Immigration and Group Relations

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THE UNITED STATES is the prototype of a country built by immigration and assimilation. The blurring of ethnic lines through the process of assimilation has promoted equality of economic opportunity and produced a cultural life open to popular participation and relatively free of constraints imposed by group membership.[1] African Americans are the obvious exception to this pattern, since their ancestors came as slaves, not as "immigrants"—as the word is customarily used—and they are not a subject in this essay.

Those who arrived as newcomers on the American shore were thrown into a "melting pot," almost every scholar once assumed. It was much too simple a notion. Many immigrants joined the mainstream while preserving much of their own ethnic culture. In fact, American liberty has allowed precisely that process of preservation. Freedom and tolerance have permitted religious and cultural minorities who were marginalized or persecuted in their homelands to maintain a distinctive way of life free from fear. The consequence of limited government has been an extraordinarily strong civil society within which groups have organized on their own

terms.[2] Widespread assimilation is thus coupled with a vibrant ethnic pluralism. American society resembles a simmering stewpot of gradually blending fragments; no crucible immediately melted newcomers into homogeneous Anglo-conformity.

But collective ethnic identity has never been a self-evident and permanent "given"; it has required much energy to sustain. The loose, open, and eclectic organization of American society has been, at one and the same time, a gift and a mortal enemy, affording spaces for ethnic life yet confounding those who would preserve a cultural inheritance in its more or less original form. In the era of industrialization and urbanization, an immense array of foreign nationalities settled together in rough propinquity, each group exposed to the different habits of new neighbors, and to a consumer-oriented mass culture that eroded their traditions.[3]

In addition, although immigrant communities have not "melted," with each successive generation they have tended to become increasingly American. Over successive generations, social mobility and acculturation produced positive changes in social class, schooling, and participation in public life and affairs. And thus by intergenerational measures of occupational mobility, residential patterns, income, property ownership, and education, members of European and non-European immigrant groups (to varying degrees) came to look much alike.

Furthermore, paradoxically, as newcomers from the Western Hemisphere, Asia, and Africa made American society more culturally and racially pluralistic, the possibilities for assimilation increased. The influx of newcomers produced a greater tolerance of intergroup differences, making the society more absorptive. Thus Poles, for instance, became more willing to shed their Polishness in favor of "the American way." Had the society been less tolerant, groups would have held fast to their ethnic traditions in residential enclaves. As it was, groups underwent a gradual but steady course of cultural transformation. That process began with northern and western Europeans in the nineteenth century; they were followed in the early twentieth century by southern and eastern Europeans, Asians, and

immigrants from Western Hemisphere countries. More recently an influx of people from the Third World have followed in their footsteps. These new Americans shaped a creative assimilative process in which they both changed themselves and became part of the whole by changing the whole. The national culture was porous and absorbent, but so were the subcultures arising out of the adaptation of immigrants and their children.[4]

The movement of immigrant groups into the center of national life constituted a creative achievement in the face of imposing challenges and obstacles. The alienated and disempowered multitudes from abroad arduously devised the arts of coexistence with others. They learned to act together with culturally distant—sometimes hostile—natives and other newcomers who had been strangers or antagonists in the countries they left behind. In their new homes in America, the Jews, Poles, Russians, and Germans of Chicago came to accept each other as neighbors and as equals. Immigration was a rigorous school in which new lessons of group cooperation and interdependence had to be learned for the sake of survival.[5]

The new cultural relationships in which immigrants found themselves inevitably attenuated the transplanted forms of homeland culture. Pathways of multigenerational change varied in timing and length, but they all tended to head in the same direction. The English, the Welsh, the Dutch, and the Scots, and to a lesser degree the descendants of Norwegians, Danes, Swedes, and Germans—those whose ancestors were part of the American population since the colonial and early national era—experienced the greatest divergence from homeland cultural legacies. Americans whose forebears came from southern and eastern Europe, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America exhibited a stronger tendency to retain distinctive ethnic features. But even for them, the ties and feelings of a homeland-based identity yielded in degrees to the syncretic and eclectic forms of American culture.

Immigrants were often unaware of how far they had departed in habit and custom from the ancestral culture. An American-born Chinese girl in the 1930s described the experience of self-discovery on a visit to China:

> I gave up trying to be a Chinese; for as soon as the people in China learned that I was an overseas Chinese, they remarked, "Oh, you are a foreigner." Some asked, "Where did you learn to speak Chinese?" Some thought it remarkable that I spoke Chinese at all. So you see I was quite foreign to China. I wore Chinese clothes and tried to pass as a Chinese, but I could not so I gave up and admitted my foreign birth and education. I lack very much a Chinese background, Chinese culture, and Chinese manners and customs; I have neither their understanding nor their viewpoint nor their patience. Sometimes I was homesick for America. Where I had friends, I felt better.[6]

The inescapable forces of social change made ethnic identity only one part of personal identity. Increasingly, over the generations, individuals were shaped by the jobs they held, the churches they attended, their places of residence, and by their schooling, peer culture, and consumer tastes.[7] In addition, the public forms of Anglo-Saxon society became, for immigrants and their descendants, a cultural lingua franca. For later descendants of European immigrants, ethnicity itself became increasingly thin and symbolic, a matter of personal choice.[8]

Assimilation also meant a very high degree of linguistic unification in twentieth-century America, in spite of a mass immigration that introduced a linguistic diversity greater than that found in any other modern society. In the early twentieth century, several dozen languages were spoken; in the 1990s, the number of foreign languages in use probably rose even higher and certainly included many more non-European languages. But people may know and use both the language of their homeland and English; over time, immigrants who speak Vietnamese at home have nevertheless become absorbed into an English-language culture.

Thus, a study based on the 1990 U.S. Census showed that among all immigrants, the proportion of those who spoke only English or who spoke English very well rose from 36 percent among those who had been in the United States five years or less, to 57 percent among those who had been residents from sixteen to twenty-five years, to 77 percent for those who had been here for forty or more years.[9]

In addition, the numbers of those who primarily used a foreign tongue

dwindled sharply by the second generation. The federal Census of 1980 showed that almost all natives (more than four years old) spoke English as their primary language, although many were of immigrant ancestry. Since many recent immigrants arrived well educated and had often studied English, they moved rapidly into the English linguistic mainstream. Even Hispanics, represented by group spokesmen advocating an official policy of bilingualism, have nevertheless made large strides toward English usage. In the 1970s, the majority of American-born Hispanic adults—including three-quarters of Mexicans, four-fifths of Puerto Ricans and Cubans, and nine-tenths of Central or South Americans—used English as their principal or sole language.[10]

The impressive rise in the rate of intermarriage among the descendants of immigrants may have been the trend with the most profound impact, however. The extraordinary degree to which the American population has become defined by mixed ancestry in the late twentieth century is evident in Census data. "Intermarriage [became] so common in the postwar era that by 1980 the vast majority of Americans had relatives, through birth or their own marriage, from at least two different ethnic backgrounds," an expert on American pluralism has noted.[11]

Indeed, well before World War II, social scientists were calling attention to the rise in ethnic intermarriage. The pioneering sociologist of the University of Chicago, Robert E. Park, saw the fusion of races in Hawaii where "new peoples are coming into existence" as a harbinger of the future.[12] On the other hand, a well-known study of religious intermarriage in 1940 found that, yes, Italians were marrying the Irish, but Catholics were choosing Catholic spouses, Jews other Jews, and Protestants, too, were sticking to their own. As Will Herberg was later to put it, the American experience was thus characterized by not one but three melting pots—Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant. Separate processes of melting took place within each of these pots.[13] Fifty years later, however, that picture had changed. By the 1990s, half of Catholics and Jews were marrying outside the faith.[14]

At the end of the twentieth century intermarriage among both religious and ethnic groups of European origin was pervasive.[15] Indeed, by the third or fourth generation intermarriage is frequent, if not the norm, among

many European ethnic groups. In 1972, in a special population survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census, 40 percent of white respondents chose not to identify with any specific heritage.[16] In subsequent years, the number of Americans who saw themselves as simply "American" continued to rise. A 1979 Census survey encouraged respondents to choose ethnic ancestries, and yet 13.5 million refused and gave "American" or "United States" as their ancestry; they became the seventh largest "ethnic" group on the government's list.[17]

That survey included members of non-European groups; newcomers from Asia and Latin America also have significant rates of mixed ancestry and intermarriage. In the 1979 poll, 31 percent of Filipinos, 23 percent of Chinese, 22 percent of Japanese, and nearly 22 percent of the Spanish ancestry population claimed multiple ancestry.[18] These rates of intermarriage provoked a heated debate over whether the federal census of 2000 should include a "multiracial" enumeration category for the rising number of offspring of such unions.[19] These high rates of intermarriage led to the decision to allow multiple answers to the race question on the federal census of 2000.

When Asian or Hispanic minorities marry outside their groups, the spouses are usually white. A study of 1990 federal census returns found that, looking at all married couples with an Asian spouse, 27 percent had a white spouse, and 3 percent had a nonwhite or Hispanic. Among married couples with a Hispanic spouse, 29 percent had a non-Hispanic white spouse, while only 2.1 percent had a nonwhite. Nearly a quarter of the 2.0 million children who had at least one Asian parent, and a quarter of the 5.4 million children with at least one Hispanic parent, lived in interracial households with a white parent or stepparent.[20] The rates of mixed ancestry among Asians and Hispanics appear especially impressive when one takes into account group sanctions against exogamy, the operation of laws barring miscegenation that were not completely stricken from state statutes until the 1960s, and the high percentage of recent immigrants who might have been expected to maintain group ties.

These assimilative patterns obviously took time to take hold, and the

process was not all sweetness and light. In the immediate wake of the migrations of the twentieth century, ethnic boundaries usually tightened, cultural distances widened, and social divisions deepened. Large numbers of new immigrants strained institutions and public services. In the Progressive era, middle-class natives complained that Italian, Jewish, and Slavic immigrants meant expensive Americanization programs, overcrowded schools, overburdened charity organizations, spreading slums, disease, crime, political corruption, and the propagation of alien cultural values. These disorders were handled by teachers, policemen, physicians, nurses, inspectors, administrators, bureaucrats, and elected officials at a high cost to the public. In post–Cold War America, the same complaints about the burdens of immigration could be heard in updated form. Those concerned about the continuing flood of newcomers talked about the costs of bilingual and multicultural school programs, the spread of barrios, overtaxed hospital and medical facilities, the environmental impact, ethnic favoritism in the form of racial and ethnic preferences, and the spread of non-Western values and customs.[21]

But such doubts and fears ignore much good news. Immigrants have been producers, consumers, and entrepreneurs, and their economic energy has increased the gross national product and made for greater general prosperity. Often self-educated, hard working, and thrifty, they have also brought to their adopted land valuable cultural capital. Immigrants have helped, too, to expand the dimensions of American liberty and democracy. They have insisted on their right to maintain their ethnic heritage, as well as to modify or reject it. And wanting to ensure their own self-determination—their right to make social, cultural, and political choices—they have widened the degrees of freedom for others.[22]

As a corollary, immigrants have demonstrated that American opportunities for the individual could work to overcome notions of group determinism. They have affirmed the principle that personal achievement is the basis of self-worth and have in that way helped to shape and reaffirm a national culture that rewards individual effort and accomplishment. Immigrants and their descendants have proved they are productive work-

ers, trustworthy neighbors, and patriotic citizens, whatever their ethnic origins, thereby making individual behavior, not background, the standard by which most Americans continue to judge others.[23]

Immigrants have also demonstrated the viability of collective organization for mutual progress. Transplanted communities of Chinese, Japanese, Asian Indians, Greeks, Jews, and Lebanese in different parts of the nation employed similar forms of cultural solidarity to promote group economic progress.[24] Networks of kinship and communalism have been the foundation of their ability to build communities. Immigrant ethnic groups have thus exemplified the formation of social capital—that set of social connections and social assets that promote positive collaborative endeavor. They brought with them norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement.[25]

Immigrants have furthered the evolution of a society based on achieved status, voluntary identity, and free association. And what ethnic groups developed in common through mutual activity became more important than what made them different. The opportunities of liberal democracy released the innate talents and drive of immigrants. In the twentieth century, immigrants from Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, the Pacific, and the Western Hemisphere all contributed to economic and social progress.

In the final analysis, the vitality of America's assimilative pluralism limited the ability of policy makers and opinion makers to consign immigrants to permanent compartments. Race, especially, proved an inadequate "container" for ethnic Americans whose core identities continued to shift and expand as employment, levels of educational attainment, marriage and other social patterns, consumer tastes, and places of residence changed. In the era of industrialization, European immigrants were once divided into "The Races of Europe," but racial classifications such as "Southern Italians" and "Hebrews" (actually used by federal immigration agencies from the 1890s to the 1940s) became practically meaningless after two or three generations. The classification of the newest global immigrants as disadvantaged racial minorities labeled African, Hispanic, and Asian and Pacific

American suffers from a similar inadequacy; these categories fail to capture the fluid character of an individual's social identity and social status, which makes the dichotomy "people of color" versus "white" much too simplistic.

The historian Donna Gabaccia has noted:

> In American eyes immigrants of Asian, African, or Native American descent become Americans by becoming racial minorities. Recently arriving elite, well-educated immigrants from the third world contemplate this road with much ambivalence. Many prefer to become ethnic Americans—Korean Americans or Jamaican Americans—rather than "blacks" or "Asian Americans."[26]

The capacity for mobility and adaptation possessed by these newest immigrants will, as Gabaccia points out, "fruitfully challenge American assumptions about class and race." As long as immigrant groups have an open society in which to create new patterns, they will resist the petrifaction of ethnic boundaries into racial boundaries.

Over the course of the twentieth century, immigrants increased the power of such assimilative factors as an expansive economy, an absorbent composite culture, a fluid social structure, and a cosmopolitan democracy. And deeply woven patterns of group intermixing immunized the society against ethnic and racial fragmentation. Whether such assimilative patterns can be carried forward into the twenty-first century will depend on the degree of public commitment to America's nationalizing and democratizing traditions. The successful integration of current and future immigrants will require maintaining a framework for ethnicity that encourages assimilative behavior within a democratic, pluralistic context. Ethnic identities have coexisted with acculturation, pluralism with assimilation, and differences with commonality. That is the mix upon which individual opportunity will continue to depend.

Americans who consider themselves liberal and progressive on ethnic questions often embrace the notion that people must belong to separate groups and cultures. And yet the idea that particular groups have a fixed culture and identity has profound consequences for the future of democ-

racy, especially when it is manipulated by the forces of statism and modernization. The idea that culture and identity are possessed by unique groups encourages a political language that homogenizes and reduces individuals into stereotypical collective categories. Even more important, this sort of ethnic reductionism leads to the dangerous position that in the realm of government only a Hispanic legislator, for instance, can adequately represent Hispanic voters; an "Anglo" inevitably speaks only for "Anglo" interests. Similarly, Asians are disfranchised when a Hispanic is elected from the district in which they live. This form of functional representation can bring more group solidarity, but at a cost: the erosion of the freedom of individuals to define themselves and their interests regardless of their social origins—a freedom fundamental to liberal democracy.

The drive to repackage people by labels and categories that can be publicly managed is not a uniquely American phenomenon; it is well known in other countries with historically less democratic polities. The University of Chicago political scientists Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph see similar patterns in the United States and India:

> Which identities become relevant for politics is not predetermined by some primordial ancientness. They are crafted in benign and malignant ways in print and the electronic media, in textbooks and advertising, in India's T.V. megaseries and America's talk shows, in campaign strategies, in all the places and all the ways that self and other, us and them, are represented in an expanding public culture.[27]

In spite of both the media and the state, which invent official groups, a new diversity is forming in the United States in which ethnic particularism is increasingly irrelevant. Deeply rooted universalizing and acculturating forces are at work. As sociologist Orlando Patterson has argued, American culture is not owned by any particular group:

> Once an element of culture becomes generalized under the impact of a universal culture, it loses all specific symbolic value for the group which donated it. It is a foolish Anglo-Saxon who boasts about "his" language today. English is a child that no longer knows its mother, and cares even less

> to know her. It has been adapted in a thousand ways to meet the special feelings, moods and experiences of a thousand groups.[28]

"Ethnic WASP culture is no longer the culture of the group of Americans we now call WASP's," Patterson concluded. Jim Sleeper, who noted these insights by Patterson in his book, *The Closest of Strangers*, recalled how a stint teaching in a New York high school showed him that "the Chinese-American students . . . were [not] interested in adopting 'white' culture as much as they were interested in becoming part of the larger 'universal' culture of constitutional democracy and technological development." Immigrant minorities today have a hard time not being affected by assimilation in the globalizing democratic society that America has become.[29]

In a plural society that aims to be democratic, people need to be free to mix and blend with those outside their ethnic group. All change begins at the margins, and the margins are where individuals can make new changes and choices a part of their lives. Without this dimension of personal freedom, group boundaries and identities tighten and become impassable. It is often today's immigrants who truly understand the value of American freedom. The journalist Richard Brookhiser has reported that when a liberal "pol" tried to tell a Pakistani immigrant cabdriver about the error of registering Republican, the "cabbie defended his dislike of ethnic group politics. 'I came here to get away from it,'" he said.[30]

Those who have seized the opportunity to leapfrog ethnic identities have become the agents for a creative, open, and voluntary national life. Because of his transcultural connections, Fiorello LaGuardia, mayor of New York City during the Great Depression, gained legitimacy and popular support from a variety of ethnic interest groups. Historian Arthur Mann provided an unforgettable glimpse of LaGuardia:

> Tammany Hall may have been the first to exploit the vote-getting value of eating gefullte fish with Jews, goulash with Hungarians, sauerbraten with Germans, spaghetti with Italians, and so on indefinitely, but this unorthodox Republican not only dined every bit as shrewdly but also spoke, according to the occasion, in Yiddish, Hungarian, German, Italian, Serbian-Croatian, or plain New York English. Half Jewish and half Italian, born in Greenwich

> Village yet raised in Arizona, married first to a Catholic and then to a Lutheran but himself a Mason and an Episcopalian, Fiorello LaGuardia was a Mr. Brotherhood Week all by himself.[31]

In my own explorations as a historian, I once stumbled upon a page from a 1911 federal immigration report that recorded the numbers of Albanians, Bosnians, Herzegovinians, Serbs, and Croatians arriving in the United States. Almost a century later, their descendants have assimilated and learned to coexist as members of one American nation. In their homeland of former Yugoslavia, by contrast, their countrymen reenact a tragic cycle of destructive ethnic conflict and separatism. The historic American conditions of soft and open group boundaries, once symbolized by the melting pot, ensured that, in this country, southeast European minorities would not follow that path.

It is a cliché to say that those who do not learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat its errors. But we should not forget that an American framework for ethnicity that rests on the opportunity to assimilate in a pluralistic democracy has proved to be highly effective in getting different people to live and act together productively, on terms of equality and freedom.[32] It is an achievement with important and broad implications. In a time of global ethnic strife, the United States more than ever can demonstrate to the world that pluralism works and can work democratically.

Notes

1. See Richard D. Alba, "Assimilation's Quiet Tide," *Public Interest* 119 (spring 1995): 4.

2. Nathan Glazer, *Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), pp. 24–26; Donald L. Horowitz, "Immigration and Group Relations," *Immigrants in Two Democracies: French and American Experience* (New York: New York University Press, 1992), pp. 23–25.

3. Olivier Zunz, *The Changing Face of Inequality: Urbanization, Industrial Development, and Immigrants in Detroit, 1880–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), chaps. 4, 7; Lizabeth Cohen, *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chaps. 1–3; David Ward, *Cities and Immigrants: A Geography of Change in Nineteenth-Century America* (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1971), chaps. 3, 4; Oscar Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants: A Study in Acculturation, 1790–1880*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), chaps. 4–6; James R. Barrett, *Work and Community in the Jungle: Chicago's Packinghouse Workers, 1894–1922* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), pp. 75–76, 78–79.

4. John Higham, *Send These to Me: Jews and Other Immigrants in Urban America* (New York: Atheneum, 1975), pp. 18–20, 24–28; Sean Wilentz, "Sense and Sensitivity," *New Republic*, October 31, 1994, p. 46.

5. Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin, *The Dimensions of Liberty* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 130.

6. William Carlson Smith, *Americans in Process: A Study of Our Citizens of Oriental Ancestry* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Edwards Brothers, 1937), p. 243.

7. Richard D. Alba, *Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 4–15.

8. Mary C. Waters, *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 147–55.

9. Barry R. Chiswick and Teresa A. Sullivan, "The New Immigrants," in Reynolds Farley, ed., *State of the Union: America in the 1990s*, vol. 2, *Social Trends* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995), p. 238.

10. Alejandro Portes and Ruben Rumbaut, *Immigrant America: A Portrait* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), tables 28, 31, p. 208.

11. Lawrence H. Fuchs, *The American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity, and the Civic Culture* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1990), p. 327.

12. Robert E. Park, *Race and Culture* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950), pp. 116, 149, 151, 191–95.

13. Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy, "Single or Triple Melting Pot? Intermarriage Trends in New Haven, 1870–1940," *American Journal of Sociology* 49 (1944): 331–39; Will Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1960; 1955), pp. 32–34.

14. In 1990, Richard D. Alba concluded that "the rising tide of intermarriage is also sweeping across religious lines," thus showing that the triple melting pot theory "does not seem to be holding up." *Ethnic Identity*, p. 14.

15. Alba describes "the wide dispersion of ethnically mixed ancestry" as the most profound ethnic change among whites in the twentieth century. Ibid., pp. 15, 310–13.

16. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Characteristics of the Population by Ethnic Origin: March 1972 and 1971," *Current Population Reports*, P-20, no. 249 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1973); Higham, *Send These to Me*, pp. 9–11.

17. The English, German, Irish, black, Italian, and French were the only larger groups. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports, Ancestry and Language in the United States: November 1979*, series P-23, no. 116 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1982). Examining this data, sociologists Stanley Lieberson and Mary Waters saw the genesis of a "new American ethnic group" whose members did not identify with premigration antecedents; Stanley Lieberson and Mary C. Waters, *From Many Strands: Ethnic and Racial Groups in Contemporary America* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1988), pp. 264–68. See also Harold J. Abramson, *Ethnic Diversity in Catholic America* (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1973), chap. 4.

18. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports, Ancestry and Language in the United States: November 1979*, p. 7; David A. Hollinger, *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), pp. 165–66.

19. Michaell S. Teitelbaum and Jay Winter, *A Question of Numbers: High Migration, Low Fertility, and the Politics of National Identity* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1998), p. 171; Stephan Thernstrom, "One Drop Still—A Racialist's Census," *National Review*, April 17, 2000, pp. 35–37.

20. Roderick J. Harrison and Claudette E. Bennett, "Racial and Ethnic Diversity," in Reynolds Farley, ed., *State of the Union: America in the 1990s*, vol. 2, *Social Trends* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995), pp. 165–67.

21. U.S. Immigration Commission, *Abstracts of Reports*, vol. 1–2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1911); Oscar Handlin, *Race and Nationality in American Life* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), chap. 5; Peter Brimelow, *Alien Nation: Common Sense About America's Immigration Disaster* (New York: Random House, 1995).

22. See, e.g., Ellen Smith, "Strangers and Sojourners: The Jews of Colonial Boston" and "'Israelites in Boston,' 1840–1880," in Jonathan D. Sarna and Ellen Smith, eds., *The Jews of Boston: Essays on the Occasion of the Centenary (1895–1995) of the Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston* (Boston: Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston, 1995), pp. 44, 65.

23. David B. Davis, "The Other Zion," *New Republic*, April 12, 1993, pp. 29–36; Francis Fukuyama, "Immigrants and Family Values," *Commentary*, May 1993, pp. 26–32; John F. Kennedy, *A Nation of Immigrants*, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 67–68.

24. The argument that cultural capital operates as an independent variable is found in Thomas Sowell, *Migrations and Cultures: A World Perspective* (New York: Basic Books, 1996).

25. On this point, see Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 167, 168–71; Robert D. Putnam, "The Strange Disappearance of Civic America," *American Prospect*, winter 1996, pp. 34–48.

26. Donna Gabaccia, *From the Other Side: Women, Gender, and Immigrant Life in the United States, 1820–1990* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. xvii.

27. Susan Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph, "Modern Hate," *New Republic*, March 22, 1993, pp. 24–29.

28. Orlando Patterson, *Ethnic Chauvinism: The Reactionary Impulse* (New York: Stein & Day, 1977), pp. 149–50.

29. Jim Sleeper, *The Closest of Strangers: Liberalism and the Politics of Race in New York* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), p. 234.

30. Richard Brookhiser, "Melting Pot or Boiling Pot?" *New York Observer*, May 28, 1990, p. 5.

31. Arthur Mann, *LaGuardia: A Fighter Against His Times* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 21.

32. Recent arguments for the benefits of immigrant assimilation are Linda Chavez, *Out of the Barrio: Toward a New Politics of Hispanic Assimilation* (New York: Basic Books, 1992); John J. Miller, *The Unmaking of Americans: How Multiculturalism Has Undermined the Assimilation Ethic* (New York: Free Press, 1998).