

## After Hu, Who?--China's Provincial Leaders Await Promotion

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China's provincial leadership is both a training ground for national leadership and a battleground among various political forces. Provincial chiefs currently carry much more weight than ever before in the history of the PRC. This is largely because the criteria for national leadership have shifted from revolutionary credentials such as participation in the Long March to administrative skills such as coalition-building. In addition, provincial governments now have more autonomy in advancing their own regional interests.

Nonetheless, nepotism and considerations of factional politics are still evident in the recruitment of provincial leaders. Emerging top-level national leaders--including Hu Jintao, Zeng Qinghong, and Wen Jiabao--have all drawn on the pool of provincial leaders in building their factions, hoping to occupy more seats on the upcoming Sixteenth Central Committee and the Politburo. At the same time, new institutional mechanisms have been adopted to curtail various forms of nepotism. The unfolding of these contradictory trends will not only determine who will rule China after 2002, but even more importantly, how this most populous country in the world will be governed.

During his recent visit to an elementary school in New Mexico, President George W. Bush offered advice to a child who hoped to become president. "If you want to be President, I would suggest you become a governor first," said President Bush, "because governors make decisions, and that's what presidents do."<sup>1</sup>

What is true of the career path of American leaders seems also to be true of their counterparts in present-day China. The top leadership positions in China's provinces and major cities have often been stepping-stones to national political offices in the People's Republic of China (PRC), and this is especially the case during the post-Mao period.<sup>2</sup> Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Zhu Rongji, premier of the State Council, served as both party secretary and mayor in Shanghai for four years before moving on to the most important posts in the national leadership. Hu Jintao, vice president of the PRC and designated successor to Jiang, also served as party secretary in Guizhou and Tibet.

During the past two years, China's provincial leadership has undergone rapid turnover. Many leaders in their early 50s and even 40s have become provincial party secretaries and governors. This is understandable because about half of the current Politburo members will retire before the Sixteenth Party Congress convenes in September 2002. According to regulations adopted by the Politburo in 1997, with the exception of extraordinary circumstances, all top leaders (including the members of the Politburo and the premier and vice premiers of the State Council) should not seek another term after they reach the age of 70.<sup>3</sup> In addition, a large number of seats on

the 190-member Central Committee of the CCP will also be vacant. All incumbent provincial party secretaries and governors will likely occupy seats on the Sixteenth Central Committee. Some prominent members of the current provincial leadership will enter the Politburo and perhaps even serve on its seven-member standing committee, the highest decision-making body in China. Provincial chiefs may be in line for top national leadership positions, perhaps only after Hu Jintao and a few others.

It is, of course, too early to suggest that the political future of individual figures in China's provincial leadership is assured. One may also reasonably argue that the transition of power from Jiang to Hu is not necessarily certain. This is, however, precisely the reason that we need to focus attention on a broader group of potential contenders for power, especially among rising stars in the provincial leadership. There is little doubt that today's provincial chiefs will be among tomorrow's decision makers for the entire country. They will rule China for most of this decade and beyond.

### *Provincial Government: Training Ground and Battle Ground*

The provincial leadership has always been a crucial level in Chinese politics. However, provincial party secretaries and governors have carried much more weight in the reform era of the past twenty years than during the first three decades of the PRC. This is largely because the criteria for national leadership have shifted from revolutionary credentials such as participation in the Long March to administrative skills such as political networking and coalition-building. In addition, provincial governments now have more autonomy than ever before in advancing their own regional interests.

Not surprisingly, a large number of top leaders in today's China have substantial work experience in provincial-level leadership. Table 2 (appended) shows the provincial leadership experience of the members of the current Politburo. Among these twenty-four most powerful leaders in the country, twenty (83 percent) have had administrative experience at the provincial level. Fourteen (58 percent) served as provincial chiefs (either as party secretary and governor or mayor in province-level administration). Four of them (17 percent) currently hold the post of provincial party secretary (in Guangdong, Shandong, Beijing and Shanghai), and all four have worked as top provincial leaders for over a decade. The remaining four Politburo members who have no provincial leadership experience include two career military officers, one professional diplomat, and one career ideologue. All members who are under 65 have leadership experience at the provincial level.

The provinces that these leaders have governed are large socioeconomic entities. It is often said that a province is to China what a country is to Europe. In fact, Chinese provinces are much bigger in terms of population than most of the countries in Western Europe. Table 3 (appended) illustrates that in a cross-country comparison, China's five largest provinces (Henan, Shandong, Sichuan, Jiangsu and Guangdong) are more populous than the five largest countries in Western Europe (Germany, England, France, Italy and Spain). China's provincial chiefs, like top leaders in European nations, have constantly been concerned about regional economic development and have coped with daunting challenges such as unemployment, political stability and social welfare needs in

their jurisdictions. For China's future national leaders, provincial administration provides an ideal training ground.

More importantly, China's provincial leadership is also a political force in its own right. At various stages of its history in power, the CCP has faced serious problems of "localism" (*difang zhuyi*) – the inability of the central leadership to ensure that provincial administrations obey directives. One type of such behavior, political localism, occurred in the early 1960s. By that time, many provincial chiefs had been in their leadership positions for over a decade and had become "local emperors" in the provinces they ruled. This made Mao anxious because he felt that his power was being weakened, not only at the top by leaders like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, but also by leaders at the provincial level.<sup>4</sup> He therefore replaced almost all province chiefs during the first two years of the Cultural Revolution.<sup>5</sup> In the early and mid-1970s, another type of localism--this time, military--emerged and threatened the central authorities. Military commanders held top provincial leadership positions and quite effectively controlled the levers of power in the provinces.<sup>6</sup> Only a prolonged series of maneuvers by Mao and Deng gradually weakened the power of the military at the provincial level.<sup>7</sup>

During the reform era, and especially since the mid-1990s, the central authorities have effectively restrained both political and military localism. No provincial chief can establish his own "political kingdom" that is free of control from the central authorities. The fall of Chen Xitong, the boss of the Beijing municipal government, and the decline of the "Cantonese separatist movement" in Guangdong are good examples. The central government has accomplished this largely through frequently reshuffling top provincial leaders, regularly limiting the length of their terms, and occasionally investigating province-based official corruption. Meanwhile, the scenario that China's military will interfere in politics has become increasingly remote. The departure of paramount military figures such as Yang Shangkun and his brother, Yang Baibing, from the Central Military Commission (CMC) in the early 1990s, the successful ban of the Chinese military's involvement in business in the late 1990s, and the absence of a strong military figure at present all support this assessment.<sup>8</sup>

What has become prevalent during the reform era is economic localism. Provincial governments compete with each other--and against the central government--for favorable fiscal and investment policies. Although economic reform over the past two decades has enhanced the standard of living of the whole country, some provinces and cities along the coast have benefited far more than those inland, largely due to the favorable policies of the central government. The difference in GDP per capita between Shanghai and Guizhou, for example, increased from 7.3 times in 1990 to twelve times in 2000.<sup>9</sup> The growing regional disparities are particularly reflected by consumption expenditures. In 1985 per capita expenditures in Shanghai were 299 yuan higher than the national urban average, but the differential increased to 2,929 yuan in 1995, about a ten-fold increase in ten years.<sup>10</sup> Understandably, many provincial leaders, especially those in the inland areas, have had strong reservations about the way in which Jiang Zemin favors Shanghai at the expense of others.

Public concern about Jiang's favoritism toward Shanghai in its economic development is closed linked to the rise of the so-called "Shanghai Gang" – the powerful network of national leaders

who originally came from Shanghai. Since Jiang was promoted by Deng from party secretary of Shanghai to general secretary of the CCP in 1989, he has promoted some of his friends from Shanghai to important national leadership positions. Jiang has apparently cultivated a web of personal ties based on Shanghai connections. Two of Jiang's deputies in Shanghai, Wu Bangguo and Huang Ju, were soon promoted to be Politburo members as part of Jiang's effort to consolidate his power in Beijing. Zeng Qinghong, Jiang's chief-of-staff in Shanghai, moved with Jiang to Beijing in 1989. Zeng is now an alternate member of the Politburo and head of the party Organization Department. Chen Zhili, Jiang's deputy on the Shanghai Party Committee, now heads the Ministry of Education. Zeng Peiyan, Jiang's long-time associate, now serves as Minister of the State Development Planning Commission. At the upcoming Sixteenth Party Congress, Zeng Qinghong, Wu Bangguo and Huang Ju will be among the candidates for seats on the Politburo's standing committee. Chen Zhili and Zeng Peiyan will be front-runners for new membership on the Politburo.

The presence of the "Shanghai Gang" in the central leadership, however, has received growing opposition and criticism, not only within Chinese society, but also among deputies both to the last party congress and to the National People's Congress (NPC), where they blocked the election of nominees favored by Jiang. For example, in the preliminary election of the Fifteenth Party Congress, three men from Shanghai--including two vice mayors and You Xigui, head of Jiang's bodyguards, originally from Shanghai--had to be dropped from full to alternate membership because they did not receive enough votes.<sup>11</sup> In elections to government positions at the Ninth NPC held in 1998, Jiang's "Shanghai Gang" again fared badly. Han Zhubin, nominee for procurator general and Jiang's long-time associate in Shanghai, was nearly rejected by the NPC since about 35 percent of the deputies opposed the appointment.<sup>12</sup>

Since the mid-1990s, institutional arrangements have been made to curtail over-representation of certain regions in the central leadership. On the Fifteenth Central Committee, all but one of the thirty-one province-level administrations has two full members. These two seats are usually occupied by the party secretary and the governor of the province.<sup>13</sup> This further explains why Jiang transferred his close friend, Chen Zhili, to Beijing, where she took charge of China's education just a few days before the 15<sup>th</sup> Party Congress. Otherwise, she too would probably not have been elected to full membership on the Central Committee.

Hu Angang, an outspoken economist who studies regional development in China, has even proposed a "one province, one seat" on the Politburo. His plan would give every province a voice in party policy and narrow the disparity between coastal and inland provinces.<sup>14</sup> Hu has been very close to several provincial chiefs in the inland region. He is widely known for his disputes with officials in the coastal regions, such as with the party secretary of Shenzhen. By the same token, the governors in Guizhou and Yunnan have treated Hu as a hero and publicly expressed their appreciation for Hu's appeal for more balanced regional development in the country.<sup>15</sup>

Uneven economic development across provinces in present-day China and the difference in provincial representation in the central government have profound implications for the way in which China deals with issues such as accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the policy

toward Taiwan. As China enters the WTO, the perceived economic challenge to the inland provinces is much greater than to the coastal region. A large number of state-owned enterprises and a larger portion of China's agricultural sector are located in the central and western regions, and they will be severely affected. During the Taiwan Strait tensions that resulted from the presidential election in 2000 in Taiwan, China's inland provinces were more belligerent than the coastal provinces because the former were not risking as much if a war broke out. Their counterparts in the coastal region reportedly lobbied against military hardliners during the crisis.<sup>16</sup>

All of these reasons above indicate a comprehensive study of China's provincial leaders is needed. Their biographical background, political socialization, career patterns, and rate of reshuffling are all crucial to analysis of Chinese politics. This is especially true as the jockeying over the posts of provincial chiefs has intensified during the past few months, the outcome of which will help to shape the leadership transition at the Sixteenth Party Congress.

### *Provincial Chiefs: Biographical Backgrounds*

China's provincial leadership has experienced a very high rate of turnover since the late 1990s. Since the Ninth NPC in March 1998, forty-eight of the total of sixty-two provincial chiefs have been replaced or reshuffled.<sup>17</sup> As a result, the number of provincial chiefs who are over sixty years old decreased from twenty-six in 2000 to twenty-one in 2001. Since March 2001, the CCP Organization Department has been engaged in a new round of reshuffling of provincial leadership, with the goal of completing it in the few months before the Sixteenth Party Congress convenes.

Table 4 (appended) summarizes the biographical background of China's current provincial chiefs. Not surprisingly, only one of the sixty-two chiefs is a woman, Uyunqing, a Mongol who serves as governor of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. The table also shows that the number of the provincial chiefs who are over sixty has dropped further, from twenty-one early this year to sixteen at present. The average age of party secretaries and governors in 2001 is 58.3 and 57.6, respectively. The average age of all sixty-two provincial chiefs is 58. Approximately 70 percent are in their fifties.

Hu Jintao and Zeng Qinghong, who are both in charge of the selection of candidates for the Sixteenth Central Committee, recently stated that the age range of the current Chinese leadership remains a problem. Most leadership posts above the county level are usually held by those in their sixties and fifties – members of the third and fourth generations.<sup>18</sup> The plan by Hu and Zeng is to recruit more members of the fifth generation – those who were born in the 1960s and went to college in the 1980s – to leadership posts above the county level. The CCP Organization Department recently required that all leadership bodies above the county level have a number of top officials in their early forties or below. Provincial deputy chiefs (deputy party secretaries and vice governors) who are more than fifty-eight years old, prefecture heads older than fifty-five, and county chiefs older than fifty-two should be prepared to vacate their seats in favor of younger leaders.<sup>19</sup>

According to the cadre retirement regulations outlined by the party Organization Department, any provincial chief whose age is above sixty-five has to retire. This means that those who are in their early sixties will either retire or move into the central government, vacating their provincial leadership posts to younger officials prior to the Sixteenth Congress. Li Chunting (65, governor of Shandong), Cheng Andong (65, governor of Shaanxi), Jiang Zhuping (64, party secretary of Hubei), and Lu Ruihua (63, governor of Guangdong) will likely soon be replaced. Huang Ju (63, party secretary of Shanghai) and Wu Guanzheng (63, party secretary of Shandong) are concurrently members of the Politburo. They may keep their seats in the next Politburo or even enter its standing committee, but they will unlikely continue to serve as party chiefs in provincial-level administrations after the Sixteenth Party Congress. Xu Kuangdi (64, mayor of Shanghai) may also enter the Politburo or hold a senior post on the State Council.

The birthplaces of the sixty-two provincial chiefs are unevenly distributed. Twelve were born in the coastal province of Jiangsu, accounting for 19.4 percent of the total. Jiangsu natives (Liu Qi, Li Shenglin and Bao Xuding) serve as mayors of Beijing, Tianjin and Chongqing, respectively. Other provinces in eastern China--Anhui, Shandong, and Zhejiang--are also over-represented. Altogether, provincial chiefs who were born in eastern China account for 44 percent of the total. This also echoes several recent studies of post-Mao leadership that show an over-representation of elites who were born in eastern China, especially in Jiangsu and Shandong provinces.<sup>20</sup>

Region-based favoritism seems to have had a strong effect on the trend toward higher representation of East China during the Jiang era. The high percentage of Jiangsu natives in the civilian leadership may be partially due to the fact that Jiang Zemin, a Jiangsu native, likes to promote his fellow Jiangsu provincials. For example, Jiang's strong endorsement during the late 1990s of the promotion of Li Lanqing, a native of Zhenjiang city in Jiangsu province, to be a standing member of the Politburo and executive vice premier, seems to confirm the practice of favoritism based on a shared birthplace.

Another important type of nepotism, which seems to contradict the phenomenon of over-representing certain provinces such as Jiangsu, is the trend to select leaders to serve in their provinces of origin. During the 1980s, provincial and municipal leaders were often selected to serve in their home areas, partly because of increasing regional autonomy in economic development and partly because of decentralization in the selection of local leaders. The growing influence of localism during the reform era has certainly put Beijing on alert, and central authorities have since sought to reverse this trend. The party Organization Department recently attempted to put limits on the number of provincial top leaders who work in their native areas. In June 1999, it issued the "Regulations on Cadre Exchange," which specifies the following three rules:

- county and municipal chiefs should not be appointed to their home regions;
- those who head a county or city for more than ten years should be transferred; and
- transfers of provincial leaders, whether to another province or to the national level, should be more frequent.<sup>21</sup>

Table 4 shows that at present only ten provincial chiefs (16.1 percent) are now serving in their native provinces. Another ten serve in neighboring provinces. A majority of them (67.7 percent) hold leadership posts in provinces distant from their home areas. Only two provincial party secretaries (Wen Shizhen in Liaoning and Yang Zhengwu in Hunan) serve in the province in which they were born. (In contrast, there were four in 2000, six in 1999, seven in 1998 and nine in 1997). Eight governors serve in their native provinces. Three of them are autonomous regions designated for ethnic minorities. In contrast, thirteen governors served in their native provinces in 1997. At present, there is no province in which both the party secretaries and governors are natives. But in 1997, there were four provinces (Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Shandong and Guangdong) in which both the party secretaries and governors served in their native provinces. The “law of avoidance”--by which mandarins were prohibited from serving in their native provinces and counties, both a policy characteristic of traditional China for centuries and a practice that was adopted during the Mao era--seems again to be in force.<sup>22</sup>

Almost all province chiefs are college graduates. Table 2 shows that eight of them (12.9 percent) have a graduate-level education. The number of those who majored in engineering and physics accounts for 67.7 percent. The real number of those trained in engineering and natural sciences is probably even higher because 16 percent of the academic majors of these provincial chiefs are not identified. Technocrats will likely continue to dominate the Chinese leadership in the years to come. In addition, some trained economists have also emerged. Li Keqiang, governor of Henan, received a Ph.D. in economics at Beijing University. None of them, however, has studied abroad. Xu Kuangdi, mayor of Shanghai, is the only provincial chief who has had substantial foreign experience, having worked in Sweden for a couple of years during the 1980s. This contrasts with leaders of the third generation, many of whom studied in the former Soviet Union and other eastern European countries.

Both Jiang Zemin and party Organization Department Director Zeng Qinghong have recently stated that students returning from study abroad should be seen as a major source of political recruitment.<sup>23</sup> Zeng also specified that some outstanding returning students be immediately appointed to leading bureau-level posts (*juchang*). Such people might be promoted to even higher posts after serving as bureau heads for a few years. In part, Beijing’s current top leaders are eager to promote young cadres with foreign-study background because they are usually in their thirties and early forties – the right age cohort for a fifth generation of PRC leaders. It remains to be seen whether they will attain provincial leadership in the near future.

### *Provincial Chiefs: Career Patterns*

The high rate of turnover among China’s provincial chiefs is particularly reflected in the brevity of their tenure in their current posts. Table 5 (appended) shows that over 40 percent of them were appointed after 2000. Another 35.5 percent were appointed between 1998 and 1999. The two provincial chiefs who have the longest tenure are Huang Ju (party secretary of Shanghai) and Abdulahat Aburixit (governor of Xinjiang) who have held these posts since 1994. In 2000, the

average tenure of provincial party secretaries and governors was 3.3 years and 2.3 years, respectively, confirming the fact that a quick reshuffling and/or promotion of provincial chiefs has taken place during the past few years.<sup>24</sup>

An analysis of the previous posts of these provincial chiefs shows that a majority of them were promoted from party deputy party secretary or vice governor positions, either within the same province or, in many cases, from other provinces. Many had served in deputy positions for a year or two and were then promoted to full posts. Others were appointed party secretary from the post of governor--a promotion because provincial party secretaries are considered the top leader in their provinces. Four governors--Bo Xilai in Liaoning, Lu Hao in Gansu, Zhang Yunchuan in Hunan, and Li Zhaochuo in Guangxi--were promoted from the lower level post of party secretary of a major city (Dalian, Lanzhou, Changsha, and Nanning) within each of those provinces. Approximately 27 percent of provincial chiefs were transferred from other provinces, and another 15 percent come from the central government.

None of these provincial chiefs was a member of the CCP Central Committee before the 1982 Twelfth Party Congress. Six joined the Central Committee at the Twelfth Party Congress, and all were alternate members. They include Wu Guanzheng (party secretary of Shandong), Li Changchun (party secretary of Guangdong), Song Defu (party secretary of Fujian), Zhang Lichang (party secretary of Tianjin), and He Guoqiang (party secretary of Chongqing). Their seniority as Central Committee members may help them further advance their careers in the political hierarchy, especially considering the fact that some of them are relatively young.

A majority of the current provincial chiefs are members of the Fifteenth Central Committee, including thirty-seven (59.7 percent) who are full members, and seventeen (27.4 percent) who are alternates. The eight provincial chiefs who are not members of the Central Committee were all appointed recently. They will likely become members of the Sixteenth Central Committee.

Thirty-three (53 percent) of the sixty-two provincial chiefs have had provincial leadership experience in other provinces. For example, He Guoqiang served as party secretary of Jinan city and standing committee member of the Shandong Party Committee between 1986 and 1991. He then moved up to the national government, where he served as vice minister in the Ministry of Chemical Industry for five years. Between 1996 and 1999, he was appointed successively as deputy party secretary, vice governor, and governor of Fujian. Since June 1999, he has served as mayor in the province-level city of Chongqing. Another example is Hui Liangyu, party secretary of Jiangsu, who previously served as vice governor of Jilin, deputy party secretary of Hubei, and governor and party secretary of Anhui.

Six among the current provincial leadership were former ministers of the State Council before serving as provincial chiefs. They include Zhou Yongkang (party secretary of Sichuan), Song Defu (party secretary of Fujian) and Liu Qi (mayor of Beijing). Their broad experience in both central and provincial leadership has placed them in advantageous positions for further advancing their political careers.

*Future Watch: Rising Stars and Challenging Issues*

Which provincial leaders are likely to move to the center in the coming leadership succession in the Sixteenth Party congress in 2002? What are the most challenging issues the country will face in central-provincial relations as the need for political institutionalization increases? More specifically, what can data on the past biographies of provincial leaders (as discussed above) tell us about their future careers? Clearly, an individual leader's advancement will depend on various factors, only some of which can be predicted with acceptable degrees of certainty.

It would be a major act of hubris for any analyst to claim surety in predicting such factors and their interaction exactly. Each potential claimant to power (or each member of a possible new collective leadership) has more information about the succession processes and factors than China-watchers can garner from afar. Politicians in China use such information – and often change it through compromising or shifting their loyalties – to affect the outcome.

Yet, we may assume, for the sake of analysis, that nothing is completely without a cause. Information about one leader's career experience may give some clue as to his future. The biographical background and political affiliations of leaders, in the context of new regulations and new rules of the game, tell us a great deal about the momentum of, and constraints on, politicians and their factions. Factors such as age, current status in the power hierarchy, the size and importance of the province that one governs, broad experience in other provinces and in the central government, who one's powerful patrons are, and various distribution requirements are all useful in predicting the major power contenders for seats in the Politburo of the Sixteenth Party Congress.

A relatively young age is perhaps the most important factor for provincial chiefs who seek further promotion. There are only four provincial chiefs who were born in the 1950s. They are Bo Xilai (51), Xi Jinping (48) Li Keqiang (46) and Zhao Leji (44). Li Keqiang has been in the spotlight in the country for many years. He was born in Anhui where he also worked as a "sent-down youth" in rural areas during the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, Li passed the national examination for college entrance and enrolled in the law department at Beijing University. He later obtained a Ph.D. in economics at the same school. His political career has been spent largely in the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), where he held a leadership position for about 15 years. In 1998, at the age of 43, Li became the governor of Henan, China's most populous province. Li's educational and administrative credentials position him as a primary candidate for a Politburo membership at the Sixteenth Congress, although his bright political future may be clouded by two fires during his tenure in Henan which caused about 400 deaths. These two fires, though politically damaging to him, may not jeopardize Li's chance for promotion because many other regions such as Shanghai have also experienced major accidents in recent years.

Two other young governors, Bo Xilai and Xi Jinping, are "princelings"--that is, sons of high-ranking officials. Their career progress thus far has certainly been the result of their family ties. But at higher levels of leadership, their princeling backgrounds are more likely to be obstacles than

stepping-stones. In 1997, for example, despite the fact that his high-placed father and friends had designated him to be a member of the Fifteenth Central Committee, Bo Xilai failed to get even a deputy seat on Liaoning province's delegation to attend the Fifteenth Party Congress.<sup>25</sup> Although Xi Jinping was elected to an alternate seat on the Fifteenth Central Committee, he received the lowest number of votes among all 344 members.<sup>26</sup> Bo and Xi will face strong opposition among congress deputies if they are nominated for a seat on the Sixteenth Politburo.

The youngest governor, Zhao Leji, has leadership experience only in Qinghai and probably needs to wait until the Seventeenth Party Congress in 2007 to be seen as a contender for national-level leadership. In addition, Zhao Leji does not have a powerful patron in the central government. More promising are those provincial chiefs who have leadership experience in the CCYL similar to Li Keqiang's. For example, Qian Yunlu (57, party secretary of Guizhou) and Ji Yunshi (56, governor of Jiangsu) both served as CCYL secretaries at the provincial level. The most promising provincial chief is probably Song Defu (55, party secretary of Fujian), who served in the CCYL Secretariat between 1982 and 1993. Song had leadership experience in various sectors: in the military (as deputy director of the Organization Department under the PLA General Political Department), the party (as deputy director of the CCP Organization Department), and the State Council (as minister of personnel). In addition to his relatively young age and his broad leadership experience, both of which will help him further advance his political career, Song is also a confidant of Hu Jintao.

It remains to be seen whether Hu will promote former associates like Song, Li and others with backgrounds in the CCYL to the top party and state leadership. Such leaders associated with Hu in the CCYL are generally in their forties and early fifties. It is widely expected that many leaders in their forties will serve as provincial deputy party secretaries and vice governors.<sup>27</sup> At present, about 22.3 percent of all CCP members are under the age of 35.<sup>28</sup> The future of the CCP will largely depend on whether, as Hu Jintao recently said, the new Chinese leadership can win over public support, especially among the country's younger generations--implying that those who have experience in youth affairs will be primary candidates for future leadership.<sup>29</sup>

In terms of their current status in the power hierarchy, the four provincial chiefs who are now members of the Politburo are in advantageous positions for promotion. But, ironically, Huang Ju, Jia Qinglin and Li Changchun are all seen as Jiang Zemin's protégés, and Wu Guanzheng is also believed to be very close to his fellow native from Jiangxi, Zeng Qinghong, Jiang's confidant. They may keep their memberships in the next Politburo, but the chances that all four of them will enter the Politburo's Standing Committee are extremely slim. While both the public and the political establishment are concerned about members of Jiang Zemin's "Shanghai Gang"--such as Huang Ju and Zeng Qinghong--the number of Shanghai leaders who have been promoted to the central government and the top leadership in other provinces is quite limited. Only one provincial chief, (Meng Jianzhu, party secretary of Jiangxi) has been transferred from Shanghai where he served as deputy party secretary during the past decade.

Among these four incumbent Politburo members, Li Changchun has the best chance to obtain a seat on the Standing Committee because he is fifty-seven, the youngest among these four. He also holds the record for being China's youngest-ever mayor of a capitol city and governor. His broad leadership experience in three large provinces (Liaoning, Henan and Guangdong) has prepared him to deal with tough challenges. This is especially the case in his appointment as party secretary of Guangdong, a province known for its cultural resistance to outsiders. Li effectively established authority over the autonomy-minded Cantonese officials soon after he took over the post of provincial party secretary in 1998.

Wu Guanzheng is another political heavyweight in provincial leadership who deserves much attention. Wu not only has had broad leadership experience in the provinces (Hubei, Jiangxi and currently Shandong), but he has also promoted many of his assistants (*zhuli* or *mishu*) and deputies to high offices. Among the other sixty-one current provincial chiefs, seven worked under Wu previously. They include: Qian Yunlu (party secretary of Guizhou), who was Wu's deputy in Wuhan in the early 1980s; Wang Taihua (party secretary of Anhui) and Jiang Zhuping (party secretary of Hubei), who were Wu's deputies in Jiangxi in the late 1980s; Cheng Andong (governor of Shaanxi), Zhang Yunchuan (acting governor of Hunan), and Huang Zhiquan (governor of Jiangxi), all of whom served as Wu's assistants in the provincial government of Jiangxi in the early 1990s; and Song Fatang (governor of Heilongjiang), who served as Wu's deputy in Shandong between 1997 and 1999. No other provincial chief has had so many high-profile protégés at the same level of leadership as Wu Guanzheng has had.

While Hu Jintao and Zeng Qinghong are in charge of the selection of provincial chiefs, Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao have also recommended their own assistants to serve as provincial chiefs. Hong Hu (governor of Jilin), Shi Xiushi (governor of Guizhou), and Xu Rongkai (acting governor of Yunnan) all recently served on the State Council before taking the posts of provincial chiefs. Hong was deputy director of the State Council Economic Restructuring Office, and Shi and Xu served as deputy secretaries general of the General Office of the State Council. Leaders with experience on the State Council – along with the three former Ministers Zhou Yongkang, Liu Qi, and Song Defu discussed above – constitute an important source for the top national leadership in the years to come.

Nepotism and factional politics are prevalent in the recruitment of provincial leaders in present-day China. Hu Jintao's CCYL cadres, Zeng Qinghong's "Shanghai Gang," Wen Jiabao's assistants on the State Council, and other provincial heavyweights such as Li Changchun and Wu Guanzheng have shared the pie of provincial leadership positions. The common goal for their respective factions is to occupy more seats on the Sixteenth Central Committee and the Politburo.

But at the same time, many institutional methods such as age limits for retirement, term limits, the "law of avoidance," regional representation, intra-party elections, and regulations for reshuffling have all been adopted in the Chinese political system to curtail various forms of nepotism and favoritism. Paradoxical as they are, these developments show the tensions and dynamism of politics in China today. It is premature to claim that one or more of these contradictory tendencies will

prevail in the near future. This will make the next one to two years a period of experimentation. It is not only a test of the wisdom of leaders, but also a testimony to new institutional developments in China that are attempting to sustain both national integration and regional autonomy.

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### Notes

<sup>1</sup> *The New York Times*, August 16, 2001, p.A1.

<sup>2</sup> China has thirty-one provincial level administrations, including twenty-two provinces, five autonomous regions, and four municipalities directly under the central government. These autonomous regions and municipalities have provincial status. This study identifies these provincial party secretaries and governors (or mayors) of the thirty-one province-level administrations as “provincial chiefs.” A listing of all sixty-two chiefs, together with significant biographic information on each, is appended as Table 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Shijie ribao* [World journal], February 11, 2001, p.A1.

<sup>4</sup> For information about the stability of provincial leaders between 1956 and 1966, see Frederick C. Teiwes, *Provincial Party Personnel in Mainland China, 1956-1966* (New York: Occasional Paper of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1967). On the rise of “local emperors,” see David S. G. Goodman, “Li Jingquan and the South-West Region, 1958-1966: The Life and ‘Crime’ of a ‘Local Emperor,’” *China Quarterly* 81 (March 1981): 66-96; and Peter R. Moody, “Policy and Power: The Career of T’ao Chu 1956-1966,” *China Quarterly* 54 (April-June 1973): 267-93.

<sup>5</sup> Richard Baum, “Elite Behavior under Conditions of Stress: The Lessons of the ‘Tang-ch’uan P’ai’ in the Cultural Revolution,” in Robert Scalapino, ed., *Elites in the People’s Republic of China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), pp.540-74.

<sup>6</sup> Gordon Bennett, “Military Regions and Provincial Party Secretaries: One Outcome of China’s Cultural Revolution,” *China Quarterly* 54 (April-June 1973): 294-357; and Frederick C. Teiwes, *Provincial Leadership in China: The Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University East Asian Papers, No. 4, 1974).

<sup>7</sup> Cheng Li and David Bachman, “Localism, Elitism and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social Change in Post-Mao China,” *World Politics* 42, No. 1 (October 1989): 64-94; and Cheng Li and Lynn White, “The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping: Familiar Fealties and Technocratic Trends,” *Asian Survey* 33, No. 8 (August 1993): 757-786.

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<sup>8</sup> James Charles Mulvenon, *Soldiers of Fortune : The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business Complex, 1978-1998* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001).

<sup>9</sup> *Shijie ribao*, January 12, 2000, p.A9. For a detailed discussion of the growing disparity in present-day China, see Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, *The Political Economy of Uneven Development: The Case of China*, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

<sup>10</sup> Deborah S. Davis, "China's Consumer Revolution." *Current History*, September 2000, 252.

<sup>11</sup> *Qianshao yuekan* [Advance guard monthly], October 1997, 16-17.

<sup>12</sup> Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "All the President's Men," *South China Morning Post*, March 18, 1998, p.1; Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, "Strong Opposition as Jiang's Man Gets Top Law Job," *South China Morning Post*, March 18, 1998, p.1; and *Shijie ribao*, 20 March 1998, p.A9.

<sup>13</sup> In the municipalities where one Central Committee full member concurrently holds the positions of both Party secretary and mayor--for example, Jia Qinglin in Beijing or Zhang Lichang in Tianjin--usually a deputy Party secretary in the city also holds a full membership on the Central Committee.

<sup>14</sup> Quoted from Wu An-chia, "Leadership Changes at the Fourth Plenum," *Issues and Studies* 30, no. 10 (October 1994): 134. Hu Angang also argues that the Financial Committee of the National People's Congress, which is responsible for deciding budgetary matters, should consist of 30 members (each province has one representative on the committee). Hu, *Zhongguo fazhan qianjin*, [Prospects for China's development]. (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1999), p.312.

<sup>15</sup> Zhang Xiaoxia, *Zhongguo gaoceng zhinang* (China's high-level think tanks), Vol. 1 (Beijing: Jinghua chubanshe, 2000), pp.182-83.

<sup>16</sup> For a further discussion, see Cheng Li, "China in 2000: A Year of Strategic Rethinking," *Asian Survey* 41, no. 1 (January/February, 2001): 71-90.

<sup>17</sup> *Shijie ribao*, March 2, 2001, p.A3.

<sup>18</sup> For a detailed discussion of the political elite generation in China, especially the fourth generation of leaders, see Cheng Li, *China's Leaders: The New Generation* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001).

<sup>19</sup> *Shijie ribao*, August 4, 2000, p.A7.

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<sup>20</sup> For example, see Li and White. "The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping," pp.757-786; Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin." *Asian Survey* 38, no. 3 (March 1998): 231-264; and Zang Xiaowei, "The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy," *Asian Survey* 33, no. 8 (August 1993): 787-803.

<sup>21</sup> *Liaowang* [Outlook], June 7,1999, pp.15-16.

<sup>22</sup> For a further discussion of the "law of avoidance" in the selection of Chinese local officials, see Ying-mao Kau, "The Urban Bureaucratic Elites in Communist China: A Case Study of Wuhan, 1949-1965," in A. Doak Barnett, ed. *Communist Chinese Politics in Action* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1972), p.227; and Li and Bachman, "Localism, Elitism and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social Change in Post-Mao China," 84-88.

<sup>23</sup> See <<http://www.chinesenewsnet.com>> September 25, 2000.

<sup>24</sup> *China Directory* (Tokyo: Rapiopress, Inc.,1995 and 2000). The data were accumulated by the author.

<sup>25</sup> Li, *China's Leaders*, 164-66.

<sup>26</sup> For more discussion on the election, see Li and White, "The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," 231-264.

<sup>27</sup> *Zhongguo shibao* [China times], August 26, 2001, p.1.

<sup>28</sup> *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily], June 4, 2001, p.1.

<sup>29</sup> *China Daily*, June 20, 1998, p.1.

Table 1: Biographical and Career Information about China's Provincial Top Leaders (As of September 10, 2001)

Province/City	Position	Name	Tenure	Previous Position	Sex	Birth Year	Birth Place	Education Level	Major	CC Since	15 <sup>th</sup> CC	Experience/ Central Gov't	Experience/ Other Provinces
Beijing	Party Sec.	Jia Qinglin	1997	Beijing Mayor	M	1940	Hebei	College	Engineering	M14th	PM	Bureau Head	Fujian, Shanxi
	Mayor	Liu Qi	1999	Beijing Vice Mayor	M	1942	Jiangsu	Graduate	Engineering	AM14th	M	Minister	Hebei
Tianjin	Party Sec.	Zhang Lichang	1998	Tianjin Mayor	M	1939	Hebei	2 year-Col	Engineering	AM12th	M	None	None
	Mayor	Li Shenglin	1998	Tianjin Vice Mayor	M	1946	Jiangsu	College	Engineering		M	None	None
Hebei	Party Sec.	Wang Xudong	2000	CCP Deputy Director	M	1946	Jiangsu	2-year Col	Engineering		AM	CCP director	None
	Governor	Niu Maosheng	1999	Minister	M	1939	Beijing	College	Engineering		M	Minister	Beijing
Shanxi	Party Sec.	Tian Chengping	1999	Qinghai Party Sec.	M	1945	Hebei	College	Engineering	AM14th	M	None	Qinghai, Beijing
	Governor	Liu Zhenhua	1999	Shanxi Vice Governor	M	1943	Shandong	College	Engineering	AM14th	AM	None	Liaoning
Neimenggu	Party Sec.	Chu Bo	2001	Hunan Governor	M	1944	Anhui	College	Engineering		AM	None	Hunan
	Governor	Uyunqing	2001	Neimenggu Vice Governor	F	1942	Liaoning	College	Unknown	AM14th	AM	None	None
Liaoning	Party Sec.	Wen Shizhen	1997	Liaoning Governor	M	1940	Liaoning	College	Engineering		M	None	None
	Governor	Bo Xilai	2001	Dalian Party Sec.	M	1950	Shanxi	Graduate	Journalism			CCP Central Off	None
Jilin	Party Sec.	Wang Yunkun	1998	Jilin Governor	M	1942	Jiangsu	College	Engineering		M	None	None
	Governor	Hong Hu	1998	Office Dir. State Council	M	1940	Anhui	College	Engineering		M	State Council	None
Heilongjiang	Party Sec.	Xu Youfang	1997	Minister	M	1939	Anhui	College	Engineering		M	Minister	Jilin
	Governor	Song Fatang	2000	Heilongjiang Vice Gov.	M	1940	Shandong	College	Chinese		AM	None	Shandong
Shanghai	Party Sec.	Huang Ju	1994	Shanghai Mayor	M	1938	Zhejiang	College	Engineering	AM13th	PM	None	None
	Mayor	Xu Kuangdi	1995	Shanghai Vice Mayor	M	1937	Zhejiang	College	Engineering	AM14th	M	None	None
Jiangsu	Party Sec.	Hui Liangyu	2000	Anhui Party Secretary	M	1944	Jilin	2-year Col	Unknown	AM14th	M	CCP Office Dir.	Jilin,Hubei,Anhui
	Governor	Ji Yunshi	1999	Jiangsu Vice Governor	M	1945	Jiangsu	College	Physics		AM	None	None
Zhejiang	Party Sec.	Zhang Dejiang	1998	Jilin Party Secretary	M	1946	Liaoning	College	Economics	AM14th	M	Vice Minister	Jilin
	Governor	Chai Songyue	1998	Zhejiang Vice Governor	M	1941	Zhejiang	College	Engineering	AM14 <sup>th</sup>	M	None	None
Anhui	Party Sec.	Wang Taihua	2000	Anhui Governor	M	1945	Jiangxi	College	Chinese	AM14th	AM	None	Jiangxi
	Governor	Xu Zhonglin	2001	Jiangsu Dep. Party Sec.	M	1943	Jiangsu	College	Engineering			None	Jiangsu
Fujian	Party Sec.	Song Defu	2000	Minister of Personnel	M	1946	Hebei	2-year Col	Unknown	AM12th	M	Minister	None
	Governor	Xi Jinping	1999	Fujian Dep. Party Sec.	M	1953	Shaanxi	College	Engineering		AM	CCP Office	Hebei
Jiangxi	Party Sec.	Meng Jianzhu	2001	Shanghai Dep. Party Sec.	M	1947	Jiangsu	Graduate	Economics		AM	None	None
	Governor	Huang Zhiquan	2001	Jiangxi Dep. Party Sec.	M	1942	Zhejiang	College	Engineering		AM	None	None
Shandong	Party Sec.	Wu Guanzheng	1997	Jiangxi Party Sec.	M	1938	Jiangxi	Graduate	Engineering	AM12th	PM	None	Hubei, Jiangxi
	Governor	Li Chunting	1995	Shandong Dep. Party Sec	M	1936	Shandong	2-year Col	Unknown	AM14th	M	None	None
Henan	Party Sec.	Chen Kuiyuan	2000	Tibet Party Sec.	M	1941	Liaoning	College	Unknown	M14th	M	None	Neimenggu,Tibet
	Governor	Li Keqiang	1999	Henan Dep. Party Sec.	M	1955	Anhui	Ph.D.	Economics		M	Youth League	None
Hubei	Party Sec.	Jiang Zhuping	2001	Hubei Governor	M	1937	Jiangsu	College	Engineering	M14th	M	Bureau Chief	Jiangxi
	Governor	Zhang Guoquang	2001	Liaoning Governor	M	1945	Liaoning	College	Engineering		M	None	Liaoning
Hunan	Party Sec.	Yang Zhengwu	1998	Hunan Governor	M	1941	Hunan	2-year Col	Unknown	AM12th	M	None	None
	Governor	Zhang Yunchuan	2001	Party Sec. Changsha	M	1946	Zhejiang	College	Engineering			None	Jiangxi, Xinjiang
Guangdong	Party Sec.	Li Changchun	1998	Henan Party Sec.	M	1944	Liaoning	College	Engineering	AM12th	PM	None	Henan, Liaoning
	Governor	Lu Ruihua	1996	Guangdong Vice Governor	M	1938	Guangdong	Graduate	Physics	AM14th	M	None	None
Guangxi	Party Sec.	Cao Bochun	1997	Liaoning Dep Party Sec.	M	1941	Hunan	College	2-year Col	AM14th	M	None	Liaoning, Hunan
	Governor	Li Zhaochuo	1998	Nanning City Party Sec	M	1944	Guangxi	College	Engineering		M	None	None
Hainan	Party Sec.	Bai Keming	2001	Head, People's Daily	M	1943	Shaanxi	College	Engineering			CCP director	Shaanxi
	Governor	Wang Xiaofeng	1998	Hainan Vice Governor	M	1944	Hunan	College	Engineering	AM14th	M	None	Hunan

Chongqing	Party Sec.	He Guoqiang	1999	Fujian Governor	M	1943	Hunan	College	Engineering	AM12 <sup>th</sup>	M	Vice Minister	Fujian, Shandong
	Mayor	Bao Xuding	2000	Chongqing Vice Mayor	M	1939	Jiangsu	Graduate	Engineering		M	Minister	None

Province/City	Position	Name	Tenure	Previous Position	Sex	Birth Year	Birth Place	Education Level	Major	CC Since	15 <sup>th</sup> CC	Experience/Central Gov't	Experience/Other Provinces
Sichuan	Party Sec.	Zhou Yongkang	2000	Minister	M	1942	Jiangsu	College	Engineering	AM14 <sup>th</sup>	M	Minister	Liaoning, Xinjiang
	Governor	Zhang Zhongwei	2000	Sichuan Vice Governor	M	1942	Sichuan	College	Unknown			None	None
Guizhou	Party Sec.	Qian Yunlu	2001	Guizhou Governor	M	1944	Hubei	College	Economics	AM14 <sup>th</sup>	AM	None	Hubei
	Governor	Shi Xiushi	2001	Guizhou Dep. Party Sec	M	1942	Henan	College	Engineering			State Council Off	None
Yunnan	Party Sec.	Linghu An	1997	Yunnan Dep. Party Sec.	M	1946	Shanxi	College	Engineering		M	Vice Minister	Liaoning
	Governor	Xu Rongkai	2001	Dep.Dir, State Council	M	1942	Chongqing	College	Engineering			Vice Minister	Sichuan
Tibet	Party Sec.	Guo Jinlong	2000	Tibet Dep. Party Sec	M	1947	Jiangsu	College	Physics		AM	None	Sichuan
	Governor	Legqog	1998	Tibet Vice Governor	M	1944	Tibet	2-year Col	Unknown		AM	None	None
Shaanxi	Party Sec.	Li Jianguo	1998	Tianjin Dep. Party Sec	M	1946	Shandong	College	Chinese	AM14 <sup>th</sup>	M	None	Tianjin
	Governor	Cheng Andong	1995	Shaanxi Vice Governor	M	1936	Anhui	College	Engineering	AM14 <sup>th</sup>	M	None	Jiangxi
Gansu	Party Sec.	Song Zhaosu	2001	Gansu Acting Governor	M	1941	Henan	College	Politics		AM	None	Henan
	Governor	Lu Hao	2001	Lanzhou City Party Sec	M	1947	Hebei	College	Engineering		AM	None	None
Qinghai	Party Sec.	Bai Enpei	1999	Qinghai Governor	M	1946	Shaanxi	College	Engineering	AM13 <sup>th</sup>	AM	None	Neimenggu, Shaan
	Governor	Zhao Leji	1999	Qinghai Vice Governor	M	1957	Unknown	Unknown				None	None
Ningxia	Party Sec.	Mao Rubai	1997	Vice Minister	M	1938	Jiangsu	College	Engineering		M	Vice Minister	Tibet
	Governor	Ma Qizhi	1997	Ningxia Dep. Party Sec.	M	1943	Ningxia	College	Unknown	AM14 <sup>th</sup>	AM	None	None
Xinjiang	Party Sec.	Wang Lequan	1996	Xinjiang Dep. Party Sec.	M	1944	Shandong	Graduate	Party Affair	AM14 <sup>th</sup>	M	None	Shandong
	Governor	Abdulahat Aburixit	1994	Xinjiang Vice Governor	M	1942	Xinjiang	College	Engineering		M	None	None

Notes and Sources:

Liao Gailong and Fan Yuan (comp.) *Zhongguo renming da cidian xiandai dangzhengjun lingdaorenwujuan*, [Who's Who in China: Current Party, Government, and Military Leaders], 1994 edition, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994); Shen Xueming and others, comp., *Zhonggong di shiwujie zhongyang weiyuanhui zhongyang zhongyang jili jiancha weiyuanhui weiyuan minglu*, [Who's who of the members of the Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Fifteenth Central Commission for Discipline Inspection] (Beijing: Zhonggong wenxian chubanshe, 1999); *China Directory* (Tokyo: Rapiopress, Inc.,; 2001); and the Internet version of *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily], see [www.peopledaily.com.cn](http://www.peopledaily.com.cn).

AM=Alternate Member; CC=Central Committee; CCP=Chinese Communist Party; Col.=College; Dep.=Deputy; Dir.=Director; Gov.=Government; M=Member; Off.=Office; PM=Politburo Member; Sec.=Secretary.

Table 2: Provincial Leadership Experience of the 15<sup>th</sup> CCP Politburo Members (2001)

Name	Age	Current Position	Previous Provincial/Mayoral Leadership Experience
Jiang Zemin	75	CCP Secretary General & PRC President	Shanghai Party Secretary ('85-'86) Mayor ('86-'89)
Li Peng	72	Chair, National People's Congress	Head, Beijing Electric Power Bureau ('66-'80)
Zhu Rongji	72	Premier	Shanghai Party Secretary & Mayor ('87-'91)
Li Ruihuan	67	Chair, Political Consultative Conference	Tianjin Party Secretary & Mayor ('82-'87)
Hu Jintao	59	Vice President	Tibet Party Secretary ('88-'92) Guizhou Party Secretary ('85-'88)
Wei Jianxing	70	Chair, Central Com. for Discipline Inspection	Beijing Party Secretary ('95-'97)
Li Lanqing	69	Vice Premier	Tianjin Vice Mayor ('83-'86)
Ding Guangen	72	Head, CCP Propaganda Department	
Tian Jiyun	72	Vice Chair, National People's Congress	Head, Sichuan Financial Bureau ('69-'81)
Li Changchun	57	*Guangdong Party Secretary ('98-present)	Henan Party Sec. ('92-'98), Mayor ('90-'92); Liaoning Governor ('86-'90)
Li Tiesing	65	President, Chinese Academy of Soc. Science	Liaoning Party Secretary ('83-'85)
Wu Bangguo	60	Vice Premier	Shanghai Party Secretary ('91-'95) & Deputy Party Secretary ('85-'91)
Wu Guanzheng	63	*Shandong Party Secretary ('97-present)	Jiangxi Party Secretary ('95-'97), Governor ('86-'95), Wuhan Mayor ('83-'86)
Chi Haotian	72	State Councilor, Minister of Defense	
Zhang Wannian	73	Vice Chair, Central Military Commission	
Luo Gan	66	State Councilor	Henan Party Secretary ('81-'83)
Jiang Chunyun	71	Vice Chair, National People's Congress	Shandong Party Secretary ('88-'95), Governor ('87-'88)
Jia Qinglin	61	*Beijing Party Secretary ('97-present)	Beijing Mayor ('96-'97); Fujian Party Sec. ('93-'96), Dep. Party Sec. ('85-'93)
Qian Qichen	73	Vice Premier	
Huang Ju	63	*Shanghai Party Secretary ('94-present)	Shanghai Mayor ('91-'94)
Wen Jiabao	59	Vice Premier	Deputy Head, Gansu Geological Bureau ('79-'82)
Xie Fei (deceased)		Vice Chair, National People's Congress	Guangdong Party Secretary ('91-'98)
Zeng Qinghong	62	Head, CCP Organization Department	Shanghai Deputy Party Secretary ('86-'89)
Wu Yi	63	State Councilor	Beijing Vice Mayor ('88-'91)

Notes and Sources: \* Concurrently provincial chiefs. Liao Gailong and Fan Yuan (comp.) *Zhongguo renming da cidian xiandai dangzhengjun lingdaorenwujuan*, [Who's Who in China: Current Party, Government, and Military Leaders], 1994 edition, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994); Shen Xueming and others, comp., *Zhonggong di shiwujie zhongyang weiyuanhui zhongyang zhongyang jilü jiancha weiyuanhui weiyuan minglu*, [Who's who among the members of the Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Fifteenth Central Commission for Discipline Inspection] (Beijing: Zhonggong wenxian chubanshe, 1999); Ho Szu-yin, comp., *Zhonggong renmin lu* [Who's who in Communist China] (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1999); and *China Directory* (Tokyo: Rapiopress, Inc., various years from 1985 to 2001).

Table 3: Population of the Five Largest Chinese Provinces and the Five Largest Countries in Western Europe (2001) (in thousands)

Henan	93,917	Germany	82,797
Shandong	89,110	England	59,508
Sichuan	85,751	France	59,330
Jiangsu	72,533	Italy	57,634
Guangdong	71,700	Spain	39,997

Sources: State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China, comp., *China Statistical Yearbook 1999* (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1999), 117; and *The World Almanac Book of Facts 2001* (Mahwah, NJ: World Almanac Education Group, Inc, 2001), 860-862.

Table 4 Biographical Backgrounds of Provincial Chiefs (as of September 2001)

	Number	Percentage
<b>Gender</b>		
Male	61	98.4
Female	1	1.6
<b>Age</b>		
61-65 (b. 1936-1940)	16	25.8
56-60 (b. 1941-1945)	31	50.0
51-55 (b. 1946-1950)	12	19.4
46-50 (b. 1951-1955)	2	3.2
41-45 (b. 1956-1960)	1	1.6
<b>Birthplace (Province, top seven)</b>		
Jiangsu	12	19.4
Liaoning	6	9.7
Anhui	5	8.1
Hebei	5	8.1
Shandong	5	8.1
Zhejiang	5	8.1
Hunan	4	6.5
<b>Workplace-Birthplace Correlation</b>		
Work in the Birth Province	10	16.1
Work in a Neighboring Province	10	16.1
Work in a Distant Province	42	67.7
<b>Educational Level</b>		
Graduate Studies	8	12.9
4-Year College	46	74.2
2-Year College	7	11.3
Unknown	1	1.6
<b>Academic Majors</b>		
Engineering	39	62.9
Economics	4	6.5
Physics	3	4.8
Chinese	3	4.8
Politics and CCP Affairs	2	3.2
Journalism	1	1.6
Unknown	10	16.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Sources: Shen Xueming and others, comp., *Zhonggong di shiwujie zhongyang weiyuanhui zhongyang zhongyang jili jiancha weiyuanhui weiyuan minglu*, [Who's who among the members of the Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Fifteenth Central Commission for Discipline Inspection] (Beijing: Zhonggong wenxian chubanshe, 1999); and *China Directory* (Tokyo: Rapiopress, Inc., various years from 1985 to 2001).

Table 5: Career Experiences of Provincial Chiefs (as of September 2001)

	Number	Percentage
<b>Tenure in Current Post</b>		
1994	2	3.2
1995	3	4.8
1996	2	3.2
1997	8	12.9
1998	12	19.4
1999	10	16.1
2000	10	16.1
2001	15	24.2
<b>Most Recent Post Prior to Current Post</b>		
Switching posts in the same province (from governor to secretary)	6	9.7
Promotion from same province (from deputy to full post)	26	41.9
(from lower administrative level)	4	6.5
Transfer from other province (from secretary to secretary)	6	9.7
(from governor to governor)	1	1.6
(from governor to secretary)	7	11.3
(from deputy to full post)	3	4.8
Transfer from central government (from minister to party secretary)	3	4.8
(from CCP director to party secretary)	2	3.2
(from minister to governor)	1	1.6
(from vice minister to secretary)	1	1.6
(from deputy minister to governor)	2	3.2
<b>Membership in Previous Party Congresses</b>		
Since 12 <sup>th</sup> Party Congress (1982)	6	9.7
Since 13 <sup>th</sup> Party Congress (1987)	2	3.2
Since 14 <sup>th</sup> Party Congress (1992)	23	37.1
<b>Membership in the 15<sup>th</sup> Party Congress (1997)</b>		
Full Members	37	59.7
Alternate Members	17	27.4
<b>Leadership Experience outside of the Province</b>		
In other province(s)	33	53.2
In central government	21	33.9
Total	62	100.0

Sources: Same as Table 4.