

Striving for New Equilibria

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As Beijing moved through the winter to establish the new state leadership at the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC) and its companion meeting, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), in March 2013, PRC officials continued to stress policy consistency toward Taiwan along lines laid out in the context of the 18th Party Congress held in November 2012.¹ They expressed growing confidence that, as cross-Strait relations had already entered a “period of consolidation and deepening” (鞏固、深化期), and as the PRC’s growing national power earned it greater international influence, they had the ability to take more initiative in managing cross-Strait development and to cope with foreign “interference” in cross-Strait relations in a calm manner.² That said, as one PRC legal scholar pointed out, the central issue regarding Taiwan is “the problem of the Republic of China.” That is both a political issue and a legal issue and at present, he noted, there is no solution.³ The newly appointed head of the Taiwan Affairs Office, Zhang Zhijun, underscored the point when he stated, “as viewed from any perspective, there is no possibility the Mainland will accept the ‘Republic of China’” (要大陸接受中華民國，無論從哪個角度，也不可能).⁴

We devote a good deal of this essay to updating our discussion about the new PRC leadership’s approach to Taiwan. In addition, we review the state of “international space” deliberations, the Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement, and the continuing drama of Taiwan’s Fourth Nuclear Power Plant.

Cross-Strait Relations—Political Dialogue and All That

Speaking in his newly assumed role of president at the NPC in March, Xi Jinping, as he had after the 18th Party Congress last November, laid stress on the importance of having people on both sides of the Strait work together for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations; improving the well-being of compatriots across the Strait; and jointly opening up new prospects for the Chinese nation.⁵ Foreshadowing this positive but patient approach, several weeks earlier in a meeting with Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan, Xi had observed that the Mainland was “soberly aware that historical problems remain in cross-Strait relations, and that there will be issues in the future that will require time, patience, and joint effort to resolve.”⁶

At a post-NPC press conference, newly installed Premier Li Keqiang struck similar themes regarding the prospects for progress on the basis of firm principles and close bonds. He stressed the importance of the people on both sides being “compatriots” (同胞)

and expressed confidence that by safeguarding that emotional bond and persisting with adherence to “one China,” there would be tremendous potential for advancing cross-Straits relations.⁷ Li pledged, “the new government will carry out the promises made by the previous government” (新一届政府将会履行上届政府所做的承诺). And he said that as the Mainland proceeds with its own greater opening up and development, it “will give even more consideration to the well-being and interests of Taiwan compatriots” (会更多地考虑台胞的福祉和利益) and “share development opportunities with Taiwan” (与台湾共享发展的机遇).

Although these remarks did not repeat earlier comments about “reciprocity” that had led people in Taiwan to believe that the days of one-sided agreements in their favor were over⁸—in fact, it was quite the opposite⁹—Li did nonetheless say something that raised that prospect again in people’s minds. In an echo of Wen Jiabao’s comments in a similar post-NPC press conference three years earlier,¹⁰ he observed that the Mainland and Taiwan were the common home (共同的家园) of the people on both sides of the Strait. A widely shared interpretation of that remark was that if Taiwan did not embrace a shared vision of one family, the Mainland would be less inclined to treat Taiwan so kindly in the future.¹¹

Still, the Ma administration chose to respond only indirectly and in a low-key way to the “common home” theme. Buried toward the end of a 300-word Mainland Affairs Council press release was the statement, “the Republic of China is our country and Taiwan is our home” (中華民國是我們的國家，臺灣是我們的家園).¹² Rather than focusing on this issue, the MAC statement instead emphasized the more conciliatory message that the two sides should work together to secure cross-Straits peace and stability and the well-being of the people on both sides.

Positive messages for Taiwan were echoed throughout the speeches of the PRC leadership. In February, even before he was elected chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Politburo Standing Committee member Yu Zhengsheng, who is assuming the leading role on Taiwan played by Jia Qinglin under Hu Jintao, spoke at a Taiwan-related work conference in Beijing. Yu hewed to standard lines, emphasizing that peaceful development of cross-Straits relations is the only way to achieve peaceful unification and that peaceful development of cross-Straits relations is also an important part of the PRC’s broader grand strategy of peaceful development. He encouraged academic dialogue on cross-Straits political issues “from a non-governmental perspective” and repeated that the rights and interests of Taiwan compatriots should be protected in earnest.¹³

Conveying the most detailed message, Wang Yi’s successor in the Cabinet-level role as director of the Taiwan Affairs Office (and of the Taiwan Work Office under the CCP Central Committee), former Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun, made his first major statement in the keynote address at a symposium in Pingtan, Fujian Province, in mid-March. Zhang expounded on the theme of “steady progress and comprehensive development” (稳步推进、全面发展) as the objective for the coming year.¹⁴ In addition to predicting great progress with respect to mutual trust as well as along more concrete

economic, cultural, and educational axes, like his political seniors Zhang reaffirmed the Mainland’s commitment to maintaining current cross-Straits policies. “There is no reason,” he said, “not to adhere to correct policies, and we will not only not change effective practices, but we will carry them out even better” (正确的方针政策没有理由不坚持，行之有效做法不仅不会改变，而且还会做得更好). Citing no less an authority than Deng Xiaoping, Zhang said that if the course you are on is correct, the policy will not change.

Zhang referred several times to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and its contribution to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (中华民族伟大复兴), citing the fact that “even some people in the DPP” were rethinking their positions and seeking to enhance understanding of the Mainland and to improve cross-Straits relations. He framed the task in the coming year in dynamic terms, calling for promotion of new progress and achievement of new results, pushing forward the comprehensive development of cross-Straits relations. Expanding on this theme, Zhang said that there will be difficult obstacles ahead, but that pursuing a comprehensive approach, making progress in various fields, would have a mutually reinforcing effect in achieving sustainable development. As he put it, “a four-wheel drive, off-road vehicle is always better than a two-wheel drive car for overcoming obstacles” (四轮驱动的越野车总比两轮驱动的车更能爬坡越障).

Reiterating the basic catechism of cross-Straits relations, Zhang expressed the hope that, on the common political foundation of consolidating opposition to “Taiwan independence” and adhering to the “1992 Consensus,” the two sides could enhance mutual political trust. He expressed confidence that, despite the many differences between the two sides, those relations will have a broader and brighter future by maintaining and consolidating the “one China framework” and “making fair and reasonable arrangements regarding cross-Straits political relations in the special circumstance when the country is not yet unified” (对国家尚未统一特殊情况下的两岸政治关系作出合情合理安排).

Zhang went on to talk not only about promoting further economic links, but also about actively following up on the two sides’ agreed intention to establish “integrated” (合性办事机构) representative offices and pursuing cooperation agreements across the fields of culture, education, and science and technology (S&T). He then addressed the issue of the complex and difficult political problems between the two sides.

Zhang suggested a three-pronged approach to political issues: face the problems squarely without setting restrictions; think positively and seek solutions; and adopt for those issues the same approach agreed upon for overall relations, that is, deal with easy matters first and more difficult ones later, “moving step by step to build consensus” (逐步累积共识).

Refining the PRC’s position on political dialogue at the 18th Party Congress where Hu Jintao called for “jointly exploring” cross-Straits political relations,¹⁵ Zhang suggested building on various Track 2 efforts already under way, conducting dialogue among

academic institutions and experts on both sides in order to help create conditions for cross-Straits political talks in the future.¹⁶

He also told reporters at Pingtan that he hoped to have a chance to visit Taiwan and to welcome “the chief of Taiwan’s concerned authorities” (i.e., MAC Minister Wang Yuchi) to visit and “have a look” around the Mainland.¹⁷ Wang had commented several days earlier not only that he would like to visit the Mainland, but that Zhang would be welcome to visit Taiwan “at an appropriate time, in a suitable capacity and when related conditions are right.”¹⁸ Zhang took note of Wang’s remarks but said it was “completely unnecessary” for the Taiwan side to set “certain conditions” for him to visit the island. “If both sides have the same feelings and hearts for [arranging such a visit], the question about under what title and in what form I will visit will be easy to handle.”¹⁹

The MAC fended off Zhang’s suggestion regarding “agreements” of various sorts by noting that cultural and educational exchanges involve a wide range of issues and related problems could not be resolved by signing a single agreement.²⁰ Moreover, the MAC said that since the two sides had engaged in academic S&T exchanges for years and already have an existing model for diversified exchanges and cooperation, there is no “pressing need” for an agreement in that area.²¹

Nonetheless, the push by Beijing for agreements in these areas is likely to persist. Indeed, in his inaugural speech as the newly installed head of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), the quasi-official PRC agency for negotiating with Taiwan and counterpart of Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), Chen Deming echoed Zhang Zhiqun’s line on the need for such agreements as well as for the systemization of cooperation and exchanges in those fields.²²

When Taiwan’s defense ministry issued the 2013 Quadrennial Defense Review, it deflected any idea of near-term cross-Straits military confidence-building measures, saying the time was not ripe given the lack of mutual political trust. Making clear the significant challenges in the way of any such process, Vice Minister of National Defense Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang said that, even though both sides must put in place measures to reduce tensions, military confidence-building measures will require that Taiwan and the Mainland each give assurances of respect for the other side’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and that each side renounce military invasion of the other side.²³

Despite this clear signal of Taipei’s lack of interest in military CBMs, Yu Zhengsheng persisted in identifying ending the state of war across the Strait and signing a peace accord as “fair and reasonable arrangements” in the political realm.²⁴ And, in the context of indications that Xi Jinping has ordered all Taiwan affairs units to propose specific measures to advance cross-Straits relations,²⁵ it was reported that the Mainland has identified work on cross-Straits mutual military trust-building measures as a “national research project” (國家專案) for the next three years.²⁶

Other Dimensions of Cross-Straits Relations Remain Active

Meanwhile, other dimensions of cross-Straits relations continued to be very active through the period. After repeated postponements since late 2012, it was reported that the two sides were closing in on completion of an ECFA follow-on agreement on trade in services. Even there, however, the signals about how soon such an agreement could be completed were mixed. Initially there were hopes it could be signed in April or May,²⁷ but then that appeared to have been pushed off by at least several months.²⁸ Now again, as this essay is heading for the editors, there seems to be optimism about conclusion of an agreement before the end of June,²⁹ to take effect by the end of the year.³⁰ Moreover, despite earlier nervousness about PRC demands for strict reciprocity, as discussed earlier all signs point to an agreement that strongly favors Taiwan,³¹ in many sectors according to Taiwan what has been termed “WTO-Plus” treatment.³² Not unexpectedly, the DPP cast doubt on the agreement, suggesting the net impact on Taiwan had not been sufficiently studied.³³

At the same time, officials on both sides have continued to express hope that a trade in goods agreement and dispute settlement agreement, the other two ECFA-related negotiations under way, could be concluded within 2013.

Although issues obviously remain to be worked out with respect to the reciprocal exchange of SEF and ARATS branch offices, following two rounds of lower-level consultations, agreement was reached in March to place the topic on the formal negotiating agenda (though apparently not at the meeting envisioned for June³⁴), and two rounds of official talks on the subject were held, the first in mid-April³⁵ and the second in mid-May.³⁶ The Executive Yuan in Taipei approved a draft bill governing the establishment in Taiwan of an ARATS office³⁷ and MAC head Wang Yu-chi said he was looking forward to having the whole matter completed by the end of next year, that is, 2014.³⁸

Among the arrangements already worked out, it has been agreed that while the offices will be “non-official” in nature they will be staffed by officials from a number of relevant agencies and will each be headed by someone at the vice minister level.³⁹ Because there are so many more people from Taiwan living in the Mainland who will need the services of these offices than there are Mainlanders living in Taiwan, Beijing has also reportedly agreed that Taiwan may establish three offices on the Mainland while the PRC will have only one in Taiwan.⁴⁰

As TAO Director Zhang Zhijun observed in late May, certain difficult issues still remain to be resolved. Among these is likely Taiwan’s strong desire that the offices carry out the “substantive functions” of a consulate (even if not the name), including the authority not only to process travel documents but also to undertake such activities as visiting their nationals imprisoned by the other side. Nonetheless, Zhang asserted that good progress had been made and that the remaining issues were not insuperable. Overall, he expressed confidence and optimism about ultimately establishing reciprocal offices.⁴¹

Hence, even if political dialogue is confined to Track 2 or Track 1.5 events (with some officials participating in their “individual” capacities), and there is no prospect of moving to the governmental level in the foreseeable future, nonetheless, if SEF and ARATS offices can at least be agreed upon this year, and if not only a services agreement but agreements on trade in goods and dispute resolution can be concluded, taken together with anticipated exchanges (if not necessarily formal agreements) in the fields of education, culture and S&T, this would represent a considerable advance in cross-Strait relations.

Even beyond those items, Taipei was also preparing to facilitate cross-Strait exchanges in a number of areas, including easing restrictions on Mainland students,⁴² drawing up regulatory changes to allow Mainland white-collar managers and workers at Taiwan-owned multinational enterprises located in new “free economic zones” soon to be created in Taiwan,⁴³ and possibly further easing of regulations limiting Mainland investment on the island,⁴⁴ including in the banking sector.⁴⁵ Cooperation was also evident with respect to the latest bird flu outbreak when, despite some initial indications that Beijing would not collaborate, eventually the Mainland did provide specimens of the virus to Taipei to help with its research efforts on prevention and treatment.⁴⁶

To the consternation of Taiwan farmers, as part of these efforts to liberalize cross-Strait relations, the Ma administration was reportedly planning to allow processing of over 800 kinds of Mainland agricultural products in the “free economic zones.” Even though those products would theoretically not be allowed into Taiwan in their original state, it was reported that 10 percent of them would, in fact, be allowed in after processing.⁴⁷

In response to farmers’ protests, the Council of Agriculture minister said that in determining which products would be allowed in, three principles would apply: protecting the interests of Taiwan farmers, guaranteeing the sustainable development of Taiwan’s agricultural sector, and adding value to that sector—with the last being the most important. Still, he acknowledged that the Mainland might well ask Taiwan to further open its market to Chinese products and that if Taiwan’s cross-Strait agricultural trade deficit dropped, Beijing would inevitably ask Taiwan to ease current restrictions.⁴⁸

Despite this flurry of concern on Taiwan, Beijing has shown itself sensitive to reaction from the Taiwan farmers and fishermen it has been courting. A TAO spokesman asserted that the reports regarding pressure to take more agricultural products from the PRC were “inaccurate” and that the Mainland was not currently considering any such plan. Treating the two sides as one family (again that critical assumption), he said the Mainland always looks after the interests of the people in Taiwan, especially farmers in central and southern Taiwan.⁴⁹ Addressing the issue again several days later, a spokeswoman seemed even more definitive, saying that the Mainland would not force Taiwan to open its doors to Chinese agricultural produce. “The question of whether China will force Taiwan to allow imports of Chinese agricultural produce does not exist. Farmers and fishermen in Taiwan can rest assured.”⁵⁰

Also reflecting the increasing pace of activity between the two sides, not only was the first cross-Strait submarine communications cable completed,⁵¹ but the number of direct cross-Strait flights is being increased to 616 per week, adding eight more destinations on the Mainland (bringing the total to 49) and one more in Taiwan (bringing the total to 10). An important driving force in this area is the rising number of Mainland visitors to Taiwan, up to 2.2 million in 2012 from 1.78 million in 2011.⁵²

On the prospectively less positive side of things, blind Chinese dissident Chen Guangcheng is scheduled to visit Taiwan for two weeks starting in late June. Chen is being hosted by the Taiwan Association for China Human Rights, which raises the possibility of activities and statements that could stir a bit of cross-Strait unhappiness. His sponsors originally said that Chen's visit would be low-key and that he had no plans to meet with political figures.⁵³ As it turns out, however, he will hold an international news conference, speak at the Legislative Yuan,⁵⁴ and meet with DPP Chair Su Tseng-chang.⁵⁵ Moreover, there is speculation that he might meet with President Ma Ying-jeou as well. Beijing has cautioned that Chen "should understand how to protect the dignity of our country when overseas and how to fulfill his responsibility as a citizen."⁵⁶

International space

As readers will recall, Ma Ying-jeou has been pressing for greater participation in UN specialized agencies in recent months, arguing that it would enable Taiwan to make a greater contribution in areas such as global aviation and sustainable development. He has taken note of the fact that not only have the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress supported a greater role for Taiwan, but that even Hu Jintao expressed willingness to "seriously study" possibly helping Taiwan secure ICAO participation in an appropriate fashion.⁵⁷

Asked whether the Mainland would show "more good will" toward Taiwan's aspirations for greater international space, a TAO spokesman stated in February that Beijing has continued to support the idea of making "reasonable arrangements" regarding Taiwan's international participation through "pragmatic consultation" (务实协商) with Taiwan on the premise of not implying "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan."⁵⁸ However, at that same time, Xi Jinping told visiting KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan that while he was aware of Taiwan's desire to enhance its international profile, this is a political question that has to be sorted out with patience when the conditions are right.⁵⁹

In mid-March, after identical bills were introduced into the U.S. House and Senate directing the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the triennial ICAO Assembly meeting in Canada in September,⁶⁰ Beijing repeated the guidance used in February but added that Beijing opposed "interference" by foreign forces, which could only complicate things⁶¹ (a position that has been emphasized in private by senior PRC officials⁶²).

A few days later, Taiwan's foreign minister reaffirmed Taiwan's hope to participate at the September ICAO conference, although he could do no better than say that it "appeared" the Mainland was still considering the extent to which it would tolerate

Taiwan's participation in ICAO.⁶³ By the end of March, in light of the Mainland's continuing reserved attitude, the foreign ministry in Taipei began to press its case with greater vigor, arguing that Taiwan's quest for participation in ICAO was pragmatically based, in order to promote safety, and that it was consistent with the overall thrust of cross-Strait engagement, as well.⁶⁴

The Mainland Affairs Council's comment at this juncture was even more sharply edged than the foreign ministry's. MAC said that the Republic of China is an independent and sovereign country and it is the people's common aspiration to participate in international organizations and activities with dignity. "It is our right as well as our duty."⁶⁵

However, lack of progress on the ICAO issue was not Taiwan's only frustration in the area of international space. It came in the midst of three other issues that were cited by a broad spectrum of people in Taiwan as demonstrating Beijing's hostile attitude toward any expansion of Taipei's international participation.

The first of these concerned Ma Ying-jeou's invited attendance at the March 19 inauguration of Pope Francis, the Vatican being one of Taiwan's 23 remaining diplomatic partners. According to the official transcript of the press briefing, when asked about the Mainland's reaction, the PRC foreign ministry spokeswoman expressed congratulations to the new pope but then went on to say:

The Chinese government's position on China-Vatican relations is consistent and clear. We hope that under the leadership of the new Pope, [the] Vatican could work with China to create favorable conditions for the improvement of relations.

The Chinese government's two basic principles in dealing with China-Vatican relations are consistent and unchanged. We hope [the] Vatican could adopt a flexible and practical attitude and take concrete actions to create conditions for the improvement of China-Vatican relations.⁶⁶

Press coverage of these remarks created a confused picture. As reported by Mainland, Taiwan, and international media alike, the spokeswoman had spelled out the "two basic principles" for establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing: that the Vatican would have to break ties with Taiwan and it should also stop "interfering" in the PRC's internal affairs in the name of religion.⁶⁷ The fact that these terms were spelled out gave people the impression that Beijing might be about to break the "diplomatic truce" that had been in effect since 2008, a tacit agreement not to steal each other's diplomatic partners. After all, if the Mainland was laying out terms, maybe it was interested in making a deal.

In fact, however, as cited above, the official transcript includes no reference to the spokesperson spelling out the conditions, only referring vaguely to the "two basic principles." There are at least two possibilities for the discrepancy between the official transcript and those press accounts. One is that the press, knowing what the conditions were, spelled them out even though the spokeswoman had addressed them only in the

more elliptical fashion of the above citation. And, as happens so often, correspondents merely picked up on what others had written.

The other is that she did spell them out but the longer version was expunged from the record.

The truth of the matter seems to be the latter case, that the spokeswoman did, in fact spell out the two principles and that it was decided this took things too far, and the record was “sanitized.” In any event, it generated a loud response across the political spectrum in Taipei. While MAC Minister Wang Yu-chi, for example, described the PRC’s reported “demand” that the Vatican break relations with Taiwan as standard, he also characterized it as “unacceptable,” putting on an “unfriendly face,” and unhelpful to boosting cross-Strait ties.⁶⁸

Another issue contributing to unhappiness in Taipei was an incident in Indonesia, where a Taiwan delegation about to attend the third annual Jakarta International Defense Dialogue (JIDD) was uninvited at the last minute at PRC insistence.⁶⁹ Taiwan had sent a delegation in 2012, hailed at the time by the ministry of national defense in Taipei as a “breakthrough.”⁷⁰ Some people took note of the fact that the PRC delegate this year was a deputy chief of the PLA general staff, a considerably more senior official than attended last year’s meeting, perhaps generating greater sensitivity on this occasion. Many, however, saw the sudden reversal this time as evidence that the new Xi Jinping leadership was going to take a tougher stance toward Taiwan’s international participation.

A third factor in the negative reaction in Taiwan to how the PRC was approaching Taiwan’s international space was Beijing’s response to the courtesy extended to Taiwan’s representative in Tokyo on the occasion of the memorial service marking the second anniversary of the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. More than simply attending, he was invited to present flowers and to sit in the area reserved for foreign ambassadors.

As background to understanding this, one should know that although Taiwan had been the single largest donor of relief and reconstruction aid to Japan in the wake of the tragedy (\$260 million), the representative was not invited either to sit in the diplomatic area or to present flowers at the one-year memorial service in 2012. This led to considerable criticism by Japanese parliamentarians and media over what was considered shabby treatment. Then-Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko apologized, and Taiwan was accorded the more prestigious treatment this year.⁷¹

Beijing reacted to this not only by staying away from this year’s memorial ceremony but by issuing a sharply worded foreign ministry statement. Noting that the PRC expressed condolences and support to the Japanese people and recognized that “China’s Taiwan region” had “also provided assistance,” the statement nonetheless went on to object to the seating arrangement accorded Taiwan as having “violated relevant principles and spirits of the China-Japan Joint Declaration” and Japan’s commitments on the Taiwan issue. Expressing strong dissatisfaction, protest and opposition to any country’s attempt to

create “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” in any form, the statement called on Japan to correct its mistakes and honor its commitments.⁷² The perceived violation of the unofficial nature of Japan’s relations with Taiwan would doubtless have been enough to produce the protest. The fact that Japan was in the process of negotiating a fisheries agreement with Taiwan in important part apparently to prevent a cross-Strait coalition over the Senkakus/Diaoyu issue (discussed below) was doubtless a compounding factor.

The Taiwan opposition parties seized upon all of these developments to note that the PRC has never ceased its efforts to limit Taiwan’s international space even as it has sought to win hearts and minds in Taiwan through economic incentives. Beijing’s hawkishness, a DPP official asserted, showed that Ma’s touting of a “diplomatic truce” was merely wishful thinking and that cross-Strait exchanges under the PRC “framework of containment” did not serve Taiwan’s long-term interests. A legislator from the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) went further and accused the foreign ministry and Mainland Affairs Council of malfeasance for staying quiet about Beijing’s interference.⁷³

When former Vice President Vincent Siew led the Taiwan delegation to the annual Boao Forum in early April, he was treated as an honored guest. His picture was prominently displayed, he was seated at lunch directly across from Xi Jinping, and he met privately with Xi and other officials.⁷⁴ In this favorable setting, Siew raised the question of international space with Xi, apparently focusing especially on Taiwan’s hope to participate in regional economic activities. According to the TAO spokesman, Xi responded that the two sides could sit down “at the proper time” to negotiate a way for Taiwan to join in regional economic cooperation projects. The spokesman characterized this position as an expression of goodwill “in consideration of Taiwan’s needs for economic development,” voicing the hope that Taiwan could “find a new space for its economic development” and that “new vitality can be injected into cross-Taiwan Strait economic cooperation.”⁷⁵ Though Siew seemed open to the idea of such collaborative efforts, others saw yet further attempts by Beijing to contain Taiwan’s connections to the region under the rubric of “one China.”

Meanwhile, Taipei made clear it will continue to actively pursue Free Trade Agreements (or FTA-like agreements) beyond those already nearing completion with Singapore and New Zealand,⁷⁶ perhaps including Indonesia, India, the Philippines and other ASEAN countries.⁷⁷

As this article was heading to the editor, Taiwan’s health minister attended the World Health Assembly for the fifth year where he spoke at sessions of many of the WHA’s committees. Even with regard to this one bright light in the international space firmament there is a downside. Taiwan still feels constrained in its ability to participate in the health organization’s activities, and the minister used his presence at this year’s assembly to make a pitch for greater WHO access both in his meeting with his American counterpart⁷⁸ and in his address to the WHA plenary.⁷⁹

Taiwan-Japan Fishing Agreement

Taipei's sporadic negotiations with Tokyo over fishing rights in the vicinity of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkakus islets resumed last fall after a three-year hiatus,⁸⁰ and in early April the 17-year-long process was successfully concluded, opening vast new areas to Taiwan fishermen.⁸¹

The immediate 12nm territorial waters around the islets themselves are not included in the arrangement, however. And while Ma said that neither side yielded on its territorial and maritime claims,⁸² and the sovereignty issue had been put to the side for now in accordance with the principles of his East China Sea Peace Initiative,⁸³ he also said that Taiwan fishermen still had the right to fish in the 12nm zone and that Taiwan's coast guard would act to protect them if their activity were interrupted by Japanese authorities.⁸⁴ The Japanese government responded that it would enhance patrols near the islands⁸⁵ and would seize and "deal harshly" with any Taiwan fishing boats operating outside bilaterally agreed areas.⁸⁶

While the potential for miscalculation obviously remains, and although the exact terms of many provisions remain to be worked out—the first meeting on May 7 of the bilateral fishing commission created to handle this task failed to reach agreement⁸⁷—an important underlying factor in people's expectation of successful implementation going forward is that Taiwan fishermen's association leaders have welcomed the agreement. One called it a "major breakthrough" in the protection of Taiwan's fishing rights, "definitely good news for Taiwan fishermen."⁸⁸ Another leader took a somewhat more reserved position, characterizing the agreement as "not satisfactory but acceptable" and calling for the government to continue to work to expand the area open to Taiwan fishermen.⁸⁹ Nonetheless, even this leader said that his men would follow basic rules under the agreement to avoid trouble with Japanese fishermen from Okinawa Prefecture.⁹⁰ So, while the level of enthusiasm is mixed, the achievement is widely appreciated and the potential for actual confrontation has been substantially reduced. In the first two weeks after the agreement took effect, three Taiwan fishing boats were detained on separate occasions and fined for straying over the agreed lines. But the fishermen acknowledged their trespass, paid the penalty with minimal complaint, and were quickly released.⁹¹

Although the two governments are committed to work to avoid fishing incidents and to resolve any problems amicably, the question of efforts by "protect Diaoyutai" nationalist activists in Taiwan may prove more difficult. In mid-January, a leading activist's effort to land on the islands and plant a flag fell short by 16 nautical miles, but his boat was escorted throughout the voyage by four of Taiwan's coast guard vessels, which exchanged water cannon fire with the Japanese coast guard.⁹² The same activist returned to the area in March, reportedly to test Japanese awareness and to harass the Japanese coast guard.⁹³ Yet a third foray was announced for sometime before the end of April,⁹⁴ although it seems not to have materialized. The two sides' handling of any such efforts in the future will be an important indicator of how well the agreement will work.

There was also a cross-Strait dimension to these nationally oriented forays. The activist had apparently let the PRC know ahead of time of his venture in January. As a

result, three PRC marine surveillance vessels were on the scene and made a show of assisting the activist's boat.⁹⁵ This brought into even sharper relief for Tokyo a concern Japan has long had about the potential for Beijing and Taipei to join hands in pressing a "Chinese" sovereignty claim. In fact, the Ma administration had made clear from the outset that it would not collaborate with the Mainland over the islands, and during the January episode the Taiwan coast guard vessels warned the PRC boats to stay away. Nevertheless, a spate of press stories not only reported that the Mainland had used that occasion to demonstrate a "united front,"⁹⁶ but speculated that the Ma administration had cooperated in allowing the protest boat to set sail in the first place in deference to Beijing. There is no evidence to support such an assertion, but the fact that it circulated was indicative of popular sensitivity to the cross-Strait implications of the entire Diaoyu/Senkakus issue.

In any event, although Tokyo's motives were no doubt mixed, it is widely believed that Japan's willingness to reach such generous terms on opening areas to Taiwan fishermen was related to its desire to forestall cross-Strait collaboration.⁹⁷

For its part, Beijing has emphasized that compatriots on both sides of the Strait have a common responsibility to safeguard Chinese sovereignty over the islands and to protect resource rights. It has pledged to defend the interests of fishermen coming from both the Mainland and Taiwan.⁹⁸ But not only was Taipei not about to agree that the PRC had any role in protecting Taiwan fishermen or that Taiwan had any interest in assuming responsibility for protecting Mainland fishermen, the Ma administration went so far as to assert that it would expel any PRC trawlers that encroached on areas covered by the Taiwan-Japan agreement.⁹⁹

Specifically regarding the sovereignty issue, as the fisheries negotiation between Taipei and Tokyo seemed increasingly likely to reach a successful conclusion, then-TAO Director Wang Yi stated: "In safeguarding sovereignty over the Diaoyu islands, the two sides can have their own methods, but our attitude must be resolute, the goal must be the same, otherwise we will be unworthy before our ancestors and future generations" (在维护钓鱼岛主权上，两岸可以有各自的方式，但我们的态度应当是坚定的，目标应当是一致的，否则上对不起列祖列宗，下对不起子孙后代).¹⁰⁰

The day after Wang Yi's statement, without referring to it, Ma Ying-jeou declared that Taiwan has a "very important role to play" (on its own) in the Diaoyu dispute. Other people were not used to such a visible role, he said, and often asked Taipei to stand aside. But Taiwan should stand up and let other people know that it can, and will, play a part in trying to achieve a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

Taiwan used to be considered a troublemaker in this part of the world. But that is no longer so. And most importantly, in the past, Taiwan sometimes was a silent bystander. But now, it has decided not only not to be a troublemaker, but it wants to be a peacemaker.¹⁰¹

In response to the fisheries agreement, Beijing has continued to warn Japan to “properly deal with Taiwan-related issues in strict accordance with the principles and spirit of the China-Japan Joint Statement” (严格按照中日联合声明确定的原则和精神妥善处理涉台问题).¹⁰² While the agreement is unlikely to be a major factor in their ongoing dispute over the islands, it likely will reinforce Beijing’s determination not to allow Japan to “compromise” the PRC’s sovereignty claims in the Diaoyu area.

As for its attitude toward Taiwan, the PRC is clearly frustrated at Taipei’s unwillingness to make common cause and has repeated its mantra about “common responsibility to safeguard sovereignty over the Diaoyus.” The defense ministry did so again in late April.¹⁰³ But since the agreement did not directly touch on sovereignty, and hence did not “give away” anything, and since Beijing will not want to oppose anything that benefits Taiwan fishermen, that frustration is unlikely to affect the course of cross-Straight relations.

In the meantime, although some academics in Taiwan have raised questions about whether the fisheries agreement adequately protects Taiwan’s sovereignty claim,¹⁰⁴ the political opposition has generally hailed Ma’s achievement.¹⁰⁵

Two final comments on the fisheries agreement and its relationship to President Ma’s East China Sea Peace Initiative. First, while at this point it seems unlikely that the PRC and Japan will follow the model laid out in this case of setting aside sovereignty issues and focusing on practical benefits—after all, the dispute between Tokyo and Beijing is all about sovereignty—nonetheless the agreement serves as an example for others to consider. Moreover, in and of itself, removing the potential for clashes between Taiwan and Japanese fishing and coast guard vessels is a significant contribution to maintaining peace in the area.

Second, included in Ma’s East China Sea Peace Initiative was a proposal to create a code of conduct, and one of Ma’s important objectives in putting the initiative forward appears to have been to snare a seat at the negotiating table. This parallels Taiwan’s strong interest in participating in negotiations over a code of conduct in the South China Sea, where it has vast claims and a significant presence. But, sensible as inclusion of Taiwan would be from a practical perspective, this goal is likely to prove elusive in both cases due to the well-known sovereignty concerns.

Still, just as Taiwan is thinking about participating in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) drawing on the same concept it used to join the World Trade Organization (i.e., as the “separate customs territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu”), it isn’t impossible to imagine a similar formulation in these cases. The fact that following the APEC leaders meeting in September 2012 former Vice President Lien Chan reported that most of the ASEAN member states in attendance expressed support for Taiwan’s inclusion in the South China Sea talks¹⁰⁶ has led some people to think that, over time, a way will be found to bring Taiwan in.

Nuclear Issue

Among the other issues that drew great attention during this period, and that could affect future Taiwan political leadership—and hence cross-Straits relations—none was more controversial than that surrounding Taiwan’s almost completed Fourth Nuclear Power Plant.

The plant has had a checkered history. In 2000, one year after it began, construction was suspended by the Chen Shui-bian administration, only to be resumed in 2001 under pressure from a court decision and the KMT-dominated legislature. Since then, the plant seemed to be on track for completion in 2015. At this point, 95 percent of the construction work on the plant’s Number 1 reactor has been completed and almost three-quarters of the work has been tested.¹⁰⁷

The Fukushima Daiichi meltdown in Japan in 2011, however, led to an upswell of concern in Taiwan about beginning commercial operations, and in recent months that concern has exploded into a full-blown political storm.¹⁰⁸

We don’t have space here to go through the details of the issue, but the Fukushima Daiichi events seemed to feed into a general nervousness about the overall safety of nuclear power, and a lack of trust that the fourth plant, specifically, would be safe. Opposition to the plant, largely led by the DPP but in many respects cutting across party lines, has focused on halting construction altogether—preferably to abandon the project, but at least not to proceed with it until a final determination has been made regarding both safety and public opinion.

The DPP initially considered introducing a referendum on the issue. Few thought a referendum could pass (none of the six referenda put to a vote thus far has succeeded¹⁰⁹), but in light of the KMT’s instinctive opposition to referenda the idea was apparently to create a stir that would knock the administration off balance. Unexpectedly, however, Premier Jiang Yi-huah (in close consultation with President Ma) endorsed the referendum idea, not because he was giving up on the fourth plant, but because he was *not* giving up on it. As Ma put it, “If we can help people fully understand the two choices’ challenges and the price we will have to pay for those choices, we will be able to shoulder the consequences together and help our society become more harmonious.”¹¹⁰ Unspoken was Ma’s assumption that once people had such a “full understanding” they would support the fourth plant.

Given the near impossibility of a referendum’s passing, the administration chose to frame the question to be put before the voters in such a way that a “no” response would allow construction to continue.

Thus the question put forward by the KMT LY caucus was worded as follows: “Do you agree that the construction of Nuclear Power Plant No. 4 should be halted and it should not become operational (你是否同意核四廠停止興建不得運轉)?”¹¹¹ Failure of the referendum would mean that the voters did *not* agree construction should be halted or operations blocked, and so it would continue on course. Moreover, under the provisions

of the Referendum Act, this decision would not be open to another ballot test for eight years after the plant was up and running.¹¹²

The opposition charged that the administration was insincere, seeking to fool the voters into believing it wanted to be guided by public opinion when it really did not.¹¹³ While the administration denies this, many in the ruling KMT are nonetheless leery about the referendum, fearing the outcome will be a lose-lose proposition for them no matter which way it comes out. They believe it will simply fuel anti-nuclear—and anti-KMT—sentiment, with negative effects on the party’s chances in the 2014 local elections as well as the 2016 presidential contest.¹¹⁴

In fact, jockeying for position in the 2016 KMT presidential nomination contest seems already to be under way as two of the leading contenders have staked out different positions on the issue of the fourth plant. Taipei’s KMT mayor, Hau Lung-bin, has said that, because of safety concerns, he would vote against a referendum if it were held tomorrow.¹¹⁵ And even though, like his probable rival for the nomination, New Taipei Mayor Eric Chu Li-luan, he originally supported holding a referendum,¹¹⁶ more recently Hau has suggested that public opinion polls are so overwhelmingly negative that the time and costs of a referendum are not necessary, and construction should simply stop now.¹¹⁷

For his part, Chu has reserved his position on the issue of stopping construction, but he continues to back the holding of a referendum. He also dismissed Hau’s comment on voting against the referendum if held “tomorrow”: “It is meaningless to talk about hypothetical questions because the referendum is not being held now.”¹¹⁸

The political impact of the nuclear issue is also visible with respect to President Ma’s popularity. While other factors are undoubtedly also at work, including corruption scandals involving some of Ma’s close associates, one presumes that sentiment about the nuclear issue has played a role in the president’s continuing drop in the polls.¹¹⁹

In the meantime, however, the administration is trying to change the public mood and understanding of what is at stake. First, it has said that it would not allow a referendum to proceed unless the plant is rated “safe” during a rigorous inspection process,¹²⁰ and it would withhold an operating license until safety is assured.¹²¹ But second, it has argued that if the plant is deemed safe, and if construction is allowed to proceed, when completed it will provide vitally necessary electricity at a reasonable price. Otherwise, if nuclear power were suddenly abandoned, Taiwan would likely experience energy rationing, substantially higher electricity prices, a slowed economy, and lost jobs, as well as suffering negative effects on the environment.¹²²

Although the opposition argues that these alleged ill effects are grossly exaggerated, even a less drastic picture could sway public opinion once the safety of the plant is established (if it is established). As the head of a major economic research organization pointed out, the public has regularly opposed even slight increases in electricity rates. Whether they could accept the more serious consequences that are forecast is, he reasoned, highly questionable.¹²³ Moreover, the head of the Environmental Protection Administration has

argued that, viewed from a scientific perspective, the risks of climate change from coal or other likely substitute fuels would be more serious than they would be from nuclear power.¹²⁴

Like Premier Jiang, President Ma has identified himself with the ultimate goal of a nuclear-free Taiwan, but he has strongly endorsed achieving it gradually, without cancelling the fourth plant.¹²⁵ In light of public concerns about nuclear power, however, the government has also indicated that, if the new plant does go on line, efforts would be made to phase out the older, existing plants earlier than their planned decommissioning dates, perhaps over the next five years rather than the ten years now envisioned.¹²⁶

Although one poll in late March revealed that over 70 percent of respondents said they would participate in the proposed referendum, and almost as many people said that they favored stopping construction now,¹²⁷ the administration is counting on the fact that this could change. A poll conducted by the government found that, if safety of the fourth plant were affirmed, almost 57 percent of respondents did not support a drastic change, but supported Ma's approach of a gradual movement toward the goal of a nuclear-free homeland. This included sticking to the decommissioning schedule for the three existing plants by 2025 and allowing the fourth plant to come on stream as planned, and then taking steps over the coming 40-year life of the fourth plant to reduce the country's dependence on nuclear power,¹²⁸ eventually phasing it out altogether.

Meanwhile, the opposition is seeking to challenge the legality of the government-favored referendum on a variety of technicalities, but that effort does not seem likely to succeed. The opposition has run into a brick wall in the LY as well. Holding only a minority of seats, the DPP was unable to pass a motion to stop work on the plant,¹²⁹ and although it was able to delay consideration of the KMT referendum bill for several weeks, that bill is proceeding to its second reading in the LY and the DPP seems destined to fail in efforts to defeat it.¹³⁰

Nonetheless, the DPP has announced that it will continue to fight the fourth plant—and nuclear power in general—even if the LY passes the KMT's bill.¹³¹ Initially it considered proceeding with its own referendum alongside the KMT proposal, but that idea appears to have been dropped.¹³² Rather, through a massive series of events to present facts and statistics to bolster its case and to generate enthusiasm,¹³³ it is seeking to rally support for participation in the referendum vote, trying to beat the odds and actually get enough people to the polls to vote it down. At the same time, however, the DPP is trying to amend the Referendum Act to lower the bar for passage to 20 percent participation rather than 50 percent.¹³⁴

The government has also initiated a campaign of its own to present what it sees as the facts about risks and costs of the project. It is distributing a booklet¹³⁵ and has even launched a dedicated website.¹³⁶ All of this is in line with Ma's belief that once people have been truly educated about the issue, and assuming safety is assured, then they will support the fourth plant.

At best, it appeared that a referendum could not take place before July or August. However, with extensive safety inspections by dozens of experts now scheduled,¹³⁷ and with a new element of allowing absentee voting having been introduced (preparation for which will take time), it is likely that a referendum will not be held until the very end of 2013.

As noted earlier, this issue has the potential to affect the political balance of power in Taiwan and hence the question of who will face the PRC in cross-Straits dealings after 2016. We will therefore continue to follow it.

Final Note Regarding the DPP and the PRC

Although we indicated in *CLM* 40 that we would devote attention to the DPP's internal debate over cross-Straits policy, we will save that for a later essay. The first meeting of the party's China Affairs Committee took place May 9, with Frank Hsieh Chang-ting having joined at the last minute following a personal appeal by Su Tseng-chang.¹³⁸ Despite this obvious effort at unity, tensions were reported to have surfaced at that meeting, with Hsieh and others clashing over the role of the constitution¹³⁹ and former DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen reportedly walking out early.¹⁴⁰ The committee is due to meet again July 11, and we will look at the state of play after that.

Notes

¹ Alan D. Romberg, "Following the 18th Party Congress: Moving Forward Step-by-Step," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 40, January 14, 2013 (hereafter Romberg, *CLM* 40), <http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM40AR.pdf>.

² "Zheng Lizhong: The Mainland will seize more initiative in developing cross-Straits relations" (鄭立中：大陸將更多的掌控兩岸關係發展主動權), *China Review News*, March 8, 2013, <http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1024/6/2/8/102462850.html?coluid=3&kindid=12&docid=102462850&mdate=0308143148>.

³ Lin Ts'ung-ch'eng, "Mainland scholar worries exchanges won't necessarily lead to unification," *Want Daily*, April 26, 2013, <http://news.chinatimes.com/focus/501013317/112013042600133.html>. The scholar cited is Wang Zhenmin, Dean of the School of Law at Tsinghua University.

⁴ Lin Tse-hung, "Zhang Zhijun: Construct cross-Straits political relations on the basis of the one China framework and the 1992 Consensus" (張志軍：一中框架、九二共識 建構兩岸政治), Interview, *United Daily News* (UDN), May 23, 2013, <http://udn.com/NEWS/MAINLAND/MAIN1/7915989.shtml>.

⁵ "Xi Jinping: Speech at the first session of the 12th National People's Congress" (习近平：在十二届全国人大一次会议上的讲话), Xinhua, March 17, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-03/17/content_2356344.htm.

In his Lunar New Year greetings to Taiwan, then-TAO Director Wang Yi affirmed once again Beijing's intention to create more benefits for Taiwan compatriots ("Chinese Mainland confident in cross-Straits relation development," Xinhua, February 8, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/china/Off_the_Wire/2013-02/08/content_27918362.htm), a theme that continues to resonate in high-level statements despite concerns in Taiwan about Mainland demands for greater reciprocity. (Romberg, *CLM* 40, p. 10.)

As it was Commerce Minister Chen Deming whose comments occasioned the initial concern about greater reciprocity (*ibid.*), Taiwan observers will watch attentively as Chen moves into his new role replacing Chen Yunlin as head of the PRC's quasi-official negotiating arm, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). Most people believe that, whatever Chen was seeking to convey in his earlier remarks, he spoke in his role as minister in charge of trade negotiations and that in his new role he

will become much more of an advocate for the underlying policy of winning hearts and minds on the island.

⁶ Michael Martina and Clare Jim, “China’s Xi to tread peaceful, patient path on Taiwan,” Reuters, February 25, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/25/us-china-taiwan-idUSBRE91Q0CC20130225>. A detailed account of that meeting is contained in Li Hanfang, “General Secretary Xi Jinping meets Lien Chan and entourage” (习近平总书记会见连战一行), Xinhua, February 25, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-02/25/c_114794281.htm.

It is worth noting that Lien’s use of a 16-character phrase in his meeting with Xi caused a minor political kerfuffle in Taipei. One issue was whether the statement (“one China, peace across the Strait, mutual benefit and integration, and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” 「一個中國、兩岸和平、互利融合、振興中華」) had been coordinated with Ma Ying-jeou. The president’s office said it had not, Lien’s office insisted that, in substance, it had. On the assumption that the president had known of—and possibly even approved—it, the DPP charged that this showed Ma was yielding on the “respective interpretations” formulation he has insisted upon to demonstrate he has not caved in to the PRC’s pressure to accept their version of the “one China principle.”

In the end, this controversy faded in Taiwan, but the Mainland’s appreciation of Lien’s role in promoting cross-Straits relations in a positive direction was seen in Xi Jinping’s flattery of him: “Chairman Lien is a visionary and a sagacious statesman with deep national feelings, and he has done a lot of hard work for the improvement and development of cross-Straits relations. We highly evaluate Chairman Lien’s outstanding contributions to the development of cross-Straits relations.” (Wang Ping, “‘Xi Lien Meeting’ carries on from the ‘Hu Lien Meeting,’ makes clear the continuity of the Mainland’s Taiwan policy” [“习连会”接棒“胡连会”凸显大陆对台政策延续性], *People’s Daily Overseas Edition*, February 26, 2013, currently available at <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0226/c64387-20600034.html>.)

⁷ “Premier Li Keqiang and others meet with Chinese and foreign reporters covering the two meetings and answer their questions” (李克强总理等会见采访两会的中外记者并回答提问), Xinhua, March 17, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/2013lh/content_2356400.htm.

⁸ See footnote 5.

⁹ And while in his new role as head of ARATS, Chen Deming called for greater access to Taiwan’s finance industry, he also reiterated that the PRC would grant Taiwan “better than WTO” treatment in the services agreement. (Lin Tse-hung, “Regarding the services trade agreement, ‘concessions’ will exceed commitments to WTO” [服務貿易協議「給惠，將超過對WTO承諾」], Interview with Chen Deming, UDN, May 24, 2013, <http://udn.com/NEWS/MAINLAND/MAIN1/7918516.shtml>.)

¹⁰ In his post-NPC press conference in 2010, Wen had drawn attention to the fact that, in an earlier internet chat, he had spoken of letting Taiwan benefit more from the then-pending ECFA “because we are brothers.” Though cast in positive terms (“I believe that as brothers, we will eventually solve the problems”), the implicit warning was that if they were not interacting as brothers, then negotiations would not go so well. (“Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao press conference, full-text, March 2010,” MaximsNewsNetworks, March 18, 2010, <http://www.maximsnews.com/news20100318ChinaWenJiabopress11003180101.htm>.)

¹¹ Comments by Xi Jinping to Vincent Siew at Boao also led people to draw the same conclusion. This reading was not only made in Taiwan (Y.F. Low, “China Times: A pragmatic approach to cross-Straits exchanges,” Central News Agency (hereafter CNA), Editorial Extract, April 11, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aopn/201304110006.aspx>), it was made on the Mainland, as well. A well-known PRC expert, Zhang Nianchi, interpreted Li’s “everything can be discussed between brothers” comment as implying that if both sides are not “brothers,” then there is nothing to talk about. Zhang went on to reason that the Mainland might not make more concessions to Taiwan in the economic and trade area unless the two sides could further enhance their fraternal relationship. (Jung Fu-t’ien, “Zhang Nianchi views cross-Straits relations, no urgency for political dialogue” [章念馳看兩岸 政治對話不能急], *Want Daily*, April 8, 2013, <http://money.chinatimes.com/news/news-content.aspx?id=20130408000843&cid=5080382>; Jung Fu-t’ien, “Analyzing Xi and Li’s attitude toward Taiwan, if not brothers, then talking will be delayed” [分析習李對台 不是兄弟就免談], *Want Daily*, April 8, 2013, <http://money.chinatimes.com/news/news-content.aspx?id=20130408000847&cid=5080382>.)

¹² Mainland Affairs Council news release no. 018, “The two sides should adhere to the spirit of ‘mutual respect and mutual benefit,’ and together promote cross-Straits peace, stability and development”

(兩岸秉持「相互尊重、互利共榮」的精神，共同推動兩岸和平穩定發展), March 17, 2013,
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=104095&ctNode=6409&mp=1>.

¹³ Chen Jianxing, “2013 Taiwan-related work conference held in Beijing; Yu Zhengsheng attends and delivers an important speech” (2013年对台工作会议在京举行 俞正声出席并作重要讲话), February 19, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201302140008.

¹⁴ “Full text of Zhang Zhijun’s speech at the 11th session of the Cross-Straits Relations Symposium” (张志军在第十一届两岸关系研讨会上的讲话[全文]), China Taiwan Net, March 22, 2013, http://www.taiwan.cn/xwzx/bwkx/201303/t20130322_3979785.htm.

The theme of “steady progress and comprehensive development” had been adumbrated by outgoing TAO Director Wang Yi two weeks earlier in meeting with reporters on the margins of a discussion with the Taiwan delegation to the NPC. “Steady progress,” he said, meant that the Mainland would continue to adhere to easy issues first, harder ones later, and a step-by-step approach in promoting cross-Straits relations with the focus on improving the quality and effect of exchanges in various fields. “Comprehensive development” meant no more man-made restrictions or blank areas in development of cross-Straits relations. The focus would still be on deepening and advancing cooperation in the economic area, while strengthening cultural exchanges. As to sensitive political issues, which were getting more and more attention on both sides of the Strait, the Mainland was willing to explore these questions through nongovernmental channels such as think tanks in order to create conditions for solving them in due time. (“Wang Yi: Steady progress, comprehensive development” [王毅：稳步推进，全面发展], China Taiwan Net, March 6, 2013, http://www.taiwan.cn/xwzx/bwkx/201303/t20130306_3867722.htm; “Wang Yi: Safeguarding the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands is the common responsibility of compatriots on both sides of the Strait” [王毅：维护钓鱼岛主权是两岸同胞的共同责任], China Taiwan Net, March 6, 2013, http://www.taiwan.cn/xwzx/la/201303/t20130306_3867848.htm.)

We cite both stories immediately above to highlight the fact that in the NPC context, Taiwan is openly identified as a “province.” In the first story, the banner proclaiming the title of the group was clearly visible in a photograph: “Delegation of Taiwan Province to the first session of the 12th NPC” (十二届全国人大一次会议台湾省代表团). Although the word “province” (省) was omitted from the text of the report, in the second story, where the picture did not appear, the full title of the delegation was included in the report.

At the same time, Taipei did apparently get some satisfaction from a protest to the World Health Organization (WHO) regarding Taiwan’s designation in a report on the H7N9 bird flu epidemic. Although corrections had not been made on all WHO sites, the WHO West Pacific office changed the designation from “Taiwan, China” to “Taiwan.” (Tseng Ying-yu and Elizabeth Hsu, “Taiwan’s protest on WHO designation has been answered: official,” CNA, April 30, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201304300029.aspx>.)

¹⁵ Romberg, *CLM* 40, p. 2.

¹⁶ Even earlier, in December 2012, a group of senior people from Taiwan, led by former Foreign Minister C.J. Chen and former SEF Chairman Hong Chi-chang, traveled to the Mainland under the auspices of the Taipei Forum, a non-partisan group founded by former National Security Council Secretary-General Su Chi, an outspoken advocate of dialogue on political issues. (Regarding Su Chi’s perspective, see Scarlette Chai and Lilian Wu, “Ex-NSC official calls for cross-Straits political dialogue,” CNA, December 15, 2012, http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201212150026.) The Chen-Hong delegation met with prominent think tanks in Beijing. This was the first time that retired ambassadors and representatives from the two sides had met openly. They discussed the world situation in general, the situation in Asia, and cross-Straits relations. They noted that direct political negotiations between the two sides were not possible at this point, but suggested that political dialogue through this type of exchange with think tanks could be useful. (“Taipei Forum delegation departs for the Mainland,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], December 13, 2012, <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12294>.) (Please note that the various renderings of Scarlette Chai’s name found throughout these citations reflect the spellings in cited sources.)

By early 2013, at least two and perhaps more academic conferences were being planned along the lines of Zhang Zhijun’s suggestion. One, to be held in Beijing in early summer, will focus on strengthening shared identity and mutual trust, essentially a sequel to a conference series that started out in April 2010 in

Japan and took place in Sydney and Taipei subsequently, including DPP participants. (Private conversation with a participant. The 2010 meeting was discussed in Romberg, “Ma at Mid-Term: Challenges for Cross-Straight Relations,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 33, endnote 84.) As in 2010, although the Ma administration will be aware of these meetings it is not likely to give them any official blessing or authorization. The Taiwan Affairs Office in Beijing, however, will very likely be involved in preparations on the Mainland side.

How these conferences will address the subject of shared identity remains to be seen. But comments coming from the Mainland indicate some recognition of the importance of accommodating trends in Taiwan if progress is to be made on political relations. Taking into account recent polling in Taiwan showing growing “Taiwanese” identity, a deputy to the National People’s Congress who is an expert in cross-Straight relations suggested in mid-March that if Beijing is to succeed in persuading the majority of people in Taiwan to acknowledge the relationship of the “Republic of China” with the Mainland it will need to adopt a flexible, innovative and inclusive definition of “one China.” (Minnie Chan, “New leaders should seek flexible definition of Taiwan, NPC deputy says,” *South China Morning Post*, March 14, 2013, <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1190120/new-leaders-should-seek-flexible-definition-taiwan-npc-deputy-says>.)

Moreover, in an extensive article about “strategic thinking” regarding ultimate unification, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Taiwan Studies Institute raised the need for “sensible and reasonable treatment of the political status the Taiwan authorities should have”

(合情合理看待台當局應有的政治地位) and for appropriate handling of the issue of international space. On the latter score, the author argued that, within the context of “both sides of the Strait belonging to one China” (兩岸同屬一中), in addition to being flexible with respect to the name Taiwan uses in the international community, the Mainland also “could make suitable concessions at suitable times on the issue of suitable international participation by Taiwan” (還可針對適當的台國際參與問題適時做出適當的讓). Citing the views of scholars with whom he obviously agreed, he called for “overcoming the constraints of conventional thinking” (突破傳統的慣性思維的束縛) about cross-Straight relations, “maximally expanding the idea of ‘one country’ and interpreting the implications of unification as loosely as possible”

(兩岸統一將最大限度地擴充“一國”的概念，最為寬鬆地解釋統一的含義), and “creating a unification concept that is more flexible” (形成更具有彈性的統一觀). Both sides need to “emancipate the mind” (解放思想), he wrote. (Leng Bo, “Evaluation and strategic consideration of the overall situation in current cross-Straight peaceful unification” [當前兩岸和平統一總體形勢評估及戰略思考], *China Review News*, February 10, 2013, <http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1024/2/2/102422542.html?coluid=54&kindid=0&docid=102422542&mdate=0313103958.>)

¹⁷ “Newly-posted Taiwan affairs chief hopes to visit Taiwan,” Xinhua, March 22, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/22/c_132254973.htm.

¹⁸ Chen Wei-ting and Lilian Wu, “MAC welcomes China’s new Taiwan affairs head if timing right,” CNA, March 13, 2013,

http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201303190022; Scarlet Chai and Lilian Wu, “China unfriendly to ask Vatican to sever ties with Taiwan: MAC,” CNA, March 20, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aIPL&ID=201303200031.

¹⁹ And, in fact, public opinion in Taiwan is favorably inclined toward a visit by Zhang, with 56.4 percent of respondents to a recent poll supporting it as against only 22.2 percent opposed. (“Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey, Last 10 days of March, 2013 and summary of the results of a survey on questions during this period” [台灣民心動態調查2013年3月下旬，台灣民心動態調查與本期議題調查結果摘要], Taiwan Indicators Survey Research [TISR], March 29, 2013, http://www.tisr.com.tw/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/TISR_TMBS_201303_2.pdf.) These results compare with only 50.3 percent of respondents who supported the planned visit of ARATS head Chen Yunlin in late 2008 with 31.2 percent opposed.

²⁰ When Taiwan’s culture minister, Lung Ying-tai, proposed setting up cultural offices in various Mainland cities before concluding an agreement, Beijing responded by suggesting the reciprocal establishment of such offices. At that point, Minister Lung retreated, saying she would need to continue “internal” discussions, consultations, and coordination with the MAC and NSC. (“Mainland’s TAO favors establishing cross-Straight cultural offices on a reciprocal basis,” Kuomintang News Network [KMT News

Network, from Taipei papers]), December 13, 2012,

<http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12296.>)

²¹ Su Yan-feng, “MAC: Welcome Zhang Zhijun to visit Taiwan at an appropriate time”

(陸委會：歡迎張志軍適時訪台), CNA, March 22, 2013, <http://www.cna.com.tw/News/aCN/201303220352-1.aspx>.

²² Scarlett Chai, Chiu Kuo-chiang, and Elizabeth Hsu, “Taiwan sends congratulations as Chinese negotiator takes office,” CNA, April 26, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201304260019.aspx>.

²³ Elaine Hou, “Time not right for military discussions with China: ministry,” CNA, March 13, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201303130035.

²⁴ Lin Tse-hung, “Yu Zhengsheng: Cross-Straits political relations are a work in progress”

(俞正聲：兩岸政治關係是進行式), Interview, UDN, May 23, 2013,
<http://udn.com/NEWS/MAINLAND/MAIN2/7915988.shtml>.

²⁵ Ch'en Min-feng, “Xi Jinping readjusting Taiwan policy” (習近平重整對台政策), *Excellence*, No. 325, May 15, 2013, http://www.ecf.com.tw/newMag-page.php?a_id=2055.

²⁶ Lin Tsung-sheng, “Mainland identifies cross-Straits mutual military trust as national research project” (兩岸軍事互信 陸列國家專案), *China Times*, May 3, 2013,
<http://news.chinatimes.com/mainland/11050501/112013050300154.html>.

²⁷ Wang Kuang-tzu, Yang Wen-chi, Lin An-ni, “Signing of cross-Straits services agreement looks to be delayed” (兩岸服務貿易協議簽署 恐延後), UDN, April 2, 2013,
<http://udn.com/NEWS/MAINLAND/MAI1/7804049.shtml>.

²⁸ In a pattern that became familiar during negotiations over the investment protection agreement finally concluded in August 2012 (see Romberg, “Shaping the Future, Part II: Cross-Straits Relations,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 39, <http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM39AR.pdf>, p. 3), in mid-December it was announced that the services agreement negotiations were in the “final stage” and would be completed by the end of the year (Scarlett Chai and Kendra Lin, “Taiwan, China to complete service trade talks soon: negotiator,” CNA, December 17, 2012,
http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201212170016), only to have that date pushed back some 10 days later (“Signing of cross-Straits services trade agreement to miss year-end target,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], December 27, 2012,
<http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12360>). The TAO spokeswoman who announced that delay also pointed out that, once terms were agreed, implementation would proceed gradually, step by step.

In late February, another delay was announced, until April or May, this time attributed to the likely change of key PRC personnel at the upcoming National People’s Congress and National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. (“Talks on cross-Straits services deal may be delayed,” *WantChinaTimes.com*, February 23, 2013, <http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=2013022300047&cid=1201>.)

²⁹ Chen Deming was quoted as telling the audience at his maiden ARATS meeting that he hoped to hold a formal meeting with his Taiwan counterpart, SEF Chairman Lin Join-sane, in the first half of 2013 to sign an agreement on trade in services and to push for completion of a merchandise trade agreement. (Scarlett Chai et al, “Taiwan sends congratulations” CNA; see endnote 22.)

Although much was made of the fact that Taiwan firms were apparently going to be able to gain access to a portion of the Internet Content Provider market, there was not agreement in certain other significant service areas such as law, accounting, practice of medicine, and architecture. These would be the subject of later negotiations. (Sofia Wu, “Cross-strait service trade pact in offing,” Talk of the Day, CNA, April 26, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/atod/201304260040.aspx>.)

³⁰ Huang Chiao-wen, S.C. Chang, and Y.L. Kao, “Cross-strait service trade pact may take effect by year-end: official,” CNA, April 30, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201304300050.aspx>.

³¹ Huang Chiao-wen and Y.L. Kao, “Taiwan to gain wide benefits under pact with China: official,” CNA, April 30, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201304300032.aspx>.

³² “Mainland offers Taiwan WTO-Plus treatment in cross-Straits services trade,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), May 3, 2013,
<http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12862>.

³³ Chris Wang, “DPP concerned over ‘hasty’ trade pact,” *Taipei Times*, May 3, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/05/03/2003561331>.

³⁴ Wang Zongming, “Wang Yu-chi: Cross-Straits office exchange is not on the Lin-Chen summit agenda” (王郁琦：兩會互設辦事處 不列林陳會議題), *China Review News*, May 22, 2013, <http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1025/4/8/4/102548438.html?coluid=46&kindid=0&docid=102548438&mdate=0522103337>.

³⁵ Grace Guo, “Talks begin on reciprocal cross-Straits offices,” *Taiwan Today*, April 19, 2013, <http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=204274&ctNode=445>.

³⁶ Chai Ssu-chia, “Preliminary consensus reached on text of agreement to establish SEF and ARATS offices” (兩會互設辦 文本獲初步共識), CNA, May 16, 2013, <http://www.cna.com.tw/News/aIPL/201305160325-1.aspx>.

³⁷ Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Cabinet drafts bill on cross-Straits offices,” *Taipei Times*, April 12, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/04/12/2003559413>. The bill provides that, on a reciprocal basis, the offices would be immune from search and seizure and their personnel would enjoy civil and criminal immunity when engaged in official duties. They would also be granted certain tax exemptions and other privileges at the discretion of the authorities.

Opposition party and pan-Green commentators raised questions about the proposed arrangements for ARATS in Taiwan, suggesting that they appeared no different from those for the Liaison Office of the PRC Central People’s Government in Hong Kong. The MAC sharply disagreed. (Lee Yu-hsin, “Joseph Wu: If there is not complete diplomatic function, mutually establishing offices has no significance” [吳釗燮：不具外交功能 互設機構沒意義], *Liberty Times*, April 12, 2013, <http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2013/new/apr/12/today-fo3-3.htm>.) Concerns were also voiced that the ARATS office could become an espionage center. (“Opposition DPP slams proposal to allow Chinese representative office,” Formosa Television News [FTVN], April 12, 2013, <http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sno=7142C123F0A02FEAF3732B885C1F97AD>.)

Former DPP chair Tsai Ing-wen argued that since the exchange of offices was highly political and concerned sovereignty, the government should not proceed with it before a national consensus was reached. (Rich Chang, “Consensus needed on cross-Straits offices: Tsai,” *Taipei Times*, April 15, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/04/15/2003559675>.) Another commentator argued that the Ma administration was cleverly manipulating the process so that, at the end of the day, it would not need to submit the text of any agreement with the PRC on the exchange of offices to the Legislative Yuan for approval, but only provide it for the LY’s “reference.” (Su Yung-yao, “Ma government using a loophole, evading Legislative Yuan’s substantive examination” [馬政府鑽漏洞 規避立院實質審查], *Liberty Times*, April 13, 2013, <http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2013/new/apr/13/today-p1-2.htm>.)

Others, however, saw benefits, and observed that agreement to carry out consular-type functions would be a step forward in mutual recognition of jurisdiction. (Sofia Wu, “A step toward cross-Straits recognition of jurisdiction,” Talk of the Day, CNA, April 12, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/atod/201304120036.aspx>.)

³⁸ Ch’en Bo-ting, “Regarding the reciprocal establishment of SEF and ARATS offices, Wang Yu-chi: Hopeful to achieve by the end of next year” (兩會互設辦事處 王郁琦：明年底有望), *China Times*, April 11, 2013, <http://news.chinatimes.com/mainland/11050506/112013041100177.html>.

The DPP and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) have mounted opposition to LY approval of implementing legislation, including through a boycott of the Home Affairs Committee. They insist that any representative offices be established under a framework that defines cross-Straits ties as “nation-to-nation relations.” (“Opposition parties boycott cross-Straits offices bill,” *China Post*, May 20, 2013, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2013/05/20/379023/Opposition-parties.htm>.) Given the disparity in party strength in the LY, however, this effort seems destined to fail.

³⁹ “Reciprocal cross-Straits offices to be established based on TECRO model,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), January 24, 2013, <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12474>.

Unsurprisingly, pro-Green forces complained that if the Beijing office could not function as an overseas government office and issue visas or perform other consular work, not only would it be an unnecessary duplication of structures that already exist to take care of trade issues, but it would be like any other provincial office in Beijing. They argued that this was an example of the Ma government simply falling

into the “one China” birdcage and was a harbinger of political talks. This was not a matter of reciprocal negotiations, they said, but of self-diminution. (Su Yong-yao, “Commentary: Self-diminution will create a local office in Beijing,” *Liberty Times*, March 6, 2013, <http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2013/new/mar/6/today-p5-2.htm>.)

This commentary followed the release of a poll by the pro-DPP Taiwan Thinktank that showed nearly 50 percent of respondents supported the reciprocal establishment of offices but 62 percent expressed concern about a PRC office in Taiwan. A DPP legislator suggested that people in Taiwan are open-minded about cross-Straits exchanges but concerned about efforts by the Mainland to turn Taiwan into “another Hong Kong.” (Chen Hui-p’ing and Li Hsin-fang, “Taiwan Thinktank public opinion poll: 62 percent of the public are anxious about China setting up an office in Taiwan” [台灣智庫民調：中國來台設處 62%民眾憂心], *Liberty Times*, January 29, 2013, <http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2013/new/jan/29/today-p7.htm>.)

⁴⁰ Lo Yin-chung, “Breakthrough on reciprocal establishment of cross-Straits offices, SEF set on Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou” (互設辦突破 海基敲定北上廣), *Want Daily*, May 3, 2013, <http://news.chinatimes.com/mainland/11050501/112013050300157.html>.

⁴¹ Lin Tse-hung, “Reciprocal establishment of offices ‘already has made positive headway’” (互設辦事處「已取得積極進展」), Interview with Zhang Zhijun, UDN, May 23, 2013, <http://udn.com/NEWS/MAINLAND/MAIN1/7915986.shtml>.

⁴² Hao Hsueh-chin, Scarlett Chai, and Y.F. Low, “Taiwan to continue to ease restrictions on Chinese students,” CNA, March 28, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201303280019.

⁴³ Zoe Wei and Elizabeth Hsu, “Restrictions on Chinese white-collars in Taiwan to be eased,” CNA, March 27, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201303270036. As with almost all such proposals for liberalization of access of Mainlanders to Taiwan, concerns were raised, in this case by legislators from various parties who were concerned they would replace domestic workers, in particular blue-collar workers. Administration officials pledged to implement strict restrictions to ensure that appropriate numerical limits would be observed. (Ann Yu, “Lawmakers fret over inflow of mainland China workers,” *China Post*, March 28, 2013, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2013/03/28/374425/Lawmakers-fret.htm>.) It is estimated that approximately 300 companies would qualify for the program, employing up to 9,000 such workers. Among the complaints is the fact that the government (i.e., taxpayers) would foot 40 percent of the health insurance premiums for these people, which trade union officials termed unfair. (“Taiwan opens doors to more Chinese white-collar workers, raising doubts,” FTVN, March 28, 2013, <http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sno=8DD6A525604A3360C6BCC4196554A8BD>.)

⁴⁴ “MOEA mulls easing of Mainland China investment,” *Economic Daily News* (translated in *Taiwan Today*), January 21, 2013, <http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=201039&ctNode=445>.

Meanwhile, however, Taiwan investment in the Mainland seemed to be shrinking both due to the rising cost of labor (“Increasing labor costs in China forcing out Taiwanese businesses,” *WantChinaTimes.com*, January 22, 2013, <http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cont.aspx?id=20130122000115&cid=1202>) and because of the downturn in the Mainland market and structural adjustments in the manufacturing sector (“Taiwan investment in Mainland China decreases,” *Commercial Times* [translated in *Taiwan Today*], January 22, 2013, <http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=201073&CtNode=419>).

⁴⁵ “Taiwan eases controls on Chinese bank investment,” AP, April 1, 2013, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/taiwan-eases-controls-chinese-bank-investment>.

⁴⁶ “Taiwan, Mainland China cooperate on bird flu research,” Agence France-Presse (AFP, in *China Post*), April 22, 2013, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2013/04/22/376684/Taiwan-mainland.htm>.

⁴⁷ Chung Li-hua, Kao Chia-ho, and Wang Meng-lun, “Big change in policy on Free Economic Demonstration Zones: 830 types of Chinese agricultural products will invade Taiwan” (自經示範區政策大轉彎// 830項中國農產品 攻台), *Liberty Times*, January 28, 2013, <http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2013/new/jan/28/today-t1.htm>.

⁴⁸ Lee I-chia, “Opening to Chinese products inevitable: minister,” *Taipei Times*, January 30, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/01/30/2003553778>.

⁴⁹ Transcript of TAO press conference, January 30, 2013,

http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201301/t20130130_3728279.htm.

⁵⁰ Tsai Su-jung and Jamie Wang, “China will not force Taiwan to import produce: official,” CNA, February 5, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201302050044.

⁵¹ Lo Hsiu-wen and Lilian Wu, “Construction of cross-Straits submarine cable system completed,” CNA, January 18, 2013,

http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201301180036.

⁵² Chao Hsiao-hui and Frances Huang, “Direct cross-Straits flights expected to exceed 600 a week,” CNA, February 12, 2013,

http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aECO&ID=201302120005.

⁵³ “Chinese activist Chen plans Taiwan visit in June,” AFP (carried by *Taipei Times*), March 16, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557212>.

⁵⁴ Wen Kui-hsiang, Scarlett Chai and Sofia Wu, “Taiwan welcomes blind Chinese dissident’s visit: MAC,” CNA, May 13, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201305130009.aspx>.

⁵⁵ “China warns blind dissident Chen Guangcheng ahead of Taiwan trip,” Reuters (carried in *South China Morning Post*), May 23, 2013, <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1244215/china-warns-blind-dissident-chen-guangcheng-ahead-taiwan-trip>.

⁵⁶ “On Chen Guangcheng’s visit to Taiwan, Mainland: Should fulfill his responsibilities as a citizen” (陳光誠訪台 陸：該盡公民責任), CNA, May 23, 2013, <http://www.cna.com.tw/News/aCN/201305230338-1.aspx>.

⁵⁷ Rachel Chan, “Ma seeks expanded role for Taiwan in UN agencies,” *Taiwan Today*, December 15, 2012, <http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=199765&ctNode=445>. The issue was discussed at some length in recent essays, including Romberg, *CLM* 40, pp. 7–8.

⁵⁸ Transcript of TAO press briefing, February 27, 2013,

http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201302/t20130227_3835214.htm.

⁵⁹ Maubo Chang, “KMT honorary chairman meets top Chinese Communist,” Talk of the Day, CNA, February 26, 2013,

http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?ID=201302260039&Type=aTOD.

⁶⁰ The text of the House bill introduced by Congressman Ed Royce, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on March 14, 2013, identical to the one introduced in the Senate the same day by Senator Robert Menendez, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is available at <http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/1151/text>.

⁶¹ Transcript of TAO press conference, March 27, 2013,

http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201303/t20130327_4007877.htm.

⁶² Private conversation, May 2013.

⁶³ Angela Tsai and Elaine Hou, “Taiwan hopes to participate in ICAO assembly in September,” CNA, March 18, 2013,

http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201303180014.

⁶⁴ Justin Wu, Wang Ching-yi, and Scully Hsiao, “Taiwan seeking pragmatic participation in ICAO: foreign ministry,” CNA, March 28, 2013,

http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201303280025.

⁶⁵ Chai Ssu-chia, “MAC: To participate in the international community is a right and duty” (陸委會：參與國際是權利義務), CNA, March 27, 2013, <http://www.cna.com.tw/News/aCN/201303270462-1.aspx>.

⁶⁶ Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying’s regular press conference on March 14, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t1021741.shtml>.

⁶⁷ Hu Qingsyun, “Ma heads to Rome to attend papal inauguration,” *Global Times*, March 18, 2013, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/768699.shtml>; Scarlet Chai and Lilian Wu, “China unfriendly to ask Vatican to sever ties with Taiwan: MAC,” CNA, March 20, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aIPL&ID=201303200031; “Taiwan row a first diplomatic test for Pope Francis,” March 19, 2013, AFP, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130319/corrected-taiwan-row-first-diplomatic-test-pope-francis>.

⁶⁸ Scarlet Chai and Lilian Wu, “China unfriendly to ask Vatican to sever ties.”

⁶⁹ Sarah Mishkin and Ben Bland, “Jakarta forum hit by China-Taiwan spat,” *Financial Times*, March 21, 2013, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2f59e8b4-91d7-11e2-b4c9-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz2OHJvFcIC>. The

delegation was to be composed of two academics specializing in national security and two people from Taiwan's unofficial representative office in Jakarta.

⁷⁰ Shih Hsiu-chuan, "Taiwan gets barred from Jakarta defense summit," *Taipei Times*, March 22, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/03/22/2003557679>.

⁷¹ Yang Ming-chu and Lilian Wu, "Taiwan envoy invited to earthquake memorial service in Japan," CNA, March 11, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201303110032.

⁷² "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's remarks on the Taiwan-related issue which arose at Japan's memorial ceremony of the March 11 earthquake," March 11, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t1020675.shtml>.

⁷³ Chris Wang, "Lawmakers slam Beijing interference in ICAO bid," *Taipei Times*, March 29, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/29/2003558280>.

⁷⁴ "Former VP Vincent Siew meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping," FTVN, April 8, 2013, <http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sno=EBEEBFCA00963D99328BC4A2597E5815>. The Xinhua report of the meeting is at http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wlyl/201304/20130408_4054049.htm.

The DPP and its supporters thought they detected slights in Siew's treatment (Zou Li-yong, "Lai I-chung: China's reception of Vincent Siew not as warm as in the past" (賴怡忠：中方接待蕭萬長熱絡不若以往), *China Review News*, April 9, 2013, <http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1024/9/5/1/102495118.html?coluid=142&kindid=0&docid=102495118&mdate=0409003310>). This does not seem to be borne out when all factors are taken into account.

⁷⁵ Rita Cheng and S.C. Chang, "China to 'help' Taiwan on regional economic cooperation," CNA, April 8, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201304080032.aspx>. Unsurprisingly, the DPP dismissed the idea that Beijing would truly help Taiwan participate in regional economic integration efforts. (Sophia Yeh and S.C. Chang, "DPP criticizes Ma for 'wishful thinking' on China," CNA, April 8, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201304080035.aspx>.)

The TAO's version of this briefing is at http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wlyl/201304/20130408_4054048.htm. Terming the Xi-Siew meeting "significant and fruitful" (积极而富有), it contains more expressions of mutuality and has less about benefiting Taiwan, *per se*, but the strong desire for greater economic cooperation, including in coordinating with the regional economic order, is clear.

⁷⁶ C.W. Huang and Flor Wang, "Taiwan-New Zealand trade talks nearing completion," CNA, May 18, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201305180009.aspx>.

⁷⁷ Huang Kuo-fang, "David Lin: To actively pursue FTAs" (林永樂：積極爭取自由貿易協定) CNA, April 30, 2013, <http://www.cna.com.tw/News/aIPL/201304300187-1.aspx>.

⁷⁸ Emmanuelle Tzeng and Y.F. Low, "Taiwan seeks U.S. support for wider WHO participation," CNA, May 21, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201305220005.aspx>.

⁷⁹ Emmanuelle Tzeng and Y.L. Kao, "Taiwan's health minister speaks at WHA," CNA, May 22, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201305220042.aspx>.

⁸⁰ Romberg, *CLM* 39, pp. 14ff.

⁸¹ "Japan makes concessions to Taiwan over Diaoyutai fishing: Reports," *Taiwan News Online*, April 10, 2013, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2192804.

⁸² Article 4 of the agreement, the "disclaimer clause," stipulates: "The accord or measures taken pursuant to the provisions under the accord shall be without prejudice to relevant positions on issues with respect to the law of the seas held by competent authorities of both sides." (Shih Hsiu-chuan, "Analysis: Academics have mixed outlooks on fishery accord," *Taipei Times*, April 23, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/04/23/2003560505>).

⁸³ "President Ma's remarks at the video conference with CDDRL [Center of Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law] at Stanford University," Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), April 16, 2013, <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=1124&itemid=29715&view=home>.

⁸⁴ Ni Hongxiang, "Ma Ying-jeou pledges: Definitely will protect fishermen in the area surrounding the Diaoyu islands," *China Review News*, April 17, 2013, <http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1025/0/4/9/102504937.html?coluid=46&kindid=0&docid=102504937&mdate=0417004101>.

⁸⁵ “Government to boost Senkaku patrols,” Jiji Press (hereafter Jiji), May 8, 2013, <http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0000201802>.

⁸⁶ “Japan to seize Taiwanese boats operating outside agreed area,” Kyodo, May 5, 2013, <http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2013/05/223303.html>.

⁸⁷ “Japan, Taiwan apart on fishery rules around Senkakus,” Jiji, May 7, 2013, <http://jen.jiji.com/jc/i?g=eco&k=2013050700951>. The commission will continue to negotiate and meet again later this year. (Elaine Hou, “Taiwan, Japan discuss fishing regulations near disputed Diaoyutais,” CNA, May 7, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201305070052.aspx>.)

⁸⁸ “President Ma: ROC made no concessions on sovereignty over Diaoyutai,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), March 11, 2013, <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12767>.

⁸⁹ Shen Ju-feng and Lilian Wu, “Taiwan fishermen see ‘benefits’ in fishery pact with Japan,” CNA, April 10, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201304100049.aspx>.

⁹⁰ “Taiwan fishermen welcome accord with Japan,” *NHK World*, accessed April 10, 2013 at http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/english/news/20130410_32.html. This concern is not without justification. Although the fishing areas were established in the agreement, the joint commission of Japanese and Taiwan officials is to deal with important details such as catch quotas, the number of fishing boats allowed in an area, and when fishing would be permitted. As a preliminary session of that commission was scheduled to meet in Tokyo in late April, Okinawa’s governor expressed “extreme indignation” about the agreement and urged the government to review it. (“Nakaima rips signing of Taiwan fishery accord,” *Japan Times* [from Kyodo and Jiji reports], April 26, 2013, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/26/national/nakaima-rips-signing-of-taiwan-fishery-accord/>.) A more detailed discussion of the functions of the commission can be found at Ko Shu-ling, “Japan, Taiwan to form joint fishing committee,” Kyodo, April 15, 2013, <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Japan,+Taiwan+to+form+joint+fishing+committee.-a0326496234>.

⁹¹ Worthy Shen and Lilian Wu, “Fined Taiwanese captain laments trespassing incident,” CNA, May 24, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201305240030.aspx>.

⁹² Johnson Liu and Y.F. Low, “Taiwanese boat returning after Diaoyutais protest,” CNA, January 24, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aSOC&ID=201301240022.

⁹³ Li Wenhui, “Taiwanese Diaoyutai activists use hit-and-run tactics, keep Japanese coast guard ships on alert” (台灣民間保釣採打跑戰術 日艦保持緊繩), March 20, 2013, <http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1024/7/5/0/102475049.html?coluid=46&kindid=0&docid=102475049&mdate=0320001245>.

⁹⁴ Li Wenhui, “Huang Hsi-lin: Taiwan and Japan join hands to create problems, will go to sea by the end of the month without fail” (黃錫麟：台日聯手刁難 月底出海不妥協), *China Review News*, April 25, 2013, <http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1025/0/8/8/102508898.html?coluid=93&kindid=8530&docid=102508898&mdate=0420001958>.

⁹⁵ Liu and Low, “Taiwanese boat returning” (see endnote 92).

⁹⁶ The PRC made a similar display of PRC “comradely concern” when a Philippine coast guard vessel killed a Taiwan fisherman in mid-May, with the Foreign Ministry spokesman explaining “It is the joint responsibility of both the Mainland and Taiwan to safeguard the rights and interests of fishermen on both sides of the Strait.” (“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s regular press conference,” May 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t1040941.shtml>.)

A *People’s Daily* commentary put it even more directly: “China does not take the initiative in provoking incidents at sea, but if the Philippines continues to deal in crude fashion with mainland Chinese and Taiwan fishing boats and fishermen, Chinese maritime law enforcement forces should counterattack in timely and forceful fashion, to protect the legitimate rights of mainland Chinese and Taiwan fishermen; we cannot let fishermen’s legitimate fishing activities proceed in fear.” (Hua Yiwen, “Philippines’ killing of a Taiwan fisherman cannot be left unresolved” [菲射杀台湾渔民案不能不了了之], Xinhua [from *People’s Daily* overseas edition], May 11, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2013-05/11/c_115727633.htm.)

The assertion of PRC co-responsibility in this instance was equally as unwelcome to the Ma administration as it was in the Diaoyu case. (Luo Yin-ch’ung, “Thanks for the concern [but] Wang Yu-chi does not want the Mainland to get involved” [感謝關切 王郁琦不願陸插手], *Want Daily*, May 15, 2013, <http://news.chinatimes.com/focus/501013462/112013051600137.html>.)

⁹⁷ Although Abe's chief cabinet secretary said Japan reached the agreement with Taiwan in order to "restore order to fishing," Abe himself told the Upper House Budget Committee, "We took into account Taipei's stance that (it) will not partner with Beijing over the Senkaku Islands." ("Insight: Abe returns to hard-line approach in response to Beijing, Seoul," *Asahi Shimbun*, April 24, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/AJ201304240082.)

⁹⁸ "Mainland, Taiwan urged to jointly safeguard Diaoyu sovereignty," Xinhua, March 27, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/27/c_132265907.htm.

⁹⁹ Adam Westlake, "Taiwan will 'expel' Chinese fishermen under new Senkaku deal with Japan," *Japan Daily Press*, April 12, 2013, <http://japandailypress.com/taiwan-will-expel-chinese-fishermen-under-new-senkaku-deal-with-japan-1226882>.

¹⁰⁰ "Wang Yi: Safeguarding sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands is the common responsibility of compatriots on both sides of the Strait" (王毅：维护钓鱼岛主权是两岸同胞的共同责任), ChinaTaiwannet, March 6, 2013, http://www.taiwan.cn/xwzx/la/201303/t20130306_3867848.htm.

¹⁰¹ "Remarks by President Ma Ying-jeou at Fulbright Research Workshop," Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), March 7, 2013, <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=29346&rmid=2355>.

¹⁰² Foreign Ministry press conference, April 12, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/t1030642.shtml.

¹⁰³ Chiu Kuo-ch'iang, "Mainland military: Both sides of the Strait have responsibility for protecting Diaoyu" (陸軍方：保釣 兩岸有責), CNA (domestic), April 25, 2013, <http://www.cna.com.tw/News/aCN/201304250324-1.aspx>.

¹⁰⁴ Shih Hsiu-chuan, "Analysis: Academics have mixed outlooks on fishery accord," *Taipei Times*, April 23, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/04/23/2003560505>.

¹⁰⁵ Not only did DPP stalwart and frequent Ma critic Bi-khim Hsiao express approval of the achievement on her blog (<https://www.facebook.com/Bikhim/posts/10151391880515687>), but even former president Lee Teng-hui termed it "very important" (很重要) and a "very big help" (很大的幫助) to Taiwan's fishermen. (FTVN, "Ex-president Lee Teng-hui applauds Taiwan-Japan fishery pact," April 12, 2013, <http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sno=E2DB3670B2210097FAD0BEB2361A7E14>.)

¹⁰⁶ "APEC supports Taiwan's role in South China Sea Code of Conduct," CNA (in *WantChinaTimes.com*), September 10, 2012, <http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20120910000059&cid=1101>.

¹⁰⁷ Lee Shu-hua, Lin Meng-ju, Chen Wei-ting, and Y.F. Low, "Government to accept referendum on 4th nuclear plant," CNA, February 25, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201302250031.aspx>.

¹⁰⁸ Much of this account comes from Tseng Ying-yu and Elizabeth Hsu, "Referendum will not mean nuclear policy has changed: premier," CNA, February 26, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201302260031.

¹⁰⁹ The Referendum Act in its current form stipulates that for a referendum to pass, over half of all eligible voters must cast valid ballots and over half of those casting valid ballots must vote "yes." The text of the Act is available at <http://law.moj.gov.tw/eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=D0020050>.

¹¹⁰ Jeffrey Wu, "Referendums can be manipulated by framing of question: Nobel laureate," CNA, March 31, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201303310013.aspx>.

¹¹¹ "KMT caucus unveils text of plebiscite question on nuke issue," KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), March 8, 2013, <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12642>. In introducing the text, the caucus also presented five reasons to oppose the plant (and hence to support the referendum) and five reasons to support it (and oppose the referendum):

Cons:

- Nuclear plant not safest way to generate energy; risk of irreparable consequences
- Nuclear power not cheapest source of energy taking into account cost of disposing of nuclear waste, decommissioning a plant, and cleaning up construction site
- Many safety issues with 4th Nuclear Power Plant have been discovered
- Frequent earthquakes and typhoons; plant in vast metropolitan area; if threat of radiation leak, no capability to evacuate area

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- After Fukushima, many countries working toward being nuclear-free; Taiwan can also adopt such a policy and develop alternative sources of energy.

Pros:

- Relatively clean re CO₂ emissions; cut greenhouse gases, meet pledges
- Can't achieve nuclear-free homeland in one step; nuclear power allows gradual transition
- Terminating construction could lead to power shortages because alternatives such as natural gas are undeveloped, extremely expensive and subject to price fluctuations in the global market
- Halting construction could send electricity prices soaring, severely impacting economy and people's livelihoods, driving down GDP, driving industries overseas, raising unemployment
- If 4th plant not put into operation, might need to expand capacity of existing three nuclear plants, which could carry serious risks due to the aging reactors.

¹¹² Article 33 reads: "Whether a proposal of referendum is adopted or vetoed, no more proposals may be raised for the same matter within 3 years commencing from the day when the election commission publicizes the result of voting. However, if a proposal of referendum over an important policy on a public facility is vetoed, no more proposals may be raised for the same matter within the period from the day when the result of voting is publicized to 8 years after the facility is completed and put into use."

(<http://law.moj.gov.tw/eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=D0020050.>)

¹¹³ "DPP questions Taiwan premier's sincerity over nuclear referendum," *Taiwan News Online*, February 26, 2013, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2158133.

¹¹⁴ Peng Hsien-chun and Stacy Hsu, "Referendum bad for party: KMT committee," *Taipei Times*, March 12, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/12/2003556885>.

¹¹⁵ "If nuclear referendum tomorrow, I'd vote against: Taipei mayor," *Taiwan News Online*, March 21, 2013, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2178411.

¹¹⁶ "Taipei and New Taipei mayors comment on proposed referendum," FTVN, March 4, 2013, <http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sno=0A11041B56EC14B4B2DA9C6D5129B806>.

¹¹⁷ Mo Yan-chih, "City poll shows 66% in favor of plant suspension," *Taipei Times*, March 29, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/03/29/2003558260>.

¹¹⁸ Mo Yan-chih, "Hau's nuclear comments spark concern," *Taipei Times*, March 24, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/24/2003557861>.

¹¹⁹ Taiwan Indicators Survey Research reported that in the first half of April 2013 Ma's dissatisfaction rate rose to 74 percent, an increase of almost 5 percentage points in only half a month, along with a rise in his mistrust rating by a like amount, to over 60 percent. ("Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey First Ten Days of April, 2013" [2013年4月上旬台灣民心動態調查], April 11, 2013, <http://www.tisr.com.tw/?p=2680>.) Other polls conducted in May on the first anniversary of Ma's second term, whether from the DPP or conservative institutions, produced similar results.

¹²⁰ Tseng Ying-yu and Lilian Wu, "Referendum on nuclear plant only when safety ensured: premier," CNA, March 6, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/api/201303060036.aspx>. Recent discovery of another leak at the Japanese Fukushima nuclear plant, the second in three weeks, will do nothing to increase confidence in nuclear safety among the Taiwan public. ("Second leak found at Japan's Fukushima nuclear plant," Reuters, April 7, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/video/2013/04/07/second-tank-leak-found-at-japans-fukushi?videoId=242100385&videoChannel=1>.)

¹²¹ "President Ma discusses four issues in exclusive UDN interview," KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), April 9, 2013, <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12758>.

¹²² "Cabinet: Power rationing inevitable in 2015 without NPP4," KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), March 29, 2013, <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12726>.

¹²³ "CIER [Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research] president: people want electricity but oppose power plants," KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), April 2, 2013, <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12740>. This point seemed to be underscored by significant KMT support in the LY to block a 10 percent electricity rate hike due to take effect later this year. (Shih Hsiao-kuang and Jason Pan, "KMT legislators back bill opposing electricity hikes," *Taipei Times*, May 11, 2003, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/05/11/2003561980.>)

¹²⁴ Lee I-chia, "No nuclear power, more carbon: minister," *Taipei Times*, March 21, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/21/2003557614>.

¹²⁵ Chen Wei-ting and Jamie Wang, “Taiwan will become nuclear-free by 2055: premier,” CNA, March 12, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201303120042.aspx>.

¹²⁶ Wang Chieh-peng, “If 4th nuclear plant goes into operation, the 1st nuclear plant could be retired early” (核安/核四若商轉 核一將提前除役), *Central Daily News*, April 12, 2013, http://www.cdnews.com.tw/cdnews_site/docDetail.jsp?coluid=107&docid=102273307.

Actually, Premier Jiang indicated that there were two preconditions for early retirement of the First and Second Nuclear Power Plants. First, the Fourth Plant needed to be commercially operational before 2016, and, second, idle capacity (held in reserve for emergency use) needed to be within safe range. (Su Hsiu-hui, “Jiang: two preconditions for early retirement of First and Second Nuclear Power Plants”

[江揆：核一二提前除役二前提], *UDN*, April 17, 2013,

<http://udn.com/NEWS/BREAKINGNEWS/BREAKINGNEWS1/7838396.shtml>.)

Interestingly, there are some indications that opposition to the fourth plant doesn’t actually carry fully over to opposition to nuclear power in general or to continued operation of the existing three plants. (Chris Wang, “Majority oppose Gongliao plant: survey,” *Taipei Times*, March 12, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/12/2003556882>.) Even former President Lee Teng-hui, while saying he would not vote in the referendum on the fourth plant, argued that Taiwan could not afford to abandon nuclear power in the near future and should enhance its nuclear energy program by developing advanced technologies such as nuclear fusion. (Chris Wang, “Lee Teng-hui says nuclear power plants still needed,” *Taipei Times*, April 12, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/04/12/2003559438>.)

¹²⁷ “Poll on fourth nuclear power plant after anti-nuclear demonstration” (廢核遊行後，核四公投民調), TVBS, March 28, 2013, http://www1.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/PCH/201304/d7z80d61vr.pdf.

¹²⁸ Hsieh Chia-chen and Elizabeth Hsu, “Majority supports holding referendum on nuclear plant: poll,” CNA, April 16, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201304160027.aspx>. A summary of the RDEC poll results is at

<http://www.microsofttranslator.com/BV.aspx?ref=IE8Activity&a=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rdec.gov.tw%2Fct.asp%3FxItem%3D4549167%26ctNode%3D12829%26mp%3D100>. The decommissioning of the existing plants is scheduled for 2019, 2023, and 2025. (Lee Shu-hua and Ann Chen, “DPP to launch ‘rational’ anti-nuclear campaign,” CNA, March 3, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw>ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aIPL&TNo=&ID=201303030021.)

¹²⁹ “Taiwan Legislative Yuan defeats opposition nuclear stop proposal,” *Taiwan News Online*, April 12, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/atod/201304090021.aspx>. A further motion in early May to place on the LY agenda a motion to immediately halt construction also failed. (Shih Hsiu-chuan and Rich Chang, “Opposition parties fail in nuclear referendum bids,” *Taipei Times*, May 4, 2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/05/04/2003561419>.)

¹³⁰ Tseng Ying-yu and Jay Chen, “Nuclear referendum proposal proceeds to second reading,” CNA, April 26, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201304260037.aspx>.

¹³¹ Katherine Wei, “DPP to still resist Nuke 4 if referendum passed,” *China Post*, April 25, 2013, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2013/04/25/376970/DPP-to.htm>.

¹³² Wen Kuei-hsiang, Justine Su, Lin Ruei-yi, and Elizabeth Hsu, “Opposition prepares for ruling party’s referendum motion,” CNA, March 2, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201303020016.aspx>.

¹³³ Chris Wang, “DPP plans 1,000 anti-nuclear events,” *Taipei Times*, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/21/2003557613>.

¹³⁴ Enru Lin, “KMT holds firm, DPP to take offensive on Referendum Act,” *China Post*, February 28, 2013, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2013/02/28/371586/KMT-holds.htm>.

¹³⁵ “Taiwan opposition continues to block nuclear vote at Legislature,” *Taiwan News Online*, April 23, 2013, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2203516.

¹³⁶ Huang Chiao-wen, Hsieh Chia-chen, and Elizabeth Hsu, “Ministry launches website to educate public on nuclear energy,” CNA, April 23, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201304230028.aspx>.

¹³⁷ “Nuclear power experts to start 6-month series of safety checks,” *UDN* (translated by KMT News Network), March 29, 2013, <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12729>.

¹³⁸ Su Lung-chi, “Su invited face to face, Hsieh agreed to join DPP’s China Affairs Committee” (蘇面邀謝允加入中國事務會), CNA (domestic), May 6, 2013, <http://www.cna.com.tw/News/aIPL/201305060261-1.aspx>.

¹³⁹ “Frank Hsieh debates Chiu I-jen on respective interpretations of the constitution,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), May 10, 2013, <http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12890>.

¹⁴⁰ Huang Xiaoyun, “Commentary: Tsai Ing-wen left the committee meeting without speaking, Su faction is rumored to be unhappy” (觀察：蔡英文未發言即快閃 傳蘇系很不滿), *China Review News*, May 10, 2013, <http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1025/3/3/2/102533201.html?coluid=142&kindid=0&docid=102533201&mdate=0510010629>.