

Guangdong Leads Calls to Break Up “Vested Interests” and Revive Reform

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In September a protest in a Guangdong village threatened to embarrass the province and its party secretary, Wang Yang, who is a candidate for membership on the powerful Politburo Standing Committee when the 18th Party Congress meets later this year. Not only did Wang Yang intervene decisively to defuse tensions, but he also used a plenary session of the provincial party committee to launch an attack on “vested interests” and to call for reviving reform. Guangdong’s outspokenness was quickly echoed in the pages of *People’s Daily*, scholarly reports, and liberal opinion. The long-term implications are not yet clear, but the revival of reform rhetoric suggests a contentious year of politics as the country heads into the 18th Party Congress.

On the morning of September 21 some 200 people from the village of Wukan, in Guangdong’s Lufeng City, marched to a construction site and then to the city government offices to protest not getting compensation for village land that had been sold off. After dispersing for a while, some of the crowd gathered again that afternoon at the building that houses the village committee and, in an ensuing clash, smashed doors, windows, the village committee sign, and the family planning office. The villagers then went back to the construction site, where they damaged excavating equipment and tore down the security booth and some work sheds, at which point local police moved against them. As often happens in the aftermath of such confrontations, different stories emerged from villagers and officials. Villagers claimed that many had been hurt and a child killed, while police said that no villagers had been hurt or killed but that 10 police officers had been hurt and six police vehicles smashed. In the event, the following day 2,000 villagers surrounded the police station demanding the release of four villagers who had been detained. The confrontation was only calmed after the villagers were released and officials from Lufeng promised a thorough investigation.¹ It was later revealed that the party secretary of Wukan village, Xue Chang (薛昌), and the village head, Chen Shunyi (陈舜意), who were the targets of villagers’ ire, fled the village along with other members of the village party committee after the incident and did not return.²

Unrest had been simmering in Wukan for a long time. About two years ago, village leaders had sold off some 3,200 mu (one mu is about 667 square meters) of land, leading some peasants to start petitioning higher authorities. The prosperous Wukan’s population of some 13,000 people is a very diverse one. There are families with 47 different surnames in the village, making it difficult to undertake collective action, and perhaps laying a foundation for the extraordinary longevity of the village leadership—Xue Chang and Chen Shunyi had been in power some 40 years.³ The September incident was set off

when another 400 mu of land was sold off without the approval of villagers or adequate compensation.

Two months after that, on November 21, having not received any adequate response, four to five thousand villagers from Wukan marched the seven kilometers to Lufeng City, which oversees Wukan, to protest at party headquarters. Lufeng party secretary Yang Naifa met with leaders and vowed to investigate their three demands: a democratic village election, compensation for illegally seized land, and full disclosure of the village's financial records. In the four decades that the village leadership in Wukan had been in place, villagers had not been allowed to elect either the village committee or the village head, as required by law,⁴ though some reports say that the leadership had organized small meetings to “elect” (or re-elect) the village leadership.⁵ For instance, one report said that in the past, “about a dozen village officials gathered to hold a meeting and vote by a show of hands.”⁶ Obviously most villagers had had no role in deciding the village head or committee.

On December 9, Shanwei City, a prefectural-level city that oversees Lufeng City (a county-level city) held a press conference to announce that the “reasonable demands of the villagers in Wukan have already been complied with” and that order in the village had returned to normal. But the news conference also said that the “Wukan Villagers’ Provisional Representative Council” (set up after the original village leadership fled) and the “Wukan Village Women’s Representative Federation” would be banned because they were “illegal” and that the leaders of the “destructive incident” (presumably the clash on September 21)—namely Xue Jinbo (薛锦波), Zhuang Liehong (庄烈宏), and Zeng Zhaoliang (曾昭亮)—had been arrested.⁷ Xue had been elected as a community leader after party officials had abandoned the village in September.⁸ Unfortunately, the 42-year-old Xue Jinbo died the next day while still in police custody. Officials declared that he had died of a heart attack, but villagers were convinced that he had been beaten to death.

With tempers still simmering over the lack of compensation, Xue Jinbo’s death caused widespread anger. Immediately on the 11th, as anger spread, 1,000 police tried unsuccessfully to enter the village and restore order.⁹ Police then set up a cordon around the village, blocking supplies of food and other necessities from entering. Police also prevented fishing boats from putting to sea, further pressuring the villagers.¹⁰ This police action hardly failed to calm the situation. Demonstrations broke out on nearly a daily basis in the village, with the demand for the return of Xue Jinbo’s body as the focal point of protest. According to local custom, Xue should have been buried on the 17th,¹¹ and when the body was not returned new protests mounted. On the 16th one villager, Lin Zulian (林祖恋), who would eventually emerge as the new village leader, addressed 6,000 assembled villagers, urging them to march on Lufeng and demand Xue’s body if it was not returned within five days. Speaking to an emotional crowd, Lin declared, “If they have 100 coffins, they can bury me in 99. But I will save one for the corrupt officials who have been working with businesspeople to take away our rights and our friend.”¹²

Up until this point, Chinese media coverage of events was both limited and hostile to the protests. For instance, when *Southern Daily* reported on the November 21 petitioning

movement to Lufeng, it minimized the number of participants (saying there were only 400), citing positively the ways in which Lufeng City had responded to grievances and saying that there were “a small number” of villagers in Wukan who were still not satisfied. The report said that party authorities would strengthen “propaganda work” and “strictly handle people and events that violated discipline.”¹³ Similarly, the Lufeng City public security bureau issued a “Circular urging the surrender by law-breaking and criminal suspects in the Wukan September 21 and September 22 serial cases” on December 9.¹⁴

Wang Yang Gets Involved

Even as the Wukan incident appeared to be spiraling downward toward a violent conclusion, however, efforts were being made to turn the situation around. The Guangdong People’s Procuratorate hosted a meeting following Xue Jinbo’s death and spoke with delegates to the local people’s congress, members of the local People’s Political Consultative Conference, and Xue’s family.¹⁵ Starting on December 18th, Shanwei City party secretary Zheng Yanxiong (郑雁雄) began meeting with villagers, including students and teachers.¹⁶ Provincial party secretary Wang Yang (王洋) had obviously intervened. With international attention focused on Wukan, the party secretary could hardly escape embarrassment if events careened out of control. On December 19, he dispatched a provincial work team headed by Zhu Mingguo (朱明国), deputy party secretary and member of the provincial discipline inspection team to Wukan village to negotiate a settlement.¹⁷ Wang’s instructions to Zhu were to “calm the situation and pacify the people” (息事宁人).¹⁸ Zhu did so by recognizing the villagers’ complaints as reasonable. On December 23, the villagers who had been arrested along with Xue Jinbo were released on bail.¹⁹ The tone of media coverage changed accordingly.

Rather than content himself with resolving a single, albeit highly publicized, protest, Wang used it to launch a new campaign to energize Guangdong’s reform. Apparently Wang called for using the “Wukan approach” to reform local governance in the province. According to Wang, “Guangdong deputy party secretary Zhu Mingguo leading a delegation into Shanwei’s Wukan village was not only meant to solve problems in the village, but also to set a reference standard to reform village governance across Guangdong.”²⁰ The *South China Morning Post* account that quotes Wang cites a report in China News Service (apparently 中国通讯社), but Wang’s words never made it into the provincial party paper, *Southern Daily*, indicating caution. The obvious danger was that display of leniency would set off similar protests, as indeed happened in some places.²¹

National Support

Only two days after Zhu Mingguo announced that the demands of villagers in Wukan were reasonable, *People’s Daily* ran a signed commentary entitled “What does the ‘Wukan turnabout’ show us?” Although carried on page 9, the article still indicated strong support from some quarters in the party leadership for the moderate handling of at

least some types of protest. What was remarkable was how sharply the commentary criticized local cadres. According to its author, Zhang Tie:²²

Had the cadres promptly come to grips with the interest demands, listened carefully to them, dealt with them impartially, and solved the problem decisively, what started out as a minor incident would not have escalated and turned into a mass conflict and the Wukan incident would have taken a different direction. Now there has been a turn for the better in the case precisely because the work group fully affirmed that “the public’s main demands are reasonable.” This shows that in dealing with a specific conflict, to understand the interest demands of the masses is to grasp the solution to the problems.

Just five days later, on December 27, Premier Wen Jiabao addressed the annual meeting of the Central Rural Work Conference. Wen noted that under the pretext that the land is collectively owned, some places had “forcefully and arbitrarily occupied land contracted by peasants without prior communication and negotiations.” He called for rapidly revising the Land Management Law and reforming the regulations governing the requisition of land. He also called for expanding villagers’ self-governance and improving township governance in accordance with the increasing awareness of peasants about political participation.²³

It is highly unlikely that Wen would have inserted such lines in response to the situation in Wukan (indeed, they seem in line with sentiments that Wen has expressed repeatedly), but a month later when Wen came to Guangdong to meet with Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel, he took time to comment on the rights of peasants. Wen told local officials that it was necessary to protect farmers’ suffrage and the villages’ autonomy. “We should have open, fair, and transparent election procedures,” the premier added.²⁴ In February the premier held a symposium in Zhongnanhai, the seat of the Communist Party, and said, “We should resolve difficulties through reform. The problems relating to economic structure, unfair distribution, and anti-corruption may be fundamentally put to an end only through reform and system building.”²⁵

Guangdong Moves to Reinvigorate Reform

On January 5, the day after the Guangdong provincial party committee convened its 11th plenary session, the provincial party paper *Southern Daily* featured Wang Yang’s remarks on the need to break through vested interests. He said, “Thirty years ago, reform primarily meant breaking the bonds of ideology, but now reform means breaking the restraints imposed by vested interests. If the direction of reform is determined by the vested interests, then reform cannot be continued.”²⁶ *Southern Weekend* soon followed up with a commentary arguing that the need to “break through the confines of vested interests and fight a tough battle with vested interest groups is becoming a new consensus of more and more scholars and reform-oriented officials.”²⁷

The issue of vested interests has moved to the center of recent commentary on reform, though the issue has been around for a long time in one form or another. In January this year, Sun Liping and others in the sociology department at Tsinghua University issued an eye-catching report entitled, “‘Middle Income Trap’ or ‘Transition Trap’?” In the report Sun and his colleagues argue, “in the past we overly emphasized the advantages of incremental reform. Now, it seems the danger of incremental reform falling into a ‘transition trap’ is even greater.”²⁸ According to Sun et al., “On the one hand, vested interests obstruct substantive reform, while, on the other hand, they use the name of reform to secure benefits, causing reform to be transmogrified and thus inducing the masses to resist reform.”²⁹

Sun’s concerns have been echoed in other reports. In January, Wang Yukai, a professor at the Chinese Administrative College, gave a talk in which he argued that “‘interest groups’” (利益集团) had come together and solidified over the past decade and more since enterprise reform was undertaken in the mid-1990s. Such “‘vested interests’” (既得利益) were now an “‘obstacle blocking the whole of reform.’” Unless vested interests could be broken up by separating officials and enterprises, carrying out reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), implementing an income disclosure system, and carrying out widespread elections, then reform would stagnate.³⁰

Anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Southern Tour’

Back in Guangdong, local media greeted Wen Jiabao’s visit to the province to meet with Chancellor Merkel by commemorating Deng Xiaoping’s “‘southern tour.’”³¹ Beginning on January 18, *Southern Daily* ran a series of reports and commentaries reviewing Deng’s trip 20 years earlier. On February 6, when Wen Jiabao was in Guangdong, the party paper ran four such commentaries. One of them, by Huang Ting, the vice president of the China Economic Structural Reform Research Society, argued that 20 years ago, Deng “‘hit the nail on the head’” when he said, “‘Be wary of the right, but defend primarily against the left.’” Thirty years of reform has proven that reform is correct and is “‘the successful path toward the great revitalization of the Chinese nation.’” Huang went on to say that conflicting interests had evolved into a contest between different interest groups, some of which talk about reform but do otherwise, “‘leading people to hope for another ‘Southern talk.’”³²

The author of another of the commentaries writes that societies inevitably become more complex and interest groups more diverse over time, but that “‘overcoming the barriers of the structure of certain vested interests must be an important thing to seize in reform and innovation, and improving socialist market economic structural construction.’”³³

The following day, *Southern Daily* published a commentator article that linked Deng’s trip with Wen Jiabao’s February 5 remarks. The article quoted Wen recalling Deng’s remarks that Chinese “‘must uphold reform without wavering; without reform and opening up, there is no way out’” and that China must beware of the “‘right’” but primarily must guard against the “‘left.’” Comparing the difficulty in carrying out reform today to 20

years earlier, the commentary said that reform today was more complicated and that it was more difficult to break through obstacles. Society needs to discuss “how to reform” and pull together a social consensus.³⁴

Similar commentaries continued after Wen left the province. On March 2, *Southern Daily* published a commentary saying:³⁵

Lack of a consensus for reform has made it harder to promote reforms, as any reform must have the support of the masses, which provide its foundation. Cadres are those who directly participate in, plan, and lead reform and their unremitting efforts were indispensable for the brilliant achievements to date. Yet, as reform has progressed, it has been reduced to empty slogans in some places. To build a new consensus for reform, the masses must become its main body and be involved in arranging it, backed up by a structure and systems that will promote those who are skilled at reform. The real problems must be studied, without avoiding clashes of interests or social contradictions, to find breakthroughs for current reform, systems that are good at promoting reform, and an atmosphere that emboldens reformers to lead, create, and experiment boldly.

Public Debate

With the turnabout on the Wukan protests, numerous discussions and online postings began. For instance, on the afternoon in which Zhang Tie’s commentary on Wukan appeared in *People’s Daily*, the “Hu Yaobang historical materials and information website” (胡耀邦史料信息网) and *Economic Observer* (经济观察报) held a joint symposium to discuss the “Wukan approach” (乌坎处理模式). In opening the discussion, Sheng Ping (盛平), head of the website, compared Wukan village with Anhui’s Xiaogang village (小岗村), which is generally credited with launching China’s rural reform three decades ago. Former *People’s Daily* commentator Ma Licheng (马立诚) saw a breakthrough in ways to carry out “social management,” the buzzword that Hu Jintao has promoted over the past year.³⁶ Hu Deping (胡德平), former general secretary Hu Yaobang’s (胡耀邦) oldest son, expressed the hope that the Wukan incident could become a foundation for building democracy and the rule of law.³⁷

Back to Wukan

While the political debate filled the newspapers and blogs, Wukan still had to settle on a new leadership. On January 15, a new general party branch was established in the village. About 70 percent of Wukan’s 133 party members (only about 1 percent of the population, a remarkably small percentage) participated in a process of recommendation and discussion that was overseen by Wang Yemin (王叶敏), head of the provincial work group (工作组) in charge of elections. After consideration, the party committee of Donghai town (东海镇) appointed Lin Zulian

(林祖恋), 67, who had joined the party in 1965 but had also been one of the leaders of the Wukan protests, as party secretary. According to Wang, Lin had opposed violence during the demonstrations and had worked well with the work group since it had entered the village.³⁸

On February 1, villagers in Wukan went to the polls to choose members of an election commission that would supervise the election of a new village head and village committee. Villagers turned out in large numbers for the election; of the 8,222 eligible voters, 7,349 registered to vote and 6,200—over 80 percent—actually cast ballots. Another leader of the village protests, Yang Semaο (杨色茂), who had been detained with Xue Jinbo and others, was elected as director of the election commission,³⁹ and the fathers of two of the villagers who had been arrested (Zhang Jiancheng and Hong Ruichao) were elected.

Finally on March 3, villagers went to the polls. Of the 8,363 registered voters, 6,899 participated. Lin Zulian was elected as village head by an overwhelming margin, with 6,205 votes. Yang Semaο was elected deputy head with 3,609 votes, but the other 5 members of the village committee did not have enough votes to be elected on the first ballot.⁴⁰

Conclusion

The Wukan protest started out like many protests throughout the country—an aggrieved citizenry first petitioning and then, angered by lack of response, protesting. Had the police response not been so heavy-handed and the media presence not so unavoidable (given the closeness of Hong Kong), the incident might have been “solved” the way so many are—giving some compensation to the villagers and arresting the leaders. With the death of Xue Jinbo, however, anger boiled over and international attention focused on the village. Wang Yang was on the spot.

One cannot know what communication may have transpired between Wang Yang and leaders in Beijing, but it is obvious that Wang Yang not only moved to resolve tensions in Wukan but to roll that solution into a broader effort to criticize “vested interests,” summon the memory of Deng Xiaoping’s southern trip, and revive reform. And Beijing responded, albeit modestly. *People’s Daily* carried a prominent commentary, and Zhou Yongkang, not usually thought of as moderate on law and order issues, called for “adher[ing] to civilized standards of law enforcement”⁴¹ and for “properly resolving the lawful and reasonable appeals of the masses.”⁴² Wen Jiabao responded repeatedly. This backing for Wang Yang not only suggests his odds of entering the Politburo Standing Committee in the fall are good, but it also suggests that there will be intensified discussions in Beijing about the place of vested interests in China that might well affect the leadership lineup that will come out of the 18th Party Congress.

The contrast between Wang Yang’s endorsement of reform and the still murky unfolding of events in Chongqing—where first former security chief Wang Lijun (王立军) was suddenly removed from office, went to the American consulate in Chengdu, and was

subsequently escorted to Beijing by security officials, followed by Chongqing party secretary's Bo Xilai being suddenly removed from office on March 15—is obvious, even if its full meaning is not yet clear. In contrast to the dramatic events unfolding around the removal of Bo Xilai, Wang Yang's push for reform marks an important bookend likely to presage his elevation to the Politburo Standing Committee.

Notes

¹ Lu Xinfu, "Petitioning over land issue by villagers in Lufeng sparks riot" 南方都市报 (Southern Metropolis Daily), September 23, 2011; Stephen Chen, "Angry Villagers Riot over Land Grab," *South China Morning Post*, September 23, 2011; and Choi Chi-Yuk and Zhuang Pinghui, "Vow of Land-Grab Probe Silences Lufeng Uprising," *South China Morning Post*, September 26, 2011.

² Sally Wang, "Defiant Villagers Stage New Protest after Leader's Death," *South China Morning Post*, December 15, 2011.

³ Editorial, "Wukan Incident," *Ming Pao*, (in English), December 21, 2011.

⁴ Mimi Lau, Villagers Out in Force in Protest over Land Grab," *South China Morning Post*, November 22, 2011.

⁵ "Peaceful Resolution," *Global Times* (in English), November 25, 2011.

⁶ Tong Shengqi (童身贵) Suo Youwei (索有为), and Chen Shiyong (陈世勇), "广东乌坎村民称从未见过这样正规的选举" (Villagers of Guangdong's Wukan say they have never seen such a proper election), 中国新闻社 (China news service), February 2, 2012.

⁷ Li Qiang (李强) and Hong Jiyu (洪继宇), 村民合理诉求已落实 事件正依法处置中 (Villagers' reasonable demands have already been met, incident is being handled in accordance with the law), 南方日报 (*Southern Daily*), December 10, 2011. Two other villagers, Hong Ruichao (洪锐朝) and Zhang Jiancheng (张建成), were also arrested, apparently separately.

⁸ "Updates with Protest March," AFP, December 17, 2011. A 13-member committee was elected after village officials fled in September, and Xue was its vice chairman. See Editorial "Wukan Village," *Ming Pao* (in English), December 21, 2011.

⁹ "Wukan village under Police Siege," *Caixin* (in English) December 15, 2011; note that info is referenced to the *Telegraph*.

¹⁰ Peter Simpson, "China's Rebel Villagers in Wukan Threaten to March on Government Offices," *Telegraph*, December 17, 2011.

¹¹ Teddy Ng, "Village Protesters Demand Democracy," *South China Morning Post*, December 18, 2011.

¹² Simpson, "China's Rebel Villagers in Wukan Threaten to March" (see endnote 10).

¹³ Hong jiyu (洪继宇) Lu Xuan (陆宣), "广东陆丰乌坎村400村民聚集市政府上访" (400 villagers from Wukan, Lufeng, Guangdong gather at city government to petition), retrieved from http://news.ifeng.com/photo/news/detail_2011_11/22/10828075_0.shtml. The article is accompanied by photos.

¹⁴ Liu Lan (浏览), "公安机关开展清障行动, 推进乌坎维稳工作" (Security organs remove obstacles to movement, promote stability work in Wukan), retrieved from http://www.lufengshi.gov.cn/E_ReadNews.asp?NewsId=988.

¹⁵ Sally Wang, "Defiant Villagers Stage New Protest after Leader's Death," *South China Morning Press*, December 15, 2011.

¹⁶ Ao Minhui (敖敏辉), "汕尾官方: 无派军警进乌坎村" (Shanwei officials: No armed police have entered Wukan village), *Wen Wei Po* (文汇报), December 20, 2011.

¹⁷ Hong Jiyu (洪继宇) and Xie Xicheng (谢锡城), "省工作组进驻陆丰解决乌坎事件 倾听村民诉求" (Provincial work group stationed in Lufeng to resolve Wukan incident, hear villagers' appeals), 南方都市报 (*Southern Metropolis Daily*), December 21, 2011. Zhu Mingguo had followed Wang Yang from Chongqing where Zhu had served as head of the Law and Politics Commission and head of the Public Security Bureau.

¹⁸ Ding Wang (丁望), "乌坎请愿事件 出现王洋拐点" (The Wukan petition affair reveals turning point for Wang Yang), 新报 (*Hong Kong Daily News*), December 22, 2011.

¹⁹ Mimi Lau, "Wukan Protest Leaders Released," *South China Morning Post*, December 24, 2011.

- ²⁰ Mimi Lau, “Base Reforms on ‘Wukan Way,’ Party Boss Says,” *South China Morning Post*, January 5, 2012.
- ²¹ Wanggang village, in Guangzhou’s Baiyun district, was the most obvious example of copycatting. When the village protested land seizures, Guangzhou’s deputy mayor, Xie Xiaodan, quickly promised a thorough investigation. Subsequently three officials in the village were suspended. See Mimi Lau, “Second Village Wins Swift Graft Probe,” *South China Morning Post*, January 19, 2012; and Mimi Lau, “‘Wukan-Style’ Protests Lead to Trio’s Suspension,” *South China Morning Post*, February 18, 2012.
- ²² Zhang Tie (张铁), “‘乌坎转机’提示我们什么” (What does the ‘Wukan turnabout’ show us?), 人民日报 (*People’s Daily*), December 22, 2011, p. 9.
- ²³ Wen Jiabao (温家宝), “中国农业和农村的发展道路” (The road for developing China’s agriculture and villages), 求实 (*Seeking Truth*), No. 2 (January 16, 2012).
- ²⁴ Jeff Pao, “Wen Tells Local Govts to Protect Farmers’ Suffrage, Land Rights,” 香港经济日报 (Hong Kong Economic Journal), in English, February 5, 2012.
- ²⁵ Jiang Xun (江迅), “炎黄春秋力抗当局整肃” (中国春秋 [Spring & Autumn of China] strenuously resists reorganization by the authorities), 亚洲周刊 (*Asia Week*), no. 9 (February 26), 2012.
- ²⁶ “深化改革要敢于打破利益格局” (Deepening reform means daring to break through special interests), 南方日报 (*Nanfang Daily*), January 5, 2011.
- ²⁷ Staff commentator Dai Zhiyong (戴志勇), “打破既有利益格局需要放开民众维权,” (Breaking through special interests requires opening up rights protection for the masses), 南方周末 (*Southern Weekend*), January 12, 2012.
- ²⁸ 清华大学凯风研究院社会进步研究所 and 清华大学社会学习社会发展研究课题组, “‘中等收入陷阱’还是‘转型陷阱’” (Tsinghua University, Kai Feng Research Institute Institute of Social Progress, and Tsinghua University, Social Learning and Social Development Research Group, “The ‘middle income trap’ or ‘transition trap’”), p. 4.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- ³⁰ Wang Yukai (汪玉凯), “破除既得利益团是收入分配制度改革的关键” (Breaking up vested interests is the key to reforming income distribution), 中国改革网 (China Reform), available at <http://www.chinareform.net/show.php?id=5122>.
- ³¹ Hong Kong media had been commenting on how low key the commemoration of Deng’s tour was. See, for instance, Priscilla Jiao, “No Great Fanfare 20 Years after Tour,” *South China Morning Post*, January 20, 2012.
- ³² Huang Ting (黄廷), “重温南方谈话再聚改革共识” (Reviewing the southern talks, bringing together a consensus on reform once more), 南方日报 (*Nanfang Daily*), February 6, 2012, p. 2.
- ³³ Dong Xiaolin (董小麟), “深化改革必须突破及有利利益格局制约” (Deepening reform requires breaking through the restraints of vested interests), 南方日报 (*Nanfang Daily*), February 6, 2012, p. 2.
- ³⁴ Commentator (评论员), “凝聚社会共识, 破解改革困境” (Pull together a social consensus, break through the dilemmas of reform), 南方日报 (*Nanfang Daily*), February 7, 2012, p. 2.
- ³⁵ Commentator (评论员), “凝聚共识, 推动改革再出发” (Bring together a consensus, and promote a new start for reform), 南方日报 (*Nanfang Daily*), March 2, 2012, p. 2.
- ³⁶ Joseph Fewsmith, “‘Social Management’ as a Way of Coping with Heightened Social Tensions,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 36 (Winter 2012), retrieved from <http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/8701>.
- ³⁷ “‘乌坎转机’的时代意义和国家样本意义” (The meaning of the ‘Wukan turnabout’ for the age and as a national model), retrieved from <http://www.hybsl.cn/zonghe/zuixinshiliao/2011-12-26/28051.html>.
- ³⁸ Li Qiang (李强), “乌坎村党总支支部成立” (Wukan village establishes general party branch), 南方日报 (*Nanfang Daily*), January 16, 2012.
- ³⁹ Lin Meilian, “Wukan’s Democracy,” *Global Times* (English), February 8, 2012.
- ⁴⁰ “广东乌坎村党总支书记林祖恋当选村委会主任” (Wukan general party secretary Lin Zulian elected village committee head in Guangdong), available at <http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/03-03/3716102.shtml>.
- ⁴¹ Cited in Agence France-Presse report on December 22, 2011.
- ⁴² Zhang Zongtang (张宗堂), “全国政法委书记座谈会在京召开” (National forum of political-legal commission secretaries held in Beijing), 人民日报 (*People’s Daily*), December 24, 2011.