic nuclear weapons and of creating third-generation weapons with nuclear pumping (an evaluation of the acceptable yield threshold is given below).

Over the course of negotiations several test levels could be considered.

d) For these purposes we can agree to a proposal put forth by a number of countries to set an annual quota on the number of nuclear tests conducted by the USSR and the USA, possibly in conjunction with a limit on the yield threshold.

A base-level proposal including 10 blasts a year is acceptable, including: two tests of 150kt each, four tests of 50kt each, and four tests of less than 20kt.

2) Proposals regarding yield thresholds for nuclear weapons tests

a) The accepted threshold of 150kt allows us and the Americans to develop nuclear charges for all types of arms up to 600kt, including weapons based on new principles (directed energy) which are being created for national missile defense (BMD) and Space-based Strike Systems (SSS). It is possible to

create, with confidence, charges with yields 3-4 times greater than the threshold.

b) Lowering the threshold to 100kt will not in practice change anything for us or for the Americans. New nuclear charges will be created for all types of arms (the same as with 150kt threshold) and the arms race will continue with the creation of ever newer types of nuclear weapons.

c) With the threshold set at 50kt, it is possible for us and the Americans to develop nuclear charges that are one-and-a-half to two times more powerful than the threshold (around 100kt). With this yield it will be possible to develop directed energy weapons, tactical nuclear weapons and a limited range of strategic nuclear weapons (up to 100kt); sharper limitations will arise if the threshold is reduced further.

d) With a threshold of 20-30kt it is possible to develop most of the systems for BMD and SSS (X-Ray lasers, boosted & directed electromagnetic pulse, directed X-Rays, high-frequency directed energy, and kinetic energy).

The development of weapons for strategic weapons to counteract the American SDI program will be precluded, but the development of charges for tactical weapons will continue.

e) Lowering the threshold to 10kt will prevent the Americans and us from developing nuclear charges more powerful than 15kt. It will restrict the development of combat models of directed-energy weapons with the required specifications. Work to complete the development of tactical nuclear charges will continue, as will elucidation of the possibilities of creating weapons based on new principles, and theoretical calculations and experimental research on the creation of models of

charges up to 100–150kt will continue, with possible tests in the future, should the threshold be raised.

f) With a threshold of 1kt it will be impossible to develop any thermonuclear charges including for weapons based on new principles. It will be possible to work on the development of kinetic weapons with limited effectiveness characteristics; to perfect the elements of equipment for generating directed electromagnetic pulse; to test arms and military equipment for their ability to withstand the effects of nuclear explosions; and to conduct theoretical calculations and experimental work to provide the scientific basis for the further development of nuclear weapons. Keeping in mind that the US has a more powerful computing and experimental base, it will possess certain advantages at this threshold.

Therefore, the most acceptable thresholds limiting the further development of nuclear weapons, but in practice not harming the other side, are in the 10–50kt range. With a reduction of the threshold yield to below 10kt, the USA will have certain advantages in further improving their nuclear weapons due to their more powerful computing and experimental base.

3) The state and time-tables of work on directed energy nuclear weapons

The main reason why the US refused to join our unilateral moratorium is their desire to complete research on the design concept for directed-energy nuclear weapons, work on which began in US in the 1970s.

The principle of action of the new type of weapons consists in transforming part of the energy from a nuclear explosion into powerful streams of directed X-rays or electromagnetic radiation or a stream of high-energy particles. Such directed

streams are capable of disseminating a distance of several thousand kilometers in space, and weapons systems created on their basis are capable of striking, in space or from space, ballistic missiles, their warheads, satellites and other targets at those distances.

Moreover, work is being conducted in the US on the creation of kinetic energy nuclear weapons, in which a nuclear explosion creates a stream of metallic fragments of small mass that travel at more than ten kilometers per second and are capable of striking targets in space, including warheads, with a direct hit.

According to our sources, the Americans have conducted 10 underground nuclear tests for the purpose of creating an X-ray laser weapon. No less than three tests were conducted towards the creation of directed electro-magnetic radiation weapons, and two tests were performed in relation to kinetic energy weapons. The nuclear tests that were conducted for the purpose of creating these types of weapons took place during our moratorium.

Full-scale development of these weapons is expected to occur in the second half of the 1990s.

In the USSR, research on the possibility of creating directed energy nuclear devices analogous to those being developed in the USA has been ongoing since the late 1970s. Beginning in 1980, there have been 5 underground nuclear tests conducted in our country to study the possibility of creating nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers. Three further tests were prepared but postponed in connection with the announcement of our moratorium. One underground test was conducted to evaluate the feasibility of kinetic energy weapons; the test showed the potential plausibility of accelerating a small mass to high speeds.

Considering that the US has conducted more research on the creation of directed energy nuclear weapons, has a better experimental laboratory base, and has continued nuclear tests for this type of weapon over the period of our moratorium, the US has achieved results in this area which surpass those of our country.

With a complete ban on nuclear testing or a bilateral moratorium, full-scale development of directed energy weapons would be completely excluded both in the US and in our own country.

4) The consequences of a complete ban on nuclear weapon testing for the development of our country's strategic arms.

The technical level of the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) of the USSR is on a par with the level of strategic offensive forces of the United States. Given a complete ban on nuclear tests, the combat effectiveness of the SNF could be maintained at the current level for the next 5–10 years through the production of nuclear charges already developed and tested according to existing technology.

a) However, under these conditions it will be impossible to modernize/improve them (the charges) or raise their combat effectiveness. Development of future warheads for strategic systems such as the land-based RT-23 UTTH system, the sea-based D-19 UTTH system, and the air-launched strategic cruise missiles (Kh-90 and Kh-90S) will become more complex. Ground-penetrating nuclear munitions for striking heavily defended targets will not be created, nor will warheads with an "untouchable" regime.

b) The most negative effects of a complete ban on nuclear tests would affect our strategic defensive arms. The possibility

of developing nuclear weapons of the new generation—directed energy weapons (X-ray lasers, high-intensity electromagnetic and super-high frequency radiation, kinetic, etc.) for space-based anti-missile systems will be completely excluded. X-ray warheads will not be created for the "Nariad—V" anti-space system and the A-135 Moscow ABM system.

c) Work to check the ability of arms to withstand the effects of penetrating radiation from nuclear explosions will cease, since currently only by means of nuclear explosions can one ensure the complex impact of all the factors involved in weapons effects.

Should nuclear testing cease it would be possible to confirm the combat-readiness of nuclear munitions only by calculations and modeling. However, these methods would be incomplete and will not guarantee the readiness and reliability of the munitions.

d) A unilateral cessation by the Soviet Union of nuclear testing would lead to the military-technical superiority of the United States in the area of nuclear arms, especially where the development of munitions of the new generation for strategic weapons is concerned.

In the case of a joint decision with the United States to ban nuclear tests, the existing parity will be preserved, and the possibility of developing nuclear weapons of the new generation will become problematic for both the USSR and the USA.

II. Regarding Space Weapons

1) Whose materials are being used to evaluate the condition of work on space weapons in the USSR & USA?

The development of our country's space weapons was analyzed and evaluated on the basis of directives from the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union: "The main directions of development of arms and military equipment," development programs, five-year R&D plans, decisions to develop individual models and weapons systems.

The capabilities and development times of prospective space-based weapon systems are based on the reports and conclusions of governmental, inter-departmental, and expert commissions, taking account of the current state of affairs in the organizations developing the systems.

Space-based weapons of the USA are evaluated on the basis of the classified materials of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff, the KGB, scientific-technical institutes of the Academy of Sciences and of the defense industrial ministries, as well as on open materials in the domestic and the foreign press.

Given the lack of reliable information about the opponent, it is not to be excluded that the information about certain types of weapons might be somewhat exaggerated.

The main materials used for comparing prospective space-based arms in the USSR and the USA up to the year 2000 and beyond are the conclusions of inter-departmental commissions (the commission of Academician Velikhov and others).

2) Comparative evaluation of ground-based echelons of missile defense in the USSR and the USA.

During the first stage, up to 1990, the US will continue R&D on short- and long-range interception.

The USSR will conduct similar work, and in addition the Moscow "A-135" missile defense system will enter into service.

During the second stage, up to 1995, the US could begin the testing and then the deployment of all three complexes for close, medium, and long-range interception: Sentry, HEDS, and ERIS.

The USSR plans to complete development and begin deployment of the "Sambo" complex for close interception for defense of command posts and missile silos, and the "S-550" medium range system for the defense of especially vital administrative and industrial centers.

During the third stage, up to the year 2000 the US might numerically increase the ground-based echelon.

The USSR plans to deploy the "A-235" for the defense of Moscow and the Moscow industrial region.

Overall, work on creation of the ground-based missile defense echelon in the Soviet Union and the US is at approximately the same level.

3) Comparative evaluation of the state of work on the space-based echelons of BMD in the USSR and the USA.

During the first stage, up to 1990, the US plans demonstration tests of prototypes of elements of prospective space weapons for destroying ballistic missiles. The USSR plans to conduct

only fundamental and exploratory research into space-based missile defense systems.

During the second stage, up to 1995, the US plans demonstration tests of space-based kinetic and laser weapons for intercepting ICBMs in the ballistic & terminal stages of their flight trajectory. Furthermore, the US plans to work out the principles for interacting with information systems. The USSR plans to develop a demonstration-test model only with missile weapons.

During the third stage up to 2000 the US might begin deployment of a group of space-based systems with missile weapons and might continue to conduct tests in space of electro-dynamic and laser weapons.

At this stage, the USSR can conduct flight tests of space systems with laser and electro-dynamic weapons.

The full-scale deployment of space-based missile-defense systems can be expected after 2010. We need to bear this in mind while looking at our own programs.

Overall, the Soviet Union lags approximately 4–5 years behind the United States in research on creating the elements of a space-based missile defense echelon.

4) Why are we lagging behind the US in the development of a multi-echeloned Missile Defense System?

We lag for two reasons. The *first* is the poorer technological quality (compared to the US) of the basic critical elements required for multi-stage missile defense: optical-electronic systems, small high-performance computers, laser gyroscopes, cryogenic systems, etc.

The Americans are close to completing work on heat-seeking

guidance for interceptor missiles with infra-red self-guided warheads. We have not developed models of this type of technology.

Comparison of the technical characteristics of the elements being developed in the USSR and the USA shows a technological lag on the part of the USSR in the production of hyper-clean materials for receivers and integrated circuits, in the degree of integration of the elements, in the precision of diamond-polished optics, in the creation of hyper-sensitive deep-cooled receivers in the long-wave infrared spectrum, and in the creation of smaller on-board computers.

The second is the insufficient development of the test base and the limited quantity of high-performance equipment for the processing and manufacture of complex elements of space technology.

Moreover, we began work on space-based strike systems later than the United States, as a responsive measure. We have been able to devote fewer scientific and industrial resources to this area based on our existing capabilities.

5) Is it possible to create a perfect multi-echelon Missile Defense System to intercept all incoming warheads?

An evaluation of the possibilities of the SDI system currently being developed by the United States shows that 100 percent interception of all missiles and warheads is in practice impossible.

An analysis conducted by the Ministry of Defense, together with industry (Research programs: "Duel-2," "Vekha-2," "Countermeasures"), shows that around 2010–2020, even with the creation of several missile-defense echelons, the effectiveness of the US BMD System—and then only theoretically—will

be approximately 99% (i.e. 1% of warheads will be able to penetrate to their intended targets).

As far as the final American goals in creating a full-scale BMD system are concerned, an analysis based on classified and unclassified materials, conducted by the Inter-departmental working group comprised of the leading specialists from industrial organizations, the Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Defense (created by the Military-Industrial Commission on June 6, 1985), shows that the Americans think that a multi-echelon missile defense system should allow, at most, 0.1% of the attacking missiles to get through.

It will be possible to evaluate the real prospects of achieving such BMD effectiveness only after the problem of creating weapons based on new physical principles, of nuclear weapons of the third generation, is solved, and by taking account of the measures which the other side can take to overcome or destroy the multi-echelon missile defense system.

Only in the mid-1990s, if a treaty banning nuclear tests is not concluded, will there be the basis for a real assessment of the time it will take to build a national BMD system in the United States.

6) Is it possible to distinguish reliably between offensive and defensive space-based systems?

Any space-based system carrying strike weapons (kinetic, energy beam, nuclear) is both offensive and defensive.

There is no basis for separating space-based strike systems into offensive and purely defensive categories. This distinction is useful to the US to mask the true goals of creating a multi-echelon missile defense system (SDI). In reality, this is a strategic offensive system designed to destroy the warheads of our

missiles and also other objects in space, on earth and in the air.

It is possible for the Soviet Union to recognize the presence of these strike systems in space. Before entering service, they will go through a phase of development and testing in space. The space-based strike group will grow gradually and be placed into orbit at various altitudes and angles. To destroy our missiles and warheads, the US will need to put into space hundreds of space strike vehicles. That is why we have created and deployed a space-monitoring system. The USA will not be able to deploy these assets without our observing them.

Our national means of inspection allow us to determine if an object in space has nuclear weapons on board. It is extremely difficult to determine by technical means the presence of other weapons.

7) Why it is necessary for the USSR to keep the 1972 ABM Treaty in effect for no less than 10 years?

Ever since it entered into force in 1972, the ABM Treaty has been considered by us to be the foundation of the system of international agreements on arms limitation and reduction. Only mutual restraint in the area of BMD makes it possible to make progress in restraining the race in strategic offensive arms. The treaty is of unlimited duration (art. XV). In that regard our position remains unchanged: to maintain the ABM Treaty regime. This is necessary for us as we seek to delay the creation by the US of a multi-echeloned missile defense system, to gain time to conduct analogous work in our own country, and to develop counter-measures against the US BMD.

For that we must gain agreement that the USA and the USSR will not withdraw from the treaty for up to 15 years and will

observe all of its provisions, including the ban on deploying ABM systems for the defense of the territory of the country. It is especially important to achieve a ban on development (except for laboratory work) and testing of space-based systems and components.

It would be possible to accept an agreement not to withdraw from the treaty for 10 years on condition that all of its provisions are observed, and then, in the following five years, to conduct negotiations on the problem of national multi-echelon BMD system and strike space systems. As a last resort, the timing of the negotiations could be shortened to 2.5–3.0 years.

8) Why and for what purpose did the Soviet Union create an anti-satellite system?

The work done in the 1960s to develop a Soviet anti-satellite system was a necessary response to the creation in the U.S. of ground-based missile complexes such as "Nike-Zeus" and "Nike-Hercules." These missiles could have been used by the Americans to destroy low-orbiting Soviet national technical means of verification, and communications and navigation satellites.

In 1983 the Soviet Union unilaterally announced a moratorium on the testing of its anti-satellite system, abandoned its deployment, and ceased the launch of "IS-M" satellites.

The USSR is proposing to conclude a bilateral agreement banning the testing and deployment of anti-satellite systems.

9) Why does the Soviet Union launch 4–5 times more space vehicles than the United States?

There are in space, on a permanent basis, about 170 space vehicles operated by the Soviet Union, and about 150 by the United States.

We conduct about 100 launches per year, the United States about 20. The disparity in the number of launches (approximately 5 times), despite an almost identical number of continuously operated space vehicles in orbit, can be explained mainly by the shorter life-span of our space vehicles.

III. Strategic Offensive Weapons

1) Why is the problem of reducing strategic offensive arms connected to the ban on creating a broad-scale ABM system with space-based components?

This is not a new problem. The USSR and the USA encountered it at the end of the 1960s in the process of working out SALT-1. At that time, the USA was creating a limited ground-based ABM system (Safeguard), and even then it became apparent that if one side creates an ABM defense, then the other side is forced to search for means and methods of overcoming it, in order to prevent the opponent from destroying its offensive capabilities.

In the course of the negotiations, both sides jointly acknowledged that there is an unbreakable link between strategic offensive and defensive systems. It is not a coincidence that in 1972 the USSR and the USA simultaneously signed the ABM Treaty and the Interim SALT Agreement. Moreover, both sides indicated in the aforementioned documents that only mutual restraint in the area of missile defense would make it possible to move forward to limit and reduce strategic offensive arms.

Now the USA has decided to break that linkage. It intends to deploy a space echelon for national BMD, on the basis of weapons being developed on new physical principles. Such a BMD system, combined with the growth of strategic offensive arms, is designed to create a first-strike capability without the fear

of retaliation. In other words, the aim is to disarm us in the face of the U.S. nuclear threat. Under these conditions it would be impossible for the Soviet Union to reduce its strategic nuclear forces because that would objectively help the United States to achieve a decisive military advantage over us. There will be one result: an uncontrolled arms race.

2) Under what conditions would the USSR agree to cut its strategic offensive weapons by 50%?

A radical reduction (by 50%) of strategic offensive arms would be possible under the following conditions:

First — if the USSR and the USA do not withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty for a period of up to 15 years and observe all of its provisions including the ban on development (except in laboratories), testing, and deployment of space-based missile-defense systems and components. It would be possible to agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and to carry out its provisions for ten years, and then, in the next five years (or even 2.5-3 years), to conduct negotiations on the problem of multi-echeloned missile-defense systems and space-based strike systems.

Second — if strategic offensive arms are considered as a "package." All components (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) must be subject to reduction to the agreed levels in the number of delivery systems as well as warheads. Each side would retain the sovereign right to determine the numerical composition of its weapons within the framework of the maximum overall levels for strategic offensive arms. No component of the strategic offensive arms could have more than 60% of the charges in the total.

Third — long-range sea-launched cruise missiles should be

limited (the US plans on having 4,000 units) and included in the overall total for strategic offensive arms. These missiles should only be deployed on certain (agreed) types of submarines. It would be possible to include sea-launched cruise missiles in a sub-total (for example, 400 for each side) without including them in the overall framework of warheads and delivery systems of strategic offensive arms.

Fourth — mobile land-based missile complexes should be permitted, so that the survivability of our ICBM force can be maintained in the case of a sharp overall reduction of strategic offensive arms. For the purposes of verification, an appropriate system has been developed with the use of national technical means.

3) How does the Soviet Union intend to take account of sea-launched cruise missiles?

Sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of more than 600km are a new type of nuclear weapon and according to the classification of SALT II they are strategic weapons. They should be counted.

We propose to count them in one of two ways: 1) to include them in the overall strategic offensive arms framework or 2) not to include them in the overall framework, but to limit them under a separate agreed sub-level. In both cases the cruise missiles would be restricted to specific types of submarines (two types for each side).

The verification of these limitations could be achieved with the help of national technical means on both sides, and in certain cases through agreed measures, even up to on-site inspections. Furthermore, in relation to verification the Soviet side is proceeding from the following: if a cruise missile has under-

gone flight tests with a range of more than 600km, all cruise missiles of that type would fall under the limit; cruise missiles with a range less than 600km must be differentiated from long-range cruise missiles, otherwise they too would fall under the limit. Any cruise missiles with a range over 600km should be considered a nuclear delivery system, regardless of its actual payload, and be included under the appropriate limits on nuclear charges. Long-range cruise missiles should not be deployed on surface ships.

4) How should heavy bombers armed with nuclear weapons & SRAM missiles be counted in the totals for strategic offensive arms?

We agree that each heavy bomber equipped to carry only nuclear bombs and short-range guided missiles (type SRAM) should be counted as "1 unit" for both delivery systems and warheads.

5) At what stage of the negotiations on nuclear and space arms would it be possible to remove the question regarding U.S. forward-based nuclear weapons?

The Soviet side has never removed the question regarding forward-based American nuclear weapons/capabilities during START. These weapons supplement US strategic capabilities and represent a real threat to the territory of the Soviet Union.

If we did not push for a cardinal resolution of this question during SALT-I and SALT-II, that was only because, with a small reduction in the level of strategic armaments, the correlation of forces was not substantially affected by these forward-based systems. Now, however, when there is talk of reducing strategic offensive arms by 50%, the weight of these forward-deployed American systems grows immeasurably in

importance in the overall balance of forces. Therefore, we must not let them out of our sight.

Only if the US agreed to a solution of the problem of space weapons that is acceptable to us and eliminates on a reciprocal basis their medium-range missiles in Europe, could we then not insist on complete elimination of U.S. forward-based American nuclear weapons and limit ourselves to a US commitment not to increase their number in the future.

6) Why are American proposals from 2/1/85 and 9/18/86 unacceptable to the Soviet Union?

Both US proposals are unacceptable to us for the following reasons:

First — The reduction of strategic offensive arms is being proposed without a solution of the problem of space, that is, in isolation from the ban on space-based strike weapons. We cannot do that in conditions where SDI and other strategic defensive systems are not limited.

Second — According to the American proposals, a significant part of strategic nuclear weapons would remain outside the framework of reductions: sea-launched long-range cruise-missiles (4,000 units) and SRAM missiles and atomic bombs on heavy bombers (5,000 units). This would allow the US to have roughly another 9,000 charges above the proposed limit on nuclear charges (7,500 units). This way, the quantity of nuclear warheads carried by US delivery systems would not decrease but actually increase.

Third — The suggested sub-ceilings for nuclear charges on ballistic missiles and especially ICBMs are aimed at achieving a radical break in the structure of Soviet strategic nuclear forces—on the American model. We would have to reduce

sharply our heavy ICBMs, destroy the mobile ICBM launch platforms, and in their place build heavy bombers in order to observe the established limits on the components of the strategic offensive forces.

The United States would retain all of its strategic programs and would even be able to increase the warheads on its ICBMs by almost 1,000 units and reduce its strategic arms by eliminating obsolete Poseidon missiles and B-52 heavy bombers.

The purpose of these proposals is not to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement; they are aimed at giving the United States a one-sided military advantage.

7) How does the USSR propose to resolve the question of heavy ICBMs in START reductions?

The question of the Soviet SS-18 heavy ICBMs has a history of its own. It was a topic in the US-Soviet negotiations in 1974 in Vladivostok. Then it was established that the USSR had grounds for keeping the quantity of heavy missiles that it possessed at the time, as long as the question of U.S. forward-based systems remained unsolved.

The Soviet Union did not increase the quantity of its SS-18 missiles, while at the same time the US has significantly increased its forward-based nuclear systems capable of reaching the territory of the USSR. The Americans added to their arsenal the new MX ICBMs, which are just as capable as the Soviet SS-18 missiles.

	ICBM "MX" (USA)	ICBM SS-18 (USSR)
Range (km):	10,000	11,000
Accuracy (CEP), m:	130	230
Total Warheads (number x payload), kt:	10 × 600	10 × 500

Despite the facts outlined earlier, the USSR has taken into account the concerns of the United States. We are proposing deep cuts in the strategic arms of both sides, including, of course, the Soviet heavy SS-18 missiles.

8) How could verification of land-based mobile missile complexes be achieved?

Verification of mobile missile systems could be carried out by national technical means. The quantity of ground/road complexes would be verified through the number of stationary structures positioned in the deployment. Rail-based mobile systems could be tracked by the number of wagons in the train that have special distinguishing markings.

Mobile systems would be included in the totals for strategic arms once they leave the factory or other place of final assembly. These factories and assembly places would be indicated in advance, and notification would be provided of the number of complexes. Mobile complexes would be removed from the totals for strategic arms as they were being dismantled at specially designated sites known to both sides. Should it be necessary to resolve unclear cases, on-site inspections could be conducted by agreement of both sides.

9) What can be said about the division of strategic nuclear arms into "stabilizing" and "destabilizing"?

The terms "stabilizing" and "destabilizing" were introduced by the current US administration. The administration considers "destabilizing" those forces that are the most developed by the USSR and constitute its combat might—in particular the Soviet ICBMs, which, according to the Americans, should be liquidated. Those systems in which the USA is strong, such as SLBMs, "Pershing-2" missiles, and heavy bombers that can

carry 20–28 cruise missiles each, are considered as forces of "stability and security."

Right now all strategic weapons are nearing each other in terms of their destructive capabilities. Between our ICBMs and the American "Trident" SLBMs there is no difference in terms of combat effectiveness (range, accuracy, and warhead yields). *This is the reason why strategic arms (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) should be considered together, as a united whole. This is the fundamental basis of the negotiations.* This makes possible the radical reduction of strategic arms and the drawing up of an equitable agreement that would not harm either side—on condition, of course, that space-based strike systems are banned.

10) Why is the USSR refusing to create "strategic defense" in collaboration with the USA?

If one side deploys offensive and defensive systems while the other has offensive systems, the first side attains a significant strategic advantage by acquiring the ability to launch a disarming first strike. In that case, it doesn't make any sense for the second side to reduce its strategic offensive arms. It must reserve for itself the ability to restore the strategic balance.

R. Reagan concedes this in his SDI speech on March 23rd, 1983. He states that "Defensive systems, if paired with offensive systems can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy."

However, when *both sides* have both offensive and defensive systems, the situation becomes worse than when they have only offensive systems. Calculations show that if one side has even insignificant, minor advantages in the effectiveness of its defensive systems that immediately destabilizes the whole situation. Considering that the systems are controlled by com-

puters, critical situations could arise. This situation remains even if there is a significant reduction in the level of offensive arms. That is, if both sides have defensive systems, reductions in the level of strategic offensive arms will not guarantee stability for either side. This is especially so if one side is clearly set on achieving superiority in defensive systems, as is the case with the United States.

Therefore, the USSR considers the simultaneous deployment of offensive and defensive systems to be inadmissible. We are for radical reductions in nuclear weapons, even for their complete elimination, but without deployment of large-scale BMD systems, without the creation of space-based strike weapons. This is the real path towards the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons.

IV. Medium-Range Missiles

1) What is the essence of the "zero-option" for reduction of medium-range missiles in the positions of the USSR & the USA?

The "zero options" of the USSR and the USA are complete opposites. The Soviet Union, in the framework of the "zero option," has proposed to eliminate all Soviet and American medium-range missiles in the *European Zone* and freeze the number of Soviet "SS-20" missiles in Eastern areas. The US would be required not to transfer its strategic and medium-range missiles to third countries, and Britain and France—not to increase their corresponding nuclear arms.

Our "zero-option" is a compromise in terms of the nuclear forces of Britain and France, making it possible to solve the problem without harming anyone's security and without upsetting the military balance.

The American "zero-option" proposes the elimination of medium-range missiles *on a global basis*. This means that the US reduces its medium-range missiles in Europe alone, while the USSR reduces its missiles both in the European part of the country and in the East. The Soviet Union is being forced to undertake unilateral disarmament, to the detriment of its own security, since the nuclear threat to the Soviet Union in the East from the US would remain the same and could even increase over time, while the Soviet means of neutralizing that threat would be subject to elimination.

The USSR is prepared to solve the question of its medium-range missiles in Asia. But at the same time the question of how to deal with American medium-range and forward-based nuclear arms deployed in the region and balanced by our medium-range SS-20 missiles, must be resolved.

Note: In the Far-East, the US has 510 medium-range and forward-deployed nuclear units/systems, including: 240 carrier-born aircraft, 124 long-range cruise missiles, 156 F-16 and F-4 jets in Japan and South Korea.

2) What is the essence of the "interim" option for reducing medium-range missiles in the positions of the USSR and the USA?

The Soviet "interim" option concerns the reduction of American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe down to the same level of warheads (100 warheads for each side). The USSR would then have no more than 33 SS-20 missile launchers in this region and would freeze the number of these missiles in Asia. The US could have 25 cruise missile launchers in Europe (with elimination of the Pershing-2), and on its own territory, except in Alaska, it could have a number of missiles no greater than the number of warheads on the Soviet "SS-20"

missiles in Asia. The US would be obligated to not deploy its medium-range missiles in other parts of the world where they would be capable of reaching the USSR. And so, according to the interim option of arms reduction, we move towards global parity in the number of warheads on medium-range missiles, with the understanding that the USSR would keep its medium-range missiles outside of Europe, in Asia, and the US would have an adequate quantity of medium-range missiles on its own territory.

The United States proposes as its "interim" variant a reduction *on a global basis* to 200 warheads for medium-range missiles. The USSR would then have 100 warheads in Europe and in Asia. The US would have 100 warheads in Europe (including Pershing-2s) and 100 warheads on American soil, including Alaska. The American proposal is not equitable because the USSR would have to reduce its missiles several times than the United States would have to do (almost 10 times the number of missiles and warheads).

Note: The USSR in Europe and Asia has 553 medium range missiles mounted with 1363 warheads. 487 medium-range missiles and 1165 warheads would have to be reduced.

The US has 164 medium-range missiles mounted with 332 warheads. Only 33 medium-range missiles and 132 warheads would have to be dismantled (this includes the number of missiles which would have to be redeployed from Europe to the United States).

3) Why is it necessary to include the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France?

Britain and France take the view that their nuclear arms cannot present a real threat to the Soviet Union due to their in-

significant number, and that they need these weapons for the purposes of national defense.

In reality, their position in NATO is different. It is NATO's Nuclear Planning Group that plans the use of British and French nuclear weapons, and in case of possible war they could be used against the Soviet Union.

With respect to the nuclear warheads of Britain and France, even now they have over 600 nuclear charges. Over the course of the next 10 years, this number is going to double. If the Soviet Union and United States were to eliminate their medium-range missiles in Europe, NATO would have a one-sided advantage. It should be borne in mind that the use of this number of weapons against the European territory of the Soviet Union, even without the use of American nuclear forces, could put the Soviet Union in a critical situation.

4) Why do we need to have 100 medium-range warheads in the West?

If our "interim" option is realized, we have to take into account the possible doubling of the nuclear forces of Britain and France over the next 10 years. This increase would put us in a situation, similar to the American "zero-option," where we would have no medium-range systems for effective retaliatory actions in a possible nuclear war.

In order to reduce somewhat the possible degree of risk, and to deter NATO countries from starting nuclear war, we are proposing an "intermediate" option which will eliminate American "Pershing-2" missiles and keep at least 100 "Pioneer" [SS-20] warheads for us.

5) Why do we need medium-range missiles in the East?

In the East, a powerful grouping has been deployed consisting of U.S. forces, the armed forces of Japan, South Korea, and other states. These forces have nuclear capabilities amounting to about 1,140 delivery systems and 2,000 warheads.

In order to fight such a powerful enemy in the conditions of nuclear war, we need to have in the East approximately as many nuclear munitions. Currently we have around 1,000 medium-range warheads, including 486 warheads on 162 "Pioneer" missiles. [PAGE CUT OFF]

DOCUMENT 2

Thoughts for the Meeting with R. Reagan

Below are some thoughts on key issues that might become the subject of discussion at the meeting with Reagan in Reykjavik with the aim of finding principled solutions to them.

1. Nuclear Tests. Maintain the principled line on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. At the same time it would be possible to accept that as a result of the meeting an agreement would be reached at least to start negotiations on this question on a bilateral or trilateral (USSR, USA, Britain) basis.

Agree that in the framework of such negotiations questions relating to the ratification of the "threshold" treaties of 1974 and 1976 will be discussed at the beginning (simultaneously express readiness to lower the threshold from 150 kt to 100 kt).

In this way, the question of ratification of the aforementioned treaties would be decided in tandem with US agreement to start completion of the comprehensive test ban treaty. In this scenario, pressure from the world community on the US for complete cessation of nuclear tests should not weaken.

2. *Space-based arms.* Besides confirming our principled line on a full ban on space-based strike arms, it would be possible to try to agree on an interim solution on the basis of a compromise taking account of both our and American proposals on the question of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

The decisive factor in defining this compromise is that for an agreed period of time, during which they will not withdraw from the Treaty, the parties will strictly abide by its terms, among them: that they will not only not deploy, but also not develop (apart from laboratory research) and will not test space-based antimissile weapons.

If the American side agrees to this well-founded formulation of the question, it would be possible to make specific in the following way our formula, contained in the letter to Reagan, about the 15-year period of non-withdrawal from the Treaty.

During the first 10 years (this would be the mean between our number "15" and the American "5") the parties would completely observe all the terms of the ABM Treaty, as was stated above.

During the subsequent period of no more than 5 years, the parties would conduct negotiations with the aim of finding further solutions in this area (if they have not succeeded in doing so before the end of the 10-year period). As a reserve position, it would be possible to reduce the period of negotiations from 5 years to 2.5–3.0 years.

Questions regarding what the parties would be permitted to do, and not permitted to do, during the period of negotiations (including the question of extra-laboratory tests of space-based ABM means and the question what to do in the event of fruitless negotiations) would be subject to further discussion, after the initial agreement is signed.

In this way, the compromise character of this option would

consist of the fact that we: 1) we accept the American framework (basic period of non-withdrawal + the period of negotiations); 2) we are reducing the basic period of non-withdrawal from 15 to 10 years. From the American side the concession consists in agreeing to our lawful demand that during the agreed period of non-withdrawal from the Treaty they can not only not deploy but also not test (outside the laboratory) anti-missile systems and components banned by the Treaty.

If the United States does not test these weapons over the next 10 years, that will allow us to decrease our lag behind them in creating the space-based echelon of ABM defense. Unless they observe the requirement to ban not only deployment but also testing, the aforementioned periods of non-withdrawal from the Treaty—whether 10 years or 15 years—will make no real sense. A commitment by the United States only to refrain from deploying during that period ABM elements that are now banned would not particularly limit it, since in any case it could not create a multi-echelon full-scale national ABM system in that timeframe.

3. Strategic arms. In the event that there is an agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, based on the compromise outlined above, then it would be possible not to oppose setting the level for the total number of charges at 7500, as the Americans propose, and not at 8000, as we have proposed, as long as the same level of 1600 delivery vehicles for both sides is established (the Americans have agreed with this figure of ours).

It is extremely important, however, that each side should have the right to determine for itself the composition of its own strategic forces (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) within the limits outlined above. In this connection, the United States should withdraw its demands for establishing a sub-level of 1650 charges for heavy missiles (which for us would mean

cutting them almost by half), for reducing by 50 percent the total throw-weight of our strategic delivery vehicles, and also for banning mobile ICBMs. Acceptance of these demands would mean a radical and expensive break in the whole structure of our strategic forces, while not affecting the American structure in any way.

At the same time Reagan could be given to understand that, with a reduction in strategic delivery vehicles to 1600 and of charges to 7500, the number of our heavy missiles will in fact be reduced, though not to the extent that the United States would like (if necessary, the Ministry of Defense will report on a possible specific model of the proposed reduction in that event).

As far as long-range sea-based cruise missiles are concerned, we could agree that if they are not included in the overall number of 7,500 charges (the US will not accept their inclusion), the parties could have a certain quantity of them on specified types of submarines (the details would be subject to agreement in negotiations).

In this way, in terms of strategic arms the points on which we have moved are: 1) we agree to the number of 7500 warheads proposed by the Americans; 2) we are ready not to include in this number the sea-based cruise-missiles; 3) we indicate our willingness to reduce somewhat the number of our heavy missiles. The American side would be required to give up the manifestly unfair demands that would lead to the breaking-up of the structure of our strategic forces, which was formed as a result of objective causes, including geographic ones.

In addition, Reagan could be told that if interim agreements on space and strategic arms can be reached and implemented on the basis outlined above and if the subsequent negotiations on these questions develop in a favorable direction,

then over the course of the next 10-15 years (the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty) it would be possible to reach and implement an agreement on a 50% reduction of the parties' strategic offensive aeapons.

4. Medium-Range Missiles. In preparing these considerations the following two options were reviewed.

First option: The USSR and the USA reduce their Medium-Range Missiles (MRMs) in Europe to the level of 100 charges on them (USSR—33 SS-20 missiles, USA—25 cruise missile launchers). The number of Soviet MRMs in the East would be frozen at the current level, and the USA could have the equivalent number of MRMs on its own territory. The number of missiles with a range less than 1000 km that the parties have would also be frozen.

In the event of such an interim option, we are willing, as we expressed for the first time in a recent letter to Reagan, to withdraw our demand that British and French nuclear weapons not be increased, and this gives us every grounds for insisting—and not without a chance of success—that in response to our great concession, the US should agree to remove all its "Pershings" from the FRG and withdraw its demand that Soviet MRM in Asia be reduced to 33 units (100 warheads), accepting a freeze at the current number.

This option is preferable for us, because, among other things, the USSR would retain 100 MRM warheads in Europe, which is extremely important for the West's understanding that we have the capability to inflict a retaliatory missile-nuclear strike against targets in Western Europe.

Second Option: Soviet and American missiles in Europe are completely eliminated, our demand that Britain and France not increase their nuclear weapons is withdrawn, and the US removes the question about Soviet missiles in Asia or that question is set aside for subsequent negotiations.

Analysis of this scenario has shown that, if with the complete elimination of our MRM from Europe we withdraw the demand that British and French nuclear weapons not grow, already by 1995 the quantitative ratio in medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe will be 2:1 in favor of NATO. What is especially dangerous is that the USSR would be left exclusively with medium-range aircraft as delivery systems (330 bombers with around 600 warheads on them), while NATO would have almost 30% of its charges on British and French Medium-Range Missiles (a total of 277 delivery systems with 1269 charges, including 1122 charges based on missiles, while we have none).

Taking this into account, it is advisable in the course of the negotiations with Reagan to try to reach an agreement based on the first (interim) option.

DOCUMENT 3

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

The meeting in Reykjavik will be conducted in an atmosphere where people from all over the world, and especially in Europe, are turning towards the policies of the Soviet Union. In the United States itself people are no longer just waiting but are insisting on decisions that would stop the arms race and the descent of the world towards nuclear war.

Reagan agreed to this meeting because, due to the internal situation in the country, he can no longer, it appears, continue to maintain a negative stance on nuclear issues and US-Soviet relations. For the same reason it will be difficult for him to leave the meeting without positive results.

Thus the entire international situation is favorable to achieving a breakthrough at the meeting in Reykjavik on the main points in the field of disarmament.

From our side it is essential to take advantage of this and to propose to Reagan in Reykjavik that we reach agreement, at the level of principle, on the most important questions in the nuclear sphere. According to the results of these talks, agreed and binding directives should be given to the ministers to work out the texts of the appropriate treaties and agreements, which could be signed at the next summit meeting in Washington.

It is advisable to base the negotiations, on general as well as particular questions, not on the assumption that exchanges of nuclear strikes are possible but on the reduction of military potentials to the limits of sufficiency necessary for defense.

Taking this into account, it is possible for us to take the following position in Reykjavik:

1. *A Ban on Nuclear Weapons Tests.* We should once again firmly present to the American side the question of the necessity for a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions (in that case we would evidently be required to cease peaceful nuclear explosions as well). However, our exchanges with the Americans show that this proposal remains unacceptable to them. Representatives of the current administration, including the President himself, state that unambiguously, disregarding the obvious propaganda cost to themselves. Therefore, while continuing to conduct our principled line on a cessation of nuclear tests, both in public and in our contacts with the Americans, including in Reykjavik, it would nevertheless be advisable at this stage to try to obtain from the US agreement to accept partial, but substantial, limits aimed at achieving the final objective of a complete and general ban on nuclear weapons tests.

If the American side brings up the question of ratification of the threshold treaties of 1974 and 1976, say that we are prepared to ratify these treaties and, if necessary, to make more

precise the system of verification. Emphasize that we are ready to accept complete, effective and absolute verification. But now the ratification of these treaties alone is no longer enough. We need to go further. Propose, in this connection, to open negotiations on a bilateral basis, or with the participation of Britain, on a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests.

We could confirm that our moratorium will be effective even after January 1, 1987, if the American side does not conduct nuclear explosions. It is probably not advisable for us to accept a temporary moratorium restricted to some specific period of time.

Given that the American side is obviously not ready to agree to a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, it would be advisable to propose the following option: to reduce the yield of the explosions to 1 kiloton. If the US is not ready for this either, we could propose that the yields of the explosions do not exceed 5, 10, 20 or at the most 30 kt. The number of nuclear weapons tests should be limited to 2-3 per year, but not more than four. (Note: Limiting nuclear explosions to the threshold of 10-20 kt will cause significant difficulties for the realization of our program in the area of space-based ABM.)

Peaceful nuclear explosions would be permitted for the intensification of oil extraction, exploration of the Earth's core, etc. Within the limits of a 20 kt yield it would be possible to conduct 1-2 explosions a year.

The question of verification would be resolved by mutual agreement. Here, evidently, it would be possible to agree on any effective methods of verification, with the use of necessary apparatus of different types. This would apply to both nuclear weapons tests and peaceful nuclear explosions. The experience of the American scientists' use of apparatus in the region of Semipalatinsk could be taken into account. It would be pos-

sible also not to exclude use of the American apparatus of the "Corrtex" system.

This position, which envisages concessions from both sides, would create an opportunity to pull the Americans into negotiations on the banning of nuclear tests. Such an approach could give the Americans too—if they wanted it—a way out of the general dead end in which they have put themselves by their position. We would get an opportunity to demonstrate some flexibility and at the same time to demonstrate our principled line on a comprehensive test ban, showing ourselves at the same time to be realists.

2. *Strategic offensive arms and space.* The order in which questions regarding the limitation of nuclear and space weapons will be discussed could be determined taking into account the course of the conversations with the US President.

In these questions it would be worthwhile to pay attention to the fact that the reduction of strategic offensive arms should reflect the mutual concern of both countries about the existing threat of nuclear war. That also found expression in the joint declaration on the results of the Soviet-American meeting in November of last year. It is after all the Soviet Union and the United States that have the overwhelming majority of nuclear weapons of that kind.

It would be appropriate to reaffirm our commitment to the 50% reduction in offensive arms, which was stated in the joint declaration of November 21, 1985. Of course, implementation of such reductions can take place if the parties simultaneously agree to ban space-based strike weapons, i.e. weapons which are capable of striking—from space—objects in space, in the Earth's atmosphere, and on the Earth's surface.

Say that we see, on the basis of negotiations at various levels, that the American side is interested in a different plan—an interim solution. Here an identical position on the number

of delivery systems has already emerged—1,600 units each. Say also that the Soviet side is in favor of letting both sides determine, within the framework of that level, the relationship between ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. We welcome the fact that the American side expressed at the negotiations its willingness to remove the fixed level on the number of heavy bombers that it had earlier proposed.

There is a small disagreement on the number of nuclear warheads, but this could be easily resolved. We are prepared to agree to 7,500 warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. For ICBMs and SLBMs warheads would be calculated according to the number these missiles were tested with. For heavy bombers with cruise missiles, what would be counted is the number of cruise missiles such a bomber is equipped to carry. For a long time we disagreed about heavy bombers not equipped for cruise missiles, carrying only bombs and SRAM missiles. We think we could find a compromise here: to include these bombers in the maximum levels of delivery systems and warheads by analogy with single-warhead missiles (as one unit).

Meeting the wishes of the American side, we have expressed our readiness to set percentage limits on the number of warheads placed on specific types of strategic delivery systems -- not more than 60% of nuclear warheads on any one type of strategic delivery system, and no more than 80-85% on ICBMs and SLBMs combined. We could also make it understood that, with mutually acceptable agreements on other aspects of limiting nuclear warheads, we could accept the reduction of our heavy ICBMs to 250 units (the Americans are proposing 110-150 units).

Explain that we are prepared, taking account of the American position, not to have long-range sea-based cruise missiles

included in the overall level of 7,500 warheads. The level of such missiles will be subject to agreement.

The attention of the President should be drawn to the fact that the interim option for reducing strategic offensive arms could be implemented if there is an understanding that the sides agree strictly to adhere to the ABM Treaty over an agreed sufficiently long period of time. Conduct matters so that this period should be at least 10 years. In addition, the parties would have, say, 3-5 years, for negotiations in the course of which they would decide how to proceed in regard to this question. Explain that strict observance of the ABM Treaty permits laboratory development and testing in what concerns the American SDI program and prohibits the testing of weapons created for striking from space targets in space and on the Earth. This does not entail a ban on tests of what the ABM Treaty permits. (Note: The ABM Treaty allows the testing of stationary ground-based ABM systems—anti-missiles, their launchers and radars, and also weapons based on new physical principles that are developed to replace the permitted ABM components and systems.)

3. *Medium-Range Missiles.* On this question the following possible positions can be set out. Reaffirm at the outset that the Soviet Union prefers the most radical solution to the problem of Medium-Range Missiles in Europe—the complete elimination of such missiles by the USSR and the USA while Britain and France do not increase the number of their corresponding arms, as we proposed on January 15 of this year.

As a decisive step designed to untangle the problem of Medium-Range Missiles in Europe—propose the complete elimination of American and Soviet Medium-Range Missiles in Europe, leaving to one side the nuclear arms of Britain and France. As far as Medium-Range Missiles in Asia are con-

cerned, they would immediately become the subject of separate discussions (negotiations).

According to all data, the United States and its principal allies in NATO, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany, are clearly not prepared for such a radical solution. In these conditions we propose an "interim" solution, allowing a certain number of warheads to be left on Soviet and American Medium-Range Missiles in Europe. Recently, basically due to the efforts of the Soviet side, there have been signs that the positions of both sides have been moving closer together, along the lines of this option. At the same time a number of unresolved issues remain, and on these, it appears, will depend success in working out a mutually acceptable agreement.

In our contacts with the Americans mutual understanding has been reached that after the corresponding reductions in Europe neither the USSR nor the US would have more than 100 warheads on medium-range missiles. We argue that for the USA those should be cruise missiles, with all the "Pershing-II" missiles removed from Europe. In return we agreed not to insist on the commitment by Britain and France that they not increase their corresponding arms.

As far as Asia is concerned, the positions of the parties are still far from each other. However, here too the Soviet side is looking for possible common ground. We have already proposed to freeze our missiles in the Asian part of the USSR, having expressed our agreement at the same time that the USA can have on its territory the equivalent in warheads to our missiles. The American side has proposed to keep the number of warheads on Soviet missiles in Asia also to 100 units, with the US having the right to have the same number of warheads on its medium-range missiles on American territory. We are prepared to agree to such a solution for Asia, separate from Europe, if the United States makes the commitment to remove

its Medium-Range nuclear arms from American bases in South Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, while simultaneously moving American aircraft carriers beyond certain boundaries.

If it is justified by the course of the negotiations, we could agree to leave a small number of "Pershing-II" missiles in Europe (no more than 18-20 units). In making the argument for just this number, one can refer to the fact that it was approximately that correlation of cruise missiles and "Pershing-IIs" that was envisaged in NATO's December 1979 decision.

Regarding missiles of shorter than medium range in Europe, deal with that question by freezing them at the current levels, say as of October 11, 1986.

Explain that a solution on Medium-Range Missiles both in Europe and separately in Asia could be reached without connection to the problems of space and of strategic arms.

4. *Chemical Weapons.* Recall that at the summit meeting in Geneva, the leaders of both countries noted the importance of solving the problem of the general and complete banning of chemical weapons. Both sides were in favor at the time of banning forever these barbaric weapons of mass destruction, and of eliminating their production base. This agreement encouraged a more active effort to draw up an international convention at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Bilateral Soviet-American consultations on all aspects of banning chemical weapons have now acquired a regular basis, and this has allowed the two sides to narrow the gap on such important questions as disposing of the stockpiles of chemical weapons and eliminating the facilities for manufacturing them. In solving the question of inspections on demand we also showed sufficient flexibility by stating our willingness to seek an agreement on the basis of the British proposal, which apparently is acceptable to the United States. All this is encouraging.

At the same time there are still unresolved questions: nonproduction of chemical weapons in commercial industries, including private enterprises and transnational corporations; verification of all the provisions of the convention with international on-site inspections as necessary; binary chemical weapons.

Propose to the American side the following possible solutions to unresolved questions:

The USSR and USA express their readiness (and call on other states to follow suit) to have states that are party to the convention adopt the legislative, administrative, and other measures which would provide state guarantees to ensure compliance by private enterprises and transnational corporations with obligations assumed by governments; they have agreed that effective international verification, including on-site inspections, should cover both government facilities and, as necessary, private enterprises and transnational corporations, as well as their branches and subsidiaries located in other countries.

As far as binary weapons are concerned, reaffirm our position that they should be banned as representing the special danger of creating hidden military-chemical capabilities. Preparations by the United States to launch the manufacture of binary weapons do not accord with efforts to conclude the Convention quickly. The Soviet side, in directing attention to the possible negative consequences of such a step by the United States, is willing, together with representatives of the American side, to develop special effective verification measures for banning binary weapons.

If our proposals are acceptable to the American side, agree to help with concluding the Convention in Geneva in the near future, no later than the middle of 1987.

A draft of the decree is attached. Please review.

L. Zaikov, V. Chebrikov, S. Sokolov,
A. Dobrynin, A. Iakovlev, A. Kovalev

October 1986 No: _____

DOCUMENT 4

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

We present material for the negotiations of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev with President of the United States R. Reagan

1. The key positions for the talks on questions of nuclear disarmament.

2. A draft of model agreements in the form of agreed directives from the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the President of the United States to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the USA on questions of nuclear disarmament.

A draft resolution of the CPSU Central Committee is attached.

We request approval.

L. Zaikov
V. Chebrikov
S. Sokolov
A. Dobrynin
A. Yakovlev
A. Kovalev

October 5, 1986

KEY POSITIONS

For the talks of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev with President of the United States of America R. Reagan on questions of nuclear disarmament

In considering the problems of nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union starts from the position that the final result of all measures in this area ought to be the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This has been declared by the Soviet Union and by the United States. Underline the importance of the statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee of January 15, 1986.

Moving in this direction we ought to ensure equal security for both sides. This is the basis of our policy, and we appeal to the United States to act in the same way.

Strategic offensive arms. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have put forward a proposal to reduce strategic offensive arms by 50 percent. We confirm one more time our interest in precisely such a deep reduction and no less. All the more so since we agreed on this last year in Geneva and sealed the principle in the joint declaration of November 21. Over the last year, we have been convinced that the world is waiting, and is not only waiting but demanding that such reductions be carried out.

Insofar as strategic arms represent the foundation of the nuclear might of both sides, reductions should take place in strict compliance with the mutual interests of the sides, with constant preservation of parity, and taking account of the historical characteristics of the structure of strategic forces on each side.

We are ready to take into consideration the concerns of the United States, including those with respect to heavy missiles, and we expect the American side to show the same attention to the concerns of the Soviet Union.

Medium-range missiles. We have analyzed this problem once more in all its aspects and decided to approach it from the broadest perspective, taking into account both our own in-

terests and the interests of our allies, as well as the interests of the United States and Western Europe.

Based on this fact, we propose the complete elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe. Within the framework of this decision, we are even ready, no matter how hard it is for us, to put to one side the nuclear potentials of Britain and France.

As for medium-range missiles in Asia, we propose to you, acting in the already-mentioned spirit of compromise, that the United States remove this issue, or—as a second position, that negotiations on this question take place immediately after the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik and be considered as an independent negotiation. As a last position—keep 100 warheads in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, and on the territory of the United States.

Simultaneously we are ready to conduct negotiations on missiles with ranges of less than 1000 kilometers.

The problems of ABM and the nuclear test ban. Confidence that the ABM Treaty will remain in force for a clearly designated period of time is the foundation on which the problems of nuclear disarmament as a whole, in the first place the reduction of strategic offensive arms, and also the cessation of nuclear tests, could find their solution.

It is precisely agreement on this account that could, like nothing else, create the trust that is so necessary for decisive steps to improve and further develop our relations.

We suggest agreeing on a compromise basis. Let us take the American approach (a basic period of non-withdrawal, plus a period negotiations) and determine jointly the period during which both sides would fully and strictly observe all the provisions of the ABM Treaty. Here it is very important to ensure mutual understanding that, along with this, development and testing in the area of SDI would be permitted within the

limits of the laboratory, while at the same time tests outside the laboratory of weapons being created to strike, from space, targets in space and on the Earth would be banned. This of course would not entail a ban on tests of stationary ground systems and their components permitted by the ABM Treaty.

We propose that such a time period be quite long—10 years. Then both sides would have, let's say, 3–5 years for negotiations about how to proceed with this problem.

With regard to nuclear tests, we advocate a comprehensive and final ban on them. We propose renewing the corresponding negotiations on a bilateral or tripartite basis. During this process we agree to consider the question of such verification measures as would lead to ratification of the 1974 and 1976 "threshold" test ban treaties, with the understanding that negotiations about that would become the first stage of negotiations about a comprehensive test ban.

Start from the position that the beginning of negotiations on working out a comprehensive test ban agreement should be an indispensable condition for the process of strategic arms reduction.

Chemical weapons. These are the same kind of inhuman weapons of mass destruction as nuclear weapons are. Their possible danger to humanity, taking improvement of the weapons into account, has not been appraised properly. We have traveled a long way in the negotiations on banning chemical weapons. We are convinced that the agreement on intensifying these efforts, which we reached last year in Geneva, has contributed to this.

Now the participants in the negotiations are close to agreement, and there are only a few questions left that need to be solved. We are ready to seek a solution to those questions on a mutually acceptable basis and in the shortest possible time.

Questions of verification. The Soviet Union supports full

and absolutely reliable verification of disarmament measures—whether in the nuclear sphere, in relation to chemical weapons or conventional armaments. We have no problem with verification. We are ready to implement verification by any means necessary, and when required—with the help of on-site inspections.

DIRECTIVES

Of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the President of the United States of America to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the United States about preparation of agreements in the area of nuclear disarmament

Having reviewed the situation on nuclear armaments and moved the positions of the two countries substantially closer during their working meeting on 11–12 October 1986 in Reykjavik (Iceland), General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev and President of the United States of America R. Reagan agreed to give directives to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of their counties to prepare for signing in Washington during the official visit of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to the United States (date of the visit . . .) the texts of agreements and accords, based on the key positions listed below:

1. *In the area of strategic arms.* An agreement to reduce by 50 percent the strategic nuclear arms of the USSR and the USA, taking into consideration the historically formed characteristics of the structure of the sides' strategic forces. With that, all types of strategic offensive weapons, including heavy missiles, will be subject to reduction within the stated frame-

work. A solution will be found also to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range sea-based cruise missiles.

On all questions relating to the problem of strategic offensive arms, the parties will conduct negotiations with consideration for their mutual interests and concerns, displaying the political will for an agreement.

2. *In the area of medium-range missiles.* An agreement on the complete elimination of the medium-range missiles of the USSR and the United States in Europe, without affecting or taking into account the nuclear capacities of Britain and France. Negotiations start on missiles in the parties' possession in Europe with a range of less than 1000 kilometers.

Separately, and insofar as is practical, begin negotiations as soon as possible about Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Asia.

3. *On the ABM Treaty and the ban on nuclear tests.* The USSR and the United States are reaching agreement to undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the 1972 Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions. Tests of all space-based elements of anti-missile defense in space will be prohibited, except for research and testing conducted in laboratories. This would not ban tests of stationary ground systems and their components permitted by the ABM Treaty. During the next few years the parties ought to find, in the course of negotiations, further mutually acceptable solutions in this area.

In the shortest time that is practically possible, bilateral (USSR and USA) negotiations on a nuclear test ban should resume. In the first phase of negotiations the question of preparing for ratification the 1974 and 1976 treaties on underground nuclear explosions should be considered.

The beginning of negotiations on the question of a nuclear

test ban is a condition for working out an agreement on strategic weapons.

The General Secretary of the CPSU and the President of the United States consider that these agreements have a principled character and are a turning-point on the path to successful implementation of the tasks they laid down in Geneva in November 1985: to limit and reduce nuclear arms, to prevent an arms race in space and to end the arms race on Earth, to strengthen strategic stability and universal security.

RESOLUTION OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

On the materials on questions of nuclear disarmament for the meeting of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev and President of the United States of America R. Reagan in Reykjavik on 11–12 October1986

1. Approve main positions for the talks of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev with President of the United States R. Reagan on questions of nuclear disarmament (attached).

2. Approve the draft resolutions of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and President of the United States to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the USA on preparation of agreements in the area of nuclear disarmament (attached).

Secretary of the Central Committee