Civil-Military Relations and the EP-3 Crisis: A Content Analysis

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The conduct of the Chinese government during the recent EP-3 crisis raised important questions about the state of civil-military relations in China. Observers at the time were divided as to whether the comments of senior military leaders and editorials in military newspapers were different in content than their civilian counterparts. They were also divided over whether these differences reflected only variations in propaganda or actual institutional divergence. In addition, most analysts seemed convinced that the military monopolized critical information flows to the leadership, especially data about the causes of the collision and the lack of mayday calls by the EP-3, thus tying the hands of Foreign Ministry negotiators and perhaps even unnecessarily drawing out the crisis. Using interviews, some secondary sources, and detailed content analysis of civilian and military media during the crisis, this essay explores these themes.

China’s Response to the United States: Unity or a Civil-Military Split?

As any regular reader of the Hong Kong or Taiwan media can attest, assertions of impending splits or conflicts between the CCP and PLA are commonplace in non-crisis situations, and these breathless but often inadequately sourced opinions only grow in frequency during crises. Longtime students of Chinese civil-military relations are correct to view this journalistic reportage with a jaundiced eye, since the “death” of Chinese civil-military stability has often proven “greatly exaggerated.” This is not to say that the exercise of monitoring the evolution of civil-military relations is without value. Clearly, the interlocking directorate of the Mao and Deng eras has been broken, and military crises like the EP-3 incident have the potential to create or widen cleavages in China’s partially but increasingly institutionalized system.

Because so much of the Chinese political apparatus is still frustratingly opaque, we have to rely on some traditional tools--and, especially, on content analysis of official media--to properly analyze possible splits in the leadership. It is true that the Chinese media and book publishing system has undergone a dramatic decentralization and commercialization over the last few years, severely undermining our previous confidence that most published information had either been centrally or at least institutionally coordinated. Nevertheless, the published comments of top leaders and of authoritative editorials in People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) and Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun Bao) should still be viewed as important channels of communication of policies and preferences. These data sources, along with the daily Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s comments, form the core of the analysis.

Before examining the stringy vines of content, it is first necessary to build an analytical trellis--in this case the chronology of the crisis, which is summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Chronology of the EP-3 Crisis

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Sun 1 April | U.S. EP-3 collides with Chinese F-8II, destroying the Chinese plane and killing the pilot. The EP-3 makes an emergency landing at Lingshui on Hainan Island
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Mon 2 April | President Bush: “It is now time” to release the crew. “Every day that goes by increases the potential that our relations with China could be damaged.”
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Tues 3 April | Brigadier General Sealock has 40 minute meeting with the EP-3 crew in the presence of Chinese officials
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Wed 4 April | Secretary of State Powell: “regrets that the Chinese plane did not get down safely” and “regrets the loss of the life of that Chinese pilot.”
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Thurs 5 April | Bush: “I regret that a Chinese pilot is missing and I regret that one of their airplanes is lost. Our prayers go out to the pilot, his family. The message to the Chinese is we should not let this incident destabilize relations. Our relationship with China is very important. But they need to realize that it’s time for our people to be home.”
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Fri 6 April | 2nd meeting between U.S. officials and the crew – the first meeting without Chinese officials
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Sun 8 April | President Bush warns that stand-off could hurt US-China ties. Secretary of State Powell uses the word “sorry” for the first time, saying “We have expressed regrets and we have expressed our sorrow, and we are sorry that a life was lost.” Vice-President Cheney, speaking to NBC News, still insists that there was no need to apologize to China, and National Security Advisor Condi Rice also says that “there will be no apology.” 3rd meeting between US officials and crew
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Mon 9 April | 4th meeting between US officials and crew
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Tues 10 April | 5th meeting between US officials and crew
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Wed 11 April | Letter delivered by Ambassador Preuher to the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan. Chinese announce decision to release the crew.
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Fri 13 April | Crew returns to Hickam AFB

This chronology highlights two critical questions related to civil-military relations.

**Did the PLA Lie to the Party Leadership About Wang Wei?**

This is a provocative—and perhaps unanswerable—question, but it is certainly the one immediately raised by the Rashomon-like disconnect between the American and Chinese version of the collision and its aftermath. Both sides agree that an American EP-3 was flying approximately 100 kilometers from Hainan Island when it was intercepted by two Chinese F-8II fighters, piloted by Wang Wei and Zhao Yu. At this point, however, the American and Chinese stories diverge sharply. According to Chinese accounts, the U.S. EP-3—which is a large, propeller driven aircraft as big as a Boeing 737—“suddenly veered” and collided with Wang Wei’s plane, “ramming and destroying” the
aircraft and killing its pilot.\textsuperscript{1} American officials, including former U.S. Navy pilot and serving Ambassador Joseph Preuher, rejected the Chinese version of events, arguing that the EP-3 was too lumbering and slow to perform such a maneuver, and that the international norm placed the onus for safety on the smaller, faster, and nimble Chinese fighter aircraft. Moreover, U.S. officials argued that an American pilot would never have considered such a dangerous action, since it would have placed all twenty-four crew members in a potentially fatal situation. Instead, U.S. officials placed the blame on Wang Wei, asserting he flew too close to the EP-3. The combination of this close flying with the instability of the F-8II at relatively low rates of speed caused his plane to collide with the American aircraft. As the crisis deepened, leaks began to appear that described previous episodes of recklessness on Wang Wei’s part, suggesting that he was a “hot dog” pilot who regularly endangered both himself and others. No physical evidence to support either side’s contention was publicly proffered, however, until after the crew had returned, when U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld held a press conference at which he presented video evidence of Wang Wei previously flying recklessly close to American aircraft. In one such incident, he pressed a piece of paper with his e-mail address to the window of the cockpit, and in another, he took his hands off the controls and appeared to be steering the plane with his knees.

Given the divergence between these accounts, the first question is where did the official Chinese version of events come from? Two critical facts in dispute are the account of the collision itself and the circumstances of the landing of the U.S. plane at Lingshui, both of which could only have come from military sources. As for the collision, the Wang Wei’s wingman was certainly de-briefed by his chain of command at the airbase. Extrapolating from what is known about Chinese military aircraft operations, the local airbase commander would not have to rely solely on the undoubtedly biased account of the collision provided by Wang’s wingman, however, since Chinese fighters are carefully monitored and directed by ground control intercept (GCI) personnel on the ground. Data from GCI-linked radars, for example, were likely the main source of the assertion that the collision happened 104 kilometers southeast of Hainan.\textsuperscript{2} Similarly, only the military could have provided the facts contained in a Liberation Army Daily article on April 8, including the claim that Wang Wei’s plane had been flying “400 meters” from the EP-3 on its “left side” when the U.S. plane “suddenly took a big turn toward China's fighter.”\textsuperscript{3}

As for the account of the landing of the U.S. plane on Lingshui, the Chinese government asserted from April 1 onward that it touched down “without permission.”\textsuperscript{4} The Chinese side claimed further in a People’s Daily article on April 4 that the plane “did not make any attempt to request a landing or notify the Chinese side,” even though the “plane’s communications system still functioned well.”\textsuperscript{5} On April 8, a Liberation Army Daily article went further, asserting:

\textit{Facts} show that after the collision occurred, the communications system of the US military reconnaissance plane was still under normal operation. It took 26 minutes from the collision to the landing. During this period, the US military plane had enough time and technological conditions to issue an entrance or landing request to the Chinese side. (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{6}
Such detail could only have come from the PLA. Yet one wonders about these “facts”: how did the PLA know that the communications system was still working? Perhaps PLA personnel were sitting there listening to the Mayday calls that Lt. Osborne claims to have made? They certainly could not have made such a claim with absolutely certainty based solely on the condition of the communications gear after they seized the plane, which could only tell them whether the equipment had the potential to work at the time.

How was the information about the collision and the landing transmitted from the PLA to the civilian leadership? The analysis above suggests that both of these pieces of PLA-friendly information were likely first gathered at Lingshui Airbase and then passed up the chain. From public sources, it currently unclear whether the commander relayed the information to Guangzhou Military Region (MR) Air Force headquarters--from which it would have likely passed sequentially to the Guangzhou MR headquarters, then to the General Staff Department, and finally to the Central Military Commission (CMC)--or whether the information was “skip-echeloned” directly to the General Staff Department. Regardless, the vertically stove-piped nature of the PLA’s organizational structure meant that the information likely passed to civilians at a very high level of the system, perhaps directly from the CMC to the Politburo Standing Committee. Thus, the reports passed through multiple layers of the PLA hierarchy before any civilians were involved, increasing the chances that the story was "massaged" or "sanitized" by senior military officials predisposed to tell a PLA-friendly story and place the U.S. actions in the worst possible light. The high rank and seniority of the military officers presenting the reports also likely bolstered the authority of the accounts, or at least raised the costs of questioning the story for the civilian participants in the discussion.

As a result, the PLA’s version of the collision appears to have quickly become the official position of the government. Transmitted on the day of the incident, the account of the official Chinese government news agency Xinhua contains many of the core details of the Chinese story. In particular, it asserts that the “direct cause” of the crash was that the U.S. plane “violated flight rules,” “suddenly veered” towards the Chinese plane, and landed “without permission” at Lingshui. On 2 April, Xinhua added even more detail to the official account, claiming that “the top of the left wing of the U.S. aircraft bumped against one of the Chinese planes.” Also, on April 3, a commentary began its description of the collision with the phrase “according to the Chinese pilots.” Given that official media never mentioned any civilian officials traveling to Lingshui to conduct an investigation or obtain independent information, it seems likely that these types of details could only have come from the military.

Jiang Zemin upped the ante again in his response to President’s Bush’s assertion that the Chinese pilot caused the crash, asserting that China had “sufficient evidence” that the United States was responsible. Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao on April 9 went one step further by claiming that China has “clear evidence” that the U.S. side was responsible for the collision. Despite official U.S. statements to the contrary, the Chinese government held to these positions unwaveringly until the end of the crisis on April 13.

Why was the PLA account accepted so quickly as the official position? A number of factors were likely important. First, the civilian leadership was no doubt aware that there were bureaucratic
and political costs to openly questioning the military’s account. Bureaucratically, no civilian leader could accuse the PLA of deliberately violating party discipline and lying to the central leadership without strong evidence, yet that evidence could only be obtained by questioning the story. Like most of the leaders vying for position before the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002, Jiang Zemin likely had a personal reason to back the military’s line, since the continued support of the senior military leadership would be an important constituency for his bid to retain chairmanship of Central Military Commission. Politically, it would have been very difficult for the central leadership to pursue the possibility that Wang Wei caused the accident, because the “China-as-victim-of-hegemonist-aggression” storyline meshed easily with the growing and vocal nationalism of the population, and it possessed many of the same dynamics as the 1993 Yin He incident and the 1999 American bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade. Here again, Beijing was “riding the tiger,” reaping the negative implications of its implicit decision to encourage nationalism as a normative replacement for the decline of communist ideology. To swim against such a strong current risked the possibility that the ire of the people would turn against the regime, raising questions about why the leadership was not doing more to resist the military and diplomatic encroachments of the United States on Chinese sovereignty. Once Wang Wei was effectively designated as a martyr, any possibility of backing away from the official story of the collision was eliminated.

While domestic factors were critical in deterring civilian contrarianism, external pressures were important as well. Indeed, the U.S. response at the early stages of the crisis may have actually reduced the leadership’s ability to push back against the military account of the collision. The assertions by President Bush on April 2 that the Chinese pilot caused the crash unleashed an onslaught of angry nationalist emotion in PRC media. The commentary in the April 3 People’s Daily is typical, arguing that “U.S. officials’ rhetoric about Chinese culpability is more dangerous than the collision itself.” By April 7, People’s Daily and other civilian newspapers had begun regularly borrowing the extreme rhetoric of Liberation Army Daily, asserting that the crisis had exposed “the ugly face of hegemonism.” This convergence of language was a rightward shift for the civilian apparatus, perhaps reflecting the reduced policy options for the civilians in the face of perceived American intransigence.

Overall, the PLA’s apparent control over and manipulation of the details of the collision and the landing of the EP-3 in Lingshui appears to have severely constrained and therefore pre-ordained the policy choices for the civilian leadership. With no alternative information at their disposal, it was likely impossible for the central leadership to develop any conditions for the resolution of the crisis short of the four outlined by Jiang Zemin at the beginning of the crisis: apology for the collision, explanation of the incident, compensation for China’s losses, and a halt to all future reconnaissance flights. The rigidity of this position likely delayed resolution of the crisis, since there could be no middle ground between the very different American and Chinese accounts of the collision and its aftermath. This represented a short-term victory for the military, but as we shall see later, it could have negative, long-term implications for civil-military relations and the bureaucratic interests of the PLA.

Did the PLA Waver From the Party Line?
While the PLA’s account of the collision and its aftermath may have had a strong influence on the central leadership’s policy line in negotiations with the United States, it is an open question whether the military felt that this line was sufficient or whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in fact implemented the policy to its fullest extent during the negotiations with the United States. Potential differences can be seen in the content and tone of civilian and military media and the comments of civilian and military elites during this period.

On one hand, the military and civilian apparatus appeared to be united behind the four conditions for resolution of the crisis outlined by Jiang Zemin on April 4. A Liberation Army Daily editorial on April 5 used much of the same language as its People’s Daily counterpart, listing the four conditions as the necessary steps on the part of the United States for de-escalation of the crisis. This congruence continued without exception throughout the remainder of the crisis. Moreover, beginning on April 6, there began a constant refrain of statements expressing military loyalty to the Party’s statements and policies, highlighting Jiang Zemin by name as the “core” of the leadership. The April 6 article declared that the “commanders and soldiers of the whole army and men of the People’s Armed Police resolutely support Jiang Zemin’s statement and the Chinese government’s policies,” and further asserted that Jiang’s comments reflected the concern of the party and the government for the “people’s army.” This mantra reached a crescendo upon resolution of the crisis on April 11, when Xinhua published an article with the headline “Troops of All Military Units and Armed Police Force Resolutely Support the Central Leadership’s Correct Policy Decisions, and Are Determined to Turn Patriotic Enthusiasm Into Actions for Strengthening the Armed Forces and Do a Good Job in Safeguarding State Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity.” Introducing a modernization-related theme that would play for the next couple of months, the article asserted that “the vast number of officers and servicemen of the People's Liberation Army and the armed police force all expressed their resolute support for the central leadership's correct policy decision,” and it expressed their determination to “turn the soaring patriotic enthusiasm into actions for strengthening the armed forces and to do a good job in safeguarding state sovereignty and territorial integrity.” The article ended with personal praise for Jiang Zemin, arguing that the government’s handling of the crisis “demonstrated the ability of the party central leadership with Comrade Jiang Zemin at the core to have a complicated situation in hand and to handle complicated issues.” Ending speculation that the Xinhua article represented the central leadership speaking on behalf of a reluctant military, the same themes were repeated in an April 12 Liberation Army Daily article, which added that the military now trusted the CCP Central Committee with Jiang Zemin at the core “more than ever.” As a result, the PLA “at any time and under any circumstance...will resolutely obey the command of the Party and we will steadfastly follow the direction of the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission with Comrade Jiang Zemin at the core.”

On the other hand, military statements and commentary during the crisis did not echo the sometimes accommodating language of the civilian media, albeit interspersed amidst a constant refrain of criticism and indignation. While criticizing U.S. countercharges concerning the behavior of Wang Wei, the People’s Daily on April 3 did acknowledge that the “decision to remove the three destroyers is a positive gesture that is welcomed.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 3 took pains to reassure the outside world that the EP-3 crew was “safe,” and being treated in the “spirit of humanitarianism,” while also strongly rejecting the notion that China had no right to search the U.S. plane. On April 4,
Jiang Zemin made an appeal, calling on Washington to meet China’s four conditions as a way of doing “something favorable to the smooth development of US-China relations.” He declared further on April 5 that “China and the United States should place the highest priority on Sino-U.S. relations in order to find an adequate solution.” Along the same lines, People’s Daily on April 5 asserted that “neither Beijing nor Washington wants to see a full-blown crisis over this collision.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Sun Yuxi acknowledged the same day that the “regret expressed by the United States is a step in the right direction” and that “China is committed to develop a healthy and stable Sino-US relationship.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Zhu Bangzao was even more unequivocal on April 5, declaring “We don’t want the United States to become our enemy, and China does not constitute an enemy for the United States,” even while his colleague Sun Yuxi criticized the U.S. for its “groundless” charges against China.

In perhaps the most forward-leaning statement of all, Jiang Zemin drew an analogy between the needed U.S. apology and the Western custom of people apologizing to one another when they bump in the street, seemingly implying that both sides might share some of the blame for the collision!

All of these positive sentiments came to head in the editorial commentary of April 11, which followed the triumphal accounts of China’s victory over U.S. recalcitrance with the a remarkably optimistic summary of the government’s attitude about the United States:

The direction of Sino-US relations is extremely important for the whole world. Although there are in the United States anti-China forces that are hostile to China and interfere in China's internal affairs, the American people as a whole favor friendship with China. For China and the United states to improve and develop their relations not only accords with the fundamental interests of the two countries but also benefits world peace and stability.

PLA statements and commentary, by contrast, conveyed none of these concessions or positive statements about the United States at the beginning, middle or end of the crisis. Instead, military leaders like Chi Haotian employed explosive language, accusing America of operating from a “Cold War mentality” and pursuing “hegemonism and power politics,” and threatening that “the Chinese armed forces and people will not accept it if the U.S. government attempts to evade its responsibility.” Commentary ridiculed the United States as the “world policeman” and threatened that “the Chinese people cannot be bullied and Chinese soldiers cannot be intimidated!” While asserting that “the army’s officers and men feel extremely indignant over the United States’ disgusting act of hegemonism,” PLA commentary ceaselessly lauded the heroism of Wang Wei. The few positive statements came from General Zhang Wannian, who asserted at the beginning and middle of the crisis that the situation would be resolved through “diplomatic channels,” reassuring China’s “friends” that there was no need to “worry.” And in contrast to civilian commentary following the resolution of the crisis, there was only a brief mention of the value of Sino-U.S. relations to China, attributed to a single PLA officer who asserted that “during this incident, [China’s] leadership treasured the overall interests of Sino-US relations.” This divergence between civilian and military public statements could be explained in a number of ways. It could reflect a real split between advocates of diplomatic compromise in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and hardliners in the PLA. Or it could be an example of “good cop, bad cop” in the public posture of the government. While the Chinese have a long history of
Mulvenon, *China Leadership Monitor*, No.1

subtle signaling, the latter seems too clever by half, though the current evidence is probably too fragmentary to prove the more dire conclusion authoritatively.

**Implications**

From a short term perspective, the EP-3 crisis could very well benefit the Chinese military, reminding the civilian apparatus of the salience of the military dimension of U.S.-China relations and creating the justification for additional resources to push back against American power projection in the region. Over the longer term, however, the EP-3 crisis raises some fundamental civil-military issues, some of which could rebound negatively for the PLA.

If, as the evidence and interviews suggest, the PLA high command did in fact misrepresent the account of the collision to their civilian counterparts, an additional victim of the crisis might be the bonds of trust between civilian elites and the military. This dynamic could affect military personnel choices for the Sixteenth Party Congress next year and beyond. In a reversal of recent trends towards the institutionalization of civil-military relations, the EP-3 crisis might therefore increase the salience of personal connections between civilian and military elites, as the next generation of civilian leaders looks to promote officers with whom they have personal bonds of trust. They may now be more concerned about developing relationships with people who will give them the unvarnished truth, rather than officers who are institutional paragons but unknown to them.

A second civil-military issue centers on the resolution of the crisis, which was seen by some interlocutors as being less than satisfactory. In interviews, military officers noted that the EP-3 crew was released without U.S. agreement to meet any of Jiang Zemin's four conditions outlined on April 4, especially the formal apology. While the Chinese media trumpeted the U.S. letter of April 11 as a statement of apology and portrayed China as the victor, Chinese observers could not help but notice that the conciliatory language of the letter fell far short of Beijing's demands. While such compromises are the standard fare of diplomacy, some PLA officers reportedly viewed this turn of events as a sign of civilian weakness. This belief was no doubt bolstered by Secretary Rumsfeld's combative press conference the day after the return of the crew on April 13, at which he strongly rejected the notion of apologizing to China for the collision and instead presented even more clear-cut video evidence supporting the earlier accusations against the "hot dog pilot" Wang Wei. For the PLA and other like-minded Chinese, Secretary Rumsfeld's performance likely undermined the "sincerity" of any delivered US apology, and raised doubts about the civilian Foreign Ministry officials who negotiated the release of the crew.

September 1, 2001

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7 The Chinese military system permits lines of authority to skip intervening echelons during crisis or war, allowing Beijing to reach down and directly control lower-level units.


12 Based on complete collections of related articles from *People’s Daily, Liberation Army Daily, Xinhua*, and the transcripts of the daily Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefings.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Renmin Ribao Commentator, "Translate Patriotic Fervor into Strength to Make the Country Strong," as reported by Xinhua, April 11, 2001.

34 Ibid.


40 Xinhua, April 9, 2001.