Have Old Problems Trumped New Thinking?
China’s Relations with Taiwan, Japan, and North Korea

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The past four months have hardly been proud ones for the security policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On diplomatic policies toward Taiwan, Japan, and North Korea, respectively, Beijing has appeared bullying, emotional, and ineffective. These outcomes do not match the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) self-styled image as a peaceful, responsible, and constructive rising power. The CCP may have scored a victory in late April and early May with the historic trips to the mainland by Taiwan opposition party leaders Lien Chan and James Soong, but is too soon to tell whether that effort will bear fruit in cross-Strait relations over the longer term.

On March 14, 2005, the National People’s Congress (NPC)—the PRC’s nominal legislature—passed an antisecession law aimed at Taiwan. The law was passed at a time when domestic politics in Taiwan and cross-Strait relations more generally appeared quite positive from Beijing’s perspective. Beijing had also been largely satisfied with Washington’s policies toward cross-Strait relations. As predicted in CLM 13, this law created a negative reaction in Taiwan, the United States, and the region. The passage of the law had undesirable repercussions for China even in the European Union. At the time of this writing, it remained to be seen whether subsequent trips by Taiwan’s opposition party leaders to the mainland in April and May would improve relations across the Strait or would prove polarizing in Taiwan politics and destabilizing across the Taiwan Strait.

On Japan policy, April 2005 saw significant protests that bordered on riots in Beijing, Shanghai, and elsewhere in the PRC. Government inactivity in the face of acts of vandalism and racist sloganeering on the streets of its major cities seemingly contradicted the PRC’s effort to put a smiling face on a rising China. Instead, the next generation of Chinese urban residents appeared highly nationalistic and frustrated. In late May the Chinese government abruptly canceled a scheduled meeting between Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi and China’s Vice Premier Wu Yi during the latter’s visit to Japan. In a protocol-conscious nation like Japan, this behavior was considered a gratuitous slap in the face.

On North Korea policy, Beijing has either decided to live with a nuclear Pyongyang or has simply been ineffective in trying to lure the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) back to the six-party talks. The latter explanation seems much more likely to this observer than the former. Still, it is at least possible that China has simply accepted the prospect that the six-party talks are a failure and is now trying to pin that failure on the United States. Either way, the prospect of Beijing’s weak and dependent North Korean ally flouting the standards set by international antiproliferation regimes hardly enhances Beijing’s international prestige. More importantly still, Beijing
might be losing an important opportunity to increase its influence in the region as an indispensable security partner of the United States and its allies. A successful handling of the North Korean issue could facilitate the creation of an inclusive and meaningful multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia involving the five nations engaging North Korea in the six-party talks: the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China.

The Antisecession Law

As discussed in the last issue of CLM, despite the maintenance of an anti-independence majority in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan, an improved relationship across the Taiwan Strait in January and February 2005, and general satisfaction with U.S. policy on Taiwan in the previous few months, the National People’s Congress passed an antisecession law on March 14. As detailed there, the reasons for the law’s passage seemingly lie in two areas: Beijing’s longer-term pessimism about trends in cross-Strait relations dating back to 2003 and the domestic political risks involved in reversing the earlier decision to consider such a law, a decision that was initially made in more pessimistic times. Beijing had taken many people’s temperature on the law from January to March (including scholars and officials in Taiwan and the United States). Chinese elites therefore knew that the law would be unpopular abroad. Yet for the reasons listed above, the CCP leaders went ahead with the law.

The law contains threatening elements, and it is natural for people to focus on such threats, but as will be discussed further below, the threats are hardly new in form or content, and the law eschews particularly provocative language, such as deadlines. Moreover, the law includes several positive and moderate elements regarding equality in future negotiations across the Taiwan Strait. Foreign input and the generally improved relations across the Strait might have influenced the content of the law even if such factors did not prevent the law’s passage.

Article 8 of the antisecession law threatens Taiwan with “nonpeaceful” measures and other “necessary” measures if Taipei takes actions that create the trappings of legal independence (such as constitutional change), constitute a “major incident” (zhongda shibian) of Taiwan separatism, or create conditions that seem to permanently preclude peaceful unification across the Taiwan Strait. On this score, the antisecession law says nothing new. Previous public statements and numerous official documents (e.g., the February 2000 Taiwan White Paper) have made similar threats. The antisecession law merely repeats existing threats, albeit in a high-profile manner.

Perhaps the most threatening aspect of the law is its ambiguity about the triggers that would instigate the use of force. It is not clear what a “major incident” of Taiwan independence would consist of, and it is not clear at what point Beijing might decide that all reasonable efforts to promote peaceful unification had been exhausted. The redlines remain vaguely drawn, and the law does not change in any way the fact that CCP leaders will interpret any political acts in Taiwan as they see fit, determining on their own
whether such acts qualify as “major incidents.” It hardly seems safe for citizens or politicians in Taiwan to assume that only a constitutional revision separating Taiwan from the Chinese mainland would count as such a “major incident,” and the CCP almost certainly intended to keep such doubts in the minds of their so-called compatriots across the Strait. As discussed in the earliest issues of CLM, such ambiguity means that what might determine the use of force is not so much the particular action taken by the Taiwan side, but rather the political context in which that action is taken and the degree of pessimism or optimism about longer-term trends in cross-Strait relations prevailing at the time the action is adopted.

On the more clearly positive side, the law contains no deadlines for unification and seems to imply a good deal of patience on Beijing’s part about fostering the conditions for peaceful unification. Indeed, the law contains several moderate and potentially positive elements. These more accommodating sections themselves, however, are also not fundamentally new. Rather, they repeat Beijing’s oft-stated goal of peaceful unification across the Taiwan Strait. As Beijing has done in the past, the law encourages increased economic, cultural, and social contacts with Taiwan for the purpose of promoting such an outcome. Beijing continues to hold out the prospect of political talks across the Taiwan Strait, but reiterates that peaceful unification is Beijing’s ultimate goal in such talks and that this goal can only be accomplished through Taiwan’s acceptance of the one China principle.2

One might argue that the law breaks new ground because it was passed in the PRC legislature. But the NPC lacks decision-making authority about such matters. In fact, the law explicitly states that decisions on the use of force will ultimately be made by the State Council and Central Military Commission. So it is not clear how passage of the law in the NPC really makes the threat of force seem any more compelling than it would have been without the passage of such a law.

Why the Antisecession Law Is a Source of Tension, Not Stability

Regardless of these more moderate sections of the law, it was natural for people in Taiwan and elsewhere to focus on the law’s threatening aspects. This is particularly true given the apparent relaxation in cross-Strait relations in the weeks before the law’s passage. In this sense, perhaps the most negative aspect of the antisecession law is simply its adoption at a time when cross-Strait relations seemed to be thawing and political trend lines on the island seemed to be moving in the mainland’s favor (see CLM 13 for a discussion of those trends).

In Taiwan, members of the pan-Green coalition blasted the law, as would have been predicted.3 On March 26, hundreds of thousands of marchers rallied in Taiwan to protest the law.4 The supporters of the pan-Green coalition were not alone in opposing the law; members of the pan-Blue camp also criticized the legislation as provocative.
In the United States, the Bush administration criticized the law as a source of tension in cross-Strait relations. Such a reaction could not have come as a surprise to the Chinese leadership. In January Bush administration officials had told a top PRC Taiwan policy official, Chen Yunlin, that the United States opposed the passage of any such law and hoped that Beijing would improve the climate across the Taiwan Strait at a time of reduced tensions following the Legislative Yuan elections in December 2004.

Before the antisecession law was passed, the European Union had seemed poised to end its embargo on arms sales to the People’s Republic of China. Lifting the embargo was already a controversial issue inside Europe, especially because of pressure from the Bush administration and the United States Congress to maintain the embargo. Some Europeans apparently were prepared to lift the embargo in part because they did not treat seriously the prospect of cross-Strait military conflict. By publicly reminding the world of the PRC’s willingness to adopt nonpeaceful measures to prevent Taiwan’s permanent separation from the mainland, Beijing tipped the political balance in Europe on the question of the embargo, thereby keeping it in place at least for the time being. Even in the generally cautious environment of mainland journals, certain Chinese analysts mentioned that the negative reaction in Europe was an unexpected cost of the antisecession law. For its part, the government press blasted the United States and Japan for discouraging the European Union from lifting the ban.

The antisecession law has not, however, triggered a spiral of tensions in cross-Strait relations. The March 26 rally in Taiwan was peaceful, and President Chen decided not to give a speech on that occasion. Given his past proclivity for pro-independence statements in front of audiences, such a decision was almost certainly welcomed in Beijing and Washington. Washington contributed to the limiting of tensions with its reaction to the law. To the best of my knowledge, Bush administration officials have avoided calling the passage of the law a “unilateral change in the status quo” across the Taiwan Strait—Washington’s label for fundamentally destabilizing policies, and a label that elites in Taiwan were using to describe the law soon after its passage. Instead, the administration criticized Beijing for raising tensions and for failing to seize on clear near-term opportunities to deepen cross-Strait cooperation and contacts. But Washington remained relatively measured in its response. By criticizing the law, Washington expressed its disappointment at what was obviously a setback in cross-Strait relations. It also made clear its hope that Beijing might adopt more positive actions to improve cross-Strait relations. By eschewing overly dramatic language in response to the law, the Bush administration avoided sending signals of encouragement to those on Taiwan who saw the passage of the antisecession law as an opportunity to adopt provocative countermeasures that could ratchet up cross-Strait tensions. For example, in January and February some elites in Taipei had floated the idea of responding to an antisecession law by adopting an “anti-annexation” law passed by popular referendum. Depending on its wording and the political context in which it was passed, an anti-annexation law might cross a mainland redline regarding legal manifestations of independence or permanent legal impediments to peaceful unification. In my opinion, Washington was wise to avoid words and actions that might have encouraged such a response in Taipei.
Since the passage of the law, Beijing in April hosted an entourage of leaders from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party in Taiwan, headed by Deputy Secretary General Chiang Pin-kun. Although the entourage does not represent the central government in Taiwan, Chiang reached agreements with CCP officials on the pursuit of peace and economic contacts across the Strait. The entourage also laid the groundwork for the historic visit by former premier and current head of the KMT, Lien Chan, to the mainland in late April. The leader of the other major pan-Blue opposition party, James Soong of the People First Party, was also invited to travel to China in early May. 

Some in Taiwan initially reacted angrily to the first trip and called for Chiang to be prosecuted under national security laws prohibiting private citizens from negotiating on behalf of the government with foreign countries. Some even called for new laws clarifying that mainland China be included on that list of foreign countries. The treatment of China as “foreign” in such laws could cross a mainland redline on legal trappings of independence. A few factors precluded such a move by Taiwan’s government. First, and most important, the anti-independence pan-Blue parties maintained a majority in the legislature in the December 2004 Legislative Yuan elections, making new legal measures along these lines almost impossible to pass. Second, the United States and the Taiwan public continue to impose major constraints on the flexibility of the government in pursuing such initiatives. In general, the public seems to want Beijing to engage President Chen’s government, but it is not opposed to these sorts of trips by opposition party officials. In fact, the trips by Lien and Soong have generally been welcomed on the island, although they are not viewed as replacements for government-to-government dialogue across the Taiwan Strait.

At the time of this writing, it is still too soon to tell what long-term implications, if any, will flow from the antisecession law, as well as what opportunities or challenges might be created by the high-level visits to the mainland by opposition party leaders in Taiwan. The pan-Blue gambit might pay off, and President Chen might have to respond by becoming significantly more accommodating to the mainland. On the other hand, Beijing’s strategy of reaching out only to pan-Blue leaders might backfire if the mainland is viewed in Taiwan as unfairly dismissive of any limited overture toward the mainland that Chen might make. We can revisit this issue in later editions of China Leadership Monitor.

Japan

If any policy issue rivals Taiwan policy in domestic sensitivity and international importance for Beijing, it is policy toward Japan. On the occasion of Japan’s push for consideration for membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and with the announcement in Japan of a series of new junior high school history primers, Beijing started a mini-campaign against the Koizumi government in Japan, its treatment of history, and the Japanese nation’s lack of qualifications for UNSC membership. Following the establishment of an online petition against Japan’s entrance into the U.N. by some Chinese citizens, on April 9–10 anti-Japanese protests formed in Beijing and
other cities in China to oppose Japan’s treatment of history. Unruly protests would occur the following weekend in Shanghai as well, despite an apparent ban on additional unregistered protests in Beijing. The protests included calls for boycotts of Japanese goods, racist imagery and slogans about Japanese people and Japanese leaders, and eventually violent destruction of both Japanese government property and stores selling Japanese products in Beijing and Shanghai. The fact that the Chinese police seemed willing to stand idly by while protesters hurled stones suggested government complicity with or at least indifference toward these actions. One had to wonder if the government wanted the protests to go as far as they went, if police refused to crack down on protesters because they were sympathetic to the cause, or some combination of the two.13

The protests were criticized in the Japanese and U.S. press and will likely harm China’s diplomatic image in the region more generally.14 For example, Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, hardly a casual critic of PRC diplomacy, reportedly expressed concern about the PRC’s immature nationalism in Shanghai in May 2005.15 The reasons for the protests against Japan may be valid in the eyes of other Asians; many others, especially in South Korea, oppose Japanese textbooks’ apparent glossing-over of history and oppose Japan’s bid for entry into the United Nations Security Council. Still, Beijing’s acquiescence to large groups of people congregating to throw rocks and bottles at Japanese government buildings and shops in China damages Beijing’s carefully fostered image as a responsible and peaceful rising power that sees international relations in positive-sum terms.

If such protests were organized and orchestrated by the government, then this suggests either a hypernationalist leadership on issues of Sino-Japanese relations or a leadership so worried about its weak legitimacy at home that it needs to appear tough on patriotic issues. If the protests were spontaneous or simply got out of hand, then people will wonder about the Chinese government’s ability to control popular anti-Japanese or antiforeign sentiments. The initial reaction to the protests in Beijing by the Chinese Foreign Ministry sought to pin the blame for any problems squarely on the shoulders of the Japanese government because of its treatment of history issues, because of Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the controversial Yasukuni shrine (which memorializes Japan’s war dead, including war criminals of the 1930s and 1940s), and because of the inclusion of Taiwan in the “2 plus 2” communiqué of the U.S. and Japanese defense and diplomatic leaderships.16

In late April, things seemed to be settling down in Sino-Japanese relations. Following an emergency trip to Beijing by Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka on April 17, President Hu and Prime Minister Koizumi met on the sidelines of the Asia-Africa conference on April 23. At that conference, Prime Minister Koizumi expressed Japan’s national regret for the suffering caused in the 1930s. For its part, the CCP adopted a harsh stance against further anti-Japanese protests.17 What appeared to be the potential early stages of a warming trend ended abruptly with the aforementioned last-minute Chinese cancellation of the meeting between Wu Yi and Prime Minister Koizumi.

China’s clampdown on protests might have more to do with domestic politics in the PRC than it does with Beijing’s concerns about its international image. In the days
leading up to the highly salient holidays of May 1 and May 4, Beijing had to fear that anti-Japanese protests might get out of control and, perhaps, turn against the government itself. The government of Hu Jintao has been almost obsessed with domestic control and stability, to the disappointment of many who had hoped that the fourth generation leadership would be more open and more willing to institute political reform than earlier generations.18 Arrests of protesters have been reported in Shanghai. CCP leaders and media outlets have also emphasized the need to channel patriotism in healthy and peaceful directions. One April 25 commentary (pinglun) in a Shanghai party newspaper (Jiefang ribao) was peculiarly harsh toward protests in Shanghai, which apparently occurred after the government had already asked protesters to cease their activities. That article painted the protest leaders as evil conspirators and rejected the idea that the protests were patriotic. A number of arrests were made in Shanghai about the same time the article was published.19 There has been a ban on further protests without government approval, and such approval seems unlikely to be forthcoming.20 Despite these efforts at damage control, there is little doubt that the PRC’s image on the international stage has been hurt by the events of April.

North Korean Stalemate

Beijing has proven unwilling or unable to urge North Korea back to the negotiating table in the six-party talks. North Korea has refused to return to the talks since the third round in June 2004, at which the United States for the first time offered a proposal for ending the nuclear standoff. Beijing was not entirely satisfied with the U.S. proposal, but it did believe that North Korea should respond through negotiations. Instead, before the 2004 U.S. presidential elections North Korea seemed unwilling to return to the negotiations. Many in Washington and Beijing believed that Pyongyang hoped it could deal with a Kerry administration rather than a second Bush administration. Then, after President Bush’s victory in the 2004 election, analysts believed that Pyongyang was waiting to see who would take over leadership positions in the second Bush term and what the general attitude of the administration would be toward North Korea. In her confirmation hearing, Condoleezza Rice listed North Korea as an “outpost of tyranny.” This statement was used, sincerely or cynically, by Pyongyang as a pretext to refuse to return to the talks without unconditional security assurances from the United States.

In China in early 2005, some analysts continued to believe that the U.S. posture was excessively threatening toward North Korea and that some assurances on security and some recognition of the state’s sovereignty were in order. In her first tour of Asia as secretary of state, Secretary Rice seemed to respond to Chinese concerns even if not North Korean ones. In both Japan and China she stated that the United States had no intention of attacking North Korea and that Washington acknowledged North Korea’s sovereignty. She warned abstractly, however, that if North Korea did not return to the talks in a meaningful manner, the United States had other options to increase pressure on North Korea.21 There is some speculation about what those measures might be. They potentially include bringing the North Korea issue before the United Nations Security Council (a move that would put China in a difficult position as a UNSC permanent
member), tightening the search of North Korean ships as part of the Proliferation Security Initiative, and taking actions internationally against North Korean financial assets accumulated via Pyongyang’s various illicit activities.22

Just after Secretary Rice’s trip, it seemed that perhaps China was taking a tougher line on North Korea. A high-level North Korean entourage, including Prime Minister Pak Pong Ju and First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, visited Beijing just after Secretary Rice left. President Hu was reported to have taken a stern tone regarding Pyongyang’s refusal to return to talks.23 Moreover, rumors began spreading about President Hu’s plans to visit Pyongyang in early May for a summit with Kim Jong Il. It seemed unlikely that Hu would agree to such a summit if he could not deliver some progress on the nuclear issue to the region and to the United States. What seemed particularly enticing about the rumor was that President Hu and President Bush were scheduled to meet in Moscow to commemorate the 60th anniversary of Victory Europe Day in May. So it seemed that President Hu might be able to deliver something very important to the United States at that Moscow meeting. But Pyongyang remained obstreperous, maintaining its claim that it has nuclear weapons and does not plan to give them up without talks about broader regional disarmament (suggesting that it should be treated as a recognized nuclear state in such negotiations).24 According to the journalist Selig Harrison, who visited Pyongyang, North Korean leaders also threatened to sell weapons or fissile materials abroad, thus playing on Washington’s worst fears regarding North Korean nuclearization. Speculation about a Hu visit to Pyongyang apparently was premature; such a visit is apparently no longer on the Chinese president’s agenda, if indeed it ever was.25

As of the timing this writing, there have been no sustained signals of anything but deadlock on the six-party talks. Even if Beijing continues to oppose North Korean nuclearization, it appears that China might be unwilling to exert sufficient pressure on North Korea to produce movement in Pyongyang. One possible sign of Beijing’s resignation to the failure of the six-party talks is the return of publicly stated skepticism in Beijing about North Korea’s ability to make nuclear weapons. As one scholarly entourage from the PRC recently pointed out in the United States, without a nuclear test we cannot be so sure the North actually has the weapons.26 Perhaps the North will do something so provocative—testing a nuclear weapon, conducting missile tests, or performing some other belligerent act—that Beijing will decide to increase the pressure on the DPRK. We can return to this issue in the next issue of CLM.

Conclusion

With the possible important exception of KMT leader Lien Chan’s visit to the PRC, the recent period was a very bad one for Chinese diplomacy on important security issues. By appearing internationally to bully Taiwan and Japan in counterproductive ways, Beijing damaged its mission of portraying its rise in power as peaceful and stabilizing. Moreover, it is too soon to tell whether Beijing’s gambit of inviting only opposition party members from Taiwan to the mainland will pay off in Taiwan domestic politics and
cross-Strait relations. Although the United States gets as much of the criticism internationally as China does on the North Korean issue, China’s inability to coax Pyongyang back to the negotiating table calls into question Beijing’s ability to influence its highly dependent ally on its border. Again, this ineffectuality does not help enhance China’s image as a powerful, responsible actor in world affairs. Instead, in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, China appears sincere but ineffective at best and tacitly supportive of Pyongyang at worst. None of the choices along this range of possibilities improves China’s image on the international stage.

Notes


2 In what might be its most moderate passage, the antisecession law promises equal status for the mainland and Taiwan in negotiations. This promise reiterates a relatively flexible formulation offered by Vice Premier Qian Qichen three years ago. Treating Taiwan and the mainland as equal parts of one China is preferred by many in Taiwan to the PRC’s traditional “one country, two systems” formula. That formula is rejected across the political spectrum in Taiwan and is conspicuous for its absence in the antisecession law. It is quite possible that PRC elites listened to those in the United States and Taiwan who advised against the inclusion of such a rigid formula.

3 For the official initial response of the Executive Yuan’s Mainland Affairs Council, see “Call for International Condemnation against China,” March 14, 2005.


7 See “Zhongguo fandui MeiRi jiu Oumeng quxiao DuiHua junshou jin caiqu xiaoji taidu” (China opposes the detrimental attitude adopted by the United States and Japan toward the EU’s abolition of the arms embargo toward China,” Xinhua News Agency, March 31, 2005.

8 State Department spokesman Richard Boucher characterized China’s decision as “unfortunate,” and said that the passage of the antisecession law was “unhelpful” for cross-Strait stability. See Richard Boucher, “Daily Press Briefing,” Department of State, March 14, 2005.


11 See, for example, “Jailing Chiang Is the Priority,” Taipei Times (editorial), April 9, 2005.


For extensive original Chinese-language clips from and analysis of the original April 25 Jiefang ribao article, see http://www.voanews.com/chinese/w2005-04-25-voa18.cfm. For a discussion of the article in English, see “Anti-Japan Protests ‘An Evil Plot,’” Taipei Times, April 28, 2005.

In a turnabout, Foreign Minister Li himself called for an end to protests. For a report, see Jim Yardley, “China Moves to Crack Down.”

See, for example, Secretary Rice’s emphasis on nonaggression and the sovereignty of North Korea, in Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks to the Press in China” (news conference at China World Hotel, Beijing, March 21, 2005), http://www.state.gov/secretary.