

Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ)

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China's establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone has incited strong criticisms and increased regional tensions. Both authoritative and non-authoritative sources argue consistently and often emphatically that the zone is intended to improve safety and stability, and is not directed at any particular country or target. Yet the vague language used to describe the zone, as well as the extensive and often hostile rhetoric toward Japan, suggests that such assertions are incorrect and disingenuous at best. While China has every right to set up an ADIZ, its failure to reassure other nations or clearly define the enforcement and intended impacts of the zone has undermined any purported stabilizing intentions and damaged China's larger strategic interests.

On November 23, 2013, the Chinese government for the first time publicly announced the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), a portion of airspace contiguous to (or sometimes partly including) a country's territorial airspace within which the identification, location, and control of foreign aircraft occurs. Such zones presumably serve national security interests, primarily by providing adequate early warning of aircraft entering or flying near a country's territorial airspace.¹

The United States established the first ADIZ in the 1950s, to reduce the risk of a surprise attack from the Soviet Union. The United States currently has five zones (East Coast, West Coast, Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam) and operates two more with Canada.² During the Cold War, Washington also defined the ADIZs claimed by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.³ China's new ADIZ covers a significant part of the East China Sea (ECS) contiguous to the Chinese coastline, and overlaps in some areas with the ADIZs of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. It also includes the airspace above several islands, rocks, and reefs that are currently under dispute with Japan and South Korea, including the Senkaku (in Japanese) or Diaoyu (in Chinese) Islands (hereafter referred to as the S/D islands) and the Socotra Rock (known as Suyan Jiao in Chinese and Ieodo in Korean),⁴ respectively (see figure 1 in the appendix).

Even though many other countries or territories also operate ADIZs and such zones are not prohibited by international law⁵ (in fact, ADIZs have no explicit basis at all in international law, other than the general "right of a nation to establish reasonable conditions of entry into its territory"),⁶ several countries and many outside observers and commentators objected to Beijing's establishment of the ECS ADIZ or expressed strong concerns. Most notably, Japan demanded its revocation, while the United States declared

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that it would ignore the zone and not comply with any Chinese regulations involving the zone (although out of safety concerns Washington also indirectly advised American commercial airlines to comply with China's ADIZ).⁷ South Korea expressed "formal regrets," Australia summoned the Chinese ambassador to voice its "opposition," and the Philippines criticized not just Chinese threats to safety and national security but also China's potential future control over the South China Sea, while the European Union and Germany voiced similar concerns over armed conflict in the region.⁸

The bases for such criticisms run the gamut, from the notion that the Chinese ADIZ constitutes an unacceptable unilateral and provocative attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea, as presented by Washington and Tokyo,⁹ to highly overblown assertions by various pundits that the announcement clearly signals Beijing's intent to establish a "no-go" zone across the Western Pacific directed at foreign militaries, as part of a larger strategy designed to eject the United States from the region and establish China as the new dominant power.¹⁰

Several critics of the zone stressed more narrow and specific issues, including the exceedingly poor timing of the Chinese announcement, Beijing's failure to adequately consult with or even inform other nations well before the action was taken, and the demand that any foreign aircraft entering China's ADIZ file a flight plan with Chinese authorities, even if they have no intention of entering Chinese territorial airspace.¹¹ The latter requirement, along with concerns over Beijing's use of phrases that indicate an intent to "control" aircraft in the ECS ADIZ, has led some observers to claim that China is attempting to use the new zone to establish "jurisdictional control over the near seas."¹² Still other observers asserted that the announcement of the ECS ADIZ and the followup by senior Chinese officials indicated that the action was pressed upon the civilian leadership by the Chinese military or represented a debate or rift between civilian and military authorities in China.¹³

Regardless of the accuracy or inaccuracy of such criticisms and comments, it is clear that China's establishment of an ADIZ in the East China Sea, especially at this point in time, has added significantly to the existing tensions between Beijing and other East Asian nations, most notably Japan, over territorial and other issues, thus complicating efforts to stabilize foreign and security relations among these powers. However, as with other foreign (and domestic) policy issues, any attempt to assess the meaning and significance of China's action in this case—and to develop an effective response—requires an accurate understanding of Chinese motives, intentions, and overall beliefs and assumptions regarding the ECS ADIZ, including possible differences that might exist among Chinese leaders and between the leadership, informed observers or analysts, and the general public.

This article addresses Chinese thinking on three basic aspects of this issue, presented as three sections below:

Definitions, Motives, Justifications, and Intentions of the ECS ADIZ

Criticisms by Other Nations and Territories

Near-Term Consequences and Significance of the ECS ADIZ

As in several previous issues of the *Monitor*, our examination of Chinese views on these topics will distinguish between three basic types of Chinese sources: authoritative, quasi-authoritative, and non-authoritative.¹⁴ For each area, particular attention is given to: a) the authoritative PRC government viewpoint (if publicly available); b) views toward Japan and the U.S. in particular; and c) any variations that might exist among Chinese commentators (both authoritative and otherwise), in both substance and tone. Our analysis of these sources is primarily based on a qualitative assessment of individual items appearing in a wide range of Chinese official and unofficial media. However, to provide a more quantitative assessment of Chinese media coverage on the ADIZ, various keyword searches were conducted in the *People's Daily (PD)* and *Liberation Army Daily (LAD)* newspapers, the official media outlets for the PRC government and military, respectively, over a roughly one-year period from January 2013 to January 2014.¹⁵ The results of that analysis are presented at the end of the third section on Chinese views of the consequences and significance of the ECS ADIZ.

In examining Chinese views, this article addresses several specific questions: What was Beijing's apparent intention in announcing an ECS ADIZ in November 2013? To what extent and in what manner is China's ADIZ related to its policies toward Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States? Do apparent differences exist among authoritative Chinese sources, or between authoritative and non-authoritative sources (and in particular civilian and military sources), regarding the purpose, impact, and overall value of the ECS ADIZ to China? How do Chinese sources respond to foreign criticisms of China's ADIZ?

The article concludes with a summary and assessment of China's action and its implications for East Asian relations and the security environment in the region.

Definitions, Motives, Justifications, and Intentions of the ECS ADIZ

Various authoritative civilian and military Chinese sources have provided definitions of China's ECS ADIZ and attempted to explain or clarify what the ADIZ is intended to accomplish and how it will be implemented.

The original November 23, 2013, announcement establishing China's ECS ADIZ came in the form of a rarely used Government Statement of the People's Republic of China, issued by the Ministry of National Defense (MND). Such statements are exclusively reserved for major actions of the PRC government and are approved by the most senior levels of the Chinese leadership. In this case, the issuance of such a statement by the Defense Ministry also indicates that coordination and approval by both the civilian and military arms of the government almost certainly occurred.¹⁶ That said, according to knowledgeable Chinese sources with whom the author has spoken, it is nonetheless possible that military authorities did not thoroughly consult with officials in the diplomatic and foreign policy apparatus before issuing the statement.

A second announcement, also issued by the MND on the same day, presented the rules for China's ECS ADIZ. These included, most notably, the need for aircraft flying within the zone, regardless of destination, to "report the flight plans to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China or the Civil Aviation Administration of China." Aircraft flying in the zone were also required to "follow the instructions of the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ." In the event that aircraft "do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions" the rules state that "China's armed forces will adopt [undefined] defensive emergency measures." Finally, the MND was identified as the administrative organ of the ECS ADIZ and responsible for the explanation of the rules.¹⁷

In line with its stated responsibility, the MND spokesperson provided a further explanation of the purpose and operation of the ECS ADIZ on November 23. Following the above generic definition, he stated that an ADIZ

is an area of air space established by a coastal state beyond its territorial airspace to timely identify, monitor, control and react to aircraft entering this zone with potential air threats. It allows early-warning time and provides air security.¹⁸

Hence, the PRC established the ADIZ

with the aim of safeguarding state sovereignty, territorial land and air security, and maintaining flight order. This is a necessary measure taken by China in exercising its self-defense right.¹⁹

Finally, the spokesperson added that the ECS ADIZ "is not directed against any specific country or target. It does not affect the freedom of over-flight in the related airspace."²⁰

A similar description of the nature and purpose of an ADIZ was also provided on November 26 by two senior officials of the MND's International Communication Bureau.²¹

A more assertive depiction of China's implementation of the regulations governing the ECS ADIZ was apparently suggested by a statement made by a spokesperson for the Chinese air force on November 23. He stated that, while the pattern of Chinese patrolling of the ADIZ is "in line with international common practices," "the Chinese armed forces are capable of *effective control* [author's emphasis] over the zone and will take measures to deal with air threats to protect the security of the country's airspace."²²

This general description of China's ADIZ is similar to conventional definitions provided by the United States and other countries, as indicated above. However, the requirement for aircraft to file flight plans with Chinese authorities even when they do not intend to enter Chinese airspace is at odds with the approach followed by the United States. According to the authoritative U.S. Navy publication *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*,

The United States does not recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does the United States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter U.S. airspace. Accordingly, U.S. military aircraft not intending to enter national airspace should not identify themselves or otherwise comply with ADIZ procedures established by other nations, unless the United States has specifically agreed to do so.²³

That said, China's filing requirement is not unique among nations or territories with ADIZs. For example, the published rules for ADIZs of Australia, the Philippines, Myanmar, and Taiwan require the filing of flight plans for foreign aircraft operating in their ADIZs without any reference to the destination of the aircraft.²⁴

Thus, in response to questions regarding this Chinese requirement, Defense Ministry spokesperson Geng Yansheng correctly stated:

There is no unified international rule as to how to ask other countries to report flight plans to the ADIZ demarcators. Many countries require aircraft flying over their air defense identification zones to report flight plans beforehand. China is not special in doing so.²⁵

In fact, even Japan apparently requires that Taiwan aircraft entering its ADIZ file a flight plan regardless of destination, according to ROC authorities.²⁶

Of course, no nation is legally obligated to comply with another country's ADIZ requirements, regardless of their content, since ADIZs are located in international airspace and have no explicit basis in international law, as noted above. Nonetheless, states tend to recognize them because doing so can enhance security and safety by providing clear rules and areas for the operation and possible interception of aircraft near territorial airspace.²⁷

In addition to the above authoritative sources, a variety of non-authoritative Chinese sources, both before and just after the November 23 announcement, have also provided similar definitions of an ADIZ, as well as the purpose and function of China's ECS ADIZ in particular.²⁸

Some variant of the following statement is often made:

China's creation of an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea is in keeping with the United Nations Charter and other international laws and international conventions. It is completely based on the objectives of protecting the security of national sovereignty and self-defense. It will not pose a threat to other countries, nor will it affect the normal navigation or flyover freedom of international airspace. It is fully based in the law.²⁹

In response to an initial spate of criticisms and questions regarding the ECS ADIZ, authoritative Chinese sources have sought to provide further clarifications on the nature and function of the ADIZ, emphasizing the conventional and nonthreatening nature of the Chinese zone. On December 3, 2013, a MND spokesperson made a public statement on the issue, asserting that an ADIZ is

essentially different from territorial airspace or no-fly zones. It is not a country's territorial airspace, but an international airspace demarcated outside the territorial airspace for the purpose of identification and early warning; it is not a no-fly zone, and will not affect the freedom of overflight, based on international laws, of other countries' aircraft. According to international practice, a country can identify and verify aircraft entering its ADIZ. China's ADIZ was established to set aside enough time for early warning to defend the country's airspace, with defense acting as the key point. The zone does not aim at any specific country or target, nor does it constitute a threat to any country or region.³⁰

In addition, partly in response to questions regarding the capacity of the Chinese air force to implement the ECS ADIZ, authoritative Chinese sources provided a more detailed definition of the concept of "effective control" mentioned above, stating that it means the normal monitoring of aircraft operating in the ECS ADIZ "through reported flight plans and radar response and identification, among other means. Military planes can also take flight if necessary to identify entering targets."³¹

Several quasi- and non-authoritative sources, civilian as well as military, have also sought to clarify the nature and function of the ECS ADIZ, again often in response to outside criticisms. In every case, the points made by and large repeated those being made by authoritative sources, and reaffirmed, in greater detail, the supposedly nonthreatening and positive aspects of the zone as a means of strengthening security in the area.³²

Beyond merely describing the features and purpose of the ECS ADIZ, Chinese authoritative and non-authoritative sources have explicitly or indirectly provided several justifications for its establishment, as well as for the timing of the move. As suggested above, authoritative sources cite the right of self-defense and the protection of national security under international law. As both Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry spokespersons have stated, China's establishment of the zone is aimed at safeguarding state sovereignty and the security of territory and territorial airspace and maintaining flight order. Other authoritative sources have repeated this formulation, with slight variation, on several occasions.³³

More specifically, according to these sources, the zone provides a clearer basis and set of procedures for providing early warning and identification of aircraft traveling near China's territorial airspace, especially those that appear to be moving toward that airspace.³⁴ For these reasons, according to authoritative (and non-authoritative Chinese sources, as will be discussed below), the ECS ADIZ will purportedly increase stability and reduce tensions in the region.³⁵

Quasi-authoritative sources such as Zhong Sheng largely echo the authoritative position on these points, stressing that the ECS ADIZ will improve flight order and national security, and strengthen overall stability and transparency in the area, especially given its clear compliance with the “inherent right of self-defense” of nations under international law.³⁶ Similar articles under homophone pen names appearing in the *Liberation Army Daily* shortly after November 23 provide even more extensive and detailed justifications for China’s ECS ADIZ, especially with regard to international law and the practices of other nations.³⁷ Several non-authoritative sources repeat these justifications for the ECS ADIZ.³⁸

Thus, Chinese sources across the spectrum, from authoritative to non-authoritative, have all stressed the notion that the ECS ADIZ will significantly help to maintain stability and enhance safety in the Western Pacific, by supposedly providing greater clarity regarding procedures for identifying aircraft operating along China’s maritime periphery, while establishing a better foundation for defending China against potential threats from the air. These functions will allegedly “reduce the probability of miscalculations and accidental injury and provide a buffer for preventing the sudden occurrence of unexpected incidents.”³⁹

Alongside such positive assessments of the impact and significance of the ECS ADIZ, non-authoritative Chinese sources also assert in various ways that the new zone will strengthen China’s ability to counter the provocative behavior of other nations, most notably (either explicitly or implicitly) Japan. According to some of these sources, China will no longer be in a “passive” or defensive position vis-à-vis Japanese air deployments within China’s ECS ADIZ.⁴⁰

Authoritative sources by and large avoid making this argument, seeking instead to stress the peaceful and stabilizing aspects of the ECS ADIZ, while declaring that the zone “is not directed at any particular country or target,” as noted above.⁴¹ That said, many of them address Japan’s alleged provocations in the air. Indeed, a variety of Chinese sources either state explicitly or imply strongly that the ECS ADIZ was established in part to establish parity with Japan regarding the treatment of airspace in that region, as well as to counter Japan’s allegedly illegal and unjust pattern of implementation of its ADIZ and its allegedly provocative behavior toward China. Although authoritative Chinese sources do not explicitly acknowledge such a purpose, some certainly suggest that the creation of the ECS ADIZ was related to Japanese policies and behavior.⁴²

When responding to questions regarding the ECS ADIZ, government spokespersons often make reference to Japan’s ADIZ or its provocations over the S/D islands.⁴³ Also, China’s minister of defense, Chang Wanquan, seemed to make such a linkage in remarks made during a visit to Indonesia in mid-December 2013.⁴⁴

However, the most detailed and explicit linkage of the ECS ADIZ with Japan occurs in non-authoritative Chinese sources. Both before and after the establishment of China’s ADIZ, Chinese civilian and military observers have criticized the geographical size of Japan’s ADIZ in the East China Sea, and the manner in which Tokyo was enforcing it.⁴⁵

Notably, such sources allege that Tokyo uses (and has expanded) its ADIZ in the East China Sea to monitor and intercept Chinese aircraft flying near the S/D islands. Chinese non-authoritative observers allege that this activity is part of a general Japanese effort to transform its ADIZ into territorial airspace, by regularly interrupting normal, non-threatening Chinese overflights occurring in the East China Sea. Since an ADIZ is not sovereign airspace, they argue, Japan is acting illegally and unjustly. Such observers contrast this behavior with China's own policy and approach to its ECS ADIZ, thus implying that that ADIZ was established partly as a counter-example and rebuff to Japan's behavior.⁴⁶

The veracity of the Chinese argument depends entirely on where and how Japan has intercepted Chinese aircraft. Obviously, if such encounters occurred exclusively within or near the 12-nm limit of the S/D islands, Tokyo would either be acting within what it views as its territorial airspace, or seeking to intercept "abnormal" flights of Chinese aircraft that appeared to be heading toward the islands without identifying themselves. If, however, such intercepts occur well outside of that area against PRC aircraft apparently not intending to enter Japanese territorial airspace, and consist of anything more than efforts to identify the Chinese aircraft, then the Chinese argument would hold some water.

Unfortunately, neither Chinese nor Japanese sources provide enough detailed information to make such a clarification. Although a Chinese aircraft has reportedly intruded into Japanese territorial airspace over the S/D islands only once, in December 2012,⁴⁷ Tokyo has released statements describing many specific incidents in which its fighter jets were scrambled against PRC aircraft perceived to be heading toward the islands.⁴⁸ Also, the Jeppesen *Airway Manual* (cited in endnote 24) and the 2013 Japan defense white paper indicate that interdiction efforts focus on unidentified foreign aircraft that threaten to enter Japanese territorial airspace, while Japan's guidelines on flights within the ADIZ published by the Self-Defense Forces in 1969 seem to suggest that any aircraft entering Japan's ADIZ should file a flight plan.⁴⁹ At the same time, the overall number of Japanese scrambles has been increasing in recent months and many of these could be directed at Chinese aircraft that are not clearly headed for Japanese airspace over the S/D islands or other Japanese territorial airspace.⁵⁰ And apparently Tokyo does require flight plans for Taiwan aircraft that are only traversing Japan's ADIZ, as noted above.

In addition, in some cases, non-authoritative Chinese sources seem to conflate Japanese statements regarding possible future aggressive actions that might be taken against Chinese aircraft or drones that have entered the territorial airspace of the S/D islands with Japan's response to intrusions into its ADIZ.⁵¹

Hence it appears that at least some Chinese statements about Japan's future enforcement of its ADIZ are incorrect, while the Chinese accusation that Tokyo is attempting to transform its ADIZ into territorial airspace cannot be determined based on publicly available information, despite the requirement placed on Taiwan aircraft. It is also worth noting that, ironically, some of the above-cited non-authoritative, pre-November 23, 2013, Chinese criticisms of Japan's ADIZ apply equally to China's ECS ADIZ today.⁵²

Another Japan-related purpose for the establishment of the ECS ADIZ suggested by non-authoritative Chinese sources is to compel Japan to recognize China's challenge to Japan's assertion of sovereignty over the S/D islands, by setting China on an equal footing with Japan and requiring bilateral negotiations to coordinate and deconflict the overlapping part of the two ADIZs that encompasses the islands.⁵³

More broadly, some non-authoritative Chinese sources have also asserted that the formation of the ECS ADIZ has a strategic purpose: to counter U.S. and Japanese efforts to "use Japan's ADIZ to blockade China at the first island chain." According to these sources, by establishing its own ADIZ, China can break this blockade. Exactly how this would be achieved, however, is left largely unexplained.⁵⁴

Many Chinese sources have reiterated that the ECS ADIZ, as with any ADIZ, does not cover territorial airspace and hence cannot be used to disrupt the "normal" "freedom of overflight," thus indicating that Beijing will not interfere with such flights that enter its zone.⁵⁵ This of course raises the question: What overflights are considered "normal" and "abnormal," and how will Beijing respond to the latter? As noted above, the authoritative announcement of the establishment of the ECS ADIZ vaguely states:

China's armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions.⁵⁶

This implies that abnormal overflight includes aircraft that do not identify themselves or will not obey Chinese instructions. The latter presumably includes instructions given by Chinese authorities regarding, for instance, changes in the flight direction of the intruding aircraft.

Beyond this basic interpretation, both authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese sources also clearly indicate that a specific category of aircraft will be viewed as hostile to China (and hence engaged in abnormal activity) by virtue of their apparent function: foreign surveillance and reconnaissance (S&R) aircraft. Thus, such aircraft will not enjoy unhindered freedom of overflight within the ECS ADIZ. Although the authoritative PRC government statements of November 23 establishing the ECS ADIZ do not mention this category of flights, a November 26, 2013 article by the deputy director and administrative secretary of MND's International Communications Bureau states: "Freedom of flight in accordance with international laws is not affected, therefore the zone will not affect any normal flight. However, this will not apply to provocative flyover and surveillance activities."⁵⁷

Other non-authoritative sources are even more explicit regarding the unacceptable nature of S&R flights across China's ECS ADIZ. For example, one article states:

"freedoms of navigation and overflight" in the EEZ does not include the freedom to conduct military and reconnaissance activities in the EEZ *and its superjacent airspace* [author's italics]. Such activities encroach or

infringe on the national security interests of the coastal State, and can be considered a use of force or a threat to use force...inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.⁵⁸

Moreover, the counter-S&R purpose of a Chinese ADIZ was clearly stated by non-authoritative Chinese sources well before the establishment of the ECS ADIZ. In 2008, for example, an article advocating the establishment of a Chinese ADIZ appearing in a military journal included this passage:

After we have set up our national air defense identification zones . . . our functional planes may monitor the foreign military and civilian aircraft that intrude into our national air defense identification zones, and, when necessary, force them to leave or even drive them away so as to limit their scope of spying, weaken their capability of spying on us, and prevent the recurrence of “misfiring” incidents.⁵⁹

In addition, several quasi- and non-authoritative articles on the ECS ADIZ state that such S&R overflights are primarily conducted by the United States and Japan, thus clearly indicating that the zone is intended in part to provide a clearer and stronger basis for challenging the activities of those two powers in particular.⁶⁰

Of course, prior to the establishment of the ECS ADIZ, Beijing was already challenging such S&R overflights along China’s maritime periphery, as illustrated by the EP-3 incident of 2001.⁶¹ However, the close connection established in many Chinese articles between the ECS ADIZ as a widely recognized international mechanism for ensuring national security and the supposedly hostile threats such as S&R activities conducted by Tokyo and Washington suggests that the ADIZ is probably perceived by many Chinese as a means of strengthening international support for such challenges. Some non-authoritative sources seem to imply this.⁶²

The notion that the ECS ADIZ was partly established to counter U.S. and Japanese S&R activities along China’s maritime periphery as well as to establish parity with Japan and place further pressure on Tokyo regarding the S/D islands dispute, noted above, clearly suggests that the oft-repeated statement by both authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese sources that the ECS ADIZ is “not directed against any particular country or target” is disingenuous at best.⁶³

With regard to the timing of the formation of the ECS ADIZ, authoritative Chinese sources in the form of ministry statements have provided only vague answers, connecting it to the need “of maintaining national sovereignty and security of territory and territorial airspace.”⁶⁴ However, a few authoritative and non-authoritative sources have provided a more direct response, indicating that the ECS ADIZ was established partly in response to changes in foreign and Chinese aircraft capabilities and early warning technologies.⁶⁵ At least one non-authoritative source has suggested that the new ADIZ was part of China’s new “active diplomacy” that will “take the initiative in tactics” and “dominat[e] the

issues in order to guide our strategic influence,” as reflected in Xi Jinping’s call for “bracing up and pressing ahead” during last year’s Peripheral Work Conference.⁶⁶ However, no Chinese source has explicitly explained why the ECS ADIZ was established in late 2013, as opposed to many years earlier, when proposals for an ADIZ were first made, apparently by Chinese air force personnel.⁶⁷

Reactions to Criticisms by Other Nations and Territories

As noted above, Beijing’s establishment of the ECS ADIZ has generated considerable criticism by outside observers. This criticism has run the gamut from sharp rejection of the validity of the zone and calls for its immediate revocation (by Japan), to assertions that the action is unacceptable, destabilizing, and will increase tensions in the region (by the United States), alongside expressions of general concern by a variety of other countries.

Tokyo’s criticism of and demand to revoke the ECS ADIZ centers on the charge that the zone: a) unduly infringes on the freedom of flight within international airspace (due to the Chinese requirement for all foreign aircraft in the zone to file flight plans with Chinese authorities regardless of destination); and b) includes Japanese territorial airspace over the S/D islands. It argues that China’s ADIZ is thus invalid, conflicts with international norms, and amounts to an attempt to “unilaterally alter the status quo by coercive measures,” and will therefore worsen tensions, threaten civil aviation, and increase the chance of dangerous incidents.⁶⁸

Authoritative Japanese sources also criticized China for not consulting beforehand with neighboring countries and stated that Japan “[has] no intention to change a conventional countermeasure of scrambling [the Air Self-Defense Force’s] fighter jets if Chinese aircraft enter Japan’s ADIZ.”⁶⁹ Prime Minister Shinzo Abe criticized China’s “unilateral” action and vowed to safeguard Japan’s territory, saying, “We will take steps against an attempt to change the status quo by use of force as we are determined to defend the country’s sea and airspace.”⁷⁰ The Japanese government further announced that it would not respect the ECS ADIZ and was ordering its civilian airlines not to file flight plans for those aircraft entering the zone that are not entering Chinese airspace.⁷¹ Tokyo also held air and naval training exercises in conjunction with Seoul in the area of its ADIZ that overlaps with China’s ECS ADIZ.⁷²

The U.S. criticism of China’s ECS ADIZ is similar to Japan’s in many respects, but differs in other ways. As with Tokyo, Washington charges that the zone amounts to a unilateral effort to alter the status quo in the East China Sea by interfering with the freedom of overflight in international airspace and therefore increases tensions and creates risks of an incident. U.S. officials have also stated that they will not recognize the ADIZ,⁷³ while characterizing China’s ADIZ announcement as being “unnecessarily inflammatory.”⁷⁴

In fact, the U.S. government has stated that they “do not accept the legitimacy of China’s requirements for operations in the newly declared ADIZ.” In particular, as with Japan, it rejects China’s requirement that aircraft within the ECS ADIZ file flight plans with

Chinese authorities regardless of their destination, and wants China to rescind those specific procedures.⁷⁵

To show its refusal to recognize China's new ADIZ requirements, the United States deployed two unarmed B-52 bombers over the S/D islands shortly after the Chinese announcement of the ADIZ, without filing flight plans with the Chinese authorities. Although U.S. authorities stated that the flight was part of a previously scheduled training mission and generated "no reaction" from the Chinese side, according to U.S. officials, the flights were intended "to send a clear message to Beijing that Washington would not permit China to restrict freedom of movement in international airspace or waterways."⁷⁶

In contrast to the Japanese, however, Washington has not demanded the revocation of the ECS ADIZ per se (urging instead that Beijing not implement the zone), and has not demanded that U.S. airlines transiting the ADIZ refuse to file flight plans with Chinese authorities. As indicated in endnote 7, U.S. authorities have stated that U.S. commercial airlines should operate consistent with any Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) issued by foreign countries. This is apparently an attempt to have U.S. airlines file flight plans with the Chinese authorities based on procedures other than those connected with the ECS ADIZ.⁷⁷ In addition, senior U.S. military officers have acknowledged that the declaration of the ECS ADIZ itself was not destabilizing, since many countries have such zones.⁷⁸

Finally, unlike Japan, U.S. officials have at times employed language that attempts to strike a somewhat balanced approach between China and Japan in handling the issue. For example, Vice President Joe Biden stated that the tension over the ECS ADIZ "underscores the need for crisis management mechanisms and effective channels of communication between China and Japan to reduce the risk of escalation."⁷⁹ Another U.S. official stated that there should be "in this case, plenty of overlapping common ground to reach a situation—or reach a resolution that doesn't involve inflammatory, escalating rhetoric or policy pronouncements by *any* side."⁸⁰ [Author's italics]

The South Korean government has similarly declared that it does not recognize China's ECS ADIZ. Echoing Japan, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport initially asserted that civilian aircraft flying in the zone should not submit flight plans to China.⁸¹ South Korea also conducted air and sea exercises within the ECS ADIZ near Ieodo, the submerged rocks contested by Beijing and Seoul, and has flown military aircraft across the ECS ADIZ without filing flight plans with Chinese authorities.⁸² In early December, Seoul announced that it was expanding its ADIZ nearly 200 miles to the south, to include Ieodo.⁸³ At the same time, South Korea has also called for a trilateral meeting with China and Japan to discuss how to handle the overlapping areas of their three ADIZs, and in the same month reversed its earlier policy and announced that it will allow civilian aircraft to file flight plans with the Chinese when flying in the ECS ADIZ.⁸⁴

Taiwan authorities also expressed their concern over the possible negative impact of China's ADIZ and declared a desire to work closely with Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to address the issue. However, Taipei's criticism of Beijing has been significantly milder than that of Japan, the United States, and even South Korea. While saying that China's

announcement “has not been helpful to cross-strait relations,” President Ma Ying-jeou stated that the ECS ADIZ “does not concern the issue of territorial airspace, nor territorial sovereignty” of Taiwan. Moreover, in contrast to Japan, Taiwan’s airlines are complying with China’s regulations.⁸⁵

China has made a variety of responses to these criticisms, expressions of concern, and foreign activities occurring within its ECS ADIZ. Authoritative Chinese responses have been fairly consistent and relatively restrained, compared with non-authoritative commentary. In response to press questions regarding China’s response to foreign (and especially U.S. and Japanese) comments, authoritative Chinese sources—both civilian and military—have generally repeated the above justification of the ECS ADIZ as being: a) in line with international practices; b) oriented toward safeguarding national sovereignty and security; c) not directed against any specific target or country; and d) not affecting freedom of overflight in the related airspace.⁸⁶

However, Chinese authorities have also often raised the issue of the S/D islands in this context, accusing Tokyo of creating the current tensions through its “erroneous actions” and cautioning the U.S. to “keep its words of not taking sides on the issue...and stop making improper comments.”⁸⁷

More notably, the Foreign Ministry has also expressed the hope that:

relevant countries could stop unreasonable pestering or hyping, respect international law and facts and stop all the actions that undermine China’s national sovereignty, interests and rights so as to create conditions for the proper settlement of the relevant issues through dialogue and negotiation.⁸⁸

Responding to U.S. statements on the ECS ADIZ, the Chinese assistant foreign minister Zheng Zeguang met with U.S. ambassador Gary Locke on November 24th to call on the U.S. side “to immediately correct its mistake and stop making irresponsible accusations against China.”⁸⁹ This commonly made comment presumably refers to the U.S. charge that China’s establishment of the ECS ADIZ amounts to a destabilizing, unilateral change in the status quo. At the same time, after reports that Washington suggested that U.S. civil airlines submit flight plans to China while Japan has asked Japanese airlines not to do so, authoritative Chinese sources have expressed appreciation of such U.S. actions, while criticizing Tokyo for “deliberately politicizing” the issue.⁹⁰

In response to Japanese criticisms, on November 25th, Assistant Foreign Minister Zheng lodged a protest with Tokyo’s ambassador to China, Masato Kitera, “on the Japanese side’s unreasonable accusation of China’s setting up the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.” Zheng also stated that:

Japan has no right to make irresponsible remarks and to make deliberate attacks on the Chinese side’s legitimate move that is in line with international practice. The Chinese side urges the Japanese side to immediately rectify its mistake, stop making gratuitous accusations

against the Chinese side, and cease making remarks and doing things that lead to creating frictions and damaging regional stability, so as to avoid further damaging Sino-Japanese relations. With justice on the Chinese side, China's Foreign Ministry, National Defense Ministry and the Chinese Embassy in Japan have refuted Japan's unjustifiable representations and called on Japan to immediately correct its mistakes.⁹¹

On November 28th, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson added, in response to a query about Japan's response to the ECS ADIZ (and somewhat disingenuously), that "[t]here is no need for the relevant country to make a fuss over it, get into a panic or assume that it has been targeted."⁹² More recently, Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a similar comment:

The Chinese have a saying: The prefect should not allow himself to commit arson while depriving the people of the right to light their lamps, because all should be equal. China established the ADIZ only recently; and therefore, it is unfair for some countries to criticize and even censure us because they had established the ADIZ even earlier. . . . it is entirely unnecessary for Japan to be so fretful and disturbed and even to toss groundless accusations against China from time to time.⁹³

With regard to reports of a Chinese offer to Tokyo to establish a crisis-management mechanism to avoid incidents associated with their ADIZs, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson remarked, "China is of the view that the two sides should enhance communication and jointly maintain flight security." A Defense Ministry spokesperson also voiced the same position.⁹⁴ Another spokesperson added:

To maintain the flight security in the overlapping ADIZ area of China and Japan, China calls for strengthened dialogue and communication, which fully demonstrates China's goodwill. Japan keeps saying that its door for dialogue is always open but shuts it down when it truly comes to dialogue. This has once again revealed the hypocrisy of the Japanese side who is making empty calls for dialogue. We urge the Japanese side to stop playing on this issue, creating frictions and undermining regional stability, and to make concrete efforts for regional peace and stability.⁹⁵

While Tokyo has indicated a willingness to establish a mechanism for Chinese and Japanese militaries as well as defense ministries to communicate with one another,⁹⁶ it has been unreceptive to holding talks or consultations regarding China's ADIZ, largely because it refuses to recognize the validity of the Chinese zone in covering the S/D islands.⁹⁷ Similar to its stance on discussing the S/D islands issue, it believes that doing so will confirm that there is a dispute over the islands (which Tokyo denies), and that China is in some way exercising administrative authority or has a legitimate claim over the islands that must be negotiated between the two sides.⁹⁸

In response to queries regarding apparent Japanese efforts to get other countries to echo its stance on China's ECS ADIZ, a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated, rather caustically:

Japan should tell other countries whether it has its own ADIZ or not, whether it consulted with other countries before establishing and enlarging time and again its ADIZ or not and how large its ADIZ is. It is totally unjustifiable and with ulterior motives when one, while not allowing others to exercise their legitimate rights, acts on its own will and carries out inflammatory activities hither and thither. . . . I want to point out that China, which has suffered greatly from external aggression since modern times, has made enormous sacrifice and remarkable contributions to the victory of the world anti-Fascist war.⁹⁹

The last comment in this quote apparently seeks to connect criticism of Japan's comments on the ECS ADIZ to the fight against Japanese fascism during World War II. As indicated in *CLM* 41, Chinese efforts to link current Japanese government behavior with imperial Japanese policies during that conflict are fairly common in both authoritative and non-authoritative sources and, in the author's view, reprehensible.¹⁰⁰

Perhaps the strongest authoritative Chinese response by civilian sources to Japanese criticisms thus far occurred on December 15th, in reply to a press question regarding Abe's repetition at the Japan-ASEAN Special Summit of the above-outlined Japanese stance regarding China's ECS ADIZ. The Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated:

The Japanese leader took advantage of the international occasion to slander China. We are strongly dissatisfied with that. The Diaoyu Islands are integral parts of China's territory. Japan's theft and occupation of the Diaoyu Islands has been illegal and invalid since the very beginning. It is Japan who has been deliberately making an issue of the Diaoyu Islands since last year. No one other than Japan is unilaterally changing the status quo of the Diaoyu Islands. It is fully justified and beyond reproach for China to do what is necessary in accordance with law to safeguard national territorial sovereignty. . . . Japan intentionally targets China on this issue [i.e., the ECS ADIZ], with a view to stealthily implanting a false idea, practicing double-standard and misleading world opinion. Japan's attempt is doomed to failure.¹⁰¹

On the military side, possibly the strongest response to Japan's criticisms of the ECS ADIZ occurred on December 3rd, when a Defense Ministry spokesperson asserted that Japan:

established an ADIZ as early as 1969 and later expanded its scope many times to only 130 km toward our coastline from its west end, which covers most of the airspace of the East China Sea, so they are not qualified at all to make irresponsible remarks on China's lawful and rational act. Since

September 2012, Japan has been making trouble over territorial disputes, staging a farce by announcing that it would “purchase” the Diaoyu Islands, frequently sending vessels and planes to disturb Chinese ships and planes in normal exercises or training, openly making provocative remarks such as shooting down Chinese drones, playing up the so-called China threat, escalating regional tension, creating excuses for revising its current constitution and expanding its military, trying to deny the result of the World War II, and refusing to implement the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. Japan’s actions have seriously harmed China’s legitimate rights and security interests, and undermined the peace and stability in East Asia. China has to take necessary reactions.¹⁰²

Authoritative Chinese sources generally employ more accommodating and friendly language when addressing South Korean and Taiwan criticisms or expressions of concern. For example, with regard to the overlapping ADIZs with South Korea, such sources have stated the desire to resolve any issues through “friendly consultations and negotiations.”¹⁰³ Even after Seoul announced in early December that it would expand its ADIZ to include the Ieodo submerged reef also claimed by China, authoritative sources merely expressed regret over the decision, adding that China does not have a sovereignty dispute with Seoul over the reef, because it is not territory.¹⁰⁴

Moreover, in speaking favorably of Seoul, some non-authoritative Chinese sources apparently suggest that Seoul and Beijing should increase bilateral dialogue and coordination over issues such as ADIZs presumably in order to counter Japan’s allegedly provocative behavior.¹⁰⁵ This is not surprising, of course, given Seoul’s strong criticism of Japan, and the Abe government in particular, regarding historical issues associated with WWII.¹⁰⁶

In response to Taiwan, authoritative Chinese sources have merely stated that the ECS ADIZ “is in line with the interests of both sides of [the] Taiwan Strait” adding that “The comrades on both sides of the strait are a family, and safeguarding the overall interests of the Chinese nation is in the common interests of comrades across the strait.”¹⁰⁷

In responding to foreign criticism and concerns, quasi-authoritative sources such as Zhong Sheng, along with sources such as Jun Baoyan that apparently represent important constituencies, have in general terms criticized the overreaction as well as alleged hypocrisy and double standards employed by “some individual countries” (read, Japan and the United States) in accusing China of attempting to unilaterally change the status quo and increase tensions.¹⁰⁸

Zhong Sheng characterizes such criticism as “groundless conjectures that [lack] basis in fact” and “malicious slander” caused by concerns over China’s rapid rise “and ever growing comprehensive national strength.”¹⁰⁹

When charging Tokyo and Washington with hypocrisy, these sources repeatedly refer to the initiation of ADIZs by the U.S. and Japan without prior consultation or international endorsement. For example, Jun Baoyan states:

As a country of independent sovereignty, China's establishment of the air defense identification zone in line with international practice as well as related legal regulations does not need to be "approved" by any other country. . . . It is hard to understand why some countries were not "concerned" about Japan's extending of its identification zone to the doorway of China decades ago while they become so "concerned" about China's mapping of its own air defense identification zone.¹¹⁰

This same source also singles out Japan as supposedly the only country on China's periphery that has reacted severely to the establishment of the ECS ADIZ. In another article, it states:

The international community, which includes the vast majority of countries on China's periphery, has been able to deal with this issue quietly. Only Japan, regardless of the fact that it demarcated its own air defense identification zone half a century ago, is showing off its pitiable "bullied" face and carrying out slanderous attacks on us, censuring China's "unilateral" designation of an air defense identification zone as an "extremely dangerous action."¹¹¹

While often repeating the official and quasi-authoritative stance in reaction to outside criticism of the ECS ADIZ, non-authoritative Chinese sources have at times adopted more strident and hostile language in condemning the responses of Washington, Tokyo, and other countries. Many observers were especially critical of Japan. However, others have also sought to contrast Washington's allegedly more moderate response to the zone with Japan's response, apparently for both political and strategic reasons.

One source alleges that Western criticisms of China's unilateral establishment of an ADIZ are "arrogant, groundless, and show double standards," and asserts that "if some countries brazenly send fighters to enter into China's territory above the Diaoyu Islands, Chinese combat aircraft will surely intercept, disperse and even shoot them down."¹¹² Another observer characterizes supposedly hypocritical U.S. and Japanese criticisms as "the logic of hegemony." The same source—alongside other sources—suggests that in fact the U.S. and Japan have increased tensions following the establishment of the ECS ADIZ by sending a succession of warplanes into the zone, an obvious reference to the B-52 overflight noted above, as well as other similar military flights by Japan.¹¹³

Yet another observer characterizes Tokyo as "hypocritical and impudent in its complaint with Beijing." At the same time, while describing the U.S. reaction as "vague" and Japan's reaction as "harsh," the author also expresses the hope that "the Abe administration will remain rational and restrained in action" and suggests that the two sides "establish an effective crisis management mechanism."¹¹⁴

Another source accuses the United States, Japan, and Australia of “playing their petty calculations,” “confusing the public,” and pouring “dirty water” on China, which is characterized as a wrongly accused victim. The author also directly blames the U.S. for backing Japan as its “pawn” and footing the bill to encourage this “little brother” to wantonly stir up trouble. Tokyo is also characterized as a “thief” who stole something and refuses to return it, and is shielded by the U.S. The article concludes that if countries “insist not to listen” they will “end up eating their own bitter fruit.”¹¹⁵

Unsurprisingly, among non-authoritative sources, the most caustic and hostile comments, and the most dire assessments for future relations, are generally reserved for Japan. For example, in singling out Tokyo, a *Global Times* editorial of November 29 states: “If the US does not go too far, we will not target it in safeguarding our air defense zone. What we should do at present is to firmly counter provocative actions from Japan.” The editorial endorses “protracted confrontation” against Japan, and defines China’s “ultimate goal” in this effort as being to “beat [Japan’s] willpower and ambition to instigate strategic confrontation against China.”¹¹⁶

One source characterizes Japan’s protest to the ECS ADIZ as a kind of “petty behavior” and adds that Abe’s “arrogant, high-handed” and “malicious” demand for China to undo the ECS ADIZ “falls even more into the category of a ridiculous argument lacking common sense, and was absolutely impossible.”¹¹⁷ Another characterizes Abe’s charge that the ECS ADIZ constitutes a threat to civilian flight as “crazy hyperbole aimed at deflecting blame.”¹¹⁸

In addition, several non-authoritative Chinese sources appear to gloat over Japan’s failure to have China’s ECS ADIZ issue mentioned (much less criticized) in the December ASEAN summit statement, taking this as an indication of Asian nations refusing to support Abe’s alleged effort to build alliances against China.¹¹⁹ Another source also claims—apparently with little sense of irony—that Japan is attempting to use the ADIZ issue to drive a wedge between China and South Korea.¹²⁰

In contrast to such harsh commentary, Victor Gao, director of the China National Association of International Studies, provides a relatively rare moderate assessment of Japan’s behavior and China’s necessary response. Gao states that “both nations need to handle themselves carefully and prudently to avoid any miscalculations or unintended consequences. . . . China and Japan can only resolve this dispute through peaceful negotiations.”¹²¹

Of particular note is the fact that other sources repeat a common refrain found in non-authoritative Chinese writings that the tough U.S. stance in support of Japan “might turn out to become a catalyst for Japan to take further provocative actions against China on the East China Sea, instead of serving as a condition to prompt Beijing to alter its will and determination in establishing the ADIZ.”¹²²

One observer colorfully warns that U.S. support for Japan on the ADIZ issue will “ultimately cost the United States more than it would gain from backing a country that

still honors those whose hands were red with American blood.” He warns that, in order to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control, Washington “should choose to play a constructive role in the region to stop indulging Japan’s recklessness in exchange for a mess of pottage, and to persuade the island nation not to go too far.”¹²³

Similarly, some non-authoritative observers blame Japan in particular for using the ADIZ issue, and other actions directed against China, to foment tension between Beijing and Washington and thereby (in the words of one) “drag America into military containment against China” as well as to justify Tokyo’s current military buildup.¹²⁴ Several non-authoritative Chinese sources also use the occasion of the ADIZ’s establishment (and especially Vice President Biden’s visit to China in early December) to urge Washington to, as put in one article, “stop acquiescing to Tokyo’s dangerous brinkmanship. It must stop emboldening belligerent Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to constantly push the envelope of Japan’s encroachments and provocations.”¹²⁵

Many other sources take a similar but more positive stance toward the U.S., striking a strong contrast between U.S. and Japanese behavior toward the ECS ADIZ while lauding Biden’s visit to Beijing and his call for crisis-management mechanisms between Tokyo and Beijing. Several observers pointed to the absence of a joint U.S.-Japan communiqué at the end of Biden’s visit to Tokyo, along with the absence of a U.S. demand for Beijing to repeal the ECS ADIZ, as indicative of Washington’s desire to not let the ADIZ issue, and Japan’s stance toward it, derail Sino-U.S. relations. For example, one observer argues that Washington “is unwilling to be hijacked by the Japanese agenda” and “disagrees with Tokyo in playing up regional tensions by exaggerating the threat of the zone.”¹²⁶

Yang Bojiang, deputy director of the CASS Institute of Japanese Studies, argues that Washington’s more cautious response to the ECS ADIZ will deepen Tokyo’s “misgivings about whether the United States is dependable in critical moments . . . and reinforce Japan’s sense of crisis. Japan is expected to further strengthen its strategic ability for independent action in the future and ‘make use of’ the US-Japan alliance to develop and build up its own military strength.”¹²⁷

For many such observers, this contrast probably indicates a desire to isolate Japan diplomatically. But it also likely reflects the view among some Chinese that Washington and Beijing have a clear and strong strategic commitment to developing a “new type of great power relationship,”¹²⁸ an objective that is allegedly not present in relations with Tokyo.¹²⁹

Much of the non-authoritative commentary on the ADIZ issue occurs in response to the unannounced flights through China’s ECS ADIZ by the U.S. B-52 bombers, as well as subsequent flights by Japanese and South Korean military aircraft. A typical response, occurring in the *Global Times*, asserts that, rather than placing China “into a relatively passive situation,” Beijing’s monitoring and identification of the B-52 overflight (discussed in greater detail below) constituted a “powerful reply that the zone is in operation,” and has “given full play to its role in national defense.”¹³⁰

However, interestingly, this response also argues that, while China's implementation of the ECS ADIZ is proper and effective, Beijing is losing the international "war of public opinion" regarding the zone, given the large amount of adverse criticism that has emerged. The author suggests that such criticism "will probably even undermine the image of our military forces in this transient Internet age." He argues that Chinese authorities must therefore "make speedy reactions to various emergencies and challenges and delegate such power to relevant departments and officials, who should meanwhile assume more responsibility to cope with sensitive issues."¹³¹

Several non-authoritative military sources responded to the B-52 and other foreign military overflights by stressing China's ability to monitor and patrol the ECS ADIZ. This was perhaps partly done in response to criticism that Beijing had not intercepted the B-52s because it lacked the capability to detect and rapidly respond to them.¹³²

Finally, non-authoritative Chinese sources provide relatively few comments on the reactions of South Korea, Taiwan, and other powers to China's ECS ADIZ. By and large, these reactions are similar to those occurring in authoritative or quasi-authoritative sources, that is, they are relatively mild, and decidedly nonconfrontational. For example, one observer states merely that "South Korea's recent announcement of an expansion of its ADIZ is regrettable" and recommends that Seoul and Beijing "work together . . . to foster a security environment in East Asia that is conducive to common development and prosperity."¹³³ Another editorial asserts that "Seoul understands it is not the target of China's ADIZ, plus it has tensions with Japan right now, therefore, China has no need to change its actions toward South Korea."¹³⁴ Nonetheless, some comments do contain cautions.¹³⁵

Near-Term Consequences and Significance of the ECS ADIZ

As many observers have noted, two closely related concerns have emerged as a result of China's establishment of the ECS ADIZ: the general means by which Beijing will enforce the zone, especially with regard to foreign aircraft that do not file flight plans prior to entering it; and the specific potential dangers resulting from overlapping zones and the inclusion within the zone of highly contested airspace. Some observers have also speculated that the creation of the ECS ADIZ presages China's establishment of a similar ADIZ in the South China Sea.

Regarding the first issue, the general vagueness of the ECS ADIZ regulations concerning the specific type of actions China might undertake in response to "abnormal" overflights has prompted outside observers to press Beijing for greater clarity, especially regarding the conditions under which China might employ force.

Authoritative Chinese sources have largely avoided providing a specific response to such queries, indicating repeatedly, as noted above, that "normal" flights by foreign international airlines "will not be affected at all," in the words of one spokesperson.¹³⁶ When asked if China would rule out the use of armed force in response to noncompliant civilian aircraft, the same spokesperson (in a similar manner to many other authoritative

sources) replied “China will make corresponding reactions in accordance with the situation and the level of threat that it may face.”¹³⁷

In response to repeated questions from the press as to whether or not Beijing would respond with force to noncompliance by foreign (e.g., U.S. and Japanese) *military* aircraft entering the zone, authoritative sources in the form of a Foreign Ministry spokesperson have merely stated: “If any problem or situation occurs, China will deal with it correspondingly in accordance with the [November 23] Announcement.”¹³⁸

On one occasion, the same Foreign Ministry spokesperson did suggest, albeit indirectly, that China would not use force against foreign aircraft operating within the ECS ADIZ. He stated: “Some territorial airspace-oriented measures based on sovereign rights can not and will not be applied to the ADIZ.”¹³⁹ Unfortunately, this vague statement was left unexplained.

The Chinese military, which is responsible for implementing the ECS ADIZ, has not been more specific. On the day of the ECS ADIZ announcement, a Defense Ministry spokesperson stated:

In the face of air threats and unidentified flying objects coming from the sea, the Chinese side will identify, monitor, control and react depending on different situations. We hope that all parties concerned work actively with the Chinese side to jointly maintain flight safety.¹⁴⁰

In fact, how China will respond over time to aircraft that enter the ECS ADIZ without filing flight plans was strongly suggested by its initial reaction to aircraft incursions during the months following the announcement of the zone. On December 26, the Defense Ministry’s spokesperson announced that China had “controlled” the flight activity of 800 (!) foreign warplanes that had entered the area between November 23 and December 22. He added that during the same period, 56 airline companies in 23 countries reported 21,475 scheduled flights to China, while China sent 51 rounds of surveillance aircraft, early-warning aircraft, and fighters on a total of 87 flights for policing or patrolling in the ADIZ air space.¹⁴¹ PLA Air Force spokesperson Shen Jinke again declared on January 23 that “routine patrols have beefed up China’s effective control of the ADIZ,” citing a recent patrol in which multiple types of Chinese aircraft were sent to “monitor, identify, track and warn” multiple types of foreign military planes that had entered the ADIZ.¹⁴² On the same day, the PLAAF also announced the debut of its first early-warning aircraft troop unit, claiming to conduct 24-hour continuous flight.¹⁴³

Unfortunately, authoritative Chinese sources have not indicated how many of these foreign aircraft (either military or civilian) failed to file flight plans with the Chinese authorities. In any event, if many of the aircraft did not file flight plans (as was almost certainly the case), it appears from Beijing’s stated response that China’s established “control” of its ADIZ has consisted of a variety of peaceful monitoring and identification activities.

In fact, various non-authoritative Chinese sources have indicated that long-range monitoring and identification (e.g., via radar) of foreign aircraft that do not file flight plans (such as the two U.S. B-52 bombers discussed above)¹⁴⁴ are acceptable and normal responses to such behavior.¹⁴⁵

It is of course possible that such Chinese observers are attempting to make the best of an embarrassing situation, by describing Beijing's failure to more aggressively counter the B-52s (for instance, by not deploying aircraft to monitor or intercept the bombers) as a standard response. In any event, it is extremely unfortunate that authoritative Chinese sources have not been as explicit as some non-authoritative sources in reassuring outside observers that such peaceful methods will constitute Beijing's usual response, even for foreign military aircraft that a) do not appear to be heading for China's territorial airspace; and b) do not file a flight plan or otherwise notify the Chinese authorities of their presence.

A second, arguably more important consequence of the ECS ADIZ mentioned by Chinese sources naturally concerns its possible impact on those countries or territories whose ADIZs overlap with it: South Korea, Taiwan, and especially Japan. The impact on Japan is especially significant, given the apparent purpose of the ADIZ in countering Japanese behavior (despite authoritative Chinese denials of such a purpose) and the fact that the ADIZs of both countries encompass geographical features claimed by both sides as their sovereign territory, i.e., the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Some non-authoritative sources present such overlap of ADIZs as "common" and "natural" especially given China's and Japan's situations as neighboring maritime countries that face each other's coasts.¹⁴⁶

In addressing the issue of overlapping ADIZs, authoritative Chinese sources assert that any potential confusion or other problems should be handled through dialogue and direct communication.¹⁴⁷ As noted above, several non-authoritative Chinese sources call for the establishment of an effective crisis-management mechanism (CMM) to deal with any problems emerging from the overlapping ADIZs. They assert that China should consult with Japan to develop rules for flights operating within the overlapping airspace of the two ADIZs.¹⁴⁸ Former PRC state councilor and foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan also reportedly proposed establishing a bilateral aviation CMM similar to the current maritime mechanism between Chinese and Japanese defense ministries.¹⁴⁹ This seems in line with Vice President Biden's call for a Sino-Japanese crisis-management mechanism. And indeed, at least one non-authoritative Chinese source has spoken favorably of Biden's suggestion.¹⁵⁰

However, as also noted above, when calling for dialogue and direct communication with Tokyo to deal with this issue, both authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese sources also chastise the Abe administration for hypocritically refusing to engage in such discussions, despite indicating a willingness to do so.

With regard to the dangers presented by the inclusion in the ECS ADIZ of airspace over the disputed S/D islands, authoritative Chinese sources have largely avoided this issue,

other than to assert, as they have done in the past, that the portion of Japan's ADIZ that cover the airspace over the S/D islands is illegal and therefore not recognized by China, and to call for discussions with Tokyo regarding the islands.¹⁵¹ They do not attempt to make the argument, as some might expect, that by bolstering China's sovereignty claim to the S/D islands, the ECS ADIZ provides the basis for increased interdiction efforts against Japanese or other aircraft that enter the airspace over them.

In general, non-authoritative sources largely echo authoritative sources in denouncing the illegality of Japan's portion of the ADIZ over the S/D islands and calling for talks with Japan.¹⁵² As discussed above, some non-authoritative Chinese sources also described the ECS ADIZ as another step in the effort to strengthen its control over the S/D islands or to "break through" Japan's ADIZ.¹⁵³

Some of these sources seem to suggest that China could or should conduct interdiction efforts over the S/D islands, as part of efforts to increase pressure on Japan regarding the territorial dispute. But other non-authoritative observers also recognize the fact that the overlapping of Chinese and Japanese ADIZs, especially in the area over the S/D islands, increases the chances of a clash between the two sides, thus making the need for talks even more urgent.¹⁵⁴

Regarding the possible establishment of another ADIZ in the South China Sea (SCS), an authoritative Chinese source stated: "China will establish other Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) in due course after completing relevant preparations."¹⁵⁵ Other authoritative sources have been less direct, merely indicating that China will "uphold its national security" and "firmly opposes relevant countries' words and deeds which deliberately provoke regional confrontation regardless of the security of others" (for instance, by speculating that Beijing's establishment of a new ADIZ will increase tensions).¹⁵⁶

Several non-authoritative Chinese sources expect that Beijing will establish an additional ADIZ in the South China Sea and other areas as well. However, most do not see any urgency in doing so, and at least one observer suggested that "China will evaluate further when and how to set up the new ADIZs" given the strong international reaction to the ECS ADIZ.¹⁵⁷ Another source accuses Japan and the United States of instigating speculation on a SCS ADIZ so as to "drive a wedge between China and ASEAN countries," "stir up worries of a 'China threat,'" and "trap China in a public opinion whirlpool as well as a strategically passive position." It argues that the situation in the South China Sea is far more complex, demanding far more legal and technical preparations for an ADIZ, and China has a more comprehensive and positive economic and political strategy toward Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, China has "the right" to establish another ADIZ, and "may be forced" to do so if the United States and Japan further threaten China's national security such as by intensifying S&R activities in the region.¹⁵⁸

Finally, a quantitative examination of *People's Daily* and *Liberation Army Daily* sources from January 2013 to January 2014 provides additional insights into likely Chinese views

on this issue (see figure 2 in the appendix). In general, these results tend to confirm the impressions described above. First, the language used in discussing or defining the concept of an ADIZ or the ECS ADIZ in particular focuses more on the positive aspects of such zones, and not their provocative or dangerous aspects. For example, such wordings as “freedom of overflight,” “safety,” “defensive,” and “flight order” appear most often, while wording such as “double standards” or “hypocritical” is used less often.

Second, negative terms such as “unilateral,” “illegal,” and “provocation” are almost always used in reference to Japan. At the same time, a large number of articles also mention “dialogue” and “communication,” and whether advocating such actions or criticizing Japan for refusing to take such actions, they confirm support in verbal terms for negotiated approaches.

Third, while there is some mention of ADIZ enforcement procedures such as “control,” “verification, and “monitoring,” the frequency is relatively low, suggesting little elaboration in official media sources.

Fourth, there is no discernible difference in word usage or frequency between the two newspapers, suggesting an absence of any variation in meaningful treatment of the issue by civilian and military sources, possibly due to general agreement or enforcement by central authorities of a common “take” on the issue.

Fifth, while some secondary non-Chinese sources have argued that the Chinese government has actively suppressed media discussion of the ECS ADIZ issue because of internal resistance to the zone, both the above analysis of the content of articles and the number of *PD* and *LAD* articles that discuss the issue do not confirm this argument. A total of 35 *PD* and 54 *LAD* articles made reference to the ADIZ, almost all concentrated in the roughly two-month period since China’s announcement in late November 2013.¹⁵⁹ By comparison, mentions in these two media outlets of other contentious issues such as “cyber,” the U.S. “rebalancing” and “return to Asia,” or Tokyo’s purchase of the S/D islands in 2012, as discussed in previous issues of *CLM*, were similar in frequency or less numerous.¹⁶⁰ In contrast to past trends in which civilian media references were usually more numerous than their military counterparts, however, the *LAD* generated more related keyword hits than *PD*. This suggests disproportionately greater military media attention than usual on the ADIZ rollout as compared to other policy issues such as cybersecurity, Obama’s Asia foreign policy, or even the Japanese government’s purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in late 2012.¹⁶¹

Conclusions and Implications

Whether authoritative or non-authoritative, civilian or military, Chinese sources have essentially been very consistent in describing the nature, purpose, and significance of the ECS ADIZ as a legitimate national security–related measure similar in function to ADIZs established by other nations and intended to strengthen Chinese security and increase regional safety. No Chinese sources question or contest the ECS ADIZ or characterize it as a dangerous or provocative move, although some non-authoritative sources imply that it might contribute to unintended air incidents. This contrasts with some non-authoritative

Chinese commentaries on other issues examined by this author in past issues of *CLM* (such as North Korea),¹⁶² where PRC policy is directly or indirectly criticized.

In addition, no Chinese source of any kind claims that the zone is unique, designed to function as territorial airspace or is linked in some way to an effort to establish Chinese control across the Western Pacific or even jurisdictional control over its near seas. While some Chinese observers might make such claims verbally, there is no evidence of such a view in openly published Chinese sources; quite the contrary. As noted above, many sources of all kinds explicitly reject the treatment of the ECS ADIZ as territorial airspace. That said, a very few non-authoritative Chinese sources associate the ECS ADIZ with Beijing's supposed need to "break through" the alleged U.S. and Japanese blockade of China within the first island chain.

No authoritative Chinese sources imply such a strategic purpose to the ECS ADIZ; in fact, they deny that the zone is targeted at any nation or serves a purpose other than national defense. That said, both authoritative and many non-authoritative sources clearly imply that the zone is at least partly directed at Japan. Moreover, many in the latter category of sources explicitly state that countering or pressuring Tokyo in various ways is an important feature of the zone. Many non-authoritative sources strike a contrast between the ECS ADIZ, which is not treated as territorial airspace, and Japan's alleged attempt to transform its ADIZ into such airspace, and some argue that the ECS ADIZ will assist China's efforts to establish greater parity with Tokyo regarding the S/D islands dispute. Thus, although China's establishment of ADIZs has been actively under consideration for many years, there is little doubt that the ECS ADIZ was partly established in response to Japan's ADIZ and quite possibly in part as a means of placing additional pressure on Tokyo to acknowledge the existence of a dispute over the S/D islands.

By and large, Chinese sources of all types reject virtually all of the foreign criticisms of the ECS ADIZ. However, many sources (and especially non-authoritative ones) refute Japanese criticisms most harshly and stridently, while sometimes taking a more qualified stance toward U.S. criticisms, reflecting the perceived distinctions between the two nation's responses. This approach, arguably more notable among authoritative sources, almost certainly reflects, at least in part, Beijing's desire to isolate Tokyo and portray it as the source of the current tensions in the relationship, as well as its more general desire to retain positive relations with Washington in the aftermath of the Sunnyslans summit and Biden's recent visit to China.

Many non-authoritative sources not only employ more caustic and in some cases extremely hostile characterizations of both Japanese and U.S. behavior, but also accuse Tokyo of creating tensions over the ADIZ issue, along with other issues such as the S/D islands, to strengthen U.S. support for the containment of China while justifying Tokyo's further military buildup. Although not reflected in authoritative statements, conversations with senior Chinese officials suggest that this characterization of Japanese motives is widely held within Chinese government circles. Moreover, as noted above, this argument leads some Chinese observers to appeal to Washington to rein in Tokyo.

Regarding the implementation of the ECS ADIZ, authoritative Chinese sources offer no explicit definition of when and how Beijing might respond to aircraft that do not comply with the rules governing the zone, beyond a vague reference to the use of “defensive emergency measures.” However, both authoritative and non-authoritative sources, and the record of Chinese behavior thus far, strongly imply that in most cases, noncompliant foreign (including military) aircraft operating in the zone will only be subjected to identification and monitoring, either from a distance via radar and other means, or at times via on-site, visual confirmation by Chinese aircraft. It would serve Beijing’s interests to clarify and affirm this procedure more explicitly.

Although rarely mentioned by authoritative sources, it is clear that many Chinese—and almost certainly the Chinese military—regard U.S. and Japanese surveillance flights within the ECS ADIZ as an example of “abnormal” behavior that requires some type of presumably more vigorous response. Although Beijing has long regarded such flights near China’s coastline as unacceptable and in violation of its interpretation of international law, it remains unclear how the presence of the ECS ADIZ might affect its response to such flights in the future. This also requires clarification. Serious problems will likely emerge with Japan and the U.S. if Beijing intends to use the ECS ADIZ as a justification for more aggressive pushback against such flights.

Another potentially dangerous consequence of Beijing’s lack of clarity with regard to the ECS ADIZ issue concerns overlapping ADIZs, especially regarding airspace above the disputed S/D islands. The failure of Chinese authorities to explicitly state whether the new ADIZ will result in increased challenges to Japanese aircraft operating over the islands, along with Japan’s refusal to engage in talks with Beijing regarding the issue, arguably increases the chances of dangerous incidents occurring in that area in the future. While Tokyo has reported an increasing number of scrambles against PRC aircraft, based on public Japanese and Chinese sources, there have only been two incidents reported around the S/D islands since the ECS ADIZ was announced, with no significant increase in provocative behavior, and it is unclear to what extent China has increased the frequency or scope of its flight activity in the area.¹⁶³

Finally, Chinese statements and commentary on the ECS ADIZ do not provide any clear evidence of differences between civilian and military authorities, nor of the existence of leadership debates, over the issue. Military sources overall are perhaps slightly sharper in their criticism of Japan and their defense of the ECS ADIZ than their civilian counterparts, which is entirely unsurprising. But no clear evidence was found that the Chinese military is presenting a unique or overriding interpretation of the zone, compared to civilian authorities. That said, a knowledgeable Chinese source has informed the author that the coordination occurring between civilian and military authorities in the development and presentation of the ECS ADIZ “could have been better.” This quite possibly means that, while senior civilian authorities no doubt approved the ECS ADIZ, the military authorities that originally proposed, developed, and presented the zone probably did not consult sufficiently with the foreign affairs system during this process. As previous issues of the *Monitor* have indicated, the lack of coordination in China’s


decision-making apparatus between the diplomatic/foreign affairs and military systems is a relatively common problem.

Overall, our examination of Chinese views toward the ECS ADIZ indicates that while both authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese sources argue consistently and often emphatically that the zone is intended to strengthen safety and preserve stability and is not directed at any particular country or target, in fact the vague language used to describe the zone as well as the extensive (and often hostile) attention to Japan paid by many Chinese sources suggests that such assertions are incorrect and disingenuous at best. While Beijing has every right to establish an ADIZ in the East China Sea and elsewhere along its territorial borders, it also has the responsibility to define as clearly and honestly as possible the operation and intended impact of any such zone. In this instance, the timing of China's announcement, during a period of already high tensions with Tokyo, along with the failure to clearly reassure other nations regarding the manner in which Beijing will enforce the zone, have undoubtedly undermined the purported intention of the zone and arguably damaged Beijing's larger strategic interests in improving its relationship with other nations in the Asia-Pacific region. This entire episode suggests that Beijing's management of at least some highly sensitive foreign national security issues is dangerously unsophisticated.

Appendix

Figure 1

Map of country ADIZs (including South Korea's recently expanded zone) around the East China Sea, showing overlapping areas and disputed territories.



MODIFIED FROM: "Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone," Xinhua, November 23, 2013. Zone illustrations and English annotations by Audrye Wong.

Figure 2

Frequency hits of ADIZ-related keywords in People's Daily and Liberation Army Daily articles published between January 1, 2013, and January 17, 2014.

| | | PD | | LAD | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|----------|------------------------|----------|
| | | No. of articles | % | No. of articles | % |
| 防空识别区 | ADIZ | 35 | 100.0 | 54 | 100.0 |
| 防空识别区 + keyword (in Chinese): | ADIZ + keyword (in English): | No. of articles | % | No. of articles | % |
| 飞越自由 | freedom of overflight | 7 | 20.0 | 15 | 27.8 |
| 主权 | sovereignty | 20 | 57.1 | 25 | 46.3 |
| 安全 | safety | 26 | 74.3 | 46 | 85.2 |
| 防御 | defensive | 6 | 17.1 | 13 | 24.1 |
| 国际性 | international | 0 | 0.0 | 22 | 40.7 |
| 飞行秩序 | flight order | 8 | 22.9 | 10 | 18.5 |
| 处置措施 | crisis management mechanism | 4 | 11.4 | 3 | 5.6 |
| 全面监管 | comprehensive monitoring | 1 | 2.9 | 2 | 3.7 |
| 监管 | monitoring | 3 | 8.6 | 5 | 9.3 |
| 查证 | verification | 3 | 8.6 | 4 | 7.4 |
| 管控 | control | 5 | 14.3 | 11 | 20.4 |
| 管控危机 | control/manage crisis | 1 | 2.9 | 1 | 1.9 |
| 钓鱼岛 | S/D islands | 10 | 28.6 | 21 | 38.9 |
| 日本 | Japan | 18 | 51.4 | 34 | 63.0 |
| 美国 | US | 19 | 54.3 | 29 | 53.7 |
| 对话 | dialogue | 9 | 25.7 | 14 | 25.9 |
| 对话+日本 | dialogue + Japan | 6 | 17.1 | 10 | 18.5 |
| 对话磋商 | dialogue and consultation | 1 | 2.9 | 1 | 1.9 |
| 磋商 | consultation | 3 | 8.6 | 4 | 7.4 |
| 单方+日本 | unilateral + Japan | 0 | 0.0 | 12 | 22.2 |
| 非法+日本 | illegal + Japan | 4 | 11.4 | 4 | 7.4 |
| 非法 | illegal | 5 | 14.3 | 5 | 9.3 |
| 双重标准 | double standards | 1 | 2.9 | 4 | 7.4 |
| 虚伪 | hypocritical | 2 | 5.7 | 2 | 3.7 |
| 挑衅+日本 | provocation + Japan | 4 | 11.4 | 9 | 16.7 |
| 挑衅 | provocation | 4 | 11.4 | 9 | 16.7 |
| 沟通 | communication | 6 | 17.1 | 11 | 20.4 |
| 日本+沟通 | Japan + communication | 3 | 8.6 | 7 | 13.0 |

Notes

¹ “Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,” Xinhua, November 23, 2013. For a definition of an ADIZ, see *Introduction to Jeppesen Navigation Charts*, (Englewood, CO: Jeppesen Sanderson, December 30, 2005),

<http://ww1.jeppesen.com/documents/aviation/business/ifr-paper-services/glossary-legends.pdf>. Also see Ruwantissa Abeyratne, “In search of theoretical justification for air defense identification zones,” *Journal of Transport Security*, September 13, 2011; and *The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations* (Department of the Navy and Department of Homeland Security, July 2007).

² David Welch, “What’s an ADIZ?” *Foreign Affairs*, December 9, 2013.

³ “The A to Z on China’s Air Defense Identification Zone,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 27, 2013; Rick Gladstone and Matthew L. Wald, “China’s Move Puts Airspace in Spotlight,” *New York Times*, November 27, 2013; Peter A. Dutton, “Caelum Liberam: Air Defense Identification Zones Outside Sovereign Airspace,” *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 103 (2009).

⁴ Seoul extended its ADIZ to include the latter feature on December 8, in response to the establishment of the Chinese ECS ADIZ. Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Announces Expansion of Its Air Defense Zone,” *New York Times*, December 8, 2013.

⁵ Welch, “What’s an ADIZ?”

⁶ *The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*.

⁷ U.S. air carriers are expected to “operate consistent with NOTAMs (Notices to Airmen) issued by foreign countries” although this “does not indicate U.S. government acceptance of China’s requirements for operating in the newly declared ADIZ.” “China’s Declared ADIZ - Guidance for U.S. Air Carriers,” U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesperson, November 29, 2013. A U.S. State Department spokesperson also reiterated that “U.S. air carriers are being advised to take all steps necessary to operate safely in the East China Sea region.” “State Department Regular Briefing,” U.S. Department of State, November 27, 2013.

⁸ “S. Korea expresses regrets over China’s ADIZ,” Yonhap, November 25, 2013; “Australia expresses concern over China air defence zone,” *Australia Network News*, November 26, 2013; Sara Suanne D. Fabunan, “‘China’s ADIZ a threat,’” *Manila Standard Today*, November 29, 2013; “EU Voices Concerns Over China’s New Air Defense Zone,” *RTT News*, November 28, 2013; “Criticism of China’s ADIZ increases; Japanese airlines do a policy U-turn,” *Japan Times*, November 27, 2013.

⁹ Both Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Secretary of State John Kerry have made public statements in this regard. See Chico Harlan, “China creates new air defense zone in East China Sea amid dispute with Japan,” *Washington Post*, November 23, 2013; and Chris Buckley, “China Claims Air Rights Over Disputed Islands,” *New York Times*, November 23, 2013. For official Japanese responses, “Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the announcement on the ‘East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone’ by the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, November 24, 2013. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s opposition to the ECS ADIZ included the notion that Beijing was undertaking the effort

through coercive “use of force.” “Abe ‘Strongly Concerned’ By China’s Setting Up Of Air Defense Zone,” *Kyodo*, November 25, 2013.

¹⁰ Robert Dujarric, “China’s ADIZ and the Japan-US response,” *Diplomat*, December 7, 2013. “Beijing’s Brinkmanship,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 25, 2013; Stephen M. Walt, “How Long Will China Tolerate America’s Role in Asia?” *Foreign Policy*, December 2, 2013. Jun Osawa, “China’s ADIZ over the East China Sea: A ‘Great Wall in the Sky’?” *Brookings Opinion*, December 17, 2013. “U.S., China face off over air defense zone in East China Sea,” *Asahi Shimbun*, November 29, 2013.

¹¹ Rory Medcalf, “What’s wrong with China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (and what’s not),” *Lowy Interpreter*, November 27, 2013. Andrew Erickson, “Watch This Space: China’s New Air Defense Zone,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 25, 2013. “State Department Regular Briefing,” Office of the Spokesperson of the U.S. Department of State, December 2, 2013.

¹² See, for example, Peter A. Dutton, “Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee: Hearing on China’s Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas,” January 14, 2014.

¹³ Russell Leigh Moses, “Why Xi Jinping’s Done Little to Sell China’s Air Defense Zone,” *Wall Street Journal*, December 2, 2013. Chen Yo-Jung, “China’s Contradictory Foreign Policy,” *Diplomat*, December 16, 2013. Zheng Wang, “China’s Puzzling ADIZ Decision Making,” *Diplomat*, December 18, 2013.

¹⁴ Several types of PRC sources are considered authoritative in the sense of explicitly “speaking for the regime.” They generally include MFA and MND statements and briefings and remarks by senior civilian and military officials appearing in the leading Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (or CCPCC) and military (People’s Liberation Army or PLA) newspapers: *People’s Daily* (人民日报) and *Liberation Army Daily* (解放军报). Authoritative statements include, in descending order of authority, PRC government and CCP statements, MFA statements, MFA spokesperson statements, and MFA daily press briefings. Authoritative commentaries in *People’s Daily* and *Liberation Army Daily* include, in descending order, “editorial department articles,” editorials, and commentator articles.

Several types of usually homophonous, bylined articles appearing in the *People’s Daily* are considered quasi-authoritative in the sense that, although indirect and implicit, they are intended to convey the view of an important PRC organization. A major example of this is articles using the byline Zhong Sheng (钟声), which is an apparent homophone for “the voice of the Central,” and appears to be written by the editorial staff of the *People’s Daily* International Department. Other quasi-authoritative homophonous bylines include “Ren Zhongping” (任仲平, homophonous with “important *People’s Daily* commentary”), “Zhong Zuwen” (仲组文, homophonous with “CC Organization Department article”), and “Zhong Xuanli” (钟轩理, homophonous with “CC Propaganda Department commentary”).

Many types of low-level commentary and signed articles appearing in a wide variety of PRC and Hong Kong media convey notable yet decidedly non-authoritative views. Such articles appear in the PRC government news service (Xinhua), CCP and PLA newspapers, the Hong Kong-based (and *People’s Daily*-owned) *Global Times* (环球时报), and many minor PRC and Hong Kong newspapers and academic publications. Despite

the view expressed by some pundits, nothing published in the *Global Times* is “authoritative” in any meaningful sense, “because the newspaper is a commercial vehicle and doesn’t stand for the *People’s Daily*, even though it is subordinate to that organ.”

Alice Miller, personal correspondence, June 27, 2012.

¹⁵ Searches were conducted using the complete *PD* and *LAD* databases available through the Library of Congress, for articles published between January 1, 2013 and January 17, 2014, inclusive. The term “air defense identification zone” appeared in a total of 54 and 35 articles in the *LAD* and *PD*, respectively. Within this pool of articles, further searches were conducted with different keyword combinations, in order to analyze the nature and tone of media discussion. For example, the results show the number of times in which phrases such as “freedom of overflight,” “dialogue,” or “Diaoyu Islands” were mentioned in the context of the ADIZ. The full list of relevant keyword searches can be found in figure 2 appended at the end of this article. This paragraph was written by Audrye Wong.

¹⁶ See “Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,” Xinhua, November 23, 2013.

¹⁷ “Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the P.R.C.,” Xinhua, November 23, 2013.

¹⁸ “Defense Spokesman Yang Yujun’s Response to Questions on the Establishment of The East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, November 23, 2013.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ See Meng Yan and Zhou Yong, “Air defense ID zone to deter those with designs on China’s territory,” Xinhua, November 26, 2013. Also see Lu Desheng, “China’s Demarcation of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone is Reasonable and Legal—Exclusive Interview with Senior Captain Fu Xiaodong, Chief Justice of the People’s Liberation Army Military Court for the Navy,” *Liberation Army Daily*, November 25, 2013, Open Source Center (OSC) CHO2013112532031220; and David Cohen, “East China Sea Air Defense Moves: What for and Why Now?” *China Brief*, Vol. 13 No. 24, November 27, 2013.

²² “PLA Air Force conducts first patrol in air defense identification zone,” Xinhua, November 23, 2013.

²³ *The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*, Section 2.7.2.3 pp. 2–13.

²⁴ I am indebted to Iain Johnston for bringing this to my attention. See *Airway Manual WH-II Enroute Data—Pacific: Standard Procedures for ADIZ flights* (Englewood, CO: Jeppesen Sanderson, May 4, 2007). Jeppesen Sanderson is a subsidiary of the Boeing Company that provides specialized navigational, operational, and logistical information and training for air and marine transportation. In the aviation domain, their products serve the general, business, commercial, and military sectors. This includes navigational charts and procedure manuals for pilots. See <http://www1.jeppesen.com/index.jsp>.

²⁵ “Defense Ministry spokesman on China’s air defense identification zone,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, December 3, 2013. Also see “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 29, 2013,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 29,

2013; and “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on December 3, 2013,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, December 3, 2013.

²⁶ According to Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration, Japanese aviation authorities have required Taiwan airliners to submit flight plans when traveling through the overlapping area of Japan’s ADIZ and Taiwan’s Flight Information Region. There have also been at least two incidents, in 2002 and 2009, of passenger airliners being intercepted by Japanese fighter jets despite fulfilling identification requirements. Joseph Yeh, “Aircraft intercepted by Japanese military,” *China Post*, December 3, 2013.

²⁷ Welch, “What’s an ADIZ?”

²⁸ For example, see Sun Ran, “Expert: Deliberately Expanding the ‘Air Defense Identification Zone’ Is Prone to Spark East China Sea Tension,” 中国新闻社 (China News Service), January 11, 2013, OSC CPP20130111075003. According to OSC, China News Service is China’s official news service for overseas Chinese. And Liang Wei, “Alert to Japan’s Intentions of Air Claims,” 世界知识, (*World Affairs*) February 16, 2013, OSC CPP20130604671003. According to OSC, 世界知识 is a semimonthly journal published by the World Affairs Publishing House under the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reporting on current international issues. Also see “China’s ADIZ is justified,” *China Daily*, November 30, 2013; Jun Baoyan, “Who is creating dangers?” *Liberation Army Daily*, November 27, 2013. Citing these sources, Peter Mattis states: “China claimed the ADIZ was a routine measure for improving awareness of its airspace and protecting its national security.” Peter Mattis, “China’s East China Sea ADIZ: Framing Japan to Help Washington Understand,” *China Brief*, Vol. 13, No. 24, December 5, 2013.

²⁹ “Resolutely Protecting the Sovereignty and Security of the National Territorial Airspace,” *Liberation Army Daily*, November 24, 2013, OSC CHR2013112624696352.

³⁰ “Defense Ministry spokesman on China’s air defense identification zone.” For a similar statement by the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, see “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 29, 2013.”

³¹ “Defense Ministry spokesman on China’s air defense identification zone.” Also see “Foreign planes identified in China’s air defense zone,” Xinhua, November 30, 2013; and “China’s Main Battle Military Aircraft Can Intercept Multiple Targets in the Air Defense Identification Zone,” *People’s Daily Online*, December 6, 2013.

³² For an example of civilian quasi-authoritative sources, see Zhong Sheng, “Firm Will and Forceful Action,” *People’s Daily*, November 27, 2013, OSC CHN2013112709886 813. The author states:

“Air defense identification zone” refers to a country that sets up an area on its own in contiguous international airspace above its territorial waters in order to ensure that its airspace will not be violated, and carries out rapid identification, definition, monitoring and controlling of foreign aircraft that enter and exit this area. There is no stipulation in international law that forbids the establishment of the air defense identification zone. As long as there is no violation of relevant stipulations on free flight over the airspace of international waters of the “UN Charter” and of the “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” various countries can set up

the zone in line with their defense requirements. . . . There are no unified international standards. China's setting up the identification zone is purely a legitimate autonomous act of a sovereign state.

Also see Xie Fayuan, "The Legitimate and Lawful Move of Safeguarding National Sovereignty and Security—Legal Interpretation of China's Establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone," *Liberation Army Daily*, November 24, 2013, OSC CHO2013112532318511; Jun Baoyan, "Who is creating dangers?"; and Jun Baoyan, "Words of Worry Come From Having an Ambitious Heart," *Liberation Army Daily*, November 26, 2013, OSC CHO2013112625128475. Xie Fayuan (解法苑) and Jun Baoyan (sometimes mistranslated as Diao Baoyan) are pseudonyms or pen homophones like Zhong Sheng. While probably not as quasi-authoritative as Zhong Sheng, such sources likely denote institutional representation—in the case of Xie Fayuan, of Chinese legal agencies. Xie Fayuan states:

An ADIZ normally refers to a specific air zone unilaterally delimited by a coastal country or region above the waters off its coast according to the needs of its coastal and air defense security, and in essence, is an air alert zone established on the basis of the national defense requirements. Within the air zone, aircraft of other countries (sides) are required to submit reports about their nationalities, positions, flight plans so as to carry out identification, surveillance, and response in a timely way. If any aircraft do not abide by the stipulations, they may be disallowed from entering the territorial airspace, and may even be intercepted or be forced to land. In this way, before an unidentified aerial vehicle enters its territorial airspace, the host country can determine the character of the aerial vehicle ahead of time and win response time, thus effectively safeguarding the national defense security.

Non-authoritative sources provide very similar definitions. See Meng Xiangqing, "Air defense zone won't affect flight freedom: experts," *Xinhua*, November 26, 2013; Luo Yuan, "The Air Defense Identification Zone is the Firewall and the Buffer," *Global Times Online*, November 26, 2013, OSC CHR2013112623676544 (original Chinese edition); Luo Yuan, "ADIZ will reduce East China Sea tension," *Global Times*, November 27, 2013 (English edition). Luo Yuan writes: "ADIZs are not established in order to intensify conflicts; on the contrary, they work as a shock absorber or a cushion valve, simplifying complicated issues, clarifying the ambiguous margins of interests, and reducing misjudgments and accidental casualties."

Also see Deng Yushan, "Commentary: Safeguarding East Asian Security Needs Closer China S. Korea Coordination," *Xinhua*, December 10, 2013, OSC CHR2013121029613391; Xing Hongbo, "China's ADIZ is justified"; and Ma Jun, "Why China Needs Air Defense Identification Zone," *China-US Focus*, December 4, 2013. Ma Jun is a research fellow of the Department of Foreign Military Studies and Specially Invited Researcher for the Center on China-America Defense Relations at the PLA Academy of Military Science. For a secondary source that discusses these Chinese responses, see Cohen, "East China Sea Air Defense Moves: What for and Why Now?"

³³ See “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 25, 2013,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 26, 2013; “Defense Spokesman Yang Yujun’s Response to Questions on the Establishment of The East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.” For similar statements, see “Defense Ministry spokesman on China’s air defense identification zone,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, December 3, 2013; Lu Desheng, “China’s Demarcation of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone is Reasonable and Legal.”

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid. See also Meng Yan and Zhou Yong, “Air defense ID zone to deter those with designs on China’s territory.”

³⁶ As Zhong Sheng states:

China’s setting up the air defense identification zone is completely in line with international law and international practice. The aim is to safeguard national security and ensure flight order over the East China Sea. As China follows the open and transparent principle, it shows China is willing to maintain its sovereignty through institutionalized and legalized acts. This will help promote security mutual trust and push for virtuous interaction with peripheral countries.

See Zhong Sheng, “Firm Will and Forceful Action.”

³⁷ See in particular Xie Fayuan, “The Legitimate and Lawful Move of Safeguarding National Sovereignty and Security.” The author(s), a voice apparently representing the military legal system in China, states: “On the basis of the international community’s acceptance of air defense identification zones and the current condition in which other countries around the East China Sea have all set up their air defense identification zones, with the international common practice being taken as reference, our country’s establishment of the East China Sea ADIZ is completely legitimate, necessary, and reasonable.”

³⁸ For a particularly detailed example, see Zhang Junshe, “The US Should Take an Impartial Stance toward China’s Newly Established ADIZ,” *China-US Focus*, December 3, 2013. The author is a senior colonel and former deputy director of Naval Research Institute, PLA Navy, China. He states that the ECS ADIZ is entirely justified because: first, it has a sound legal basis; second, it accords with common international practices; third, China’s rules are not unique; fourth, it is not targeted against any country and will not affect the freedom of flight; and fifth, it is not a unilateral move altering the status quo in the region. See also Ren Youfeng, “维护国家领土领空主权和安全的重大举措—对我国划设东海防空识别区的解读” (A significant measure to defend the sovereignty and security of national territory and airspace—interpreting China’s establishment of the East China Sea ADIZ), 人民海军 (*People’s Navy*), November 27, 2013 (hereafter referred to as “A significant measure”). According to OSC, 人民海军 is the official newspaper of the Communist Party committee of the PLA Navy, and is published three times per week.

³⁹ Luo Yuan, “The Air Defense Identification Zone is the Firewall and the Buffer.” Also see Lu Desheng, “China’s Demarcation of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone is Reasonable and Legal”; Xie Fayuan, “The Legitimate and Lawful Move of

Safeguarding National Sovereignty and Security”; and Zhou Yongsheng, “China will not revoke ADIZ, due to its military and diplomatic necessity,” *Global Times*, December 4, 2013. Authoritative sources do not provide as much detail in explaining why the ECS ADIZ will contribute to peace and stability in the region, but the point is clearly made. For example, see “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 25, 2013”; and “Defense Ministry spokesman on China’s air defense identification zone.”

⁴⁰ See Han Xudong, “Wise diplomacy needed in ADIZ dispute to prevent tit-for-tat violence,” *Global Times*, December 3, 2013. The author states:

The establishment of the ADIZ helps increase the initiative of China in the East China Sea. Previously, China was put in a passive position since Japan seized the initiative by including the airspace above the Diaoyu Islands into its ADIZ. But now, the ADIZ set up by China overlaps Japan’s above the East China Sea, creating controversy, which means China can respond actively to any provocative moves by Japan in the zone. . . . The establishment of China’s ADIZ adds challenges in dealing with relevant countries such as the US and Japan in terms of airspace, but in essence it’s a necessary step and another cornerstone to safeguard China’s national interests.

Also see Ren Xiao, “The ADIZ imbroglio: A Chinese View,” *Rising Powers Initiative Policy Commentary*, December 19, 2013, <http://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/the-adiz-imbroglio-a-chinese-view/>, accessed December 19, 2013; and Luo Yuan, “ADIZ will reduce East China Sea tension.”

⁴¹ For example, see “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 25, 2013”; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 27, 2013,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 27, 2013; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 28, 2013,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 28, 2013; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 29, 2013”; “Defense Spokesman Yang Yujun’s Response to Questions on the Establishment of The East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.” This claim is also repeated frequently in non-authoritative sources. See “Tokyo’s Complaints Over ADIZ Hypocritical,” *Global Times*, November 25, 2013, OSC CHL2013112510061024; Meng Yan and Zhou Yong, “Air defense ID zone to deter those with designs on China’s territory”; “China’s air defense zone doesn’t target specific country: expert,” Xinhua, November 27, 2013; Xing Hongbo, “China’s ADIZ is justified.” As a Western observer, David Cohen, notes, “The threat to planes visiting the East China Sea could be a response to Japan’s threat last month to shoot down military drones visiting the disputed area, which China described as showing that ‘Japan means to make provocations and create a tense atmosphere’ (Xinhua, October 27). However, Chinese spokesmen are usually happy to draw connections like these, and they have not in this case.” Cohen, “East China Sea Air Defense Moves: What for and Why Now?”

⁴² For example, a MND spokesperson, in response to a press question regarding the coverage of the ECS ADIZ and the fact that its boundary extends to within 130 kilometers of “some country” (that is, Japan), stated: “the easternmost point of the Zone is so close to China that combat aircraft can soon reach China’s territorial airspace from the point. Therefore it is necessary for China to identify any aircraft from this point to assess its intentions and examine its identities so as to allow enough early-warning time for responsive measures in maintaining air security. In addition, some country [i.e., Japan] established an Air Defense Identification Zone as early as in 1969. The shortest distance from their zone to the Chinese mainland is also 130 km.” “Defense Spokesman Yang Yujun’s Response to Questions on the Establishment of The East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.”

⁴³ See “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 29, 2013”; Meng Yan and Zhou Yong, “Air defense ID zone to deter those with designs on China’s territory”; “China dismisses Japanese claim of altering status quo,” Xinhua, November 29, 2013; “Defense Ministry spokesman on China’s air defense identification zone.”

⁴⁴ “China, Indonesia Vow To Push Forward Military-To-Military Relations,” *Liberation Army Daily*, December 17, 2013, OSC CHR2013121730948088.

⁴⁵ For a criticism of the danger of locating Japan’s ADIZ only 130 kilometers from China’s mainland (the same distance Beijing’s ECS ADIZ is from the Japanese mainland!), see Jun Baoyan, “How can ‘double standard’ safeguard regional peace?” *Liberation Army Daily*, November 25, 2013, CHR2013112537505517. The article states: “As everyone knows, when Japan established its air defense identification zone back in 1969, it even included three quarters of the aerial space over the East China Sea into its identification zone, making its air defense identification zone only 130km in the closest distance to the Chinese mainland. That is a genuine ‘dangerous’ unilateral action.”

For an earlier article criticizing the size of Japan’s ADIZ, see Liang Wei, “Alert to Japan’s Intentions of Air Claims.” The author also states that, in establishing its ADIZ,

Japan did not give consideration to China’s legitimate rights. According to the international laws, one country must exercise its rights based on the legitimate rights of its neighboring countries. Japan’s ADIZ covered the adjoining airspace with China and even the airspace over and near the Diaoyu Islands (Chinese territory). Japan set the ADIZ unilaterally without consulting to Chinese government, which is a gesture of showing no respect for its neighboring country and infringing China’s legitimate rights.

Also see “Tokyo’s Menace Won’t Intimidate China,” *Global Times*, November 26, 2013, OSC CHL2013112609603470; Luo Yuan, “ADIZ will reduce East China Sea tension.” Luo states: “China’s establishment of an ADIZ in the East China Sea is a forced response to the aggressiveness of Japan which has threatened to fire warning shots against Chinese planes in its ADIZ, and deploy shore-to-ship missiles near the Miyako Strait, through which the Chinese navy enters the West Pacific.” According to Wu Shicun, president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, the ECS ADIZ is “a result of the provocation by Japan whose right-wing forces have become more and more aggressive

and whose foreign policy has taken a more hard-line stance.” Wu Shicun, “Ignore Noise Around South China Sea ADIZ,” *Global Times*, January 14, 2014, OSC CHL2014011506899543.

⁴⁶ See Xie Fayuan, “The Legitimate and Lawful Move of Safeguarding National Sovereignty and Security.” The author states: “at present, some countries use their ADIZ to disrupt the normal overflight of other countries’ aircraft, and that is actually a kind of misinterpretation and abuse of the ADIZ.” Liang Wei asserts that Japan’s alleged attempt to replace the concept of the ADIZ with territorial airspace is “intentional, well-planned, and malicious.” Liang Wei, “Alert to Japan’s Intentions of Air Claims.” Also see Ren Youfeng, “A significant measure”; “Air defense zone won’t affect flight freedom: experts”; Ma Jun, “Why China Needs Air Defense Identification Zone”; Luo Yuan, “ADIZ will reduce East China Sea tension”; and “Viewpoints: China air zone tensions,” BBC, November 28, 2013. This source cites Victor Gao, director of the China National Association of International Studies, as stating: “In recent years, Japan has on many occasions scrambled fighter planes to warn off Chinese planes when they entered the Japanese zone, as if the zone were Japan’s territorial space. In a sense, China’s announcement of an identification zone is in response to Japan’s abusive use of its zone to start with.”

⁴⁷ Liang Hui, “China’s ‘Three Steps’ To Strengthen Control of the Diaoyu Islands,” *International Herald Leader*, November 29, 2013. According to OSC, this publication is the internet version of a weekly general affairs newspaper published by 参考消息 (Reference News), a publication of China’s official news agency Xinhua. The author provides the oft-used example of Tokyo intercepting a Chinese military drone operating over 150 kilometers off the S/D islands, presumably within Japan’s ADIZ. It refers to Japanese media quotes of a MND official stating that “Japan considered shooting down the drone.”

⁴⁸ Examples in which ASDF fighter jets have been scrambled include various incidents against Chinese aircraft around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and early-warning aircraft and bombers passing for the first time through the Okinawa island chain around the Miyako Strait. Accounts of Japanese aircraft being scrambled to intercept Chinese aircraft entering Japan’s ADIZ are found in: “Japanese jets intercept Chinese observation plane near Diaoyutai,” *Want China Times*, January 8, 2014; “SDF Scrambles Soar After China Sets Defense Zone Over East China Sea,” *Asahi Shimbun*, January 22, 2014, OSC JPR2014012230618965; “Japan scrambles jets for drone near disputed islands,” Agence France-Press, September 9, 2013; J. Michael Cole, “Japan, China Scramble Military Jets in East China Sea,” *Diplomat*, January 12, 2013; “Japan Scrambles Jets To Head Off Chinese Military Planes . . . Again,” Agence France-Presse, January 10, 2013; “Japan scrambles eight fighter jets to intercept Chinese plane near Diaoyus,” *South China Morning Post*, January 7, 2013; Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan Scrambles Jets in Islands Dispute With China,” *New York Times*, December 13, 2012.

⁴⁹ The Jeppesen *Airway Manual* states:

In ADIZ, Japan Air Self Defense Force identifies aircraft approaching Japanese territorial airspace, and aircraft unidentified by flight plan is liable to in-flight interception for visual confirmation.

The Japanese defense white paper for 2013 states:

Airspace anti-intrusion measures are the series of actions taken in relation to a foreign aircraft that poses a risk of invading Japan's territorial airspace or that has actually invaded it. These actions include scrambling interceptors warning the aircraft to withdraw from Japan's territorial airspace or forcing it to land on a neighboring airport.

Articles III and IV of the 1969 guidelines state [our translation]:

Article III. The pilot, under the following circumstances, must notify the respective details by the appropriate means with flight plan to the aircraft control or warning group.

- (2) If entering the ADIZ from its outer boundary, provide the scheduled location and time of entry, as well as the time between takeoff and entry into the ADIZ.

Article IV. Under the following circumstances, the pilot must inform air craft control group or warning group of the stipulated facts.

- (1) When flying through the ADIZ (except on designated corridors taking instrumental flight method), within thirty minutes of entering the ADIZ and every thirty minutes thereafter, the present location and the [intended] location thirty minutes hence will be reported.
- (2) When entering the ADIZ from its outer boundary using airway, provide the expected time of entry at the moment of last report before the entry.
- (3) When entering the ADIZ from its outer boundary not using airway, provide the expected entry time, entry point, and entry altitude, between 15 to 30 minutes ahead of the entry.
- (4) When entering the ADIZ from its outer boundary and the aircraft is heading toward Japanese territorial airspace, notify of your location at the point of 100 nm from the Japanese coast.

See *Airway Manual WH-II Enroute Date—Pacific*; “Part III Measures for Defense of Japan: Chapter 1 Systems to Protect Citizens’ Lives and Property and Defend Japanese Territorial Land, Waters and Airspace,” *Defense of Japan 2013*, Ministry of Defense of Japan, pp. 176–177 (2013); and *Guidelines on Flight Plans within the ADIZ*, Japanese Self-Defense Agency, August 29, 1969. See also “Air Defense,” Japan Air Self-Defense Force, http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/English_page/roles/mission01/, accessed January 30, 2014; and “Defense Ability of JASDF,” Japan Air Self-Defense Force, http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/English_page/roles/mission02/, accessed January 30, 2014.

⁵⁰ Japan’s Defense Ministry announced that ASDF jets were scrambled 138 times against Chinese aircraft from October to December 2013, a 50 percent increase from the same period a year earlier. ASDF fighters were scrambled 69 times against Chinese aircraft in April–June, and 80 times in July–September, giving a total of 287 times during the first three quarters of fiscal year 2013. By way of comparison, during the same period ASDF fighters were scrambled 246 times against Russian aircraft, of which many were patrol planes. According to the ministry, many of the detected Chinese aircraft were fighter jets. However, ministry officials have declined to comment on whether the number had increased in particular after China’s ADIZ declaration. See “Japanese Fighter Jets

Scramble Record High Against China Following ADIZ Designation,” *Sankei Shimbun*, January 22, 2014, OSC JPO2014012226133700; “Number of Scrambles Against Chinese Aircraft Rises,” NHK Online, January 21, 2014, OSC JPR2014012136321394; “SDF Scrambles Soar After China Sets Defense Zone Over East China Sea”; “Japan Details Scramble Missions Against Foreign Aircraft April to December 2013,” Ministry of Defense of Japan, January 22, 2014, OSC JPL2014012218852531.

⁵¹ For example, one non-authoritative *Liberation Army Daily* article states that “In January this year, Japan’s defense minister threatened to fire warning tracer shots on foreign aircrafts entering the ADIZ, but in the past this indeed actually happened in 1987 on Soviet Tu-16 bombers.” See “Summary: JFJB on Japan’s Present, Past Air Defense Identification Zones,” November 8, 2013, OSC CHL2013111213734590. In reality, the Japanese defense minister was referring to possible future violations of Japanese territorial airspace, not entrance into Japan’s ADIZ. See “Minister: Warning shots possible for Chinese airspace incursion,” *Asahi Shimbun*, January 16, 2013; and “Extra Press Conference by the Defense Minister,” Ministry of Defense of Japan, January 15, 2013. For media confusion over the drones issue, see Ma Jun, “Why China Needs Air Defense Identification Zone”; and “Japan To Down Intruding Foreign Drones If Warnings Ignored,” Kyodo, October 20, 2013, OSC JPR2013102061276285.

⁵² For example, see Liang Wei, “Alert to Japan’s Intentions of Air Claims.” The author specifically criticizes any attempt to demand that aircraft entering an ADIZ file flight plans even when they do not intend to enter territorial airspace (!). He states:

Only those aircrafts with intention to enter the territorial airspace of a coastal country shall be enquired and identified, while other aircrafts without intention of entering the territorial airspace of a coastal country, especially state aircrafts and military aircrafts, do not need to follow the mandatory obligation of air traffic control carried out by such coastal country.

The author concludes that Japan’s effort to require aircraft entering its ADIZ to identify themselves is part of an effort to “strive for the air control of East China Sea by resorting to international laws, restrict the freedom of overflight of China’s aircrafts on the excuse of air defense identification and reduce the room for the strategic activities of China’s air force.” For similar ironic pre-November 23rd criticisms, see Sun Ran, “Expert: Deliberately Expanding the ‘Air Defense Identification Zone’ Is Prone to Spark East China Sea Tension” 中国新闻社 (China News Service), January 11, 2013, OSC CPP20130111075003; and Hao Zhou and Guo Kai, “Japan Scrambles Fighters over Diaoyu,” *Global Times Online*, January 11, 2013, OSC CPP20130111722004. These articles critical of Japan’s ADIZ appeared soon after a January 2013 incident in which Tokyo scrambled fighter jets against several Chinese military planes in the former’s ADIZ, and China responded by scrambling two F-10 fighter aircraft. There had also been unverified Japanese media reports that the Japanese government was considering firing warning shots with tracer bullets against Chinese planes.

⁵³ Zhang Hong and Minnie Chan, “Beijing’s air defense zone aimed at making Tokyo negotiate, analysts say,” *South China Morning Post*, December 1, 2013. Also see Liang Hui, “China’s ‘Three Steps’ To Strengthen Control of the Diaoyu Islands”; Ding Gang,

“ADIZ geopolitics an opportunity for talks,” *Global Times*, December 11, 2013; and Xie Chao, “China’s ADIZ is for more than just Diaoyu sovereignty,” *Global Times*, December 2, 2013. In this interesting article, Xie asserts that the ECS ADIZ rules will be used at least in the short term to “challenge the presence of Japanese flights over the Diaoyu Islands.” Another commentator, Ren Xiao, states: “The ADIZ announcement was a continuation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku island crisis, a counter-measure that resulted from Japan and China’s failure to establish a mechanism to avoid conflict and manage the island dispute. . . . With China’s ADIZ established, the two countries are now more ‘equal.’” (“The ADIZ imbroglio: A Chinese View.”) A *New York Times* article quotes a Chinese scholar affirming that the ECS ADIZ was created by “China’s top foreign policy makers” to establish parity with Japan and to “force Japan to recognize that there is a dispute, and come to the negotiating table.” Jane Perlez, “Chinese Leader’s Rise Came With New Attention to Dispute With Japan,” *New York Times*, December 2, 2013. For a more hawkish stance, see Gao Qiufu, “Bright Spots and Difficulties in China’s Peripheral Diplomacy,” *Liaowang*, January 13, 2014, OSC CHR2014012319655202: “We should exert great efforts to strengthen maritime law-enforcement contingent, actively and effectively carry out patrols in the water areas surrounding the Diaoyu Islands, make patrol activities a routine, rid Japan of its so-called ‘de facto jurisdiction,’ and realize step by step China’s overall control over the water areas surrounding the Diaoyu Islands. Establishment of the air defense identification zone in the East China Sea has been declared, and resolute efforts should be made to put relevant regulations in place.”

⁵⁴ See “China’s ADIZ makes its point,” *People’s Daily Online*, December 9, 2013. The author states: “China’s task is to break [the U.S. and Japanese ADIZ] blockade. America and Japan have showed the way: if American and Japanese warplanes can enter China’s ADIZ without prior notification, then as a matter of logic Chinese aircraft can pass through Japan’s ADIZ without notification.” See also “PRC CCTV-4 ‘Focus Today’ on Japan Mulling Use of Tracer Bullets Over Senkakus,” January 9, 2013, OSC CPP20130110338001. Also see Jane Perlez, “Chinese Leader’s Rise Came With New Attention to Dispute With Japan,” *New York Times*, December 2, 2013. Perlez cites a Hong Kong–based magazine, *Asia Weekly*, stating that the creation of the ECS ADIZ constitutes “a great sea-air strategic breakthrough for China.”

⁵⁵ For authoritative sources, see “Defense Spokesman Yang Yujun’s Response to Questions on the Establishment of The East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” and “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 25, 2013.” Qin states: “normal flight activities by foreign international airlines within the East China Sea ADIZ will not be affected at all.” For sources that appear to represent important constituencies, as well as non-authoritative sources, see Xie Fayuan, “The Legitimate and Lawful Move of Safeguarding National Sovereignty and Security.” The article attributed to Xie states: “The ADIZ is not an expansion of the air territory nor an arbitrary extension of sovereignty over air territory. Within an ADIZ, normally, aircraft are just required to submit reports about their nationalities, positions, and flight plans. This does not affect their freedom of overflight according to international law.” See also “Resolutely Protecting the Sovereignty and Security of the National Territorial Airspace”; Jun Baoyan, “Who is creating dangers?”; and Meng Yan and Zhou Yong, “Air defense ID zone to deter those with designs on China’s territory.”

⁵⁶ “Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the P.R.C.,” Xinhua, November 23, 2013.

⁵⁷ Meng Yan and Zhou Yong, “Air defense ID zone to deter those with designs on China’s territory.”

⁵⁸ See Ren Xiaofeng & Cheng Xizhong, “A Chinese Perspective,” *Marine Policy*, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 139–146 (2005), cited in Dutton, “Caelum Liberam” (see endnote 3, above). Also see Su Xiaohui, “Who Is the Real ‘Regional Security Saboteur,’” *People’s Daily* (Overseas Edition), November 28, 2013, OSC CHL2013112830056176; and Jun Baoyan, “Words of Worry Come From Having an Ambitious Heart,” *Liberation Army Daily*, November 26, 2013, OSC CHO2013112625128475.

⁵⁹ Ni Guoan and Qi Wentao, “It Is Necessary To Set up National Air Defense Identification Zone as Soon as Possible,” *National Defense and Armed Forces Building in the New Century and New Age* (新世纪阶段国防和军队建设), October 1, 2008, OSC CPP20120319318003.

⁶⁰ For example, see Wu Zurong, “It Is Time for the United States To Wake Up and Not Get Pulled Down by Japan,” *Huanqiu Wang*, December 2, 2013, OSC CHR2013121800455847. Wu, executive director, Center for American Studies, China Foundation for International Studies, writes: “If the United States and Japan feel uncomfortable that the hegemonic actions of frequently flying military planes close to China on reconnaissance is being continuously exposed, then they should consider abandoning hegemonic logic, consulting with China, opening up positive cooperation, and jointly safeguarding the security of flight in East Asian airspace.” Also see Jun Baoyan, “Words of Worry Come From Having an Ambitious Heart,” *Liberation Army Daily*, November 26, 2013, OSC CHO2013112625128475; and Jun Baoyan, “Who is creating dangers?” In discussing the function of the ECS ADIZ, the author states: “For those abnormal, provocative flights involved in close-range reconnaissance and that harbor ulterior motives, any given country can adopt corresponding response measures in accordance with relevant regulations.” Referencing U.S. S&R activities, Fudan University professor Shen Dingli writes, “the anti-reconnaissance struggle at the front gate of China will continue and will only escalate further and further... How if the United States does not accept [China’s ECS ADIZ]? Well, it will eventually accept it in 20 years from now, but China has to start its efforts now. How if the United States still will not accept it 20 years later? Well, one day in the future, when China has both the intention and capability of having its combat aircraft fly freely in the United States’ air defense identification zone, I am afraid the United States will have to make compromise by then.” Shen Dingli, “The US Military’s Hegemonic Logic for Administering Close-In Reconnaissance,” *Guoji Xianqu Daobao*, December 20, 2013, OSC CHR2013123078324383.

⁶¹ Eric Donnelly, “The United States–China EP-3 incident: Legality and *realpolitik*,” *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 25–42 (2004).

⁶² Xie Chao, “China’s ADIZ is for more than just Diaoyu sovereignty.” The author states: “If the US doesn’t observe the ADIZ rules it took the time to establish and pay due respect to China’s ADIZ, China’s future air presence in the globe will find more legitimate and moral standing.” Also see Lu Desheng, “China’s Demarcation of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone is Reasonable and Legal”; Xing Hongbo,

“China’s ADIZ is justified”; Jin Kai, “With ADIZ, China Emerges As Regional Rule-Maker,” *Diplomat*, December 6, 2013; and Ni Guoan and Qi Wentao, “It Is Necessary To Set up National Air Defense Identification Zone as Soon as Possible,” *National Defense and Armed Forces Building in the New Century and New Age* (新世纪阶段国防和军队建设), October 1, 2008, OSC CPP20120319318003.

⁶³ For example, see “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 25, 2013”; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 27, 2013”; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 28, 2013”; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 29, 2013”; “Defense Spokesman Yang Yujun’s Response to Questions on the Establishment of The East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.” This claim is also repeated frequently in non-authoritative sources. See “Tokyo’s Complaints Over ADIZ Hypocritical”; Meng Yan and Zhou Yong, “Air defense ID zone to deter those with designs on China’s territory”; “China’s air defense zone doesn’t target specific country: expert”; Xing Hongbo, “China’s ADIZ is justified”; Ma Jun, “Why China Needs Air Defense Identification Zone.”

⁶⁴ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 25, 2013.”

⁶⁵ For an example of an authoritative source, see Lu Desheng, “China’s Demarcation of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone is Reasonable and Legal.” In it, interviewee Fu states: “The fast defense penetration capabilities of modern aircraft are constantly improving, which greatly increases the possibility of it forming a threat against countries that lack effective precautionary measures. China is a maritime power, and the East China Sea is approximately 600 nautical miles in length. Foreign aircraft frequently fly in the air above the East China Sea, and the sea conditions of the East China Sea are complex. Without being able to have prompt early warning, aircraft illegally intruding into China’s territorial airspace would constitute a serious threat and danger to China’s national sovereignty and rights of the sea.”

For an example of non-authoritative sources, see Ni Guoan and Qi Wentao, “It Is Necessary To Set up National Air Defense Identification Zone as Soon as Possible.” The authors argue that a Chinese ADIZ has become more necessary than in the past because of advances in high-technology, long-range air weapons capabilities, an overall increase in the number of foreign military aircraft (especially those conducting spying and reconnaissance activities near China’s borders, as noted above), and growing competition over marine resources. Also see Jun Baoyan, “Who is creating dangers?” The author suggests that China’s acquisition of capabilities to conduct rapid identification and response to aircraft entering the ECS ADIZ made it possible for Beijing to establish the zone.

⁶⁶ Li Ying, “China’s Diplomacy—From Laying Low and Bidding [sic] Time To Bracing Up and Pressing On,” *International Herald Leader*, January 14, 2014, OSC CHL2014011780879863.

⁶⁷ According to a knowledgeable Chinese source with whom the author discussed this issue, the notion of an ADIZ was first presented to the National People’s Congress in

2008 by PLA air force representatives, at the time when discussions of a Chinese ADIZ first appeared in the press, as indicated above.

⁶⁸ “Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the announcement on the ‘East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone’” (*see endnote 9 for publication details*); “China’s Establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea (Protest by Mr. Junichi Ihara, Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, MOFA, to Mr. Han Zhigiang, Minister of the Chinese Embassy in Japan),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, November 23, 2013; “Japan, U.S. Share ‘Strong Concern’ Over China’s Air Defense Zone,” Kyodo World Service, November 27, 2013, OSC JPR2013112755169249; and “Japan Calls For Repeal Of China’s Air Defense Zone,” NHK, November 25, 2013, OSC JPR2013112534556566. The last article cites Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu Kato stating that China’s zone “violates the principle of free flight over high seas. He said in China’s case, all aircraft flying in the nation’s air zone are subject to scrutiny, not just those approaching its territorial airspace.”

⁶⁹ “The United States Expresses Concern Over Growing Tensions Between Japan, China; Japan Hopes To Cooperate With the United States in Dealing With Issue Concerning China’s Establishment of New Air Defense Identification Zone,” *Kyodo Clue IV*, November 24, 2013, OSC JPL2013112502280902. See also “Japan rejects Beijing’s call to file flight plans in new air defense zone,” *Asahi Shimbun*, November 29, 2013; Kuniichi Tanida and Fumiaki Sonoyama, “SDF, U.S. military say operations unaffected by China’s ADIZ,” *Asahi Shimbun*, November 29, 2013; and Jeyup S. Kwaak and Yumi Otagaki, “South Korea, Japan Send Planes Into China’s New Defense Zone,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 28, 2013.

⁷⁰ “Japan, China Trade Barbs Over Controversial Air Defense Zone,” Kyodo World Service, November 25, 2013, OSC JPR2013112545235379.

⁷¹ Tim Kelly, “Japanese airlines to stop giving China flight plans through new zone,” Reuters, November 26, 2013; “Japan, China Trade Barbs Over Controversial Air Defense Zone.” Even after reports that South Korean airlines were now permitted to file flight plans with China, Japanese foreign minister Fumio Kishida stated during a press conference that “Japan’s stance stays unchanged.” However, he added that “Japan’s commercial airplanes take necessary measures which facilitates the easy identification of the number of flights, location information, etc. These airplanes are equipped with two-way radio telephone apparatus, automatic answering equipment among other devices, which enables communication at any time. Thus, unintended consequences such as our civilian aircrafts being tracked by Chinese military aircrafts will not and must not occur. With regard to the safety of commercial airlines, the Chinese side has repeatedly expressed that their safety will not be impacted. We believe unintended consequences will not and must not occur.” This potentially leaves Tokyo’s position on filing flight plans as slightly ambiguous. See “Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 13, 2013.

⁷² Kim Eun-jung, “S. Korea, Japan conduct search, rescue drill in East China Sea,” Yonhap, December 12, 2013. “Japan, South Korea hold East China Sea naval drill in message to Beijing,” *Japan Daily Press*, December 13, 2013.

⁷³ Graham Webster, “Statements in the evolving US rhetoric on the Chinese ADIZ,” *Transpacifica*, December 5, 2013. “State Department Daily Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of State, December 3, 2013.

⁷⁴ “Press Gaggle by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Josh Earnest Aboard Air Force One en route San Francisco, California,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, November 25, 2013; “White House Press Gaggle by Deputy Press Secretary Earnest,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, November 26, 2013.

⁷⁵ “White House Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, December 2, 2013. One State Department spokesperson also stated: “their requirements for operating exceed internationally accepted practice in this capacity.” See “State Department Daily Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of State, December 2, 2013.

⁷⁶ Craig Whitlock, “U.S. flies two warplanes over East China Sea, ignoring new Chinese air defense zone,” *Washington Post*, November 26, 2013.

⁷⁷ “The United States urges China not to implement the ADIZ, to refrain from taking similar actions elsewhere in the region, and to work with other countries, including Japan and North Korea—or rather, Japan and South Korea—to establish confidence-building measures, including emergency communications channels, to address the dangers its recent announcement has created and to lower tensions.” “White House Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, December 3, 2013. A U.S. State Department spokesperson stated that “U.S. carriers are being advised to take all steps they consider necessary to operate safely in the East China Sea region.” See “State Department Daily Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of State, November 27, 2013.

⁷⁸ On December 4, 2013, Joint Chiefs Chairman Martin Dempsey said, “And it’s not that the ADIZ itself is new or unique. The biggest concern that we have is how it was done so unilaterally and so immediately without any consultation . . . That’s not a wise course of action to take for any country . . . It wasn’t the declaration of the ADIZ that actually was destabilizing, it was their assertion that they would cause all aircraft entering the ADIZ to report, regardless of whether they were intending to enter into the sovereign air space of China. And that is destabilizing.” Kevin Baron, “Pentagon Lets Joe Biden Do the Talking With China,” *Defense One*, December 4, 2013.

⁷⁹ “Remarks to the Press by Vice President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan,” White House Office of the Vice President, December 3, 2013

⁸⁰ “Press Gaggle by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Josh Earnest Aboard Air Force One en route San Francisco.”

⁸¹ Kim Ji-hyun, “China informed Seoul of air defense zone,” *Korea Herald*, November 25, 2013; Song Sang-ho, “Seoul considers southward expansion of air defense zone,” *Korea Herald*, December 1, 2013; “S.Korea to discuss with China over air defense zone,” Xinhua, November 25, 2013.

⁸² Jeong Yong-Soo and Sarah Kim, “Korean Navy conducts drill close to Ieodo,” *Joongang Daily*, December 4, 2013.

⁸³ Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Announces Expansion of Its Air Defense Zone,” *New York Times*, December 8, 2013.

⁸⁴ Kim Eun-Jung, “S. Korea to step up patrols in new ADIZ,” *Yonhap*, December 9, 2013; Kim Eun-Jung, “S. Korea softens stance on civilian flight plan submission to China,” *Yonhap*, December 10, 2013.

⁸⁵ See Hsieh Chia-jen and Sofia Wu, “Taiwan’s military on top of regional developments: MND,” *Focus Taiwan*, November 27, 2013; “Taiwan Evasive On Cooperation With Japan On China’s Air Defense Zone,” *Kyodo World Service*, November 27, 2013, OSC JPR2013112735625011; Satoshi Ukai and Akihiko Kaise, “Taiwan shows restrained reaction to China’s ADIZ,” *Asahi Shimbun*, November 30, 2013; “President Ma to urge China not to designate ADIZ in South China Sea,” *Focus Taiwan*, December 6, 2013; Lee Shu-hua and Y.L. Kao, “President defends Taiwan’s stance on China’s ADIZ declaration,” *Focus Taiwan*, December 11, 2013.

⁸⁶ For example, see “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks on US Comments on China’s Establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 25, 2013; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 25, 2013”; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks on Japan’s Representations about China’s Establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 25, 2013; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 25, 2013”; Lu Desheng, “China’s Demarcation of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone is Reasonable and Legal”; “Defense Ministry spokesman on China’s air defense identification zone.”

⁸⁷ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks on US Comments on China’s Establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone.” Other instances in which the S/D islands are mentioned include: “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 25, 2013”; “Defense Ministry spokesman on China’s air defense identification zone”; “China’s top legislature rejects Japanese resolution on ADIZ,” *Xinhua*, December 7, 2013; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on December 11, 2013,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, December 11, 2013; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Remarks on the Japanese Leader’s Improper Comments on the Establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone by China,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, December 15, 2013.

⁸⁸ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 25, 2013.”

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on December 2, 2013,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, December 2, 2013.

⁹¹ “Foreign Ministry Lodges Protest on Japanese Side’s Unreasonable Accusation of China’s Setting up East China Air Defense Identification Zone,” *Xinhua*, November 25, 2013, OSC CHR2013112538691019.

⁹² “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 27, 2013.”

⁹³ “Transcript of Al-Jazirah Interview with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, January 9, 2014, OSC CHO2014010939208699.

⁹⁴ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 29, 2013.” MND spokesperson Yang Yujun stated, “the unique geographical environment of the East China Sea, in which China and Japan are facing each other across the sea, means that some overlap in the air defense identification zones is inevitable. We believe that the two sides should strengthen their contacts within the overlapping airspace in the air defense identification zones and uphold flight safety together.” “Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun’s regular press conference on November 28, 2013,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, November 28, 2013, OSC CHR2013113049786481.

⁹⁵ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on December 2, 2013.” For similar statements, see “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on December 3, 2013.” See also “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 29, 2013”; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on December 11, 2013.”

⁹⁶ Japan’s Jiji Press quoted Abe as saying in a television interview: “To help prevent accidental clashes from happening, we need a mechanism enabling the Chinese military and Japan’s Self-Defense Force (SDF) to communicate with each other both at sea and in the air.” See Hu Qingyun, “Abe’s Communication Proposal ‘Empty Talk,’” *Global Times*, December 20, 2013, OSC CHL2013122009367130. See also “Press Conference by the Defense Minister, December 10, 2013,” Ministry of Defense of Japan, December 10, 2013.

⁹⁷ Demetri Sevastopulo, Jennifer Thompson, and Simon Mundy, “US urges airlines to comply with China air rules,” *Financial Times*, November 30, 2013; “Press Conference by the Defense Minister, November 29, 2013,” Ministry of Defense of Japan, November 29, 2013; “Press Conference by the Defense Minister, December 10, 2013.”

⁹⁸ For a discussion of the S/D islands issue, see Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views Regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 41 (Spring 2013).

⁹⁹ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 29, 2013.”

¹⁰⁰ Also see the recent comments by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who states that current Japanese behavior toward China is possibly deliberately designed to create tensions in order to “get rid of various post-War shackles on Japan.” Wang suggests that this behavior is particularly dangerous in light of Tokyo’s failure to “understand the past history of aggression.” “Transcript of Al-Jazirah Interview with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi.”

¹⁰¹ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Remarks on the Japanese Leader’s Improper Comments on the Establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.”

¹⁰² “Defense Ministry spokesman on China’s air defense identification zone.” Also see the spokesperson’s earlier remarks from November 28. After listing several supposed Japanese provocations and affronts, the spokesperson states: “So, who is it that is

unilaterally altering the status quo? Also, who is it that is exacerbating regional tensions? Who is it that is continually intensifying contradictions? And who is it that is undermining regional security? I think the international community can reach its own conclusions. . . . as long ago as 1969 Japan had established and announced that it had implemented an air defense identification zone . . . if they want us to withdraw [our ADIZ], then we will ask Japan to withdraw its own air defense identification zone first, then China can reconsider things 44 years later.” “Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun’s regular press conference on November 28, 2013.”

¹⁰³ “China says ‘no dispute’ with S. Korea over Ieodo in new air zone,” Yonhap, November 25, 2013.

¹⁰⁴ A Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated: “China will stay in communication with the ROK in the principle of equality and mutual respect. We hope that the ROK will meet China halfway.” See “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on December 9, 2013,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, December 9, 2013. Also see “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on December 6, 2013,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, December 6, 2013.

¹⁰⁵ Deng Yushan, “Commentary: Safeguarding East Asian Security Needs Closer China S. Korea Coordination,” Xinhua, December 10, 2013, OSC CHR2013121029613391. Zhang Hong and Minnie Chan, “Beijing’s air defence zone aimed at making Tokyo negotiate, analysts say,” *South China Morning Post*, December 1, 2013. “Japan prime target of ADIZ tussle,” *Global Times*, November 29, 2013.

¹⁰⁶ See, for example, John Hofilena, “South Korean parliamentary committee adopts resolution slamming Japan’s recent acts,” *Japan Daily Press*, April 26, 2013; Akihiko Kaise, “Park criticizes Japan’s perception of history in summit with Obama,” *Asahi Shimbun*, May 8, 2013; Hyung-jin Kim, “S. Korea leader raps Japan during Hagel meeting,” Associated Press, September 30, 2013; Reiji Yoshida and Mizuho Aoki, “Abe visits Yasukuni, angering Beijing and Seoul,” *Japan Times*, December 26, 2013.

¹⁰⁷ See “December 2013 Ministry of National Defense Regular News Conference,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, December 26, 2013, OSC CHL2013122847385798; “December 2013 Ministry of National Defense Regular News Conference,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, December 26, 2013, OSC CHL2013122847385798; “Air defense zone in line with cross-strait interests: Spokeswoman,” Xinhua, November 27, 2013; and “Mainland spokeswoman blasts Taiwan opposition’s air zone stance,” Xinhua, December 11, 2013.

¹⁰⁸ Zhong Sheng, “Firm Will and Forceful Action,” *People’s Daily*, November 27, 2013, OSC CHN2013112709886813; Jun Baoyan, “How can ‘double standard’ safeguard regional peace?”; Jun Baoyan, “Who is creating dangers?”

¹⁰⁹ Zhong Sheng, “Firm Will and Forceful Action.”

¹¹⁰ Jun Baoyan, “How can ‘double standard’ safeguard regional peace?”

¹¹¹ See Jun Baoyan, “Words of Worry Come From Having an Ambitious Heart.”

¹¹² Zhou Yongsheng, “China will not revoke ADIZ.”

¹¹³ See “China’s ADIZ makes its point,” *People’s Daily Online*, December 9, 2013. Also see Xing Hongbo, “China’s ADIZ is justified.” The author asserts:

The air defense identification zones of other countries were established in the name of safeguarding national security and are defensive in nature. But when China establishes its first air defense identification zone, it suddenly becomes “unnecessarily inflammatory”, “destabilizing” and “dangerous” and invites an “unexpected situation” in the eyes of some. The abrupt change fits into the pattern of Washington’s double standards and Tokyo is only too happy to dance to Washington’s tune.

¹¹⁴ See “Tokyo’s Complaints Over ADIZ Hypocritical.” The suggestion to establish a crisis-management mechanism is discussed in the next section. At the same time, the author adds somewhat ominously: “If Japan sends warplanes to ‘intercept’ China’s jet fighters, Beijing’s armed forces will be bound to adopt defensive emergency measures.” Also see Han Xudong, “Wise diplomacy needed in ADIZ dispute to prevent tit-for-tat violence,” *Global Times*, December 3, 2013. Han is a professor at the PLA National Defense University.

¹¹⁵ Su Xiaohui, “Who Is the Real ‘Regional Security Saboteur.’” Su is the deputy director of the International Strategic Studies Department of China Institute of International Studies.

¹¹⁶ “Japan prime target of ADIZ tussle.”

¹¹⁷ Yu Zhirong, “Expert Perspective: Urging Japan To Not Make Light of Civil Aviation Aircraft Safety,” *International Herald Leader*, December 6, 2013, OSC CHR2013121782156069.

¹¹⁸ “Facts for Biden’s Reference,” *China Daily*, December 4, 2013.

¹¹⁹ “Observers Say Japan’s ‘Checkbook Diplomacy’ Could Bounce,” *China Daily Online*, December 16, 2013, OSC CHL2013121602151087; and Cai Hong, “Guests refuse to play ball with Abe,” *China Daily Online*, December 17, 2013.

¹²⁰ Liu Jiangyong, “Abe is Ascertained As ‘Source of Trouble in Asia,’” *People’s Daily*, December 27, 2013, OSC CHN2013122709449450. Liu is vice dean of the Academy of Contemporary International Relations of Qinghua University.

¹²¹ “Viewpoints: China air zone tensions,” BBC, November 28, 2013.

¹²² “Tokyo’s Menace Won’t Intimidate China.”

¹²³ Liu Chang, “Commentary: U.S. Risks Huge Loss In Asia Pacific If Japan Keeps Drifting To Far Right,” Xinhua, December 3, 2013, OSC CHR2013120330002245. For a similar assessment and recommendation for Washington, see Shang Jun, “Commentary: U.S. should act as honest broker,” Xinhua, November 27, 2013; and Chen Xiangyang, “US Should Size Up the Situation When Standing at China’s ‘Doorstep,’” *Liaowang*, December 9, 2013.

¹²⁴ Tania Branigan and Ed Pilkington, “China scrambles fighter jets towards US and Japan planes in disputed air zone,” *Guardian*, November 29, 2013. This article contains the cited quote, by Yan Xuetong, a Chinese foreign affairs scholar at Tsinghua University. Also see Wu Zurong, “It Is Time for the United States To Wake Up and Not Get Pulled Down by Japan,” *Huanqiu Wang*, December 2, 2013, OSC CHR2013121800455847; and “What Message Did Biden’s East Asia Visit Send Out,” Xinhua, December 7, 2013, OSC CHR2013120728120625.

¹²⁵ “Facts for Biden’s Reference.”

¹²⁶ Pu Zhendong and Cai Hong, “Air zone ‘beneficial to safety,’” *China Daily*, December 4, 2013. Also see “US should see big picture,” *China Daily*, December 5, 2013; Jia Xiudong, “Japan Often Cannot Understand Sino-US Relations,” *People’s Daily* (Overseas Edition), December 6, 2013, OSC CHN2013120608829504; “What Message Did Biden’s East Asia Visit Send Out”; Yu Zhirong, “Expert Perspective: Urging Japan To Not Make Light of Civil Aviation Aircraft Safety.” The author calls on Japan to “learn from the United States and call on its civil aviation aircraft which are passing through the East China Sea ADIZ to notify China of their flight plans ahead of time.” “Biden won’t ruin China visit over Japan,” *Global Times*, editorial, December 5, 2013. The editorial states: “We believe although the US has been clear in opposing China’s establishment of the ADIZ, both China and the US can handle this discrepancy.” In addition, alongside some bombastic criticism of Japanese “right-wing forces,” a Chinese military scholar suggests that Washington should play a constructive role in the ADIZ dispute by encouraging Tokyo to “sit down and coordinate and negotiate with China so as to maintain flight safety.” See Zhang Junshe, “The US Should Take an Impartial Stance toward China’s Newly Established ADIZ,” *China-US Focus*, December 3, 2013. Interestingly, in another article, Zhang argues that Washington’s strategy is to entrap both China and Japan in low-profile disputes so as to contain China, maintain U.S. hegemony and the offshore balance in Asia. “Chinese Scholars Discuss Complicated Regional Situation at Symposium,” *China Daily*, January 14, 2014, OSC CHL2014011401256105.

¹²⁷ “What Message did Biden’s East Asia Visit Send Out.”

¹²⁸ See Michael D. Swaine, “The 18th Party Congress and Foreign Policy: The Dog that Did Not Bark?” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 40 (Winter 2013).

¹²⁹ The clearest expression of this viewpoint is found in Jia Xiudong, “Japan Often Cannot Understand Sino-US Relations.”

¹³⁰ “B-52’s defiance no reason for nervousness,” *Global Times*, December 3, 2013. For similar characterizations of China’s response to such overflights, see Zhou Yongsheng, “China will not revoke ADIZ.” Despite some bombastic language with regard to incursions into the airspace over the S/D islands (see the above citation of this source), Zhou also stated that the B-52 overflight was not reckless, due to its limited flight path and cautious explanation.

¹³¹ “B-52’s defiance no reason for nervousness.”

¹³² See, for example, “Ten Highlights of China’s Military Diplomacy in 2013,” *Liberation Army Daily*, December 23, 2013, OSC CHN2013122729345652. Zhang Junshe, “The US Should Take an Impartial Stance toward China’s Newly Established ADIZ.” Zhou Yongsheng, “China will not revoke ADIZ.”

¹³³ Deng Yushan, “Commentary: Safeguarding East Asian Security Needs Closer China S. Korea Coordination.” In an ironic note (considering Beijing’s excessive reactions to Tokyo), the author adds that “the timing [of Seoul’s decision to expand its ADIZ] implies that the decision is grounded more on emotional impulse than on strategic thinking.”

¹³⁴ “Japan prime target of ADIZ tussle.”

¹³⁵ For example, in reference to Seoul’s reaction, a *Global Times* editorial states: “South Korea’s nationalism, which is different from Japan’s, poses no threat to China,” but then adds, ominously: “South Korea needs to be wary of the serious results if it drifts away

from healthy China-South Korea ties.” See “Seoul takes petty advantage but loses big picture,” editorial, *Global Times*, December 9, 2013.

¹³⁶ For example, see “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 25, 2013.”

¹³⁷ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 26, 2013,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 26, 2013. Also see “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 27, 2013.”

¹³⁸ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 27, 2013.”

¹³⁹ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 29, 2013.”

¹⁴⁰ “Defense Spokesman Yang Yujun’s Response to Questions on the Establishment of The East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.” Also see “Defense Ministry spokesman on China’s air defense identification zone.”

¹⁴¹ “December 2013 Ministry of National Defense Regular News Conference”; “Defense Ministry: China effectively monitors ADIZ in East China Sea,” Xinhua, December 26, 2013.

¹⁴² “Chinese military planes regularly patrol ADIZ: spokesman,” Xinhua, January 23, 2014. This included “voice warnings” given to “some” of the foreign military aircraft that had flown into the zone. “Program Summary: CCTV-7 ‘Military Report’ Mandarin 1130 GMT 24 JAN 14,” CCTV-7 Military Report (*Junshi Daobao*), OSC CHR2014012475235256.

¹⁴³ “China’s First Early Warning Aircraft Troop Unit Makes Debut,” *Liberation Army Daily*, January 23, 2014, OSC CHL2014012329739756. The article also stated that “in the near future, the early warning aircraft troop unit will be used to command directly the air combat group composed of fighters, bombers and tanker aircraft, and guide the land troops to make long-distance maneuver.”

¹⁴⁴ Phil Stewart and David Alexander, “Defying China, U.S. bombers fly into East China Sea zone,” Reuters, November 26, 2013.

¹⁴⁵ For example, see Zhou Yongsheng, “China will not revoke ADIZ.” The author states:

It’s . . . an effective form of management to follow and supervise the flights using ground-based radar within the ADIZ. Sending aircraft to conduct close monitoring is not necessary every time to deal with provocations. China will not be led by the nose, but will respond based on its own demands and the real situation within its ADIZ. With the flyover by the US and Japanese aircraft in China’s ADIZ, the countries challenged China but did not pose real threats, therefore, it was enough for China to supervise through ground-based radar.

Also see Diao Pu, “防空识别区采取的识别手段” (Identification procedures in the ADIZ), 人民海军 (*People’s Navy*), November 27, 2013; and Deng Yuan, “How Can China Control the Airspace of the East China Sea,” *International Herald Leader*, December 6, 2013. Another Chinese academic at the Air Force Engineering University writes:

The focus of an ADIZ lies in effective control, not in preventing “breaches.” So long as various airborne targets entering the ADIZ can be reliably identified and effective dispositive measures can be timely adopted for threatening targets, the objective of establishing an ADIZ is achieved. From another perspective, if there were no “breaches” by foreign military aircraft, there would be no need to establish an ADIZ.

Wang Peng, “There Is No Need to Get Tied Up in Knots Over Foreign Military Aircraft Breaching China’s Air Defense Identification Zone,” *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao Online*, January 17, 2014, OSC CHR2014011710278960.

¹⁴⁶ Zhang Junshe, “The US Should Take an Impartial Stance toward China’s Newly Established ADIZ”; Ren Youfeng, “A significant measure.”

¹⁴⁷ See “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 29, 2013”; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on December 2, 2013”; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on December 3, 2013.”

¹⁴⁸ See Zhang Hong and Minnie Chan, “Beijing’s air defence zone aimed at making Tokyo negotiate”; Jin Yongming, “Work To Make a Sea Change,” *China Daily*, January 8, 2014, OSC CHL2014010802460723. “Tokyo’s Complaints Over ADIZ Hypocritical”; Ren Youfeng, “A significant measure”; and Ren Xiao, “The ADIZ imbroglio”; Liang Wei, “Alert to Japan’s Intentions of Air Claims.” Also see Xing Hongbo, “China’s ADIZ is justified”; Han Xudong, “Wise diplomacy needed in ADIZ dispute to prevent tit-for-tat violence”; “Chinese officers told Japan about expanded air defense zone in 2010,” *Mainichi Shimbun*, January 1, 2014; “China’s air defense zone doesn’t target specific country: expert,” *Xinhua*, November 27, 2013.

¹⁴⁹ On Tang Jiaxuan’s proposal, see Zhang Hong and Minnie Chan, “Beijing’s air defence zone aimed at making Tokyo negotiate negotiate.”

¹⁵⁰ See “Facts for Biden’s Reference.”

¹⁵¹ For example, see “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on December 2, 2013.”

¹⁵² “China’s air defense zone doesn’t target specific country: expert”; and “Tokyo’s Menace Won’t Intimidate China.”

¹⁵³ Liang Hui, “China’s ‘Three Steps’ To Strengthen Control of the Diaoyu Islands”; “PRC CCTV-4 ‘Focus Today’ on Japan Mulling Use of Tracer Bullets Over Senkakus,” January 9, 2013, OSC CPP20130110338001.

¹⁵⁴ Zhang Hong and Minnie Chan, “Beijing’s air defence zone aimed at making Tokyo negotiate.”

¹⁵⁵ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on November 27, 2013.”

¹⁵⁶ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on December 9, 2013.”

¹⁵⁷ Demetri Sevastopulo, “China heightens fears of widening tensions in Asian airspace,” *Financial Times*, November 29, 2013.

¹⁵⁸ Wu Shicun, “Ignore Noise Around South China Sea ADIZ”; and Wu Shicun, “中国可能被迫划南海识别区美日不必大惊小怪” (China may be forced to establish a South China Sea ADIZ; the United States and Japan need not make a fuss about it), *Global Times*, January 3, 2014.

¹⁵⁹ A very small handful of articles appeared in January 2013 after China and Japan scrambled military jets against each other and Tokyo declared that it would fire warning shots against foreign aircraft intruding into its territorial airspace.

¹⁶⁰ Searches for the term “cyber” in *PD* and *LAD* articles from January 2009 and August 2013 yielded an average of 25 and 14 hits per month in the two respective media outlets (unpublished; figures obtained from the Duxiu database at the Library of Congress). Between 2010 and 2012, only a handful of authoritative and roughly 100 non-authoritative statements were made in Chinese media regarding the U.S. “pivot” policy to Asia. *LAD* had 17 references, including 12 relevant references to “Return to Asia” (重返亚洲) or “Return to the Asia-Pacific” (重返亚太) and 5 relevant references to “rebalancing” (再平衡). A search for Air-Sea Battle (空海一体战) from January 1, 2000, to June 5, 2012, yielded five results in *People’s Daily* (two of which were in late 2011, and three in 2012) and 15 results in *Liberation Army Daily* (one in 2000, three in 2010, 11 in 2011, and one in 2012). See Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the U.S. Pacific Pivot,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 38 (Summer 2012). On media coverage of the S/D islands, articles that referred to Japanese militarism in the context of the S/D islands were searched using the phrases “militarism” (军国主义) and “Japan” (日本) along with any appearances of the phrase “Diaoyu Dao” (钓鱼岛). This search query generated 24 matches in *Liberation Army Daily*, of which roughly 88 percent occurred after September 11, 2012; and 48 matches in *People’s Daily*, of which roughly 83 percent occurred after September 11, 2012. Articles that referred to Japanese fascism in the context of the S/D islands were searched using the phrases “fascism” (法西斯) and “Japan” (日本) along with any appearances of the phrase “Diaoyu Dao” (钓鱼岛). This search query generated 31 relevant results in *Liberation Army Daily*, of which approximately 94 percent appeared after September 11, 2012, and 22 relevant results in *People’s Daily*, of which approximately 77 percent occurred after September 11, 2012. Articles that referred to the S/D islands situation as a “farce” were searched using the phrase “farce” (闹剧) along with any appearances of the phrase “Diaoyu Dao” (钓鱼岛). This search query resulted in 34 returns in *Liberation Army Daily*, of which 77 percent occurred after September 11, 2012. Within the *People’s Daily* database, this search query actually resulted in over 3,000 hits, with over 18 percent occurring after September 11, 2012. The large number of search results may be explained in part by the commonness of the phrase “闹剧” in Chinese; furthermore, it is impossible to identify how each article used the phrase “闹剧” in context, only that the returned articles contained this phrase along with “钓鱼岛” (Diaoyu Dao). Nonetheless, the vast majority of the search results occurring after September 11, 2012, referred specifically to Japan’s purchase or its current behavior as a “farce” (闹剧) as indicated by the presence of the phrase “island purchase” (购岛) in those articles. Articles that referred to Japanese “right-wing” elements in the context of the S/D islands were searched using the phrases “Japan” (日本) and “right wing” (右翼) along with any appearances of the phrase “Diaoyu Dao” (钓鱼岛). This search query generated 59 relevant sources in *Liberation Army Daily*, of which roughly 76 percent appeared after September 11, 2012, and 128 relevant sources in *People’s Daily*, of which roughly 60 percent appeared after September 11, 2012. See Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views Regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 41 (Spring 2013).

¹⁶¹ Audrye Wong provided this analysis on comparative hits with other issues of the *China Leadership Monitor*.

¹⁶² Michael D. Swaine, "China's North Korea Dilemma," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 30 (2009).

¹⁶³ Japan's Defense Ministry announced a 50 percent increase in the number of scrambles against Chinese aircraft from October to December 2013, as compared to the same period a year earlier. However, ministry officials declined to comment on whether the number had increased after China's ADIZ declaration. "Number of Scrambles Against Chinese Aircraft Rises," NHK Online, January 21, 2014, OSC JPR2014012136321394. During press conferences, Japan's defense minister has also refused to comment or elaborate on Chinese military aircraft activity and whether SDF planes were escorted, stating only that Japan would continue its regular early warning and surveillance activities. "Press Conference by the Defense Minister, November 26, 2013," Ministry of Defense of Japan, November 26, 2013; and "Press Conference by the Defense Minister, November 29, 2013," Ministry of Defense of Japan, November 29, 2013.

Since November 23, when China announced its ADIZ, there have only been two publicized Japanese military scrambles against Chinese aircraft incursions into the Japanese ADIZ. The first incident occurred on the day of the announcement, involving Tu-154 and Y-8 aircraft. The second incident occurred on January 7, 2014, involving an SOA Y-15 propeller plane that approached the S/D islands from the northwest but changed direction about 160km away from the islands. A few days later, Chinese Coast Guard ships also entered Japanese territorial waters around the S/D islands. The Tu-154 flight on November 23, which flew close to the boundaries of China's new ADIZ and within 40km of the S/D islands, appears to have been the most provocative in terms of deepest penetration into Japan's ADIZ. Two previous Tu-154 flights on November 16 and 17, respectively, flew along Japan's ECS median line and China's declared 200nm limit from its continental shelf. See "中国军机首巡东海防空识别区 日机升空应对" (Chinese military planes conduct first patrol of ECS ADIZ; Japanese planes scramble in response), *China News*, <http://www.chinanews.com/mil/hd2011/2013/11-25/268710.shtml>. "Chinese Government Aircraft Approaches Senkaku Islands," NHK World, January 7, 2014, OSC JPL2014010743211914. "Defense Ministry Releases Map, Photo of PRC Aircraft Near Senkaku Islands 7 January," Ministry of Defense of Japan, January 7, 2014, OSC JPL2014010829215437. Yang He, "Japan Threatens Use of Force," *Global Times*, January 13, 2014.