



Communicating with the World of Islam

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This publication seeks to answer three questions:

1. What can we learn from the broadcasting experience of the Cold War, particularly by examining the experiences of Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, the BBC, and the Voice of America?
2. What are current broadcasting efforts into the world of Islam and, in particular, into countries of the Arabian Peninsula, Iran, Egypt, and the Muslim communities of Europe?
3. What are the best ways of organizing U.S. efforts to communicate with the world of Islam?

LESSONS LEARNED

Drawing on a recent summary of lessons learned from the Cold War broadcasting experience,* we set out below a number of the reasons for the success of that experience, along with some discussion of those lessons.

1. Cold War broadcasting efforts were guided by a clear sense of purpose with emphasis on strategic objectives. The objectives were to constrain Soviet power (without provoking suicidal revolt), to keep alive hope of a better future, to limit tyranny, and to broaden the boundaries of internal debate, all in order to make the Soviet empire a less formidable adversary. These strategic objectives emerged after some fumbling in the early 1950s with notions of early “liberation,” “rollback,” and “keep[ing] the pot boiling.”

*Provided by A. Ross Johnson and R. Eugene Parta and included in full as Appendix B. The lessons identified here emerged from papers and discussions at the conferences mentioned in the Preface. Conference participants had studied the records of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, now located at the Hoover Institution; had been part of the effort of the Radios and of Voice of America and the BBC; or were at the receiving end of the broadcasts in one capacity or another.

2. Methods for appraising effectiveness were developed to guide fiscal allocations, but even more importantly, to suggest new ways of going about the effort.
3. A strong capability for sophisticated appraisal of the adversary was developed and a cadre of specialized researchers with deep area expertise was assembled. This information and analysis function was not envisaged at the outset; it was developed at Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) over time in response to operational need. It became in turn a major contributor to U.S. government and scholarly analyses.
4. Differentiated and tailored programs were developed for multiple audiences among and within target countries. Balanced world and regional news was a staple for all audiences. Programs for Communist elites included coverage of conflicts within and among Communist parties and reports on social democracy in Europe. Programs for non-Communist elites covered Western culture and intellectual life and, as internal dissent developed, amplification of that dissent. Programs for general audiences covered everything from agriculture to religion to labor to sports. Banned

Western and internal music was featured. Willis Conover of Voice of America (VOA) introduced a generation of Russians and Poles to jazz; the RFE Hungarian Service “Teenager Party” program attracted a generation of Hungarian youth to RFE; and Western music attracted listeners in the other RFE target countries as well. In the USSR, the *magnitizdat* phenomenon introduced banned Soviet underground music to a wide public.

5. The programs were purposeful, responsible, and relevant to their audiences, and a great effort was made to develop their credibility. Events of the day were covered, but thematic programming was important as well (e.g., a series on parliamentary institutions in a democracy). Commentary was included along with straight news and news analysis, and audiences were attracted to star-quality commentators. It was essential that programs built and maintained credibility by reporting the bad news along with the good, as in coverage of Watergate and Vietnam. Responsible programming was, at its best, calm in tone and, after the early 1950s, it avoided transmitting tactical advice and, especially, any encouragement of violent resistance. Programming emphasized local developments and was attuned to the listeners through constant au-

dience feedback obtained from traveler surveys and listener mail, and through continuous management of quality control.

6. The broadcast organizations believed in decentralization and in a large measure of autonomy for country broadcast units. This led to wider audiences and to the improvement and quality that typically stem from competition.
7. The broadcasts were accompanied by multiple-media operations beginning with balloon leaflets in the 1950s, and later including periodicals, Western books, and locally unpublished texts.
8. Funding was provided by Congress at levels that were adequate without being lavish and was subject to careful fiscal oversight.
9. Distance and insulation from official government policies were sustained and a tradition of journalistic independence nourished. The authorizing legislation, Section 2 of the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973, provided for “an independent broadcast media, operating in a manner not inconsistent with the broad foreign policy objectives of the United States and in accordance with high professional standards,” giving RFE and RL considerable

journalistic flexibility. Advocacy of specific U.S. policies was not required and was, in fact, avoided. The BBC enjoyed similar autonomy in the British context. VOA's journalistic independence, affirmed in 1976 by law in the VOA Charter, was sometimes challenged by administration policy interference and complicated by the requirement to broadcast administration policy editorials.

10. The target audiences lived in an "information poor" environment subject to continual propaganda and censorship, which created receptive listeners, a key ingredient for success. East Europeans, in particular, felt especially cut off from the rest of Europe and were predominantly pro-American.
11. The participation of émigrés in broadcasts was handled carefully. This was no simple task because émigrés frequently exaggerate both positive and negative news. Nevertheless, the Cold War experience showed that it is possible and important to use known figures who are fluent in the language of the country in which a program is broadcast.
12. A flow of events offered opportunities because people denied information by propaganda sources are generally eager to know what is going on. Chernob-

byl is an interesting example because the endangered population got all its initial news about the event from the West and either nothing or a distorted view from the Soviets. Credibility makes it possible for broadcasters to take full advantage of these events.

In brief, Western broadcasts had a remarkable impact in the USSR and Eastern Europe during the Cold War. They reached mass audiences, as documented by traveler surveys at the time and confirmed now by evidence from the formerly closed Communist archives. And they reached essential elites, both within the Communist regimes and among regime opponents. The main keys to the mass and elite audiences were the credibility and relevance of the broadcasts. Government mechanisms were geared to providing public funding and oversight while ensuring management autonomy and journalistic independence.

Current Efforts

The United States and other Western countries currently support a variety of broadcasting efforts (including radio, television, and Internet Web sites) to the Middle East. As distinct from the Cold War period, however, there is a

plethora of indigenous TV and radio broadcasting, more in some countries than others. New radio and TV indigenous initiatives keep appearing. This represents the competition or, in some cases, an opportunity to make common cause in some manner, but it represents a much more complex problem than the Cold War problem.

The following listing, though certainly not exhaustive, captures a great deal of what the United States* and other Western countries are broadcasting in the Middle East. We limit ourselves here to a listing; details may be found in the publications and Web sites of the various broadcasters. In the Arabic language, the United States currently supports Radio Sawa, RFE/RL's Radio Free Iraq, and Al Hurra Television. The BBC World Service broadcasts in Arabic throughout the Middle East. Deutsche Welle has Arab-language radio and television programs. Other Arab-language international broadcasters include Kol Israel and French-sponsored Radio Monte Carlo.

In the Persian language, the United States supports

*Since the passage of the International Broadcasting Act in 1994, all U.S. international broadcasting is under the direction of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (an Executive Branch agency headed by eight governors of both parties nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate and the Secretary of State). The BBG is intended to insulate the broadcasting entities from U.S. government pressure. Information on the BBG and the broadcasters it oversees is available at www.bbg.gov.

Radio Farda, Voice of America radio, and Voice of America television. Other Persian-language international broadcasters include the BBC, China Radio International, Deutsche Welle, Kol Israel, NHK Radio Japan, Radio France International, and Voice of Russia.

The United States also supports a number of RFE/RL and VOA programs in the languages of Afghanistan and Pakistan: Uzbek, Kurdish, Dari, Pashto, and Urdu. The BBC broadcasts in Pashto, Uzbek, and Urdu. Deutsche Welle broadcasts in Afghan languages.

Various privately run endeavors exist as well. Los Angeles has a large Iranian community, and there are numerous stations run by expatriates that broadcast satellite TV programs to Iran. Layalina Productions, started in March 2002, is a private, non-profit corporation dedicated to creating informational and entertaining television programming to bridge the divide between the Arab Middle East and the United States.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In this section we survey briefly the current state of the Arab world and Iran, and then consider how the experience in Cold War broadcasting can be applied to current efforts to influence the world of Islam.

*The Arab Lands**

The United States is involved in a critical struggle against a complex movement of radical Islam that uses the tactics of terror in an effort to change the way the world works. U.S. military and economic efforts to deal with this problem are a necessary but not sufficient condition for success. As President Bush said in his 2005 inaugural address, “In the long-term, the peace we seek will only be achieved by eliminating the conditions that feed radicalism and ideologies of murder. If whole regions of the world remain in despair and grow in hatred, they will be the recruiting grounds for terror, and that terror will stalk America and other free nations for decades. The only force powerful enough to stop the rise of tyranny and terror, and replace hatred with hope, is the force of human freedom.”

There is a canon nowadays that dwells on the rampant anti-Americanism in Arab and Muslim lands. The pollsters — the Pew survey, the Zogby survey, and others — return from those lands with what have become predictable results: huge majorities in Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia proclaim an uncompromising anti-Americanism. Those results are then inserted into our national debate, and the received

*This section is based on a draft by Fouad Ajami.

wisdom is that the anti-Americanism has been triggered by America's war against terror, by our toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, and by the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. This political judgment can be questioned, and there is a whole different way of reading this anti-Americanism. "They hate us, what's wrong with us?" ought to yield to another way of framing this large question: "They hate us, what's eating at their societies?" In critically important societies in the "broader Middle East," anti-Americanism is the diet that rulers provide for populations denied a role in the making of a decent public order. "Nations follow the religion of their kings," goes an Arabic maxim. The anti-Americanism in some Muslim lands is part of the rulers' strategy, an expression of the revolt against modernism plaguing Islamic societies today.

In freedom's confrontation with the Communist world, our broadcasting aimed at, and found, populations eager for an alternative source of information to compete with the official "truth." The Arab-Muslim world today presents a different challenge. This world is "wired" in the extreme, its public life a tumult of arguments and messages, its underemployed young people prey to the satellite channels, to the radical preachers, and to the steady drumbeats of anti-Americanism. A strategy to reach these populations would have to acknowledge the difficulty of this terrain.

The American dilemma is particularly acute in Arab and

Muslim societies supposedly in our strategic orbit — Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and Jordan come to mind. In the words of the distinguished historian Bernard Lewis, these lands could be described as pro-American regimes with anti-American populations. They contrast with Iran, where the rulers are anti-American but the population is on the other side. In the two most important Arab countries — Saudi Arabia and Egypt — the ground is treacherous. These two countries, it is fair to say, gave us Al Qaeda and the death pilots of 9/11. It is from the “deep structure” of these two societies that the modern phenomenon of Islamist terrorism emerged. Starkly put, the disaffected children of these two countries came together to strike at America as part of their campaign to bring down their entrenched regimes. A ruthlessly brilliant man of the upper reaches of Egyptian society, the physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, distinguished between what he called “the near enemy” (the Arab regimes), and “the distant enemy” (the United States). The terror against America was the choice made because our country was open and unaware of the dangers stalking it; because the Islamists could slip through our open borders, exploiting liberty and constitutional limits.

The Saudi and Egyptian custodians of power know that America was caught in the crossfire between themselves and their Islamists, but they never own up to it. They play with

us a double-game: they provide us with some intelligence and access to their workings, and to the ways of their networks of terror, while scapegoating their domestic troubles by nurturing a culture and a public information system poisoned by a malignant anti-Americanism. You need only read *Al-Ahram*, President Hosni Mubarak's principal newspaper, to be treated to the ceaseless anti-Americanism and conspiracy theories. Likewise with the press and with the religious pulpits of Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabi hatred of modernism is fierce, and anti-Americanism now suffuses that country's life. There are thousands of liberal/secularist Saudis, many of them educated by our elite universities, but they are hunkered down and terrified, and, frankly, they don't see us as their friends. In their world, American power is tethered to the ruling dynasty, and this embattled minority is in a no-man's-land.

Our leaders know the depth, and the danger, of these two Arab settings. In both his seminal speech to the National Endowment for Democracy in November 2003 and in his State of the Union Address of 2005, President Bush spoke to, and of, these problematic allies in Riyadh and Cairo: "The government of Saudi Arabia can demonstrate its leadership in the region by expanding the role of its people in determining their future. And the proud nation of Egypt, which showed the way toward peace in the

Middle East, can now show the way toward democracy in the Middle East.” We have been trying to wean these two nations away from their authoritarian ways. But these two regimes, it must be conceded, have been good at feeding the forces of anti-Americanism while cooperating with America in the shadows. A terrible price has been paid in the process: the modernist possibilities have been damaged in these two lands, and we, for our part, have paid dearly for dangers that came our way from purported allies.

Egypt is a proud nation, to be sure. But its pride stands in sharp relief against the background of dismal political, economic, and cultural results. Egypt’s standing has eroded on all the indices that matter — political freedom, economic advance, transparency in economic and public life. Fairly or not, we are implicated in the deeds of the Mubarak regime. This is our second-largest recipient of foreign aid, but the aid has been squandered, and Egypt is in the throes of a deep political crisis. From Egypt, we hear a steady mix of anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism, and anti-modernism. Our embassy there has been caught up in an ongoing clash with the media and with the organs of the regime. What is said about America in that crowded and important country is a betrayal of the American aid given to Egypt. We have not been good at reaching Egyptians, or at challenging the conspiracy theories that have become a staple of their public life. We need to break out of this unhealthy embrace of

the Egyptian regime. This is a pan-Arab matter, for Egyptians — in the main embittered, angry, and disappointed in their country — have turned on us in all arenas. They expressed no remorse for the terrors of 9/11, they opposed the Iraq war, and both the regime and the “civil society” were remarkably hostile to the Iraqi people’s attempt to rid themselves of the legacy of Saddam Hussein’s tyranny.

In Saudi Arabia, the challenge is equally daunting. Powered with a new windfall — in 2004, Saudi Arabia took in \$110 billion in oil income — public life in that country is filled with a belligerent kind of piety. The religion is made to carry and express the revolt against reason, a determination to frighten the liberal minority within the land, and to spread Wahhabism’s influence abroad. The regime has manipulated this religious bigotry, allowed it ample running room, and given it access to the mosques and to the religious institutions and philanthropies. But of late, there has been something of a retreat from this policy on the part of the House of Saud. The extremists have brought the fight onto Saudi soil. The tranquility of the realm has been shattered, and with it the smug belief that Arabia was immune to sedition and troubles. It must be this re-assessment that accounts for the new moderation of the Saudi-owned satellite television news channel Al-Arabiya (based in Dubai) and of the influential newspaper *Asharq Al-Awsat*. (The former is owned by in-laws of the late King Fahd, while the

latter is the property of King Fahd's full brother, Prince Salman, and presided over by Salman's son, Prince Faisal.) The Saudis may just be awakening to the monster of radicalism that they had fed and let loose on others.

These Arab and Muslim countries need to be monitored, and known as they are. We need able linguists and interpreters. We need to persist with the message, so forcefully stated by President Bush, that we stand for liberty and that we believe that liberty can flourish on Arab and Muslim soil. Our enemies (Iran, Syria, the rogues) need to be told this as often, and as forcefully, as our friends in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. For decades, we have accepted a terrible bargain with Arab and Muslim authoritarianism. On 9/11 we discovered that the bargain did not work. A public diplomacy worth the effort and the price tag must start from that recognition. Its message must be free of any debilitating guilt. We have to state in unequivocal terms our belief in the necessity of modernity in Muslim lands. We must let the rulers and their circles of power know that we are listening in on them, that we are in the know as to the sort of things they say on their television channels and in their papers and in their pulpits. We might be surprised to find out that the tone changes in those lands once people are put on notice that we have shed our innocence, and that we are no longer taken in by their dissimulation.

Much of what has been said about the impact of the Iraq war on America's standing in Arab lands is off the mark. Beyond the headlines of roadside bombs and daily carnage, there is a vibrant media culture in Iraq today. By one estimate, there are more than 250 daily and weekly papers in Iraq; there is a multiplicity of private radio and television stations in Baghdad and in the other provinces. There is no censorship of the media. This is a healthy contrast to the servile press in neighboring Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. We are slowly — and painfully at times — winning this bet on freedom in Iraq. It is their world, and they will have to do most of the repair. But our power and support matter greatly, as does the optimistic and uplifting message articulated by President Bush that we will not consign the Arabs to the “soft bigotry of low expectations.”

We need to develop — by example, and with our support — the middle ground between the media of incitement (Al Jazeera) and the servile media of the Arab regimes. Al Jazeera is now nearly a decade old. It caters to “the street” and to popular passions. It has its audience, and it always will. But doubts have arisen about its brand of journalism. There is distrust of it among Iraqis and among Lebanese because the satellite channel does not support their quest for freedom. The taste for the spectacular may have peaked, and credible journalism could make a dent on the Arab psyche.

*Iran**

The case of Iran offers challenges and promises different from those in the Arab world. Historically, Iranians have seen themselves as distinct from Arabs and dislike being lumped together with them. Furthermore, the reality on the ground in Iran today makes the country different from the rest of the Muslim Middle East. The biggest difference is that the people of Iran seem to be overwhelmingly pro-American and pro-democracy while the unelected mullahs who rule them see virulent anti-Americanism as part of their *raison d'être*.

The delicacy of the U.S. position lies precisely in the fact that while it must work to curtail Iran's ambitions for nuclear weapons, it must not, in the short run, seem to be making a "deal" that legitimizes the regime.

The powerful democratic movement in Iran, now in temporary tactical retreat as the result of the failures of the Khatami experience and the last "election," is sure to stir back into full action at some unpredictable moment in the future. The United States can help bring about that "moment" and, at the same time, must begin planning for how to help the transition to democracy when the moment comes.

In navigating our way to a solid public diplomacy strat-

*This section is based on a draft by Abbas Milani.

egy on Iran, we must have a clear and sober analysis of our friends and foes in Iran, including their relative strengths and weaknesses. The Iranian democratic movement, the middle class that is its backbone, and the urban women who have spearheaded it for the past quarter of a century are the strategic allies of the United States. The Iranian youth who constitute close to 60 percent of the population are predominantly pro-democratic and pro-Western, and thus form part of the embryonic pro-American grand alliance for democracy. Many members of the Iranian industrial entrepreneurial group have been trained in the West; they are by and large pro-American and are wary of the regime's corruption, incompetence, and adventurism. They want a thriving private sector, a thinning role for the state, an end to corruption and crony capitalism, an end to the embargo, extended economic ties with the United States, and, more than anything else, the rule of law. They, too, are our allies. More and more of the urban poor and elements of the Iranian countryside are beginning to lose what little faith they had in the system. The economically powerful Iranian Diaspora in the United States wants democracy in Iran and can help underwrite the cost of the transition to democracy. More importantly, they can be a helpful resource in fine-tuning the way we talk to the Iranian population. We must find ways to strengthen the democratic movement by bringing together these disparate forces

while at the same time not giving the mullahs an excuse to attack or muzzle them.

In talking with the Iranian people, we must keep in mind both strategic as well as tactical goals and tools. As in the days of the Cold War, we need to use every tool and weapon in our arsenal. These include publishing magazines that promote democracy, supporting publishing houses that contribute to the strengthening of a democratic dialogue, organizing conferences that deal with issues relating to democracy in Iran, and finally helping establish a 21st-century media to speak with the Iranian people that includes short-wave and medium-wave radio and television, radio pod-casting, and the Internet, all dedicated to the promotion of democracy in Iran. We need to use language free from the taint of hectoring or condescension and commensurate with the sophisticated democratic discourse that has recently evolved in Iran. What works in Egypt or Saudi Arabia does not necessarily work in Iran. In each case, the message and the medium must fit the intended recipients. The thousands of exiled Iranian intellectuals can help fashion a language that best suits Iran.

Iran today is unusually well “wired”; it is the country with the most bloggers—some 75,000—after Brazil and the United States. There is also a nascent movement in the use of radio pod-casting—personal computers used for private, Internet-accessible radios. In addition, of the country’s

75 million people, some 20 million have access to satellite dishes that connect them to the outside world and to the Iranian Diaspora media. That leaves another 55 million who are without access, and they hold the key to the future success of the pro-American democratic coalition.

However, the Diaspora media has failed to mobilize the masses and has gradually lost its credibility as a reliable source of news. The United States can help ignite the democratic movement by providing technological assistance through medium- and short-wave access that allows the great majority of Iranians to participate in what can become, even in its initial phase, the virtual community of the democratic coalition. Pope John Paul's journey to Poland in 1979 ignited the country's democratic movement by conveying to the millions of Poles who had come to greet the Pontiff that they were not alone. In Iran today, an expanded and expert media presence with a honed message that reaches every corner of the country could play the same unifying role. It could convey news about the democratic movement, expose the corruption and despotism of the regime, and inform the masses of the real news of the country and of the world.

Aside from these strategic considerations, the United States can also make a number of short-term tactical gestures that will disarm the regime's anti-American rhetoric and strengthen the hands of the democratic movement.

Here are two examples:

1. Put an immediate end to the embargo on the import of earthquake warning equipment. Iran sits on some of the world's most dangerous faults and the Islamic regime has been reckless in doing absolutely nothing about this danger. It is estimated that the Iranian capital, Tehran, would lose close to two million people in a future quake. Donating some of this equipment would not only expose the regime's dangerous dereliction of duty but also would improve the image of the United States in Iran and the rest of the Muslim world.
2. Provide detailed programs that show the real costs and dangers of Iran's nuclear program and underscore the fact that acquiring nuclear bombs may prolong the life of the regime.

Influencing the World of Islam

The malady in the Arab lands and Iran thus understood, here are some thoughts about how to undertake the task of influencing the world of Islam in a positive direction:

1. Broadcast and provide information. Lessons of the Cold War experience show that international broadcasting and associated information methods can have

an important impact and play a significant role in dealing with the problem. The task is much more complicated in this case because the target audience is so diverse and the competition for attention is so large. Nevertheless, the mission is essential and the job can be done.

2. Construct a realistic sense of mission. While radical Islam is, in a sense, the problem, the mission needs to focus on helping what may be called mainstream Muslims address the issues and take on the radicals. In the end, it is the Islamic community itself that needs to engage in this battle and we need to encourage that effort. In doing so, we advance the spread of freedom and democracy, and we encourage the regimes to provide good and responsive governance for their people. We also know that radical Islamists cannot function without a surrounding population that acquiesces in, or can be frightened into, supporting or not opposing them. So our effort has to be to dry up the sea of support in which terrorists swim. That is the mission.
3. Build a credible case for the necessity of the effort. Outline in broad terms what needs to be done and thereby attract the funds that will draw high talent to the effort, will assure sustainability, and will allow for considerable variety in what is undertaken.

4. Study the target audiences carefully. We will need to differentiate among them. Words like “Arabs” or “Muslims” are deceptive because they conceal immense variety. Above all, pay attention to women, who in some countries* are kept out of everyday life and have huge amounts of time to watch TV at home where the morals police can’t get at them. Women’s content programming is essential. Something similar, but with very different content, should be designed for another vast audience, unemployed males who sit around at the corner coffeehouses all day.
5. Beyond the broad sweep of programs such as those now sponsored by the U.S. government, make special efforts to target audiences in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, the Muslim communities in Western Europe, and possibly Pakistan. The history of radical movements shows that a high proportion of them originate in one form or another in these areas.
6. Include both U.S. government and outside efforts. Unfortunately, proficiency in languages and efforts at area studies have declined in the United States. Current Mideast Studies programs are inadequate. A

*The daily lives of women vary greatly in Arab countries, e.g., Lebanon and Egypt versus Saudi Arabia.

major effort is necessary to encourage universities to undertake scholarship in this field and to preserve and enhance all the ways in which the relevant languages are acquired by at least a reasonable number of Americans.

7. Monitor what people say and be ready to interact. Much of what passes for commentary is altogether delusional. The Middle East, always remember, is the world center for conspiracy theories. So some sort of counter-conspiracy desk is needed. If we are candid, open, and factually correct, we have a platform for countering some of this delusional talk. Much of the world of Islam has lost contact with reality, with the relationship of cause to effect. Reality needs to be a centerpiece in what we talk about.
8. As part of the effort to connect people with reality, place emphasis on the importance and the virtues of work. Among the problems in the European Muslim community is the fact that, as estimated for some urban areas, well over half the men of Moroccan origin over the age of forty were living on welfare of one kind or another and had little expectation of working. Work connects people with reality.
9. We need to think through the problem of addressing the Muslim populations in Western Europe, espe-

cially, though not exclusively, those in Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Germany. We will need close collaboration with the governments involved but we need to approach them with ideas of our own. We might ask ourselves, “How do we deal with intolerant and violent forces in a tolerant society?” and “How do we encourage sensible Muslim voices to rise above the intolerant barrage?”

10. We also need to develop ideas and approaches to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran. Each is different.
11. Develop means of evaluating the effects of our efforts. This is essential in maintaining funding but also in the constant process of honing our messages so that they are as effective as possible.
12. Encourage differentiated programs that are broadly consistent with the worldview of the United States and allow for decentralized creativity in efforts to reach various populations and in developing ways of putting messages. In this connection, émigrés can be very helpful, but they need to be evaluated with great care. Émigrés tend to exaggerate the positive and the negative, but really credible individuals can be identified and they can carry great weight when they speak because, among other reasons, they manage the language in a natural way.

13. Although governmental efforts are the centerpiece in all of this, private efforts can be helpful. As a first example, Layalina Productions, mentioned earlier, is developing program content under the leadership of former ambassador Richard Fairbanks. The idea is to air these programs on existing and watched stations. This effort deserves support. A second example is that generated by a group of advertising people on behalf of a number of companies operating overseas. Their work stems from a salesman's incentive to get people abroad to like Americans and, therefore, their products. That is a goal certainly compatible with U.S. government objectives.
14. Put emphasis on the importance of education in the basic sense of the word. Too much of what passes for education in the world of Islam is simply propaganda and doesn't prepare people adequately for tasks of work and tasks of critical evaluation of what they are hearing. Special incentives might be developed to encourage people to learn the English language.
15. There are many voices in the Arab world that carry encouraging and reasonable messages, often with an effort to legitimize themselves by including some critical comments about America. We should not

worry excessively about the attacks on us. We should work with the positive words of these voices and amplify them.

16. No matter how impressive our effort, it will never succeed so long as Arab regimes continue to pump out tons of daily propaganda that over recent decades has driven ordinary Arabs into a perpetual condition of hyper-inflamed rage at outsiders, thus diverting the Arab populations away from the regimes themselves. A concerted effort is needed on this problem. We need to maintain the pressure on the rulers of Qatar over the content and programming of Al Jazeera. They own it and finance it, and, by recent credible reports, the Emir of Qatar and his principal aides have been made to understand by the Administration that they can't befriend us while sponsoring this brand of journalism.
17. Consider including in our media strategy material that deftly shows that the Arab-Islamic world needs to communicate with us in a far better way than they have done. Such material could show how objectionable they look to the world when they appear to be saturated in hate, self-pity, and slaughter.

18. Our news content must be candid, tuned to local audiences, and remorselessly accurate. Credibility will emerge, and credibility is the name of the game. Major events come along (the elections in Iraq, the Cedar Revolution), and credibility leads people to take our reports on such events as accurate. In the process, we discipline all the other outlets.