Leadership Policy toward Taiwan and the United States in the Wake of Chen Shui-bian’s Reelection

Robert L. Suettinger

It can hardly be considered surprising that the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) reacted negatively to the reelection of Chen Shui-bian as president of the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan). Although Beijing adopted a careful, low-key approach to the March 20, 2004, presidential election (in contrast to missile launches in 1996 and shrill threats in 2000), there was little doubt that it hoped Chen would be defeated by the pan-blue coalition of the Kuomintang (KMT) and People First Party (PFP). Once again, Beijing had failed to influence events in Taiwan in a positive manner. But the narrow margin of victory, the recount, the court challenge, and hopes that Chen might be accommodating in his May 20 inauguration speech all apparently combined to stay Beijing’s hand. Now that the speech has been weighed and found wanting, high-level officials, media commentators, and “track two” scholars are coming out with a harsher, more confrontational line. The revised approach will have consequences both for China’s relations with the United States and perhaps on the domestic front as well.

Blue on Pan-Blue

Although China’s inadequacy in understanding the dynamics of Taiwan politics has been faulted by numerous observers, the approach taken by the government toward the Taiwan presidential election seemed, for the most part, prudent and low-key. It also was consistent with what appeared to be the new tone of PRC diplomacy across the board: calm, nonthreatening, principled, and cautious. There was ample cause for caution. Tougher approaches taken in advance of the 1996 and 2000 elections arguably had contributed to the exact opposite of Beijing’s goals—a larger margin of victory for Lee Teng-hui in 1996 and a slim plurality for Chen Shui-bian in 2000.

This time, Beijing tried to avoid both appearing to pressure Taiwan voters and being drawn into Taiwan’s domestic politics, knowing that strong advocacy for one candidate might swing more voters to his opponent. So Chinese leaders soft-pedaled their support for the joint candidacy of Lien Chan (KMT) and James Soong Chu-yu (PFP), avoiding an open endorsement. They kept up a steady drumbeat of criticism against Chen Shui-bian, particularly against his efforts to hold a referendum on the same day as the presidential ballot, which Chinese leaders saw as a prelude to a plebiscite on independence. They continued to boost economic and cultural cooperation with the people of Taiwan and promised that anything could be negotiated under the umbrella of the “one China principle.” As Hu Jintao told Taiwan delegates to the National People’s
Congress (NPC) in March 2003, the PRC was “placing hope on the Taiwan people” to achieve unification.1

Beijing also worked the Washington connection fairly effectively, taking advantage of an overall improvement in bilateral relations in the wake of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing war on terrorism; Beijing was particularly helpful in facilitating preliminary discussions with North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the United States. As part of an ongoing dialogue with Washington, Chinese leaders regularly reiterated the importance of keeping U.S.-Taiwan relations within acceptable parameters. As Chen Shui-bian pursued his campaign initiatives—especially the referendum idea—with little regard for either Beijing’s or Washington’s interests, the Bush administration felt constrained to caution Taipei against “pushing the envelope,” or trying to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited the White House in December 2003, President George W. Bush made clear his dissatisfaction with Chen’s plans for a referendum. “We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo,” Bush said, “and the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally, to change the status quo, which we oppose.”2

Despite this and other negative statements from U.S. officials about the referenda, Chen did not scrap them, but merely watered them down. They were far too important to his campaign plan, which was to turn voters’ attention away from his own record and focus the election on China, its behavior toward Taiwan, and the management of cross-Strait relations. Chen modified his two referendum proposals to:

- “Should Mainland China refuse to withdraw the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan and to openly renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that the Government should acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons to strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities?” and
- “Would you agree that our Government should engage in negotiation with Mainland China on the establishment of a ‘peace and stability’ framework for cross-strait interactions in order to build consensus and for the welfare of the peoples on both sides?”3

In the end, the contest probably was decided by a bizarre “assassination attempt” against Chen and his running mate, Annette Lu Hsiu-lien, which took place the day before the election. In an incident that remains unexplained—and a crime that remains unsolved—Chen and Lu received minor flesh wounds when they were fired upon by an unseen assailant at an unspecified time during a motorcade in Tainan, Chen’s hometown. Rushed to a local hospital, Chen received several stitches for a gash across his abdomen caused by a bullet that allegedly was recovered in his jacket pocket. Both he and Lu were able to make campaign appearances the following day, and the incident is believed by some (particularly pan-blue supporters) to have galvanized enough sympathy support for Chen to have been a factor in the electoral outcome.
Given the fact that Lien and Soong had split some 60 percent of the popular vote in the 2000 election, Beijing probably expected their joint candidacy in 2004 to win fairly easily. But it did not. In an election foreign observers praised as efficiently and cleanly run, Chen Shui-bian won reelection by less than 0.25 percent of more than 13 million votes cast—a margin of less than 30,000 votes. The two referenda, however, were declared null and void because less than 50 percent of those who voted in the presidential election chose to fill out referendum ballots.

Chen’s narrow victory was attributable to several factors: he had the advantages of incumbency; Lien and Soong were neither a unified team nor effective campaigners; pan-blue had no real policy program to attract voters, but often voiced agreement with some of Chen’s campaign initiatives; and Chen was able to attract support from a large number of younger voters by appealing to a sense of “Taiwan identity.” He also portrayed Lien and Soong as puppets of and collaborators with Beijing.

Lien and Soong immediately contested the election, refused to concede defeat, and demanded both a recount and an annulment of the election by the courts. Pan-blue supporters took to the streets in demonstrations against election irregularities and in support of Lien and Soong. The Taiwan Election Commission, however, ruled that the contest had been free of fraud and that the results were valid; still, Chen agreed to a court-sponsored recount, which continues as of this writing.

Looking to Washington

Although Beijing reportedly had prepared two statements on the outcome of the election, depending on who won, the leadership did not appear prepared for the indeterminate results. As crowds protested outside the presidential palace in Taipei, PRC media confined their commentary and reportage to factual accounts of the demonstrations and allegations of election irregularities. Meanwhile, however, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing made a telephone call on March 21, 2004, to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, urging the United States to “adhere to the One China Policy and do more to contribute to peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits and to the development of [the] cross-Strait relationship.” He also expressed the hope that Washington would maintain the three China-U.S. joint communiqués and “oppose the ‘Taiwan independence’ and any words or move by the Taiwan authorities aimed at unilaterally changing the status quo and leading to ‘Taiwan independence.’”

Once it began to be clear that the election results were going to stand—i.e., after the Taiwan Election Commission declared Chen the winner on March 26—Beijing media, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) of the State Council began to register Beijing’s position on the election. The strongest message was directed first to Washington, in the form of complaints about the White House’s and State Department’s cautious congratulatory messages to Chen. “We are firmly opposed to the wrong act of the US side, which has violated the principles of three
Sino-US Joint Communiqués and interfered in China’s internal affairs,” MFA spokesman Kong Quan told reporters, but he did not elaborate.5

An even more confusing message went out to Taiwan, consisting of quotations from an unnamed spokesman in the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office. “We have noticed that the electoral institution of the Taiwan region has announced the [March 20] election results in disregard of strong opposition from one competing side,” the spokesman said. “We have also noticed that the opposition side refused to accept the results and that they are continuing their protests.” Then, in terms often used to warn of military action, he said, “We will not sit back and look on unconcerned should the post-election situation in Taiwan get out of control, leading to social turmoil, endangering the lives and property of Taiwan compatriots and affecting stability across the Taiwan Straits.”6

On March 30, the Washington Post carried a lengthy interview with Chen Shui-bian, as well as analysis by Post reporters. In the interview, Chen explicitly rejected the one China principle and referred repeatedly to the “Taiwan identity” that had enabled him to win the election. In words carefully chosen to anger Beijing, Chen insisted that the election proved that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait was Taiwan independence. “I think we have reached an internal consensus that insists on Taiwan being an independent, sovereign country. I think only Beijing cannot accept the fact that the Republic of China or Taiwan is an independent country.”7

The interview broke the ice of Beijing’s official reticence, drawing an immediate rebuke from the Taiwan Affairs Office, again from an unnamed spokesman: “Chen’s comments . . . clearly and unmistakably show a continuous push for Taiwan independence and a stubborn stance for splitting Taiwan from China.”8 Beijing’s ire was further stoked the following day by a perhaps coincidental announcement by the U.S. Department of Defense that it had agreed to sell $1.8 billion in long-range radar systems to Taiwan to enhance its ability to detect PRC missile launches.9 MFA spokesman Kong said China would “urge the U.S. to stand by its commitments rather than send the wrong message to the Taiwanese authorities.”10 Major General Wang Zaixi, the principal military representative at the TAO, told Washington Post reporters on April 1 that “China would ‘pay any price to safeguard the unity of our country’ and described Chen’s agenda as ‘an immediate and real threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits.’” He dismissed Chen’s mild offers to discuss cross-Strait differences as efforts to “fool public opinion” from a man who “has never been sincere.”11

Cheney’s Visit Sharpens the Issue

As a previously delayed visit to China by Vice President Richard Cheney approached (April 13–15), the usual laundry list of bilateral issues and grievances was aired by both sides, and the atmosphere seemed to sour. Chinese leaders made clear through the media that their principal focus in the meetings with the U.S. vice president would be Taiwan and the accumulating problems they saw developing there. Spokesman
Kong Quan even suggested before the visit that the United States should “stop implementing the so-called Taiwan Relations Act . . . [and] earnestly honour its own commitments of pursuing the one China policy and opposing Taiwan’s independence.”

TAO Deputy Director Zhang Mingqing told reporters on the day of Cheney’s arrival: “No person nor force should underestimate the determination and capability of the Chinese Government and its 1.3 billion people to safeguard national unity and sovereignty and territorial integrity at any price.” In the middle of the vice president’s visit, the Taiwan Affairs Office held its first press conference since the election, using the occasion to blast Chen’s record in his first term, the irregularities in the election process, and Chen’s plans for changing Taiwan’s constitution in the 2006–8 time frame.

Chinese leaders appeared to have only modest expectations for any concrete achievements from the Cheney visit, knowing him to be a conservative voice within the Bush administration and not a particular fan of China. Nonetheless, they gave him full red-carpet treatment. In addition to meetings with his host, Vice President Zeng Qinghong, Cheney met with President and General Secretary Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, and Central Military Commission Chairman Jiang Zemin. They listened politely as Cheney raised important U.S. issues such as counterterrorism, the need for more earnest efforts to control North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and the need for more-equitable bilateral trade and currency policies. They gave him a forum to make a televised public speech (at Fudan University in Shanghai), but they gave the speech no advance publicity and censored the written transcript on the Internet, deleting sensitive remarks about political freedom and the Taiwan Relations Act. Still, the Chinese message to Cheney was clear and uniform—the Taiwan issue trumps all others:

- **Zeng Qinghong**: “The Chinese government will continuously uphold the basic policy of ‘peaceful reunification’ and ‘one country, two systems’ and will make every effort to resolve the Taiwan issue by peaceful means, but will never tolerate ‘Taiwan independence.’”

- **Hu Jintao**: “The splitting activities by the ‘Taiwan Independence’ forces constitute the biggest threat to the peace and stability of the Taiwan Straits.” “We hope that the United States could observe its commitment to adhere to the one-China policy, earnestly follow the three Sino-US joint communique’s, oppose ‘Taiwan Independence’ and any wording [or] oration by the Taiwan leaders attempting to change Taiwan’s status quo, and not . . . send wrong signals to the Taiwan authorities.”

- **Jiang Zemin**: “Sino-US ties will have more room for development if the Taiwan issue is well handled.”

For his part, Cheney played the visit gamely, extolling the “amazing” U.S.-China relationship while warning of underlying difficulties. “It is a mistake for us, as Americans, to underestimate the extent to which there are differences—in terms of our approach, our political systems, our culture, [our] history,” he told reporters afterward. But he insisted there were “common strategic interests” as well, and he pledged to maintain consultations on difficult issues so as to “avoid the kind of conflict and confrontation that would be a tragedy for everybody.” He reiterated the U.S. position
on Taiwan—that the United States does not support Taiwan independence, adheres to a one China policy based on the three joint communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act, and opposes unilateral action by either Taipei or Beijing to change the status quo. But he gave no indication that Washington was prepared to play a more active role in curbing Chen Shui-bian and his independence proclivities.

Dismissing Chen in Advance

As plans for Chen’s inauguration on May 20 proceeded, U.S. officials did, in fact, appear to be making efforts—for their own reasons—to keep Chen in line. In a lengthy and authoritative discussion of U.S. cross-Strait policy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly told the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations on April 21 that the United States “does not support independence for Taiwan or unilateral moves that would change the status quo as we define it.” His balanced and carefully nuanced outline of U.S. policy contained clear warnings to Taiwan, as well as to China. “As Taiwan proceeds with efforts to deepen democracy, we will speak clearly and bluntly if we feel as though those efforts carry the potential to adversely impact U.S. security interests or have the potential to undermine Taiwan’s own security. There are limitations with respect to what the United States will support as Taiwan considers possible changes to its constitution.” China took no official notice of Kelly’s presentation.

As in the past, observers looked forward to Chen’s inauguration speech for signs of how he would carry out his mandate and how he would respond to pressures from Beijing and Washington. The PRC leadership chose not to wait for Chen’s speech this time, but to set out China’s position clearly in advance. On May 17, three days before the inauguration, the Central Taiwan Affairs Leading Group (headed by Hu Jintao) and the TAO issued a joint public statement. While containing some conciliatory offers about what might be possible under the one China principle, the statement was notable for its negative view of Chen, his record, and his prospects, and for its hard-nosed position on the future of cross-Strait ties.

At present, the relations across the Taiwan Straits are severely tested. To put a resolute check on the “Taiwan independence” activities aimed at dismembering China and safeguard peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits is the most pressing task before the compatriots on both sides of the Straits. . . . “Taiwan independence” does not lead to peace, nor national dismemberment to stability. We will never compromise on the one China principle, never give up our efforts for peace negotiations, never falter in our sincere pursuit of peace and development on both sides of the Straits with our Taiwan compatriots, never waver in our resolve to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and never put up with “Taiwan independence.” The Taiwan leaders have before them two roads: one is to pull back
immediately from their dangerous lurch towards independence, recognizing that both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to the one and same China and dedicating their efforts to closer cross-Straits relations. The other is to keep following their separatist agenda to cut Taiwan from the rest of China and, in the end, meet their own destruction by playing with fire.”

Chen’s inauguration speech itself was carefully crafted to mollify Washington and avoid further provoking China, and some Western observers found conciliatory language in it. Chen, for example, pledged indirectly to continue carrying out the “five noes” policy he had enunciated in his 2000 inauguration address, indicated that he would not try to craft a new constitution through referendum, and promised that “national sovereignty, territory and the subject of unification/independence” would be “excluded from the present constitutional re-engineering project.” Beijing, however, was not attracted or impressed and wasted little time in denouncing the speech in the official media. Chen’s second inaugural address was depicted as insincere, a “disguise for separatism” brimming with independence sentiment.

Beijing may now be considering policy steps toward Taiwan that go beyond rhetorical hostility, although it is still too early to detect a clear trend. On a trip to the United Kingdom in early May, Premier Wen Jiabao raised the possibility of the National People’s Congress passing legislation mandating reunification, a move that would increase pressure for military action against Taiwan by a date certain. A late May People’s Daily article criticizing a Taiwanese business tycoon who has heavy investments on the mainland but is active in support of Chen’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has also caused concerns that China may take economic measures to exert pressure on Taiwan. Reports out of Hong Kong of a planned large-scale military exercise on Dongshan Island, near Jinmen, cannot yet be confirmed, but such exercises would be consistent with both past PRC policy and an increased level of frustration within the PRC leadership.

Turning against Washington?

As cross-Strait tensions have intensified with the reelection of Chen Shui-bian, U.S.-China ties have deteriorated from their high point in 2003, when Secretary of State Colin Powell characterized relations as being “the best they have been since President Nixon’s first visit” in 1972. Chinese leaders, including Hu Jintao, continue to hope that the United States will take strong actions against Taiwan, such as cutting off arms sales, in order to send a “correct” message to Chen Shui-bian. Taking advantage of a Bush telephone call on May 29, 2004, to solicit China’s support for a U.N. resolution on Iraq, Hu pressed Bush for a reassurance that the United States would continue to “oppose ‘Taiwan independence’” and would refrain from “sending wrong signals.”

At the same time, a more sharply negative tone has begun to appear in PRC press commentaries about U.S. policy in general and about the Taiwan issue in particular. On
May 30, Xinhua published a commentary by a little-known writer, Shi Lujia, who criticized Assistant Secretary Kelly’s April 21, 2004, testimony on Taiwan policy as “not only in violation of the one China principle and the three Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqués, but also . . . interference in China’s internal affairs.”25 A few days later, official commentators sharply criticized the U.S. Defense Department’s annual report on China’s military modernization, accusing the Pentagon of having a “Cold War mentality” and “ulterior motives.”26 While not excessive in rhetoric, these articles and others in a similar vein are more categorical in their criticism of the U.S. position, reflecting what is likely a leadership decision to allow bilateral ties to decline. How steep that decline will be depends to some degree on what happens in Taipei and Washington, but the prospects are not encouraging. Chen Shui-bian’s new cabinet reportedly will ask the Legislative Yuan for more money to buy U.S. weapons, according to accounts out of Taipei.27 The U.S. Congress is proposing stepped-up military-to-military contacts between the United States and Taiwan, and President Chen has expressed a hope to be able to visit the United States during his second term. With anger at both Taipei and Washington already at a high pitch, what might otherwise be seen as small annoyances may come to be seen as major problems, demanding strong PRC responses.

New Leaders, Old Policies

It is tempting to speculate that domestic politics in China may be a factor in reinforcing the “hard line” taken by Beijing toward both Taipei and Washington in the wake of Chen’s reelection. As usual, however, there is little in the way of reliable evidence to support such a case. Still, some tentative conclusions can be ventured:

- Without doubt, Chinese leaders traditionally have shown little interest in flexibility toward Taiwan, nor have there been credible reports of differences within the leadership on the policy issue itself. The question of “Taiwan independence” is more than just a matter of “sovereignty, unity, and national dignity”—symbolic issues on which no party leader can appear irresolute. It is now a matter of leadership legitimacy—PRC leaders cannot afford to be seen as backing down on the issue, even though their policies have been demonstrably ineffective.
- Public opinion may be a factor as well, at least insofar as Internet “chat rooms” are manifestations of public opinion. Highly nationalistic, anti-Taiwan rhetoric has become a staple on China’s rapidly growing Internet. PRC media have so saturated the public with this issue that it has created an expectation of continuity, if not of escalation. Chinese scholars, when asked whether they are considering recommending new policies toward Taiwan, usually respond that they now favor “tougher” approaches.
- Bureaucratic politics may play a role, particularly in terms of the military’s influence on policymaking. Preparations for a military attack against Taiwan have enhanced the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) access to budgetary resources for modernization, as well as its influence in policy councils.
- And finally, the issue may be part of an ongoing power contest between Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao on the one hand and Central Military Commission Chairman Jiang
Zemin and his Politburo Standing Committee cronies on the other. “Policy is being used as a weapon in the power struggle,” one PRC government official told Washington Post reporter Philip Pan. “Under these conditions, no one wants to be soft. Everyone wants to be tougher.”

Current trends suggest that cross-Strait relations are in for a difficult period ahead, as are U.S.-PRC relations. Whatever expectations there may have been for the new leadership to take a more creative, reformist approach to foreign policy, there is little evidence of new thinking with respect to the Taiwan question. China’s new leaders are very much locked into old policies. And as before, that leaves the initiative for setting the tone and the agenda for cross-Strait relations—and to a large degree, U.S.-China relations—in the hands of Chen Shui-bian.

Notes

14. “Text of PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office News Conference on Taiwan Election, Carried by Chinese Central Television (CCTV),” April 14, 2004, FBIS CPP-2004-0414-000027. In 2003 Chen had begun openly advocating a constitutional revision by a plebiscitary process, hoping to have a new draft of the Republic of China’s outdated constitution by 2006 and a final version before the end of his second term in 2008. Beijing has seen this initiative as an effort to change Taiwan’s legal status into that of an independent country and has strongly opposed it.
20 Chen Shui-bian, “Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan,” *Taipei Times* (English), May 20, 2004, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2004/05/20/2003156312. The “five noes” are a shorthand reference to Chen’s promise that he would not declare independence, change the national title, change the constitution to define Taiwan’s status as a separate state, “promote a referendum to change the status quo in regard to the question of independence or unification,” or abolish guidelines and structures for achieving “national unification.”
23 See “Chinese Army Preparing Large-Scale Military Exercises Aimed at Taiwan,” Agence France-Presse, June 1, 2004.