Part Two:
Turning the Goal of a World without Nuclear Weapons into a Joint Enterprise
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Key Judgments

This paper focuses on two related questions pertaining to the issue of how best to work with leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise:

- What would be the “mechanism” for getting all of the nuclear states together to agree on a program of action such as the steps listed in the Wall Street Journal Op-Ed article?
- Would a new mechanism—either formal or informal—be required, or would this best be done through an existing mechanism, such as the United Nations, perhaps working with other key states?

The review identified four central issues for analysis:

- **Issue 1**: How can the United States government initiate the process of working with leaders of other nuclear weapon states to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise?
- **Issue 2**: To what extent does this process need to be procedurally and substantively “inclusive” (i.e., involve all nuclear weapons states) from the start?
• **Issue 3:** Should the process be centered within existing structures and mechanisms or on a more *ad hoc* basis?

• **Issue 4:** How much “weight” should be given to the steps at the outset of this process?

- The review identified three options for consideration:
  - **Option 1:** A UN-centered process, whereby the UN General Assembly would first pass a resolution calling for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, followed by a process anchored in the Security Council.
  - **Option 2:** An *ad hoc* process with no UN involvement, whereby the U.S. would work initially with Russia (and the U.K.) on steps pertaining to U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, followed later by an *ad hoc* process involving only those states and organizations necessary for achieving further progress on specific steps.
  - **Option 3:** A “hybrid” process, which like Option 2 would focus first on bilateral steps pertaining to U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, but would then seek at an early stage to involve the UN as well as *ad hoc* assemblies, as appropriate.

- Each of the three options were evaluated against four criteria:
  - **Criterion 1:** Will the approach allow the U.S. to effectively promote and protect U.S. interests?
  - **Criterion 2:** Will the approach create early momentum behind both the vision and the steps?
  - **Criterion 3:** Will the approach be inclusive enough to prevent an “outsider dynamic” where states that are not equally involved at the outset refuse to take part at a later date?
  - **Criterion 4:** Will the approach be both flexible and sustainable over time?

**Recommendation.** The review concludes that a hybrid process—one that allows for both substantial latitude at the outset for the U.S. and Russia to lead and early involvement of other key states, including
through the UN and ad hoc assemblies—appears most promising. Most important, a hybrid process would be most likely to generate early momentum behind the vision and steps while gaining international legitimacy and support for efforts requiring the involvement of other key states. This process will necessarily be informed by early discussions between the U.S. and Russia, . . . as well as discussions with the U.K., France, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel. This could then lead to action in the Security Council and the General Assembly. To prevent the alienation of key states at the outset of the process, care should be taken not to corner nations that may lack enthusiasm for the vision or be averse to certain steps, as their positive involvement will be required at some future date. The process will also require the direct and sustained involvement of the president and other leaders of key states; and there will need to be a calculated and sustained effort by leaders to enlist support of both domestic and international publics.

Background

Wall Street Journal Commentary

In January 2007, the Wall Street Journal published an op-ed titled, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.” The essay—signed by former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, former Sen. Sam Nunn, and 17 others—states that we are on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era, with more nuclear-armed states and a real risk of nuclear terrorism. In such a world, the authors warn that continued reliance on nuclear deterrence for maintaining international security “is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective,” and that none of the nonproliferation steps being taken now “are adequate to the danger.”

A central theme of the Wall Street Journal commentary is that in order to deal effectively with the security challenges presented in this
new era, the United States and other nations must embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and pursue a balanced program of practical measures toward achieving that goal: “Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.”

The first “action” highlighted by the authors is the need to “work with leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise.”

In this context:

● What would be the “mechanism” for getting all of the nuclear states together to agree on a program of action such as the steps listed in the Wall Street Journal op-ed article?

● Would a new mechanism—either formal or informal—be required, or would this best be done through an existing mechanism, such as the United Nations, perhaps working with other key states?

Existing structures and mechanisms

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Elements of the existing international “order” for dealing with nuclear threats are centered in the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In Article VI of that Treaty, the parties undertake “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” The NPT also includes a commitment by all non-nuclear weapon states not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, and the right of all signatories to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. While Israel, India, and Pakistan have yet to sign, it is truly a global accord, with 188 signatories.

Every five years, a conference of states party to the NPT is held in order to review the operation of the Treaty to assure that its purpose and provisions are being realized. The next such conference will take place in 2010. The most recent NPT review conference in 2005 ac-
complished little other than to highlight tensions between the non-nuclear weapon states—which believe the existing nuclear weapon states have failed to fulfill their Article VI obligation to nuclear disarmament—and efforts on the part of the United States and other nations to deal with countries like Iran which are using the Treaty’s nuclear energy provisions to develop a nuclear arms capability.

*Conference on Disarmament.* In 1979, the UN established the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as “the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community.” The CD was a result of the first Special Session on Disarmament of the UN General Assembly held in 1978. It succeeded other Geneva-based negotiating fora, which included the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962–68), and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969–78).

The terms of reference of the CD include practically all multilateral arms control and disarmament problems—including nuclear disarmament. The CD has a special relationship with the UN: it adopts its own Rules of Procedure and its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations of the General Assembly and the proposals of its members. It reports to the General Assembly annually, or more frequently, as appropriate. The Conference meets in Geneva and conducts its work by consensus. The CD and its predecessors have negotiated such major multilateral arms limitation and disarmament agreements as the NPT, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Currently, the CD is charged with the negotiation of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).

*Recent Developments*

_U.K. policy._ In a speech delivered in Washington in June, the United Kingdom’s outgoing foreign secretary, Margaret Beckett, outlined a path forward for dealing with nuclear threats that explicitly drew on
the views of the *Wall Street Journal* commentary. Beckett (who cleared her talk with the new British Prime Minister Gordon Brown) said that while the conditions for the total elimination of nuclear arms do not exist today, that does not mean we should resign ourselves to the idea that nuclear weapons can never be abolished in the future. “What we need is both a vision—a scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons—and action—progressive steps to reduce warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. These two strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing. Both are necessary, but at the moment too weak.”

Beckett stated that the U.K. would be a “disarmament laboratory,” and would participate in an in-depth study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies on the requirements for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, as well as concentrate on creating a robust, trusted, and effective system of verification that does not give away national security or proliferation-sensitive information.

On July 12 in London, Beckett (no longer Foreign Secretary) underscored to Ambassador Max Kampelman that the position outlined in her June speech was entirely reflective of the position of the whole government today, and that she was keen to use her influence with parliamentary colleagues to promote multilateral initiatives in this area. In other meetings between Ambassador Kampelman and key opinion leaders in London, there was general agreement that a nuclear weapon-free world would be desirable, if it were possible and institutions sufficiently robust to prevent breakout.

*U.S.-Russia joint statement.* On the day after the July 2007 Bush-Putin Kennebunkport meeting, Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Lavrov issued a Joint Statement regarding strategic offensive reductions. The statement underscored that both sides are fully committed to the goals of the NPT and Article VI, and that discussions are still underway with respect to the development of a post-START arrangement.
Issues

Issue 1: How can the United States initiate the process of working with leaders of other nuclear weapon states to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise?

Issue 1: Discussion

As stated in the Wall Street Journal Op-Ed, “U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage—to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.”

Progress toward the goal of a world without nuclear weapons is not possible without early and sustained leadership by the United States—the world’s leading nuclear weapon state. In the absence of U.S. leadership, there is no nation or combination of nations that can fill the leadership void and make tangible progress toward the goal.

That said, it is also true that progress will ultimately require the cooperation of every nation with nuclear weapons and every state with the capability to produce fissile material. In some instances, a heavy U.S. hand on the tiller may undercut such cooperation. This is particularly true at the beginning of the process—recognizing there are many nations looking to the U.S. to provide leadership on this issue.

There may be much to be gained—in terms of mobilizing public support both at home and abroad—from an early display of presidential leadership, for example, a speech delivered to the United Nations and / or the American people. Such a call to action by the president may be both unavoidable and indispensable; however, in order to have the maximum positive impact on establishing a “joint enterprise” among leaders, and avoid the perception of a U.S. dictate, public action by the president should be carefully preceded with consultations with key states.

At a minimum, prior consultations with our closest nuclear ally—
the U.K.—as well as our key nuclear interlocutor—Russia—will be required. Other nuclear-capable states—e.g., France, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan—as well as Japan and Germany (both of whom have significant stockpiles of civilian plutonium) might also be approached prior to, or soon after, a major U.S. initiative.

**Issue 2: To what extent does this process need to be procedurally and substantively “inclusive” (i.e., involve all nuclear weapons states) from the start?**

**Issue 2: Discussion**

The United States and Russia today possess nuclear stockpiles that dwarf those of all other nations, each having approximately 10,000 nuclear warheads in its inventory. Non-governmental analysts have estimated that by 2012, about 6,000 warheads will remain in the U.S. stockpile, including non-strategic and reserve warheads. The number of nuclear warheads in the Russian arsenal could also decrease by 2012 to 6,000 or fewer. The remaining nuclear weapon states today are estimated to possess a combined total on the order of 1,000 warheads (see Table A).

In this context, the U.S. and Russia could proceed bilaterally with

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**Table A: Global Nuclear Inventories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Nuclear Warheads</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>40–50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>&lt;50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>75–200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>〈15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

significant reductions in their nuclear force levels before approaching the combined total of other states. That said, defining a global regime for reductions “in nuclear forces in all states that possess them”—as stated in the Wall Street Journal Op-Ed—as well as a world without nuclear weapons will by definition involve all nuclear weapon states, as well as those states with the ability to produce nuclear material for weapons.

Moreover, beyond the issue of reductions in nuclear forces per se, many of the “urgent steps” envisioned by the Wall Street Journal Op-Ed (i.e., securing entry into force of the CTBT; providing security for all stocks of weapons and materials; getting control of the uranium enrichment process; halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally; and effective measures to impede or counter any nuclear-related conduct that is potentially threatening to the security of any state or peoples) would need to involve states other than the United States and Russia in order to be effective.

Simply stated, a process that is U.S.-Russia centric at the outset might facilitate rapid progress on bilateral reductions; however, not involving other key states might hinder progress on other urgent steps as well as undermine the potential for devising a truly global prohibition on nuclear arms. Alternatively, a process that envisions the early involvement of other key states—procedurally and/or substantively—risks bogging down, undermining both the vision and steps.

**Issue 3: Should the process be centered within existing structures and mechanisms or on a more ad hoc basis?**

**Issue 3: Discussion**

There are existing structures and mechanisms relevant to the vision and steps. The NPT and its Article VI provides an essential foundation for the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, albeit one that does not include Israel, India, and Pakistan. That said, while the NPT’s five-year review conference has at times been used to advance the
vision and steps (for example, the 1995 decision to extend the NPT indefinitely), it is not a “day-to-day” mechanism suitable for centering an ongoing process.

The terms of reference for the CD—as well as its schedule of meetings (three regular sessions per year)—has made it at times a useful mechanism for achieving progress on specific steps; however, the CD’s membership (65 states) and consensus rule would make it an unwieldy structure for centering this process (though it can still serve as a vehicle for accomplishing specific steps).

The UN General Assembly and the Security Council have both been engaged on nuclear issues for decades—and indeed, the Security Council is today focused on the issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. Given the Security Council’s role in international peace and security—and the fact that the five permanent members correspond with the five NPT nuclear weapon states—involvement of the Council in some fashion may be both desirable and unavoidable.

That said, the Security Council’s membership does not on a routine basis include the other nuclear weapon states (Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea), or all states that can produce fissile material. Moreover, as has been the case with Iran, the ability of any one of the P-5 to block action through the veto could be a significant procedural drag. Finally, there may be a significant constituency within the U.S. that sees any process centered in the UN as suspect.

An ad hoc structure might provide greater flexibility in involving key states—and come without any institutional baggage associated with existing structures and mechanisms. Initiating and sustaining an ad hoc process, however, could prove as complex and frustrating as centering the process within existing frameworks.

Issue 4: How much “weight” should be given to the steps at the outset of this process?
Issue 4: Discussion

The Wall Street Journal Op-Ed states: “Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.” This “balance” between vision and steps is underscored throughout the Op-Ed; however, consideration must be given to how much “weight” can and should be given to the steps in the context of “working with leaders of countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise.”

Conceptually, obtaining agreement among leaders to affirm their support for the “goal” should be straightforward—at least with respect to the five NPT nuclear weapon states, which are all committed to nuclear disarmament through the NPT’s Article VI. That said, there is reason to believe that both France and Russia may be less than enthusiastic about participating in a high-profile, explicit reaffirmation of the goal, let alone a “joint enterprise” designed to achieve it. Other nuclear weapon states outside the NPT—Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea—may also hesitate to publicly “embrace” the goal, in particular, if they believe it will lead to early pressure on their own nuclear weapons programs.

In this context, an understanding amongst the nuclear weapon states as to what near-term “steps” might be the expected focus of the “joint enterprise”—and how those steps will impact them—might provide reassurance necessary to gain support for the goal and agreement on a process. Alternatively, the highlighting of certain steps (for example, CTBT entry into force with India) might undercut the effort.

Options

Evaluative Criteria. Each of the three options discussed below will be evaluated against the following four criteria:

- Criterion 1: Will the approach allow the U.S. to effectively promote and protect U.S. interests?
Criterion 2: Will the approach create early momentum behind both the vision and the steps?

Criterion 3: Will the approach be inclusive enough to prevent an “outsider dynamic” where states that are not equally involved at the outset refuse to take part at a later date?

Criterion 4: Will the approach be both flexible and sustainable over time?

**Option 1: A UN-Centered Process**

Under this approach:

- The UN General Assembly would first pass a resolution calling for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (see Table B).
- The UN General Assembly Resolution would also request the UN Security Council—working with other key states, in particular, other nuclear capable states such as Israel, India, and Pakistan, as well as states with the ability to produce enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear arms—to develop effective political and technical means to achieve this goal, including stringent verification and severe penalties to prevent cheating.
- The Security Council might at an early date call a “Key States” Conference under its auspices. The objective of the conference would be to build support for the vision and identify a program of specific steps that would lay the groundwork for a world free of the nuclear threat.

**Option 1: Analysis**

- **Criterion 1: Will the approach allow the U.S. to effectively promote and protect U.S. interests?**
  - By centering the process for action in the Security Council, the United States would ensure the process took place in a
Table B: Resolution


“The General Assembly,

Expressing its deep concern over the devastation that would ensue from even the single use of a nuclear weapon and the necessity to make every effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and avert the danger of nuclear war,

Underlining the importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention, and Chemical Weapons Convention and the need to undertake effective measures to implement, enforce, and strengthen these agreements,

Recognizing that the necessity now exists for all nations to conduct their affairs without nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Appraising the determination of all nations to pledge the elimination of all nuclear weapons and to place the relevant weapons-grade material under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards until the nuclear material can be made unusable for nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that this commitment by all nations is reliant upon the United Nations Security Council establishing the necessary political and technical means for ensuring that all nations that have or may be developing nuclear weapons agree to implement their elimination,

1. Calls upon all states in possession of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of these weapons,

2. Calls upon the United Nations Security Council—working with other key states—to develop the necessary political and technical means for ensuring the elimination of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons globally,

3. Calls upon the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure that any state that is: (a) not in full compliance with the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, or (b) developing or that possesses weapons-grade nuclear material that has not promptly declared the material to the United Nations Security Council and placed the material in the process of elimination under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, shall be considered by all member states an international criminal state disqualified to engage in any relationship—security, commercial, economic, or cultural—with any member state.
forum where the U.S. has, by virtue of its veto, the power to protect U.S. interests.

• The fact that Russia, China, France, and the U.K. also possess a veto could at times complicate efforts to promote U.S. interests.

● Criterion 2: Will the approach create early momentum behind both the vision and the steps?

• Adoption of a UN General Assembly resolution that embraces the “vision” and centers the process for developing concrete steps within the Security Council would be an early reaffirmation of support from the international community. A stamp of legitimacy by all nations would be firmly imprinted on the process, and the “vision” would be established as a goal in the minds of peoples of the world.

• Failure to achieve a UN General Assembly resolution—or a Resolution that was passed without the support of key states, in particular, nuclear weapon states—might also be perceived as an early setback.

• Once the Security Council takes up the issue, tangible progress requiring the consent of all five nuclear weapon states will be slow; moreover, efforts to involve other key states (e.g., Israel, India, and Pakistan) at an early phase may also slow progress.

● Criterion 3: Will the approach be inclusive enough to prevent an “outsider dynamic” where states that are not equally involved at the outset refuse to take part at a later date?

• The combination of a UN General Assembly resolution involving all nations and a Security Council process that would include other key states from the outset has the potential to promote a great degree of “inclusiveness.”

• However, if key states oppose the Resolution or refuse to participate in a process centered in the Security Council, they will be publicly branded as “outsiders” from the outset—and
they may find it difficult to publicly change that posture at a later date.

* Criterion 4: *Will the approach be both flexible and sustainable over time?*
  * A process centered in the UN may lack flexibility and inhibit progress; lack of progress may make the approach unsustainable.

**Option 2: An Ad Hoc Process**

Under this approach:

* The U.S. would work first with both Russia (the other major nuclear weapon state) and the United Kingdom (whose government has embraced the framework of the *Wall Street Journal* Op-Ed) in devising a strategy for advancing both the vision and specific steps.
* Initially, the focus would be on bilateral action on steps pertaining to U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.
* The process for achieving further progress involving other nuclear states would not be centered in—or seek to involve either procedurally or substantively—the UN.
* Rather, the process would be *ad hoc*, involving only those countries—and only those organizations—necessary for achieving specific steps.

**Option 2: Analysis**

* Criterion 1: *Will the approach allow the U.S. to effectively promote and protect U.S. interests?*
  * Working initially within a framework that focuses first on bilateral steps between the U.S. and Russia is a process the U.S. has used successfully for decades to promote and protect U.S. interests.
  * Later, an *ad hoc* process that involves only those states / or-
organizations necessary for achieving specific steps should minimize the risk that the process is used to frustrate U.S. interests.

- **Criterion 2: Will the approach create early momentum behind both the vision and the steps?**
  - This approach would give the U.S. and Russia a great deal of latitude to take early steps relating to their nuclear forces; in this way, it could best facilitate early momentum behind the vision and steps.

- **Criterion 3: Will the approach be inclusive enough to prevent an “outsider dynamic” where states that are not equally involved at the outset refuse to take part at a later date?**
  - While there are a number of steps that could be taken by the U.S. and Russia working bilaterally, a process that did not involve other key states—in particular, nuclear weapon states—at the outset may provide a rationale for those states not to participate. This could ultimately undercut achieving progress on further steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

- **Criterion 4: Will the approach be both flexible and sustainable over time?**
  - This approach provides maximum flexibility—both at the outset, and later into the process.
  - The key to its sustainability will be how successfully other key states can be brought in via ad-hoc arrangements; if for whatever reason that proves not to be possible, an ad-hoc approach may not be sustainable.

**Option 3: A Hybrid Process**

Under this approach:

- Like Option 2, the U.S. would work first with both Russia and the
U.K.; the initial focus would be on bilateral action on steps pertaining to U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.

- At an early stage, the U.S.—in coordination with the P-5 and other key states—would encourage a resolution in the UN General Assembly that embraced the vision of and practical steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons.
- The process for achieving further progress could include the Security Council, where appropriate, as well as ad hoc assemblies.

**Option 3: Analysis**

- **Criterion 1: Will the approach allow the U.S. to effectively promote and protect U.S. interests?**
  - Like Option 2, working initially within a framework that focuses first on bilateral steps between the U.S. and Russia is a process the U.S. has used successfully for decades to promote and protect U.S. interests.
  - Later, a process that involves an early UN General Assembly resolution, the Security Council, and ad hoc assemblies should prove manageable—with an emphasis on close coordination with the P-5 and other key states.

- **Criterion 2: Will the approach create early momentum behind both the vision and the steps?**
  - Like Option 2, this approach would give the U.S. and Russia a great deal of latitude to take early steps relating to their nuclear forces; in this way, it would facilitate early momentum behind the vision and steps.
  - Later, like Option 1, the early adoption of a UN General Assembly resolution embracing the “vision” would reaffirm support from the international community, provide a stamp of international legitimacy, and firmly enshrine the “vision” as a goal in the minds of peoples of the world.

- **Criterion 3: Will the approach be inclusive enough to prevent an
“outsider dynamic” where states that are not equally involved at the outset refuse to take part at a later date?

- This approach—by virtue of an early UN General Assembly resolution and later involvement of both the Security Council and ad hoc assemblies, as appropriate—is designed to be more “inclusive” than Option 2.
- Like Option 1, however, if key states oppose the UN General Assembly resolution or refuse to participate in a future process (Security Council or ad hoc), they will be cast as “outsiders” and may find it difficult to publicly change that posture at a later date.

- **Criterion 4: Will the approach be both flexible and sustainable over time?**
  - Like Option 2, this approach provides a great deal of flexibility—both at the outset and later in the process.
  - The key to its sustainability will be how successfully other key states can be brought in to the process at a later date—either through the Security Council or via ad-hoc arrangements.

**Recommendations**

- More likely than not, the earliest the U.S. government will be in position to start the process of working with leaders of nuclear weapons states to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise will be in the first half of 2009—at least 15 months from the date of the Reykjavik II conference.
- Given the number of domestic and international variables that might be in play in the first half of 2009, a determination as to the most effective “mechanism” for the U.S. to pursue with other nuclear states to advance the vision and steps identified in the *Wall Street Journal* Op-Ed will need to be made then.
- That said, a “hybrid process”—one that allows for both substantial latitude at the outset for the U.S. and Russia to lead and early involvement of other key states, including through the UN and ad
hoc assemblies—appears most promising. Most important, a hybrid process would be most likely to generate early momentum behind the vision and steps while gaining international legitimacy and support for efforts requiring the involvement of other key states.

- This process will necessarily be informed by early discussions between the U.S. and Russia, as well as discussions with the U.K., France, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel. This could then lead to action in the Security Council and the General Assembly.
- Care should be taken, however, not to “corner” those key states that may at the outset lack enthusiasm for the vision or be averse to certain steps, as their positive involvement will be required at some future date.
- To be successful, any process will require the direct and sustained involvement of the president and other leaders of key states, as the issues surrounding nuclear weapons go to the heart of national and international security. The absence of that involvement will likely doom the effort.
- Finally, there will need to be a calculated and sustained effort by leaders to enlist support of both domestic and international publics for the vision and steps—including the use of nuclear material for weapons for peaceful applications that will benefit all humankind.