

Chapter 5

Overview of the Reforms

STOLYPIN'S AGRARIAN REFORMS were controversial at the time and have remained so ever since. Foes characterize them as an effort to “destroy” the commune and depict a government forcing its will on a peasantry virtually uniform in its resistance. Champions of the reforms see them as having simply presented peasants with a set of new options, opening the door to modernity in the Russian countryside.

This chapter first describes the core reform policies (what choices they gave peasants, as individuals and as communes); then their immediate effects (such as the total area shifted out of open fields and repartition), the volume and ebbs and flows of peasant applications, and variations by region and by size of peasant landholding. If we focus primarily on applications, the reforms appear a success. But we can truly evaluate them only after examining the pressures and incentives they created for peasants, a topic reserved for Chapter 6.

Reform provisions: a rough cut

The reform provisions were complex. There were variations over time, as successive enactments took effect—the ukaz of November 1906 and the laws of June 14, 1910 and May 29, 1911. They distinguished between households in hereditary and redistributive tenure, between conversion of title (the cure for a commune's lands

being subject to repartition) and consolidation of tracts (the cure for open fields), between changes by individual households and ones by whole communes. Most perplexing of all, perhaps, are the apparently pointless differences between the treatment of households that had been in hereditary tenure under serfdom and ones that later switched to hereditary tenure under the reforms or earlier post-Emancipation provisions.

The ukaz. Conversion of title. Article 1 of part I of the ukaz flatly allowed any owner in redistributive tenure to demand conversion of his title into “personal property.” (As we shall see, this was almost but not quite the same as “private property.”) This change in title, known as *ukreplenie*, had no effect on the physical layout of the converter’s fields; but until the Act of May 29, 1911 took effect, it was a prerequisite to consolidation of tracts by single households.

Articles 2–3 of part I controlled the way in which the possibility of future redistributions affected the amount of land a converting peasant received. A householder was basically entitled to keep the land he had in current use (presumably the upshot of the last redistribution), not counting land he was using under rental from another holder. But many householders were currently using more land than they would have been entitled to if a new redistribution were to occur at the time of their application. The ukaz had different rules for claims to such extras (*izlishkek*, pl. *izlishki*), depending on whether there had been a general redistribution within the twenty-four years before a household’s application to convert. Because these rules may have loaded the dice in favor of title conversion, Chapter 6 contains a detailed analysis of them.

Under Article 4, the converting peasant kept his entitlement to share in various common resources, such as jointly held pastureland or forest.

The step provided for in Article 1 was, of course, only a “demand” for title conversion. The peasant submitted the demand to the commune, which was supposed to issue a suitable order (“*prigovor*”) within a month (art. 6). If the commune failed to act, the applicant

was free to appeal to the local land captain, an official of the central government's Interior Ministry, who was supposed to sort out the disputes between applicant and commune (art. 6). Further appeals could be pursued to the "district [*uezd*] congress" (i.e., a group composed primarily of land captains for the *uezd*, the unit of government smaller than the province) (art. 8), and, on limited grounds, up to the provincial government (art. 9). These latter appeals were only for acts in excess of jurisdiction or for "clear violations of law"; this presumably excluded garden-variety quarrels, such as ones over details of measurement.

In fact, evidently only about a quarter of applicants reached agreement with the commune within a month.¹ The remaining applications were presumably resolved by the commune belatedly, or by the land captain or the appellate bodies. Although some have taken the low rate of prompt commune approval as evidence of peasant reluctance to pursue title conversion,² it seems, in fact, only to show resistance on the part of commune stay-putters.

Under Article 1 of part III, parcels held in hereditary title, whether from the time of original allotment or later converted, were to be the personal property of the householder named in the decrees of the commune, land settlement authorities, or local courts. Under this provision, then, title conversion automatically shifted ownership from family to individual.

In addition, an entire redistributive commune could collectively shift to hereditary tenure by a two-thirds majority vote (part IV).

Consolidation. Under the ukaz, an individual peasant who had converted his title could then demand that the commune provide him the equivalent land, as near as possible, in one place (art. 12). (The various forms of land consolidation are covered by the word

1. Dorothy Atkinson, *The End of the Russian Land Commune, 1905–1930* (1983), 75, 89.

2. See, e.g., Esther Kingston-Mann, *Lenin and the Problem of Marxist Peasant Revolution* (1983), 120.

zemleustroistvo, which could be literally translated “land construction,” “land reorganization,” or “land settlement,” and embraces various types of consolidations.) An individual could demand the setting aside of his share at any time. If he made the request independently of a general repartition, he was entitled to the requisite amount of land so long as consolidation was neither impossible or inconvenient—an issue to be resolved by the district congress.³ If it was impossible or inconvenient, the commune could meet the demand with money, in an amount agreed on by the parties, or, failing agreement, an amount established by the volost court (art. 13). Once the court set the amount, the applying peasant could take it or stick with his scattered plots.

When a peasant filed for consolidation in connection with a general redistribution, the commune could not require him to take cash in lieu of consolidated land. This made obvious sense, as a commune already involved in reshuffling household claims could normally consolidate the plots of those interested with little or no inconvenience. Thus, so long as a peasant had filed his application to convert or had already converted before the redistribution judgment took effect, the commune had to allot him the land in a parcel (art. 14). Owners of allotments for which the redemption debt had been paid off prematurely and which had been switched to hereditary tenure under Article 165 of the Emancipation statutes could also use these provisions to consolidate (art. 17).

While the ukaz confined individual consolidation to those who had converted their titles under the ukaz or under Article 165, it allowed an entire commune—whether with hereditary or redistributive title—to choose by two-thirds vote for consolidation of all the household tracts (part IV). Consolidation by individuals was known as *vydel*, or more completely, *vydel k odnomu mestu* (literally, allot-

3. See note on Article 13 in the Statutory Appendix for discussion of this and of some authors' unexplained assumptions that the issue was up to the commune itself.

ment or separation to one place); consolidation by whole villages as *razverstanie*.

The ukaz provided for settling factual and interpretative disputes over consolidation of tracts by a cross-reference to existing arrangements for resolution of certain disputes among peasants (art. 15). The effect of the cross-reference was to give the power, in the first instance, to the land captains.⁴

The most curious aspect of the ukaz lay in its giving the right to demand consolidation as an individual only to peasants who had *converted* their title, with no parallel provision for householders whose rights had been hereditary from before Emancipation. Commentators agree that individual holders of those allotments indeed could not consolidate under the ukaz.⁵ The text seems to bear out this interpretation. Some sections of the ukaz referred to these long-time hereditary tracts separately from those with “converted” title,⁶ which would have been unnecessary if references to converted title were thought to encompass rights that had been hereditary from before Emancipation. Thus, holders of hereditary titles dating from before Emancipation could consolidate as individuals only with the approval of the commune.⁷

It is hard to see any good reason why the government might have wanted them not to be able to consolidate as easily as peasants who

4. George L. Yaney, *The Urge to Mobilize: Agrarian Reform in Russia, 1861–1930* (1982), 261, 278.

5. See, e.g., Atkinson, *The End of the Russian Land Commune*, 59.

6. See ukaz, part III, art. 1; compare part IV.

7. Article 165 of the General Statute on Redemptions required approval of the commune for such consolidation unless the allotment holder had paid off his share of the redemption debt. (And, as we’ve seen, the government did not, for purposes of Article 165, clearly equate allotment holders whose debt was cancelled as part of the tsar’s general cancellation of the debt with ones who paid off individually.) Robinson says that holders of hereditary title could consolidate with the agreement of all holders whose parcels were needed to achieve the consolidation, which in any event would likely be roughly as difficult as securing approval of the commune. Geroid T. Robinson, *Rural Russia Under the Old Regime* (1969), 73–74.

had just converted. Of course, exposure to an endless succession of individual claims would be far more inconvenient and unsettling for the commune than a once-for-all assignment of consolidated tracts to every householder in a commune (or to every householder seeking consolidation). So one can well understand the draftsmen's decision to limit the individual right, as they did by allowing the commune to cash it out in the cases of inconvenience or impossibility. But limiting the privilege to hereditary titles of relatively recent origin bears no connection to that concern. It seems to have been justified only by the idea that subjecting the *other* holders in a purely hereditary commune to this sort of obligatory reshuffling was too great an incursion on *their* property rights.⁸ As the disruptive effect is the same regardless of the nature of title, the distinction strikes me as thin.

The Act of June 14, 1910. This statute, approved by the Third Duma, added another form of title conversion. Article 1 declared that redistributive communes in which there had not been a general redistribution since the time of the original Emancipation allotment would be considered to have converted to hereditary title. Draftsmen of the act presumably thought this would accelerate title conversions; the result seems to have been quite the opposite. The existence or non-existence of a general redistribution over that long period was often in doubt, so that any effort by a peasant to establish a change in title under its provisions could cast a cloud over the status of the commune. In fact, peasants who opposed any change, whether in title or in actual plot location, evidently spotted the opportunity presented by Article 1. By invoking its provisions, they could tie the land up in legal knots, thus thwarting change by peasants trying to use the reform's other mechanisms. The disruptive effect was so great that the Interior Ministry issued instructions not to apply Article 1.⁹

8. Atkinson, *The End of the Russian Land Commune*, 59.

9. Yaney, *The Urge to Mobilize*, 381.

The 1910 statute's other important change was a switch in supervising agency. It placed disputes over consolidation initially in the local land settlement commission (*zemleustroitelnaia komissii*), with appeal up to its equivalent at the province level, and finally appeal (limited to issues of law and excess of jurisdiction) to the Senate, a quasi-judicial, non-specialized organ of government bearing no resemblance to our own body of that name (arts. 33, 37–38).¹⁰ Because the land settlement commissions were more committed to the reform than was the Interior Ministry, the change likely boosted the speed of reform.

And the act provided for a variety of consolidations at the request of households that had converted to hereditary title (arts. 32, 34, 35), including those converted under Article 1 of the act (art. 8). In the course of a general redistribution (*peredel*), such a householder could secure consolidation if he applied before the redistribution decree was issued (arts. 34(1), 35). Outside a general redistribution, an individual converted household had a right to consolidate, limited by provision for inconvenience, as before (art. 34(2)(b)). And, in an innovation, holders of converted title could get consolidation, free of any right in the commune to give them cash instead, whenever 20 percent or more of the householders applied (or, in a commune with more than 250 households, fifty households or more) (art. 34(2)(a)). The reasoning here was presumably that a demand for consolidation by such a large fraction of householders would not occur more than a handful of times for any given commune, and that because of its scale, such a consolidation would inflict relatively little inconvenience on the commune per household consolidated.

The 1910 Act also eased the path toward consolidation by a whole commune in hereditary tenure, reducing the needed vote from two-thirds to a simple majority (art. 45). For a commune with redistributive tenure, or with a mix of hereditary and redistributive, the needed majority remained two-thirds (art. 46), as under the ukaz.

10. Ibid., 261, 326–27.

And a commune that intended to use a redistribution to effect consolidation could do so prematurely, i.e., in a redistribution following the last one by less than the twelve-year minimum provided in the Act of June 8, 1893, without the special provincial permission normally required (art. 34).

The Act of May 29, 1911. This was essentially the culmination of the government's experience over the previous nearly five years. Its most important innovation was to enable peasants to sidestep title conversion as a prelude to consolidation. Thus, individual households, or groups representing 20 percent or more of a commune's households, could now consolidate regardless of whether title was hereditary or repartitional, under the rules formerly applying only to lands where title had been converted to hereditary status. The fact of prior title conversion continued to affect whole-commune consolidations, in that the varying majorities established by the 1910 Act still applied (a simple majority for a hereditary commune, including one that had become hereditary as a result of title conversions under the reform; a two-thirds majority for a repartitional or mixed commune). (See arts. 35, 36, 42.) In order to facilitate the process generally, the land settlement authorities were to try to make sure that their allocation of resources to individual consolidations did not get in the way of ones by whole communes (art. 21). And for the first time the land settlement authorities were empowered to compel inclusion of non-allotment land, or the land of a neighboring commune, where it was entangled with allotment land and was needed to secure consolidation (see, e.g., art. 50). We will encounter other provisions of the 1911 act in addressing detailed criticisms of the reforms and their methods.

The results of the reforms

The reform process went on for about nine years, until World War I distracted the government's energies and led it to draft the surveyors,

who were essential for consolidations. The shift was not immediate, but after 1915 there was virtually no reform activity. Over the nine years, the reforms by no means completed the intended transformation of the countryside, but they made a vigorous start.

The following data, developed by Dorothy Atkinson, are probably as close to a consensus as is likely to develop.

Title conversion. We start with 138.8 million desiatinas of allotment land.¹¹ In 1905, 115.4 million of these, or 83 percent, were held in repartitional (or redistributive) tenure, the remaining 23.4 million in hereditary tenure.¹² Considered through the end of 1915, activities under the ukaz of November 9, 1906 and Article 1 of the June 14, 1910 statute had reduced the area in repartitional tenure by about 16.4 million desiatinas. This amounted to about a 14-percent reduction in the pre-existing amount of redistributive allotment land (or 12 percent of total allotment land). The process left allotment land divided about 71–29 percent between repartitional and hereditary.¹³

The proportional effect on the number of households was more complicated. The absolute number of household conversions must be measured against a moving target, as the total number of households increased over the reform period through population growth and household division. A government survey for the start of 1916 shows about 15.3 million households altogether, and of these Atkinson estimates that about 11.5 million households *would have been* in repartitional tenure but for the reforms. The reforms moved about 2.5 million households out of repartitional tenure, or just under 22 percent of the otherwise expected universe of 11.5 million households in repartitional tenure. The resulting split, as of the end of

11. The difference between this figure and the 123 million desiatinas of allotment land reflected in Table 3.2 is due primarily to the exclusion of Cossack allotment lands from the peasant allotment land category in Table 3.2. See Robinson, 268–72.

12. Atkinson, *The End of the Russian Land Commune*, 83.


13. *Ibid.*

1915, was about 61–39 percent between repartitional and hereditary households.¹⁴ Figure 5.1 shows the proportions, both pre- and post-reform.

As a proportion, the change in households was clearly greater than the change in area. In fact, on average, the holdings of converting peasants were quite a bit below the average for all allotment land.¹⁵ A likely explanation (discussed below) is that peasants with small allotments who contemplated shifting out of farming, or at least out of farming as property-owners, exercised their conversion rights disproportionately.

In her estimate that 2.5 million households converted their titles, Atkinson included about 470,000 in conversions under Article 1 of the Act of June 14, 1910. Where individual households purported to convert for the entire commune, she included only the applying households themselves, or about 317,000 households. In theory, the

Figure 5.1. Proportion of Households Converting to Hereditary Title



14. *Ibid.*, 80–81.

15. *Ibid.*, 73. The average holding of repartitional allotment land was 10.2 desiatinas, see *ibid.*, 73, whereas the average size of converting households was about 6.6 (16.4 million desiatinas divided by 2.5 million households). But see *ibid.*, 94 (giving 7.0 desiatinas as the average size of holdings converted to hereditary title).

law treated the entire commune as having shifted to hereditary tenure. But in fact non-applying commune members commonly disregarded the change, possibly because they thought there really had been redistributions, possibly because they disliked the outcome or saw it as unfair; and, as we have seen, some individuals used this sort of conversion just to thwart the progress of reform. So Atkinson's exclusion seems reasonable. But where an entire commune requested certification under this section, Atkinson included *all* the households, thus adding roughly another 153,000.¹⁶

Virtually all of the conversions of title from redistributive to hereditary included a conversion from family to individual ownership. The ukaz said that the new title would belong to the household named in the document establishing the converted title; it had an exception (part III) for cases where that document said that it was establishing indivisible ownership in several unrelated persons, akin to what, in Anglo-American law, would be joint tenancies or tenancies in common.

Consolidations. The cure for scattered and intermingled plots was, of course, some sort of consolidation. Atkinson estimated that, by 1917, the land settlement authorities had consolidated about 12.7 million desiatinas,¹⁷ which was a little over 9 percent of all allotment land (138.8 million desiatinas). As the average size of consolidated holdings was almost identical to the average of allotment holdings overall—9.9 desiatinas as opposed to 9.7 desiatinas¹⁸—the proportion of households consolidated was nearly identical to the proportion of area. Again estimating on the conservative side by measuring the change against the greater (end-1915) number of households (15.3 million), the 1.3 million households consolidated would be about 8.5 percent of total households at the end of 1915.

16. *Ibid.*, 76–77.

17. *Ibid.*, 93.

18. *Ibid.*

These proportions may seem small. But Russia is a big country. The zemleustroistvo accomplished by the end of 1915 covered an area larger than the entire surface of England, and did so in a country with scarcely any land surveyors at the start of the reforms—but whose numbers had grown to nearly 7000 before they started to be siphoned off to the war.¹⁹

Related numbers and perspective. A few other points are useful in taking a bird's eye view of the reforms' accomplishments. First, the conversion figures omit conversions occurring as a package with a consolidation. Under the ukaz, whole villages in redistributive tenure could effect such a combined transformation, and after May 29, 1911 an individual could do so. It is unclear how many such uncounted conversions there were.

Second, in the cases of both conversions and consolidations, applications outran administrative processing. As we saw, Atkinson took into account about two million title conversions as a result of applications under the options provided by the ukaz of November 9, 1906, and another half million under Article 1 of the 1910 statute. But there were 2.8 million *applications* under the ukaz. Thus, even taking into account some (undetermined) number of withdrawn applications, there would have been some increase in conversions if the land settlement authorities had completed their work on the applications already filed.

For consolidations, the proportion of unexecuted applications was far greater than for conversions: more than 60 percent of total appli-

19. M.A. Davydov. *Ocherki agrarnoi istorii Rossii v kontse XIX- nachale XX vv.: Po materialam transportnoi statistiki i statistiki zemleustroistva* [*Studies of the Agrarian History of Russia at the End of the 19th and Beginning of the 20th Century: According to transport and land reorganization statistics*] (2003), 260. By the end of 1912, zemleustroistvo had covered an area 69 percent the size of England; extrapolation to the end of 1915 yields a figure of 109.6 percent. For numbers on land surveyors, see Fedorov, *Petr Stolypin: "Ia Veriu v Rossiuu"* [*Peter Stolypin: "I Believe in Russia"*] (2002), 1:371; Davydov, 285.

cations.²⁰ Had the authorities completed work on all the “individual” *zemleustroistvo* applications, the number of households consolidated would have risen by about 150 percent, from 1.3 million to over three million. Assuming no change in the area affected per household, the area consolidated would have risen to about forty million of the 138.8 million *desiatinas* of allotment land, or nearly 29 percent—instead of the 9 percent actually achieved.

The consolidation figures are also incomplete because of some peculiarities of classification. Although the ones counted above include all “individual” consolidations (*edinolichnoe zemleustroistvo*), they exclude “group” land settlement (*gruppovoe zemleustroistvo*), some of which created the sort of tract consolidations we have been speaking of. Both terms are confusing. “Individual land settlement” seems a complete misnomer, as it covers all conventional consolidations by either a single household (*vydel*) or an entire village (*razverstanie*). (About two thirds of the households consolidated did so through whole-village conversions.)²¹ And “group land settlement” covered four types of changes: (1) breaking up a large commune into separate ones, each with an integrated area of land; (2) disentangling multiple communes; (3) disentangling communes and private ownership; and (4) any redistribution of land within a commune if it reduced the number of tracts per household.²² The first three re-

20. Title conversion applications that were neither acted upon nor abandoned also piled up, but in a much lower proportion than consolidation applications. The reason for the difference is that conversion became largely moot after the May 1911 Act, so the authorities had far more time to remedy processing lags.

21. Davydov, 285.

22. Yaney, *The Urge to Mobilize*, 146, 155–56 and n. 4. And see Article 1 of law of May 29, 1911.

To summarize the awkward and misleading nomenclature: *zemleustroistvo* (consolidation or land settlement or land reorganization) is divided into two types, *edinolichnoe* and *gruppovoe*. *Edinolichnoe zemleustroistvo* in turn is divided into *vydel* (consolidation at the behest of individual households) and *razverstanie* (consolidation at the behest of a village). *Gruppovoe zemleustroistvo* comes in the four forms named in the text.

moved obstacles to consolidating the holdings of individual households, even though that was not their main purpose;²³ the fourth meant individual tract consolidations by definition. We can't treat these group land settlements as equivalent to individual household consolidations, but neither can we completely ignore them. Households involved in group land settlements by the end of 1915 numbered about 1.1 million, or a bit fewer than the 1.3 million involved in individual land settlements.²⁴ Adding in the applications for group *zemleustroistvo* that actually involved household consolidation would obviously increase the three million total applications for individual *zemleustroistvo*.

Let us conservatively take a 14-percent reduction in the scope of the redistributive commune and a 9-percent reduction in plot scattering as rough quantifications of the reforms' accomplishments in about nine years. How do they stack up? One measure would be Stolypin's own claim: "Give the state 20 years of peace, internal and external, and you will not recognize present-day Russia."²⁵ Assuming the new peasant-farmers proved comparatively successful, the pace might have quickened, but probably not enough for Russia to have achieved full transformation to hereditary rights and consolidated tracts within twenty years of 1906. But that seems only natural. Other nations took centuries to resolve the issue of scattered plots. In England, which used no general enclosure statute but proceeded piecemeal, there were thousands of specific enclosure acts between 1760 and 1850, covering about 5.5 million acres but representing

23. Yaney, *The Urge to Mobilize*, 155–56, and n. 4; see also *ibid.*, 362.

24. V. G. Tiukavkin, *Velikorusskoe krestianstvo i Stolypinskaia agrarnaia reforma* [*The Great Russian Peasantry and the Stolypin Agrarian Reform*] (2001), 203. Tiukavkin's figure for individual settlements accomplished is 1.234 million, or a bit under Atkinson's 1.3 million. The difference seems immaterial for our ballpark purposes.

25. *Ibid.*, 167. Compare Kofod's report of a visiting professor saying, in 1912, "Twelve years of peace and twelve years of land consolidation, and Russia will be unbeatable." Karl Kofod, *50 Let v Rossii, 1878–1920* [*50 Years in Russia, 1878–1920*] (1997), 219.

only 20 percent of the land.²⁶ In France, large-scale consolidation dragged out into the late 1940s.²⁷ And in Western Europe, the process was often driven by wealthy owners who may have used the process to increase their shares.²⁸ Further, market relations were only gradually penetrating the Russian countryside. If the reforms enabled willing peasants to adopt a more productive property system and imposed no unreasonable burdens on the unwilling, the first nine years look like a satisfactory launch, regardless of how long the process might have taken to play out in full.

The flow of applications over time

As we've already seen, completed title conversions and consolidations (especially consolidations) lagged way behind applications. By the end of 1915, when World War I had stopped the process, 3.8 million households were stalled by unfulfilled applications for consolidation (group as well as "individual"), compared to a little under 2.4 million households with completed consolidations (1.23 million in "individual" consolidation, 1.14 million in "group" consolidation).²⁹

Considering applications as a whole, covered households represented a large share of all peasant households: Applications for consolidation covered 6.2 million, and those for title conversion covered nearly 3.4 million (2.8 million as individual households under the

26. Launcelot A. Owen, *The Russian Peasant Movement, 1906–1917* (1963), 48. See also J. R. Wordie, "The Chronology of English Enclosure, 1500–1914," *Economic History Review* 36 (new series, 1983): 483–505.

27. Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944* (1972), 207.

28. Stuart Banner, "Transitions between Property Regimes," 31 *J. Leg. Stud.* (June 2002): S359–71.

29. Tiukavkin, 203; David A. J. Macey, "'A Wager on History': The Stolypin Agrarian Reforms as Process," in *Transforming Peasants: Society, State and the Peasantry, 1861–1930*, ed. Judith Pallot (1998), 164 (Table 8.2).

ukaz, plus .6 million in villages invoking art. 1 of the 1910 Act).³⁰ These numbers are substantial fractions of Atkinson's estimated 15.3 million households at the end of 1915.

To be sure, if we view consolidated tracts in hereditary tenure as the desired end state, only consolidations should count—and of them only individual consolidations (*vydels* and *razverstanie*) plus the unknown share of group consolidations that yielded individual consolidated tracts.³¹ Nonetheless, the numbers can be said to reflect at least a widespread embrace of the reforms (saving for Chapter 6 the issue of whether undue government inducements explain some of that embrace).

Although the annual rate of applications didn't rise continuously, there is no basis for thinking that the reforms had run out of steam, much less for the idea that they "collapsed" in 1911.³² Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show the trend in applications, a better sign of peasant response than finished conversions or consolidations.³³

The figures for consolidation applications in Table 5.1 (which underlie Figure 5.2) include not only "individual" but also "group" consolidations or *zemleustroistvo*—each probably in about equal numbers, as were the completed applications.³⁴ And it is unknown how much of the group *zemleustroistvo* comprised household tract consolidation, the main goal of this aspect of the reform. In a sense, however, the volume of group *zemleustroistvo* is a point in the reforms' favor: though not a core part of the government's original intent, it developed in response to peasant demand and is hard to

30. Tiukavkin, 193.

31. The annual number of households covered by applications for action that would lead *directly* to farm consolidations is not clear. Compare Macey, "'A Wager on History,'" 165 (Table 8.3), with Davydov, 248–59 (Tables 3.2, 3.3).

32. Davydov, 244 (quoting Anfimov as an example of those who claim a collapse).


33. The sources for the table and chart are the tables in Tiukavkin, 193, 203. As to applications for *zemleustroistvo*, Macey, "'A Wager on History,'" 163, has a slightly different number for 1907 and thus a slightly different total.

34. Davydov, 248–59 (Tables 3.2, 3.3).

Table 5.1.⁵⁵ Households in European Russia Covered by Applications for Title Conversion and for Consolidation (in 000s)

	<i>For title conversion, by individual households</i>	<i>For title conversion, by whole villages under Art. 1, 1910 Act</i>	<i>For land consolidations (zemleustroistvo)</i>	<i>Totals</i>
1907	211.9		213.3	425.2
1908	840		380.7	1220.7
1909	649.9		705	1354.9
1910	341.9	53.8	650.2	1045.9
1911	242.3	252.2	678.1	1172.6
1912	152.4	117.5	1226.2	1496.1
1913	160.3	102.2	1105.7	1368.2
1914	120.3	68	828.1	1016.4
1915	36.5	24.3	380.9	441.7
Totals	2755.5	618	6168.2	9541.7

Figure 5.2. Applications for Title Conversion and for Consolidation (in 000s)



square with the notion—propounded by the reforms’ fiercer critics—of an intolerant government hell-bent on inflicting its own views on the countryside.

Although there was a clear decline in applications for title conversion, that decline was largely offset—and after 1911 more than offset—by the rise in applications for consolidation, which households could achieve under the 1911 Act without any prior conversion of title. The aggregate pattern over time shows a mixed trend: a peak first in 1909, then another in 1912, a slight decline in 1913, and a sharper one in 1914 (some of it clearly attributable to the war). Until 1915 no decline was either deep or prolonged.

Note the rolling character of the figures. Applications for consolidation spiked in 1912, nearly doubling from 1911, possibly because of peasant recognition that the 1911 law resolved ambiguities in the earlier law, as well as making possible land reorganizations that formerly had been blocked by interstripping with private land. But in 1912 completed individual consolidations fell, probably because of the greater complexity and specificity in the 1911 Act. Then, applications in turn declined from 1912 to 1913, possibly reflecting frustration with the immediate past results.³⁵

Table 5.2 shows individual and group consolidations completed for the years 1907 through 1915.³⁶

One can imagine two general factors affecting the trend, likely working in opposite directions. On one side is the principle of low-hanging fruit: it is reasonable to think that households for which the changes were most advantageous would apply first, producing a burst of early applications, followed by a tapering off. On the other is the

35. See Davydov, 267, for suggested explanation of the spike, and cf. *ibid.*, 272–77; see David A. J. Macey, “‘A Wager on History,’” 164, for suggested explanation of the 1913 drop.

36. For the numbers, see Macey, “‘A Wager on History,’” 164; see also Tiukavkin, 203; Andrei Andreevich Kofod, *Russkoe zemleustroistvo* [*Russian Land Reorganization*] 2d ed. (1914), 112. Andrei Andreevich Kofod is the Russianized name of Karl Kofod, author of *50 Let v. Rossii*.

Table 5.2. Households in European Russia with Zemleustroistvo Accomplished (in 000s)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Individual Zemleustroistvo</i>	<i>Group Zemleustroistvo</i>	<i>Total</i>
1907	8.3	4.3	12.6
1908	42.4	17.6	60.2
1909	119.4	85.7	205.1
1910	151.8	110.6	262.4
1911	206.7	112.4	319.1
1912	122.5	125.6	248.1
1913	193.0	193.6	386.6
1914	203.9	268.2	472.1
1915	173.5	220.9	394.4
Total	1221.5	1139.0	2360.5

role of example: at least if the initial applicants' expectations were fulfilled, one would expect a steady accretion as neighbor emulated neighbor.

In any event, had the government merely executed the applications received, the upshot would have been a very substantial dent in repartition and open fields.

Regional variation

Acceptance of the reforms varied widely among regions and provinces. Table 5.3 shows the data for most provinces of European Russia. The two maps that appear after Table 5.3 visually represent these data: one shows conversions, the other, consolidations. The variation might seem to present an ideal opportunity to use modern statistical techniques to identify explanations for relative success. For lack of data, however, and the resistance of much of the information to quantification, that expectation cannot be fulfilled—at least for now. Thus we explore the variations not so much to draw clear lessons as to get some general impressions and to note the complications.

For the most part, provinces ranking high in title conversion also

Table 5.3. Applications, Conversions, and Consolidations in Forty-Eight Provinces of European Russia

<i>Province</i>	<i>% of applications for title conversion acted on favorably, of all such applications</i>	<i>% households converting title, of households in repartitional title</i>	<i>% area with converted title, of area with repartitional title</i>	<i>% households consolidating, of all allotment households</i>	<i>% area consolidated, of entire allotment area</i>
<i>Central Black Earth</i>					
Orel	85.7	39.0	26.4	5.9	6.0
Tula	79.0	21.6	14.5	12.2	10.1
Riazan	74.3	17.0	9.4	5.4	4.1
Tambov	68.4	24.0	14.0	6.6	6.2
Kursk	85.9	43.8	28.0	8.4	7.0
Voronezh	57.4	20.1	12.7	9.0	6.5
<i>Central Industrial</i>					
Tver	72.3	15.7	12.8	8.7	10.0
Yaroslavl	62.2	9.6	8.9	7.0	8.4
Kostroma	69.5	9.6	8.8	3.5	3.5
Kaluga	89.2	23.6	20.8	5.9	6.0
Moscow	78.2	31.2	21.0	16.5	8.0
Vladimir	67.7	10.1	5.5	5.5	5.0
<i>Middle Volga</i>					
Penza	68.0	25.2	15.7	9.7	8.7
Kazan	48.4	8.6	5.0	5.4	4.2
Nizhgorod	66.3	14.4	8.5	7.7	6.0
Simbirsk	63.3	23.9	18.0	8.5	8.9
Saratov	69.2	27.7	18.6	18.4	22.0

Table 5.3. (Continued)

<i>Lakes</i>						
St. Petersburg	63.1	10.3	9.8	31.3	27.7	
Olonets	71.3	11.8	3.8	1.5	1.5	
Pskov	72.9	18.8	18.6	18.2	18.8	
Novgorod	69.5	10.1	9.5	9.5	9.0	
<i>White Russia</i>						
Kovno	**	**	**	22.2	20.2	
Vitebsk	84.7	28.8	21.8	31.6	26.1	
Grodno	**	**	**	12.1	6.2	
Vilno	*	*	*	13.3	9.3	
Minsk	*	*	*	6.7	9.6	
Mogilev	96.9	56.8	54.8	15.0	18.2	
Smolensk	67.0	15.8	14.6	18.1	20.2	
<i>South-West (or Right-bank Ukraine)</i>						
Volyn	*	*	*	12.7	11.8	
Podolia	*	*	*	2.4	1.9	
Kiev	98.4	48.6	50.7	9.2	7.7	
<i>Little Russia (or Left-bank Ukraine)</i>						
Chernigov	73.1	8.5	7.1	3.9	4.0	
Poltava	84.4	12.1	13.8	11.2	10.4	
Kharkov	68.4	29.1	20.6	24.0	20.0	

Table 5.3. (Continued)

<i>Province</i>	<i>% of applications for title conversion acted on favorably, of all such applications</i>	<i>% households converting title, of households in reparitional title</i>	<i>% area with converted title, of area with reparitional title</i>	<i>% households consolidating, of all allotment households</i>	<i>% area consolidated, of entire allotment area</i>
<i>New Russia (or Ukrainian Steppe)</i>					
Bessarabia	88.9	15.1	17.3	8.4	7.6
Kherson	84.1	38.1	33.2	24.0	23.1
Ekaterinoslav	84.5	54.1	37.7	33.0	32.6
Tauride	83.7	63.6	48.5	32.0	24.9
Don [Cossacks]	*	*	*	9.9	20.7
<i>Lower Volga</i>					
Samara	74.2	49.4	29.6	25.9	28.6
Astrakhan	30.5	5.3	2.6	8.6	9.5
Orenburg	62.5	10.5	4.3	****	****
Stavropol	67.3	***	***	24.9	35.4
<i>Urals</i>					
Viatka	45.8	4.9	3.9	0.9	0.6
Perm	48.2	4.0	3.1	2.4	0.4
Ufa	70.3	14.8	5.2	5.8	5.5


Table 5.3. (Continued)

<i>Northern</i>					
Archangel	*	*	*	0.5	0.5
Vologda	50.8	6.5	3.7	3.5	2.8
<i>Total</i>	72.8	22.1	14.0	10.9	10.7

Sources: Columns for title conversion are from Dubrovskii, 574–76 (Chart 2). A * indicates that Dubrovskii says there are no data (in some cases, such as Minsk and Vilno, this is presumably because allotment land titles were *already* 100 percent hereditary); a ** indicates that that province is not included at all in Dubrovskii's table, presumably because he regarded the provinces as part of Lithuania (and in any event there was no reparitional title to convert). Columns for consolidation are from L. Owen, 87, rearranged to show regional distribution. A *** indicates that lack of data on the baseline extent of the reparitional commune makes calculation of percentage impossible. See Dubrovskii, 574. A **** indicates that Owen includes no data. Classification of provinces into regions is per Maureen Perrie, *The Agrarian Policy of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party from Its Origins through the Revolution of 1905–1907* (1976), xii, except that Stavropol has been attached to Lower Volga for convenience's sake. The percents for the totals for conversion and consolidation are drawn from Dubrovskii and Owen, respectively, for purposes of simplicity and consistency within each of those categories. The percents for the totals in column 1, 2, and 3 are based on only 40 provinces. See Dubrovskii, 576.


Dubrovskii's figures on consolidation, Dubrovskii (246–47), are quite different from Owen's. The data in P. N. Pershin, *Zemelnoe ustroistvo derevni sionoi derevni [Land Reorganization of the Pre-Revolutionary Countryside]* (1928), e.g., 420–37, seem to match Owen's, not Dubrovskii's. The answer may be that Dubrovskii is including group zemleustroistvo. Dubrovskii (204–07, 246–47) seems to argue that consolidations rise with the pre-existing degree of scatter, but as his percentages of consolidation for the central black-earth and industrial provinces are far higher than Owen and Pershin, it seems likely he's gone astray somewhere, perhaps in including group zemleustroistvo.

Map 5.1. Percentage of Households Converting Title, by Province



Cartography by Bill Nelson

Map 5.2. Percentage of Households Consolidating, by Province



Cartography by Bill Nelson

ranked high in consolidations. There are obvious exceptions. Most striking is the central black-earth region; except for Tula, which is roughly average in all categories, the black-earth region's provinces rank lower in consolidation than in title conversion, in several cases far lower (Orel, Tambov and Voronezh). Scattered about are several similar anomalies, such as Kaluga in the central industrial region and Kiev in the right-bank Ukraine. The reverse—the combination of sparse title conversions and abundant consolidations—also appears, most notably in St. Petersburg. It is unclear what explains these differences.

There seem to be two factors generally associated with above-average use of the reforms: the example of neighbors and neighboring areas; and a high level of commercial agricultural production, especially for the international trade. In title conversion, for example, the fraction of households choosing to convert tended to rise with the fraction already in hereditary tenure in the province.³⁷ Thus, the two central black-earth provinces with far above-average title conversions, Kursk and Orel, started the process with a relatively high proportion of households in hereditary tenure (30.3 and 10.3 percent, respectively), compared with the diminutive fractions for most of the others (2.6 percent for Riazan, 3.0 percent for Tambov, and 1.4 percent for Voronezh).³⁸ (Tula appears anomalous by this criterion, scoring on the high side in pre-reform proportion of households in hereditary tenure, 14.7 percent, but only average in title conversion.) Similarly, two provinces with above-average proportions of households in hereditary tenure at the outset—Kiev with 91 percent and Mogilev with 19.5 percent—saw a solid half of their repartitional households convert.

37. A point made by Tiukavkin, 194.

38. Data on the proportion in hereditary tenure come from S. M. Dubrovskii, *Stolypinskaia zemelnaia reforma* [*The Stolypin Land Reform*] (1963), 570–73 (Chart 1).

Example also played a role in consolidation. Before the reforms there had been a spontaneous consolidation movement in the West, mainly in White Russia (overwhelming in Kovno, and serious in Pskov, Vitebsk, Mogilev and Smolensk) and Ukraine (Volyniia, at any rate)—areas, perhaps not coincidentally, where the repartitional commune was sharply underrepresented.³⁹ The spontaneous movement was itself influenced by the example of consolidated tracts further west, especially in the Baltics. In all these areas of pre-reform consolidation, an above-average proportion of peasants used the reforms' consolidation provisions. Minsk, the only White Russian province with no spontaneous consolidation, was well below average in fraction of households consolidating and below average in area consolidated.⁴⁰ Seeing the importance of examples, the zemleustroistvo authorities (including Kofod, the Dane mentioned earlier who had been influenced by the commission headed by Stolypin's great uncle) tried to bring peasants to areas with consolidated tracts in use, sending about 250 on trips to Russia's Baltic regions or abroad.⁴¹ By 1908, Kofod believed there were enough examples of high-quality zemleustroistvo in every Russian province to justify dispensing with these expeditions.⁴²

Even before the reforms, of course, consolidation spread by example, and indeed was crucial to pre-reform consolidation. As in nature's spreading of seeds, much was random. Kofod tells of a Mogilev peasant who married his son to a girl from a recently consolidated village in Vitebsk. His Mogilev friends who came for the wedding

39. A. M. Anfimov, *P. A. Stolypin i rossiiskoe krestianstvo* [*P. A. Stolypin and the Russian Peasantry*] (2002), 154; Donald W. Treadgold, *The Great Siberian Migration* (1957), 45.

40. Data on pre-reform consolidation come from K. Kofod, *50 Let v Rossii*, 163. Kofod had been active in facilitating this activity.

41. Leonid Panov, *Zemelnaia reforma v Rossii. Istoki i uroki* [*Land Reform in Russia. Sources and Lessons*] (2001), 127.

42. K. Kofod, *50 Let v Rossii*, 201.

were impressed and spread the word on their return home. By 1904, says Kofod, 154 villages on both sides of the provincial border had reorganized.⁴³

The provinces most highly developed in commercial agriculture also generally saw above-average use of both aspects of the reforms. A glance at Table 5.3 shows most provinces of White Russia and Ukraine (right-bank, left-bank and New Russia) well above average, and these generally featured more agricultural trade, both international and domestic.⁴⁴ The pattern matches Africa's more recent experience with reforms aimed at increasing private property ownership.⁴⁵

The correlations with greater trade may support a theory that commercialization caused greater acceptance of the reforms: this seems to make sense, as the prevalence of trade could be expected to increase the returns to individualistic agriculture, with its greater opportunities for efficiency and innovation. Greater trade would also have reduced the net benefit of open fields on either of the main theories explaining their existence: it would have reduced the value of risk-spreading via open fields by opening up alternative ways for providing against harvest failure; and it would have increased specialization, reducing the advantage of intermingling uses, which, under the strategic-behavior theory, gave rise to plot scattering.⁴⁶ An alternative analysis might see both commerce and embrace of the reforms as effects of prior causes, such as development of arteries of commerce and the spread of knowledge about innovative agricultural techniques. Obviously the two hypotheses aren't mutually exclusive.

43. *Ibid.*, 140.

44. See, e.g., Lazar Volin, *A Century of Russian Agriculture: From Alexander II to Khrushchev* (1970), 107; George Pavlovsky, *Agricultural Russia on the Eve of the Revolution* (1968), 135–40; Robert Edelman, *Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The Nationalist Party, 1907–1917* (1980), 52–57; Robert Edelman, *Proletarian Peasants: The Revolution of 1905 in Russia's Southwest* (1987), 44–45.

45. Jean Ensminger, "Changing Property Rights: Reconciling Formal and Informal Rights to Land in Africa," in *Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics*, eds. John N. Drobak and John V. C. Nye (1997), 165–96.

46. See Chapter 2—"Open fields."

The causal role of examples has similar complexities. The examples were generally most common in areas that were prime candidates on other grounds—e.g., proximity to western markets. That proximity tended to generate nearby examples and to increase the benefits of the reforms, and each of those effects may have reinforced the other.

Besides local examples and commerce, another factor accounting for regional variations is local reaction, best measured by the percent of applications receiving favorable action at the commune level, shown in the first column of numbers in Table 5.3. Despite the authority of the land captains and courts to overturn a commune's rejection of an attempted title conversion, a commune could wear the applicant down with its resistance, and in some cases could prevail on appeal. The regions vary widely. In the central black-earth region alone, the percent of applications for title conversion acted upon favorably ranged from 57.4 percent for Voronezh to 85.9 percent for Kursk; in the central industrial area, from 62.2 percent for Yaroslavl to 89.2 percent for Kaluga.⁴⁷ The difference goes a long way to account for the far greater proportion of eligible households actually converting in the low-resistance provinces.

That finding, of course, leads to another question: the reasons for varying levels of resistance. Tiukavkin and others see high resistance as the product of extreme land shortage (as we're loosely calling a high ratio of peasants to agricultural land).⁴⁸ This seems intuitively plausible. If peasants thought that title conversions would inflict net land losses on the commune—i.e., leave remaining commune members with less land per household than before—those disinclined to change would likely have opposed peasant departures most ardently in areas where land was perceived as especially scarce. As we shall

47. Tiukavkin, 195; Dubrovskii, 574–76. The figures evidently refer to the fraction ultimately successful, whether by commune approval or on appeal beyond the commune.

48. Tiukavkin, 195.

see, peasants often did expect that title conversions would leave the commune with less land per remaining household; how sound that expectation was is uncertain and will be considered in the next chapter.⁴⁹

In fact, the effect of the peasant-to-land ratio is far from clear. Conversions were sparse in the north and northeast, areas where land was relatively abundant.⁵⁰ Applications were relatively low, which might mean that the generous supply of land left people content with the status quo. But commune resistance was high in those areas, as reflected in the low approval ratios for Viatka and Perm (only 45.8 percent and 48.2 percent, respectively). No simple role for land scarcity leaps from the data.

Furthermore, a seemingly endless array of special local factors may have played a role. For example:

- The comparatively low consolidation rates in parts of right-bank Ukraine may have been due to a practice of communes' leasing their land to sugar firms, thereby essentially mooted the open fields issue, and also to complicated servitudes that could not readily be sorted out so as to compute fair shares in a consolidation.⁵¹
- In Moscow Province the high levels of conversion, as well as the high proportion of households consolidating, may have been due to the prevalence of intensive uses of land—for vegetables and cattle for local markets.⁵²
- In the central industrial region communes had been relatively successful in enhancing productivity within the constraints of the old system—by enlarging strips and engaging in joint land

49. See Chapter 6.

50. Pavlovsky, 138; see also Atkinson, *The End of the Russian Land Commune*, 72, 86, for size of allotment holdings by region.

51. Pavlovsky, 136; A. Kofod, *Russkoe zemleustroistvo*, 128.

52. Tiukavkin, 195. For various other special local issues, see Yaney, *The Urge to Mobilize*, 355–58.

improvement, for example—and this success evidently reduced the reforms' appeal.⁵³

Kofod, who had been involved in consolidations even before the reforms and who participated in running them, identifies as plus factors uniformity of soils (making division more straightforward) and the “industrial character” of peasant agricultural activity (presumably a sign of greater market experience).⁵⁴ As minuses, he points to bureaucratic malfunctions, such as the complete absence of *zemleustroistvo* commissions in certain provinces until 1911 and a disastrous performance in Astrakhan that had to be entirely redone;⁵⁵ underdevelopment of land and need for drainage (presumably as complicating matters);⁵⁶ the presence of complicating servitudes, especially in the west;⁵⁷ the presence of ravines, swamps, forests and similar interruptions in the terrain;⁵⁸ a high degree of industrial development (sometimes producing a local leadership uninterested in agricultural matters, as well as anti-reform sentiment based on party);⁵⁹ and idiosyncratic land laws prevailing in Chernigov and Poltava since 1859.⁶⁰

Finally, until the Act of May 1911 gaps in legal authority impeded

53. Ministerstvo Ekonomicheskogo Razvitiia i Torgovli, “Agrarnaia reforma Petra Stolypina” [“The Agrarian Reform of Peter Stolypin”] <http://www.economy.gov.ru/stolypin.html> (downloaded June 18, 2002), 18. See also Yaney, *The Urge to Mobilize*, 355.

54. A. Kofod, *Russkoe zemleustroistvo*, 67.

55. *Ibid.*, 110, 124–25.

56. *Ibid.*, 129.

57. *Ibid.*, 127, 130–31.

58. *Ibid.*, 151.

59. *Ibid.*, 127.

60. *Ibid.*, 106–07, 107 and n. 1, 129. See also Davydov, 280–81, where the author contrasts non-black earth central regions where there were many departures for Siberia and relatively *low* levels of farm machinery purchase (suggesting that those not striking out for the East had lost interest in further agricultural development), with New Russia and surrounding areas, where there was much emigration but *high* levels of investment in machinery.

the process. Commune interstripping with private land, which was especially common in the central provinces, slowed or prevented consolidation until that statute enabled the land settlement authorities to compel their inclusion.⁶¹ Interstripping among multiple villages (common in the upper Volga and central industrial areas) was a further source of delay, requiring a two-thirds majority in each linked village until the 1911 law allowed compulsory inclusion of areas adjacent to villages undergoing *razverstanie*.⁶²

In short, it seems hard to draw tidy lessons from the regional distribution of title conversions and consolidations. The roles of nearby examples and degree of commercialization seem to have been fairly strong, but beyond them, local particularities—many of them hard to quantify—seem dominant.

Variations in size of holdings converted or consolidated

Households converting their titles had below-average land holdings; thus, the percent of households converting was higher than the percent of land converted. And it may be that the middle is not as well represented as the average figures might suggest. In Samara, for example, the extremes are overrepresented: those without any “sown” land and those with more than fifteen *desiatinas*.⁶³ Most convertors at the very low end presumably did so in anticipation of selling their limited interests and perhaps quitting agriculture.

One might expect that the better-off peasants would have been overrepresented among convertors and consolidators, as they might have been best able to exploit the advantages of individual ownership. But matters were not so simple. Peasants with larger holdings tended to have disproportionately large numbers of cattle, and in

61. A. Kofod, *Russkoe zemleustroistvo*, 356.

62. *Ibid.*

63. Dubrovskii, 222, 257; see also Atkinson, *The End of the Russian Land Commune*, 91; L. Owen, 63.

any commune that hadn't bothered to establish a formula limiting grazing they would have enjoyed a disproportionate benefit from the commune. Even where grazing was subject to limits proportional to cropland, the more prosperous may have used their entitlements more fully than others, and thus have done better under the communal status quo than they expected to do under privatization.⁶⁴

* * *

This overview of the reforms shows their complexity better than it justifies denunciation or acclaim. It does show that peasants took them up—and with gusto, if one focuses on the application flow. But for one interested in the reforms' possible role in advancing liberal democracy, a central question is of process. If peasant acceptance were the product of coercion, or of enticements dangled by the government (especially ones created at the expense of non-accepters), then the application flow would not augur well for liberal democracy. We turn in Chapter 6 to these issues and a number of other questions about the reforms' legitimacy and likely impact.

64. Compare Dubrovskii, 227, discussing possible grazing advantage for the prosperous. Kofod, a firsthand observer and participant, also suggests that owners with a lot of cattle tended to resist. K. Kofod, *50 Let v Rossii*, 175; A. Kofod, *Russkoe zemleustroistvo*, 61, 132. Kofod argues that anyone with more cattle than average for his quantity of land, even those with less than average land, would tend to resist consolidation because of the expected loss of his relative advantage. *Russkoe zemleustroistvo*, 61 and 61 n. 1. Pavlovsky, 133–34, argues that the discrepancy may in part arise from the differences between state peasants and pomeshchiki peasants. The state peasants were generally better off and, thus, he argues (implicitly making some unproven assumptions about the effect of size on incentives), whole communes of state peasants may have felt less pressure to change methods of cultivation. He also argues that state peasants, besides occupying more generous tracts, often had non-farm work as an alternative source of income, and, again, thus less incentive to change the structure of their farming.