The cold war had many turning points, none more compelling than those of the 1980s. The decade started with the war as cold as it could be and ended with the cold war over. These essays illuminate the process, and the authors have the advantage of experience, depth of observation, and historical perspective. They confirm that no one factor can explain what took place.

The essays offer stimulating viewpoints, and, although they differ in many respects, they are similar in one interesting way. All are rich in ideas and full of references to key individuals. The predominant names are Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, but the roles of other prominent individuals in ending the cold war are also discussed. Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice examine the policies of George H. W. Bush, Helmut Kohl, François Mitterrand, and Margaret Thatcher. Oleg Grinevsky investigates Yuri Andropov’s contribution to the transformation of Soviet foreign policy in the early 1980s. Nikolai Petrov analyzes Boris Yeltsin’s rise to power, and, in another essay on Yeltsin, Michael McFaul begins with a concisely stated key point: “Individuals matter.”

My perspective is dominated by my experiences in the 1980s, particularly my close association with President Ronald Reagan and my frequent meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev and his foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze. I had the advantage of having met with top Soviet leaders relatively often in the 1970s, including encounters with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Alexei Kosygin, and I had many meetings with Foreign
George P. Shultz

Minister Andrei Gromyko when I was secretary of state. These contacts gave me the perspective that comes from contrast.

So I will talk about a few ideas as they relate to my time as secretary of state and to the people I knew best. In doing so, I endorse another statement in McFaul’s essay: Ideas also matter. This premise is at the heart of the essays by Anatoli Cherniaev and David Holloway, both of whom examine how Gorbachev’s embrace of the ideas of human dignity and universal values influenced the Soviet system and, in turn, the whole world.

One powerful but too often overlooked idea is that strength and diplomacy go together. They are not alternatives, as is often implied. Rather, when done right, they are complementary. President Reagan believed in the importance of being strong, not only in military terms but also in our economy and self-confidence. He nourished strength but he never forgot about diplomacy. He loved negotiations, and he and I would exchange stories drawn from our common experiences in the arena of labor relations.

Many of President Reagan’s supporters were all for strength but they distrusted any effort to negotiate with leaders of the Soviet Union. By contrast, I found that Ronald Reagan was self-confident and ready to negotiate whenever appropriate. I also recalled a statement made to me as I entered office by my good friend Helmut Schmidt, who was then chancellor of West Germany. He said, “The situation is dangerous; there is no human contact.” I resolved to do something about the problem and started weekly meetings with Soviet ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin.

In early 1983, the U.S. economy was recovering, with inflation coming under control, and our military capacity was on the rise, although neither was at a satisfactory level. By chance, a snowstorm kept the Reagans in Washington one winter weekend and my wife and I were invited to supper with the president and Nancy. As our conversation unfolded, I could see how ready the president was to talk with Soviet leaders, so I suggested that I bring Ambassador Dobrynin over to see him the following Tuesday, February 15, when the ambassador was to arrive at my office for our regular
weekly meeting. The president welcomed the idea and said the meeting would be short because all he wanted to say was, “If your new leader [Andropov] is ready for a constructive dialogue, so am I.”

The meeting lasted much longer than expected and touched all the bases. I could see that Dobrynin was surprised that President Reagan was so well informed and so strong in his convictions. The president dwelt on human rights and identified the two Pentecostal families who had been living in our embassy in Moscow for several years as a virtual statement of the problem. His message was that if the Soviet Union allowed these families to emigrate and worship as they chose, he would not say a word. As Dobrynin and I rode back to my office, he suggested that we make that a project. A statement emerged with language that was far looser than we had wanted, but Dobrynin well understood our full intent. In the end, we persuaded the Pentecostals to leave the embassy, and they were allowed to emigrate with all their family members about three months later. The agreement was: We’ll let them out if you don’t crow. President Reagan never cowered. I had to believe that the Soviet leaders were impressed that President Reagan was a man of his word, able to resist the political temptation to crow, and he was therefore a good person with whom to negotiate. So President Reagan’s first deal with the Soviets was a human rights agreement realized against the background of improving strength.

President Reagan inherited the idea of linkage; that is, what happens on one front affects what happens on other fronts. The idea of linkage was vividly on display when President Jimmy Carter cut nearly all relations with the Soviets after they invaded Afghanistan. He was surprised, and he reacted: the United States boycotted the Moscow Olympics, withdrew the second strategic arms control treaty from consideration by Congress, and canceled Foreign Minister Gromyko’s annual visit to Washington, D.C., during the UN General Assembly meeting, among other actions.

President Reagan would not be constrained by linkage. Dramatically, in the wake of the brutal shoot-down of a Korean airliner by
a Soviet fighter pilot on September 1, 1983, and the resulting turmoil, President Reagan sent me, against a lot of linkage-type advice, to what turned out to be a stormy meeting with Gromyko. But we met, and I let him know how deeply we detested their deadly strike against a 747 aircraft that was clearly a passenger plane. Even more dramatically, the president sent our arms negotiators back to Geneva.

So linkage is a powerful idea, but a president need not be its slave. And President Reagan knew that strength and diplomacy in tandem is a better idea. He used his diplomacy—consulting with allies, bargaining skillfully and visibly with the Soviets—at a time when clear resolve was necessary to gain the deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles in England, Italy, and especially in West Germany in late 1983. That deployment, in turn, showed the strength and cohesion of the NATO countries, a strength that would soon lead to the series of negotiations that changed the world scene dramatically. Jack F. Matlock Jr. and Kiron Skinner investigate the Reagan administration’s deliberations and policies that made the strategy of strength possible. Alexei Arbatov and Oleg Grinevsky provide insightful analyses of both the Soviet response to that strategy and the evolution of Soviet foreign policy during those years.

I was part of the U.S. delegation attending the funeral of General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko in March of 1985. Our delegation had a long meeting with Chernenko’s successor, Mikhail Gorbachev, whom none of us had met before. Because Vice President Bush served as the head of our delegation, I had the luxury of making limited comments and observing Gorbachev carefully. In front of him was a pile of notes. He shuffled them around but never bothered to look at them. He was in complete intellectual control of a wide range of issues. He enjoyed the give-and-take. You could feel his energy and intensity even at the end of what must have been an exhausting period for him. Having observed other Soviet leaders, I could say with confidence that this new leader would be a formidable adversary, but he clearly liked ideas and was ready for vigorous conversation. This individual would matter.
The first meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev took place in Geneva in November 1985. Early on, Ambassador Dobrynin came to my office ready to start negotiations on a communiqué that would emerge from the meeting. I had unexpected news for him: President Reagan looked forward to meeting General Secretary Gorbachev, and he thought that whatever was reported afterward should reflect what they had talked about, not what the staff agreed upon in advance. Dobrynin was baffled and uneasy, but I told him that, based on my exposure to Gorbachev, I thought he might like this approach. This unscripted meeting turned out to be extraordinarily productive. The two leaders were in charge of the meeting, and the joint statement issued afterward was a good one, although we struggled all night to produce it. The big fact was that two individuals who mattered had talked to each other at length—by themselves and in large groups. They had taken each other’s measure and decided that progress could be made.

I recall meeting with Gorbachev after we both had left office. He came to my house on the Stanford campus and we sat in the backyard talking over what had taken place and where the world was going. I said to him, “When you and I entered office, the cold war was about as cold as it could get, and when we left, it was basically over. What do you think was the turning point?” He did not hesitate. “Reykjavik,” he said. My mind went back to that little room in Hofdi House where Ronald Reagan and I sat for two days with Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze. We talked about every conceivable aspect of our relationship, including crises in the third world, many of which Georgi Mirski and Peter Rodman thoughtfully analyze in their essays.

The basic agreement to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear weapons took place at Reykjavik, as did the agreement to reduce strategic arms by half to equal levels with a satisfactory counting rule for bombers, and a formal agreement that human rights would be a recognized part of our agenda. I also remember how it all broke up. The Soviet proposal to, in effect, stop the effort to develop a strategic missile defense system was not acceptable to
President Reagan, who had my strong support. Nevertheless, the bottom lines were on the table and would materialize. With all this in mind, I asked former president Gorbachev why he thought Reykjavik was the turning point. “Because,” he said, “the leaders talked about all the important issues over an extended period.” The results could not have been achieved in any other way, and in the end they led to a deepening of the personal relationship.

Then Gorbachev asked me what I thought the turning point was, and I said, “The deployment on German soil of Pershing missiles that you thought could reach Moscow.” That deployment took place at the end of 1983 after intense negotiations and a bruising propaganda battle in Europe. Beyond the missiles themselves, intended to counter the threat from deployed Soviet SS-20 missiles, was the demonstration of the strength and cohesion of the NATO countries. The resolution of the issues that divided Europe for many decades, as discussed in the essays by Karen Brutents, Robert Hutchings, Condoleezza Rice, Philip Zelikow, and Vladislav Zubok, are the defining results of policies of the early 1980s that explicitly combined strength and diplomacy.

As Gorbachev and I reminisced, I thought: Strength and diplomacy go together. Gorbachev has a point and so do I, but we would not have reached the endgame without the power of sound ideas and two individuals who could act on them.