Historians of Brazil have long stressed the cronyist nature of nineteenth-century politics and have enjoyed considerable success in documenting it as well.¹ Patronage, in the form of using resources of the central government to award positions and pork as a private payoff for political support, is the most salient example of cronyist impulse in imperial Brazil.² Nonetheless, there has been relatively little work devoted to identifying the interaction between the cronyism on the one hand and formal political institutions on the other. The politics of patronage necessarily entailed tax and expenditure policies on the part of Brazil’s government that held both

¹ This paper was written while I was a national fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. It draws from research generously supported by a U.S. Department of Education Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research Abroad Grant, International Studies and Overseas Programs at the University of California at Los Angeles, and the Social Science History Institute at Stanford University. Earlier versions benefited from conversations with José Murilo de Carvalho, Stephen Haber, Nolan McCarty, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry Weingast and from the comments of participants at the Conference on Institutions and Markets in Historical Perspective, Stanford; the Fourth International Conference of the Americas, Puebla, Mexico; and the all–University of California Latin American history meeting. All errors are mine.

allocative and distributive consequences. These were of special sig-
nificance in Brazil, given both the highly centralized division of au-
thority that characterized its polity and its poor record of economic
growth in this period.\(^3\) Since such policies were elaborated within a
well-defined set of political institutions and organizations to include
party-based cabinets and party affiliations on the floor of the Parlia-
ment, they were subject to the influence of Brazilian political orga-
nization. This chapter reassesses the role of political parties in im-
perial Brazil by examining voting patterns on the floor of the lower
house of Parliament between 1881 and 1884. The main result is that
most voting by deputies in the chamber divided along party lines,
as deputies hewed to partisan positions. On those occasions when
factions split off from parties, constituent interests indeed overrode
party positions to pull deputies away from party objectives. But the
evidence here shows that factionalization around constituent inter-
est was of second-order importance in policymaking. In light of
the findings of this chapter, the historiography understates the sig-
nificance of political parties in transforming cronyism into particular
economic policies. Although it is not possible to attribute all the
pattern of party-based voting to the influence of party organiza-
tions, parties did command considerable electoral resources that
were valued by deputies. Most important, the economic conse-
quences of strong party organizations in the Chamber of Deputies
were positive. By acting in concert, party partisans adopted mea-

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\(^3\) For a detailed discussion of the structure of the Brazilian state under the
1824 constitution, see Marquês de José Antônio Pimenta Bueno Sao Vicente, Direito
Publico Brazileiro E Analyse Da Constituição Do Imperio (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de J.
Villeneuve, 1857). On the economic consequences of centralized policymaking in
general, see Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “The Political Economy of
Federalism,” in Dennis C. Mueller, ed., Perspectives on Public Choice (Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press, 1997). The average rate of growth in per
capita GDP in Brazil was barely positive over the course of the nineteenth century.
For estimates and a study of the economic factors at work, see Nathaniel H. Leff,
sures that were less distortionary than would have been attained by independently pursuing the politics of the pork barrel. Although the magnitude of this effect cannot be stated with any precision, its direction is clear: partisan politics impelled policies that helped offset the negative economic consequences of Brazil’s highly centralized division of authority.

This chapter examines three questions about the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, using the early 1880s as a case study. Did Brazilian parties exhibit different voting patterns on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies? Did members of each party cohere, voting with their partisan colleagues? What influence did party affiliation play in explaining the voting records of each individual deputy relative to individual and constituent characteristics? In answering these questions the chapter proceeds in three sections. The first section briefly motivates the study of Brazilian parties in light of both the historiography and the theory of policymaking in legislatures, with special emphasis on the economic significance of partisan politics. The second section turns to empirical tests of party cohesion and partisan influence on voting outcomes in the Chamber of Deputies. The final section concludes.

Political Parties in Imperial Brazil: History and Theory

Historians of Brazilian political parties have generally assigned party a secondary role at best in legislative politics. Most correctly identify both the electoral connection and the influence of cabinets in shaping partisanship, but most also proclaim such partisanship to have been weak in the Parliament. Curiously, none have actually
attempted to measure the degree of party cohesion in legislative policymaking or searched systematically for other determinants of voting outcomes on the floor of the chamber. Political scientists have advanced a variety of explanations for the existence and strength of political parties in legislatures more generally, but none of these have been applied to nineteenth-century Brazil. These explanations range from teleological (parties may induce equilibrium policy outcomes) to purely rational and self-interested on the part of politicians (parties provide resources that legislative candidates value, ranging from funds for election campaigns to party labels that prove useful in providing electoral cues).\(^5\) Whether parties are strong in a legislature, or not, is largely a function of the electoral mechanism. Low district magnitudes and winner-take-all elections, combined with disincentives to intraparty competition for votes, promote strong party organizations.\(^6\) Add to those features a partly exogenous source of campaign resources, and one has the makings, in theory, of a very strong party.

Such features characterize the Brazilian polity in general, and the 1880s in particular quite well. Under Brazil’s constitutional monarchy cabinets were hand selected by the emperor, not created by the parliamentary majority.\(^7\) Since cabinets administered elections, they wielded enormous direct and indirect influence over electoral outcomes. Deputies of the majority party could ill afford to ignore the policy preferences of the cabinet, since the cabinet (usu-


\(^7\) São Vicente, *Direito Público Brasileiro*, pp. 227–56, discusses the constitutional powers granted cabinets in Brazil.
ally made up of prominent party leaders) commanded critical electoral resources. Moreover, the reform that preceded the elections of 1881 returned Brazil to an electoral division of a large number of single-member districts, as many as twenty in one province. This reduced tendencies toward intraparty competition for votes. Each party would typically field a single candidate in a district, who then faced no competition in the actual election from within his or her own party, and hence had little reason to set himself apart from her or his party. These two features together—party-based cabinets with influence over elections and many small, single-member districts—provide every reason to expect that Brazil had strong political parties in the 1880s, despite the claims to the contrary on the part of specialists on the era.

Although ascertaining the strength of Brazilian parties is a key concern of the rest of this chapter, the economic consequences of partisan politics are of special interest in the Brazilian setting and warrant some elaboration. Somewhat ironically, the starting point is with models that deduce away political parties in a distributive politics setting. To garner some insights into the economic consequences of distributive politics, the policy outcomes of two different arrangements underpinning market interventions may be compared with the benchmark of economic efficiency. The efficient policy is that of standard benefit-cost analysis and yields a project scale (be it a vector of expenditures and tax rates or a level of regulation) that maximizes the social surplus given the economy’s resources.

The first political arrangement departs from the efficient social planner by partitioning and politicizing the benefits and costs of a market intervention. Expenditures that go to politically relevant constituents represent not only resource costs but also political benefits for the legislator that obtains them. This arrangement thus transforms economic benefits and costs into political benefits and costs (from the perspective of a unitary policymaker), reassigning one component of resource costs to the benefit side of the equation. The equilibrium policy intervention in this case exceeds the optimal level. The second arrangement simply extends this politicization of project benefits and costs by partitioning the unitary government into a set of electoral districts defined on an arbitrary administrative division, where each district has a legislator and where policy outcomes are determined by majority rule. Under these conditions, the policy outcome is on a scale of market intervention even greater than that of the first case, which was already beyond the efficient policy. Legislators maximizing their political support, rather than net economic benefits, fail to internalize the negative externalities arising from the policies induced by the interests of their constituents. The key comparative statistics result is that the degree of inefficiency of the legislators’ preferences for intervention worsens with an increase in the number of legislative districts.9

Attenuating this distortionary and dissipative scenario is any feature that reduces the de facto (if not the de jure) number of districts. Political parties, in pursuing a goal favorable to party members, would internalize some of the negative externalities arising from unfettered political self-interest seeking on the part of individual legislators. For example, the majority party, by wielding electoral resources valued by legislators, could induce its members to take

9. Weingast et al., “The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs,” appropriately label this corollary the “Law of $1/N$. As $N$, the number of districts, increases, the distance between the efficient policy and equilibrium policy grows.
into consideration the political benefits and costs of market interventions to other members of the party. Although this leaves the number of legislative districts intact, it effectively reduces them insofar as they bear on the scale of the policy intervention. In the case where politicians pursue policies in response not only to constituent interests but also to partisan concerns, the policy outcome is somewhere between that of the unitary polity and that of the purely distributive legislature. The policy consequence of going from a nonpartisan legislature to one with strong parties is a movement of the market intervention from the extreme case of pure pork in the direction of economic efficiency. Strong legislative parties, when they exist, limit the inefficiency of market interventions.

**Party and Voting on the Floor of the Chamber of Deputies**

The evidence used to examine the role of political parties in policy outcomes is the roll-call voting records of the eighteenth legislature (1881–1884). The published debates for these years contain forty-one roll calls or divisions. Such a data set is extraordinarily small by the standards of the United States or the United Kingdom. It nonetheless permits the identification of significant patterns of voting, both by party and for individual legislators. The roll calls range from disputes over the seating of individual deputies for electoral reasons, to proposed taxes and subsidies, to several confidence votes in various cabinets. During the eighteenth legis-

10. These were extracted from Brazil (various years), and I believe represent this population of roll calls for these years. The roll calls are only incompletely indexed and thus required a page-by-page search in the Brazilian parliamentary debates to find them all.

lature, the Liberals held 78 of the 122 seats and the Conservatives held the balance.\textsuperscript{12} The sessions from 1881 through 1884 were marked by considerable conflict and instability, as several cabinets fell to nonconfidence votes, and the emancipation of slaves over sixty years of age became a major policy question in the chamber.\textsuperscript{13}

Attempting to identify the influence of party in roll-call voting outcomes raises thorny interpretive issues. Although students of legislative politics frequently invoke the importance of party in empirical work, present theory and method do not permit a definitive test of party strength.\textsuperscript{14} Indeed, since the tests for party strength turn out to be observationally equivalent with an absence of party discipline under some fairly weak assumptions, one cannot on the basis of roll-call voting patterns alone make an argument for the influence of party. Rather, party influence must be inferred, with less strength than might be hoped for, from both quantitative and qualitative evidence.

As a starting point it is important to establish whether party is a reasonable candidate for explaining roll-call voting outcomes in light of the evidence. Three different tests provide insights into the relationship between party affiliation and voting patterns on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies. The first of these measures is the

\begin{enumerate}
\item The politics of this period are detailed in Roger Frank Colson, “The Destruction of a Revolution Polity: Economy and Society in Brazil, 1750–1895” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1979), and, with special emphasis on the emancipation question, by Robert Edgar Conrad, \textit{The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 1850–1888} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
\end{enumerate}
The index of likeness, while displaying some variability, strongly suggests that there were fundamental differences between Liberals and Conservatives by the time a question was voted on the floor of the chamber. The vast majority of the divisions reveals low indices of likeness. In only one of the roll calls were the Liberals and Conservatives quite similar. But there the result is largely artifactual; a large number of Liberals boycotted the vote, in an apparent attempt to deny the chamber a quorum. Of those remaining, several sided with the Conservatives, giving rise to an unusually strong similarity between the parties. Whether the typical difference between the Liberals and Conservatives was a result of the influence of their respective parties, or whether party affiliation itself was a result of their constituent interests of ideological positions, cannot be determined from the index. Nonetheless, in their overall voting patterns, the parties were not indistinguishable, as some historians claim. On the contrary their differences were quite apparent.

A second test examines the degree of cohesiveness of each party. The measure employed is the index of cohesion, and its interpretation is straightforward. The greater the proportion of legisla-
Figure 4.1  Index of Likeness for Liberals and Conservatives in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies, Eighteenth Legislature (1881–1884)

 tors from a party who vote together, the higher the party’s index. Figure 4.2 presents the index of cohesion for each of the parties across the 41 roll-call votes.

Although the Conservatives enjoyed greater cohesion than the majority party on average, cohesion for both parties was typically high. Liberals suffered greater defections but still exhibited an index of cohesion greater than 0.5 on more than 75 percent of the roll calls. Combined with the index of likeness, the index of cohesion supports the view that the parties were quite different from each other, while each was internally coherent.

A third test extends the first two by applying factor analysis to each roll call to first establish the major issues, or dimensions of conflict, and then to plot each deputy on those dimensions.19 It then

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19. A variety of techniques are available for such an estimate; see Anderson et al., Legislative Roll-Call Analysis, pp. 123–174; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, “A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll-Call Analysis,” American Journal of Political Science 29 (1985): 357–84; and James J. Heckman and James M. Snyder Jr., “Linear
tests a variety of determinants of each deputy’s position to include party, personal characteristics, and constituent characteristics. For the forty-one roll calls from the eighteenth legislature, one dimension of conflict accounts for the majority of the variance among the votes cast by deputies; a second dimension accounts for another 5 or so percent of the variance; and additional dimensions account for less still. Figure 4.3 presents the unrotated factor loading plots for the roll calls, which by and large exhibits the desired pattern of roll calls lumping together on each end of the horizontal axis.

Figure 4.4 plots each deputy on the two most important factors, each of which represents an issue or dimension of conflict, much

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20. Greater detail on the results of the factor analysis are in Summerhill, “Party, Faction, and Policy in Imperial Brazil.”

Figure 4.3 Factor Loading Plots for Forty-One Roll Call Votes in the Chamber of Deputies, 1881–1884

like a simple left-right political continuum. Visual inspection is sufficient to infer that party affiliation is closely related to each deputy’s policy position on the first dimension since the Conservatives cluster to the left of the horizontal axis and Liberals cluster to the right, exhibiting virtually no overlap.

Whereas party affiliation is closely related to the first dimension, the second dimension holds no such simple interpretation since deputies from both parties are intermingled on the vertical axis. Regression analysis provides greater insight on the apparent strength of party on the first dimension and also allows an exploration of whether there are systematic determinants of the deputies’ positions on the second dimension. Figure 4.5 presents the results of a regression where the dependent variable is a deputy’s score on the first dimension and where the independent variables either capture or proxy party, occupational background, electoral strength, and constituent interest in the critical issue of the era, which was slavery.

The results are wholly consistent with the picture that emerges in Figure 4.4; party affiliation, far more than any other variable, accounts for each deputy’s position on the first issue. Most occupa-
tional variables fail to take on any statistical significance at all. Judges, however, were systematically more “liberal” than can be explained by party affiliation alone. The significant result for military officers is idiosyncratic since only one deputy was classified as military. The defining feature of conflict on the first, and most important, dimension was partisan affiliation.

Figure 4.6 provides an identical analysis for the deputies on the second dimension of conflict but yields very different results. Party affiliation plays no role whatsoever in the deputies’ respective positions on the second dimension; nor do any of the occupational variables. The only two variables that take on statistical significance are a provincewide measure of constituent interest in slavery (the number of slaves per elector in the province) and the margin by which the deputy won the last election.21 Although the

### Coefficients *

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<tr>
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<th>Beta</th>
<th>t</th>
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*a Dependent Variable: factor score, dimension 1 for analysis 1*

### Model Summary

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*a Predictors: (Constant), MARGIN2, MATH, ENGINEER, BIZNESS, MILITARY, FARMER, JUDGE, PARTY, SLAVELEC*

Figure 4.5 Determinants of Deputies’ Scores on the First Dimension of Conflict.  
*Note:* The dependent variable is the deputy’s factor score on the first dimension. Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the deputy was a Liberal and zero otherwise. All the remaining independent variables except the last two are dummy variables for the deputy’s occupation. BIZNESS indicates a merchant, and MATH a mathematics professor. DOCTOR, ENGINEER, FARMER, JUDGE, and MILITARY are literal labels. The default occupation is an attorney. SLAVELEC is the number of slaves per elector in the deputy’s province (not his district). MARGIN2 is the percentage margin of victory the deputy enjoyed in the previous election. For a more detailed explanation of this analysis see William R. Summerhill, “Party, Faction, and Policy in Imperial Brazil” (ms., Stanford University, 2000).  
### Coefficients

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*Dependent Variable: factor score, dimension 1 for analysis 1*

### Model Summary

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*Predictors: (Constant), MARGIN2, MATH, ENGINEER, BIZNESS, MILITARY, FARMER, JUDGE, PARTY, SLAVELEC*

Figure 4.6 Determinants of Deputies’ Scores on the Second Dimension of Conflict. Note: The dependent variable is the deputy’s factor score on the second dimension. Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the deputy was a Liberal and zero otherwise. All the remaining independent variables except the last two are dummy variables for the deputy’s occupation. BIZNESS indicates a merchant, and MATH a mathematics professor. DOCTOR, ENGINEER, FARMER, JUDGE, and MILITARY are literal labels. The default occupation is an attorney. SLAVELEC is the number of slaves per elector in the deputy’s province (not his district). MARGIN2 is the percentage margin of victory the deputy enjoyed in the previous election. For a more detailed explanation of this analysis see William R. Summerhill, “Party, Faction, and Policy in Imperial Brazil” (ms., Stanford University, 2000). Sources: Factor scores are derived from the procedure discussed in the text. Party affiliation, occupational variables, number of electors, and the electoral margin are derived from Barão de Jorge João Dodsworth Javari, Organizações E Programas Ministeriais, 2d ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Ministerio da Justica e Negocios Interiors, 1962), pp. 373–78. The number of slaves refers to figures from 1872; see Robert Edgar Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 1850–1888 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 300.
magnitude of the effect is small, the results indicate that the second dimension was some combination of direct constituent interest in the slavery question and the electoral “slack” enjoyed by the deputy.

The three tests here are suggestive: voting on the floor was quite consistent with the deputies’ party affiliation. As already stated, such tests are not definitive because party affiliation can have two distinct components: party discipline imposed by party organization and leaders and the selection effect, whereby deputies that are already partisan in response to their constituents’ interests, or ideology, sort themselves into two parties. None of the tests here can distinguish between these two possibilities. Although there is ample reason to believe that both components were at work in explaining the partisan pattern of voting, the party discipline model quite likely proved dominant in Brazil by 1881. Conservatives and Liberals indeed differed greatly in their underpinning viewpoints about the appropriate role of government, the division of authority between central and provincial governments, and the future course of policy, as exhibited in the party platforms and statements of principles. As such, party affiliation depended on a form of ideological sorting on the part of individual deputies. Yet party organizations, thanks to the party identity of the cabinet, also wielded tremendous electoral influence. This influence was of much more proximate concern for the typical deputy than a statement of principles adopted, in the case of the Conservative party, decades earlier. Thus, by 1881 the factors discussed above that lead to strong parties were all in place in Brazil. Relatively small, single-member electoral districts, the cohesive nature of intraparty voting, the influence of partisan cabinets,


and the observed differences between members of the two parties on roll-call votes, lead almost inexorably to the conclusion that Brazil enjoyed strong parties while still allowing for factional departures from a pure party model. Importantly, in a highly centralized polity, the economic impact of policymaking under strong parties created fewer distortions than if the chamber had operated in a nonpartisan manner.

**Conclusion**

In light of the abbreviated results reported here, it is no longer possible to dismiss the policy influence of the political parties of imperial Brazil. In contrast to the claims of historians, there is ample evidence that the Liberal and Conservative parties both differed from each other in their voting behavior and also exhibited a high degree of intraparty coherence. Rejecting the received wisdom does not mean that its polar opposite was true by default because party strength is not a dichotomous variable but rather a continuous one, which no doubt varied in its importance, both within specific legislatures and across sessions. By avoiding inquiry informed by positive political theory, and systematic empirical work, historians of Brazilian politics failed to identify the salient dimensions of policy conflict in the chamber, the relative importance of those dimensions at different points in time, and the underpinning pattern of party voting. Brazilian parties cohered, albeit imperfectly, and differed on the most fundamental dimension of policymaking. Cronyism, or the politics of patronage, and its economic consequences in imperial Brazil can no longer be understood without reference to the politics of parties.

23. A conjecture that remains to be investigated, but that is consistent with features of the Brazilian case, is that earlier episodes of multimember electoral districts weakened party discipline in the chamber.