The 16th Party Congress: A Preview

Joseph Fewsmith

The 16th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will convene November 8, 2002. It and the First Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee that will immediately follow the congress will overhaul China’s top leadership, including the Central Committee, the Politburo, the Politburo Standing Committee, the secretariat, and the CCP’s Central Military Commission. The congress will also revise the CCP’s party charter—to what extent and in what way will be watched closely—and issue a political report, which will review the party’s achievements and amend its ideology. Although much anticipated, this party congress is unlikely to provide a sharp turning point in party policy. The influence of Jiang Zemin and/or his close supporters will persist. The political transition many are hoping for is likely to be drawn out, perhaps extending to the 17th Party Congress in 2007.

The 16th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, scheduled to convene November 8, 2002, has attracted a great deal of attention, because if power is peacefully transferred to a new generation, it will be the first time this feat has been accomplished in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, the rumor mill has been working overtime in recent months, and speculation has been rife over whether CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin will retire and what personnel arrangements will be made.¹ This article cannot answer these questions directly, but it can lay out in broad terms what the party congress can be expected to do and which issues have been discussed in party publications in recent months.

In general terms, party congresses have three tasks: (1) adjust China’s leadership by selecting a new Central Committee (the Politburo, the all-important Politburo Standing Committee, the secretariat, and the Central Military Commission [CMC] are named by the First Plenary Session of the new Central Committee, which is held immediately following the close of the congress); (2) revise the party charter (minimally in recent years) to reflect evolving policy; and (3) issue a political report, which will sum up the party’s stance on a variety of issues, including the party’s achievements in the preceding five years (this time, as noted below, there will be an emphasis on the previous 13 years, or the period since Jiang Zemin was named general secretary) and theoretical and policy matters. Although congresses rarely set out specific policies, they do set a tone and provide specific language that allows party policy to evolve in particular directions.

Media headlines following the 16th Party Congress will inevitably focus on personnel changes. Those changes will be important because they affect many careers beyond those of the people who are named (or not named) to leadership positions. There will, however, be important issues considered (or sidestepped), and these developments will be equally important, for they will affect party policy in the years to come. This article attempts to set out the pressing personnel issues, particularly Jiang’s future status and influence; potential revisions to the party charter; and key theoretical/policy issues,
such as those concerning entrepreneurs and Marx’s labor theory of value, that are likely to be considered by the congress.

**Personnel Changes**

Twenty-two people were elected full members of the Politburo at the 15th Party Congress in 1997. Of these, seven were named to the Politburo Standing Committee and one (Xie Fei) has since died. In addition, two people (Zeng Qinghong and Wu Yi) were selected as alternate members of the Politburo. Eleven of the 21 remaining full members were born in 1932 or before and thus should retire this year, assuming the retirement age of 70 is upheld. Jiang Zemin, of course, is one of these members, and attention has been focused on whether he will give up his post as general secretary as well as other positions (state president and head of the CMC). The other 10 full members of the Politburo are eligible for reappointment, and if past precedent is followed, they will indeed be reappointed. This group includes Li Ruihuan, who apparently does not get along well with Jiang Zemin and would become the oldest member of the Politburo Standing Committee. The 10 expected to be reappointed to the Politburo include, of course, Hu Jintao (who is expected to be named general secretary) and Wen Jiabao (who is expected to be named premier during the National People’s Congress [NPC] meeting in March 2003). Although the new Politburo Standing Committee is likely to be drawn from the existing Politburo membership (including alternates), the party congress will no doubt name perhaps a dozen new members, or about 55 percent of the total membership, to the new Politburo. The table below lists all the members of the current Politburo.

**Politburo Members (selected in 1997)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standing Committee (listed in rank order)</th>
<th>Year Born</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jiang Zemin</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Peng</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Chairman, NPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhu Rongji</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Ruihuan</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Chairman, CPPCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu Jintao</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei Jianxing</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Head, CDIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Lanqing</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Vice Premier</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Full Members (listed alphabetically)</th>
<th>Year Born</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ding Guan’gen</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Head, Propaganda Dept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang Ju</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Shanghai CCP Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jia Qinglin</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Beijing CCP Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiang Chunyun</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Vice Chair, NPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Changchun</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Guangdong CCP Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Tieying</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>President, CASS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo Gan</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Head, Political-Legal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tian Jiyun</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Vice Chair, NPC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Qian Qichen   1928   Vice Premier
Chi Haotian   1929   Vice Chair, CMC
Wen Jiabao   1942   Vice Premier
Wu Bangguo   1941   Vice Premier
Wu Guanzheng  1938   Shandong CCP Secretary
Xie Fei (d. Oct. 1999)  1932   Guangdong CCP Secretary
Zhang Wannian  1928   Vice Chair, CMC

Alternates
Wu Yi    1938   State Councillor
Zeng Qinghong  1939   Head, Organization Dept.

Retirement will also greatly affect the composition of the Central Committee. At the 15th Party Congress in 1997, 193 people were named to the Central Committee. Since then, five have died and been replaced by alternate members of the Central Committee (which is listed in order of votes received; those with the most votes move up to replace those who have died). Central Committee members, other than those who sit on the Politburo, are required to retire at age 65. There are currently 110 members of the Central Committee (not counting those on the Politburo) who were born in 1937 or before, so the turnover rate on the Central Committee should be about 60 percent. The turnover rate for full members of the Central Committee was 57 percent at the 15th Party Congress, so this rate is normal.

Personnel changes reflecting retirements and elevation to the new Central Committee began a year or more ago and will continue into the new year as new appointments are made to the State Council following next spring’s meeting of the National People’s Congress. Recently appointed provincial leaders, as Cheng Li has elucidated in this forum, include people affiliated with the “Shanghai Gang” (such as Meng Jianzhu, party secretary of Jiangxi) as well as “princelings” (such as Yu Zhengsheng, party secretary of Hubei, and Xi Jinping, acting governor of Zhejiang). Those leaders most closely associated with the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), Li Keqiang and Song Defu, remain in position as governor of Henan and party secretary of Fujian, respectively.

Summing Up the Past 13 Years

On August 26, 2002, People’s Daily published an editorial stating that the Politburo had decided that the 16th Party Congress would be convened on November 8, approximately seven weeks later than originally anticipated. The editorial also stated that the congress would sum up the party’s work since the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee, in other words, since Jiang Zemin took over as general secretary in June 1989. Accordingly, party journals such as Dangjian yanjiu (Party-building research) have been running articles discussing the achievements of the past 13 years. As party writers present this issue, Jiang’s accomplishments include guiding the party and state through a complex domestic and international environment; managing the
relationship among reform, development, and stability; improving “socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics”; and developing Marxist theory. This last reference, of course, is to Jiang’s “three represents” (whereby the party represents the advanced forces of production, the fundamental interests of the vast majority of the people, and advanced culture). The three represents are presented as upholding the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, but also as “keeping up with the times” (yushi jujin). Thus, they are routinely said to be “inheriting” (yimai xiangcheng) Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory but nevertheless reflecting the new demands of the contemporary world.  

This emphasis on summing up (zongjie) the past 13 years is sounding like a grand send-off for Jiang Zemin. Nevertheless, even if Jiang does retire completely (meaning from his three posts of general secretary, president of the PRC, and head of the Central Military Commission), he will continue to be influential for the foreseeable future for three reasons. First, assuming the political report of the congress gives a glowing description of Jiang’s stewardship over the past 13 years, the party will bind itself closely to his legacy. Second, the party’s new ideology--the three represents--comprise Jiang’s contribution to Marxism-Leninism, and as the chief articulator of that ideology, Jiang can be expected to remain influential. And third, several of Jiang’s closest protégés, including Zeng Qinghong, Li Changchun, and Wu Bangguo, are very likely to be appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine Hu Jintao (assuming he is named general secretary) parting company with Jiang quickly. Thus, a grand send-off does not appear to add up to a going-away party.

Recent developments—which are likely to continue right up to the eve of the party congress—strongly presuppose Jiang’s continuing importance following the 16th Party Congress. On October 22, 2002, People’s Daily published an authoritative editorial titled “Taking Big Strides under the Guidance of the ‘Three Represents.’” Enshrining Jiang’s doctrine as a “guide for action,” the editorial made clear the authoritative standing of the three represents.  

Editorials normally follow Politburo meetings; this meeting no doubt entailed decisions on several important issues, including personnel changes and probably final approval of the text of the political report. On the same day as the editorial, the Xinhua News Agency announced that Beijing CCP Secretary Jia Qinglin and Shanghai Party Secretary Huang Ju would be “transferred to the center.” In light of the close relationship of each of these people to Jiang Zemin, these transfers suggest that Jiang is bolstering his strength at the center in preparation for the post-congress era. Beijing Mayor Liu Qi has replaced Jia Qinglin as Beijing party secretary, and Liu is now likely to move up to the Politburo. The same announcement stated that Chongqing Party Secretary He Guoqiang would be transferred; two days later, on October 24, Xinhua announced that He would replace Zeng Qinghong as head of the CCP Central Organization Department. At the same time, it was announced that Liu Yunshan would replace Ding Guan’gen as head of the CCP Central Propaganda Department.  

Liu Yunshan is of Mongol nationality and served in the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) in Inner Mongolia, suggesting possible links to Hu Jintao. On the other hand, assuming Zeng Qinghong moves up, as expected, to the Politburo Standing
Committee to take charge of party affairs, the selection of He Guoqiang (who formerly served as governor of Fujian when Jia Qinglin was party secretary) as head of the Central Organization Department suggests that Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong will maintain substantial control over the party’s machinery.

Revising the Party Charter

In recent months party commentary has made it clear that the 16th Party Congress will make revisions to the CCP constitution. As a recent article pointed out, the party charter has been revised 13 times through the 15th Party Congress. The same article noted that Jiang Zemin had personally overseen the revision of the party charter at the 14th and 15th Party Congresses, thus clearly implying that he would do so one more time. It also asserted that the standard for judging any revision to the party charter would be “Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the ‘three represents’ raised by Jiang Zemin.” This phraseology suggests that the three represents will be written into the party charter. Indeed, the same article describes the three represents as “the basis for establishing our party, the foundation of our ruling, and the source of our strength.” It goes on to claim that for the “party charter to explicitly state the basic demand of the ‘three represents’ will inevitably unite us better and will mobilize the whole party to struggle to realize the heavy mission the age has given to us.”

Additionally, some indication of Jiang’s status in the post-congress period will be given by the wording used to insert the three represents into the party charter. It seems unlikely that the party will grant what Jiang undoubtedly desires most: that his name be put on a par with those of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Recently, the phrase “the ‘three represents’ raised by (ti chu laide) Jiang Zemin” has been used frequently. Such phraseology would get Jiang’s name into the party charter but in a way that clearly makes it subordinate to those of Mao and Deng. When new regulations for cadre appointments were issued last summer, however, they called simply for “seriously practicing the important thought of the ‘three represents,’” a formulation that would allow considerable flexibility in interpreting the meaning of this thinking in the years to come. Another possible measure of Jiang’s status concerns the preamble to the party charter, which contains a brief characterization of the achievements of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. A summing up of Jiang’s accomplishments could be added here.

Perhaps most interesting will be whether the party will dare to change the opening sentence, which reads: “The Chinese Communist Party is the vanguard of the Chinese working class; it is the loyal representative of the interests of all the nationalities in China; and it is the leadership core of China’s socialist enterprise.” In Jiang’s speeches of July 1, 2001, and May 31, 2002, he employed the formula “our party is the vanguard of the Chinese working class, and at the same time is the vanguard of the Chinese people and China’s nationalities....” The inclusion of “the Chinese people” was apparently intended to dilute the identification of the CCP with the working class and move it in the direction of a “party of the whole people” (quanmindang) in order to facilitate opening the party to “capitalists” (the CCP uses the term “private entrepreneurs,” not “capitalists”). This formula was one of the most controversial aspects of Jiang’s
speeches, and it will be indicative of his influence and the future direction of the party to see how much of this language is incorporated into the party charter.

The party charter is also likely to be revised regarding inner-party democracy—that is, the opening up of some party activities to greater scrutiny, albeit still within the party—and the activities of certain party organs, particularly the party congresses at various levels. There has been much discussion in the party literature on inner-party democracy and on the role of party congresses. Some articles suggest that party congresses at various levels should, like the National People’s Congress, adopt a standing committee system, which would allow party congress standing committees to convene on a regular basis between full party congresses. Some have speculated that such a system might provide a platform for Jiang Zemin should he decide to retain a formal role in the system following the 16th Party Congress.

One article notes that the 14th Party Congress considered revising the party charter to specify the grassroots activities of the party in township and village enterprises (TVEs), private enterprises, foreign-invested enterprises, etc., but decided that the time was not right and that regulations could be set in the future. Perhaps this allusion hints at changes that might be made at the forthcoming party congress.

“Capitalists” in the Party

Whether in an article regarding party activities in private enterprises or elsewhere, the party charter will probably be revised in some way to meet Jiang Zemin’s demand that private entrepreneurs and other “outstanding elements” of the new social strata that have emerged in recent years be able to join the party. It has been widely rumored that the new Central Committee will include some entrepreneurs as representatives of the new social strata. If so, there will be a certain irony in this development. At the 16th Party Congress, two former model workers—Ni Zhifu and Hao Jianxiu—will no doubt retire (Ni is 69 years old, and Hao is 67), apparently to be replaced by a different type of “model worker”—private entrepreneurs.

It is evident that the party has long been discussing what to do with regard to private entrepreneurs. For instance, in June 2001, the Central Party School sent a team of researchers to Zhejiang Province in eastern China, where the private economy has developed very rapidly. In 1978, 75 percent of provincial fiscal revenues came from state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but in 2001, 75 percent came from the nonstate economy. Many writers argue that if private entrepreneurs are not admitted to the party, then they will be seen (and presumably act) as an alien force—an argument that directly contradicts the widely held assumption that Chinese entrepreneurs are intent on working solely through the state.

Having delineated the growth of the private economy, the team from the Central Party School turned to the theoretical issues involved. It is widely believed in the West, and sometimes in China, that theory (ideology) no longer matters, but the intensity with which these issues are argued in China and the perceived need for party plenums and
congresses to deal with them belie that assumption. The researchers from the Central Party School came up with an apparently new formulation to deal with the entrepreneurial economy that has emerged, calling it an “economy rooted in the people” (minben jingji). The term minben jingji was intended to circumvent and, to a degree, obfuscate the conventional distinction between the “public” (gong) economy (that is, the state-owned economy) and the “private” (si) economy. Many reformers have become frustrated with the dichotomies presented by classical Marxist economics because such dichotomies make them vulnerable to criticism. Saying that the economy is neither “public” nor “private” but rather “rooted in the people” avoids a debilitating dichotomy.

The term minben also has the virtue of resonating with traditional Mencian values. The ancient philosopher Mencius, the second greatest teacher in tradition after Confucius, held that “heaven sees as the people see,” so the “mandate of heaven” was rooted in the people (minben). This minben tradition has been at the heart of modern Chinese liberalism, so the article’s invocation of this term evokes not only a valued tradition from China’s past but also a liberal spirit of modern China.

**Labor Theory of Value**

Not every theoretical argument is so easily sidestepped and obfuscated. Bringing entrepreneurs (capitalists) into the CCP forces the party to confront—and revise—Marx’s understanding of the “labor theory of value.” The labor theory of value lies at the very heart of Marxist ideology. For Marx, “exploitation” was not a moral category (e.g., that capitalists were “bad” to exploit workers by not paying them enough) but rather a scientific description of how capitalists extract “surplus labor” from workers. This is not a matter of ill treatment (though that may be involved as well) but an intrinsic element of capitalism. Labor, Marx argued, was composed of two parts, “socially necessary labor” and “surplus labor.” The former was the labor necessary for production and expanded production; the latter was extracted by the capitalist as profits. The extraction of surplus labor was what Marx called “exploitation.” It was Marx’s identification of the two components of labor as intrinsic elements of capitalism that led him to identify himself as a “scientific socialist” in opposition to the many socialists (denigrated as “utopian socialists”) who protested the moral failings of capitalism. Without the labor theory of value, the whole edifice of Marx’s political economy falls.

The importance of the labor theory of value to the ideological claims of Marxism is not lost on Chinese theoreticians. As two writers (who favor revising Marx’s view) put it, “[I]f we negate Marx’s labor theory of value, it will negate Marxist economic theory at the root, negate scientific socialism, and negate more than 80 years of revolution and practice of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people.” Certainly conservative critics who oppose any revision in traditional interpretations of Marx’s view understand what is at stake. For instance, Wu Yifeng, a conservative economist at Chinese People’s University, has argued that economists who revise Marx’s labor theory of value are trying to deny the existence of exploitation in capitalist society and to portray this theory as leading to “extreme leftism” in theory and practice.
Nevertheless, because of the rapid change in China’s economy in recent years, especially the emergence of a large private sector (which now employs over 100 million workers), the CCP has determined that it must revise this central Marxist tenet. The Fifth Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee in October 2000 was the first session to raise this demand authoritatively. “Under the new historical conditions,” it said, we must “deepen our understanding of labor and the labor theory of value.” Then in his July 1, 2001, speech, Jiang Zemin repeated the same demand.22

If bringing entrepreneurs into the party raises fundamental theoretical issues, which are highly contentious within the party and which could threaten the legitimacy of the party if pushed too far, how does the party go about justifying revision of the labor theory of value? In broad terms, three approaches have been taken.

The first is to emphasize the difference in time between Marx’s experience in the 19th century and the realities of the current era. Indeed, this was the approach taken by Jiang Zemin in his July 1 speech when he said, “At present we are developing a socialist market economy, but the conditions we face are very different from those faced and studied by the founders of Marxism.”23 At the time Marx wrote, most workers labored in factories; now, the notion of worker has expanded to include scientists, technicians, service workers, and others who create value.

The second, closely related to the first, lies in the emphasis by many authors on the development of “mental labor.” One author commented that at the beginning of the 20th century, only 5 percent of the development of production relied on technological progress, whereas now the share has risen to 70-80 percent.24 Another writes that “there has appeared a knowledge stratum (zibenjia jieceng) that is different than the capitalist (zibenjia) in the early period of capitalism…. We can only conduct analyses and research based on Marx’s basic concepts and unite them with the new reality.”25

Third, and perhaps most intriguing, is the argument that entrepreneurs are not necessarily exploitative; indeed, they might be considered workers, too. Jiang Zemin opened the door to this approach in his July 1, 2001, speech by saying that those in the newly emerging social strata--including private entrepreneurs--have “made contributions” to socialist production through their “honest labor and work” (chengshi laodong he gongzuo). In the ensuing sentence Jiang grouped these new elements together with workers, peasants, intellectuals, cadres, and soldiers as “those who are constructing” (jianshezhe) socialism.26

Accordingly, some theoreticians have argued that the “labor” of private entrepreneurs is not exploitative. For instance, Zang Zhifeng of the Central Party School has said, “[T]he income of private entrepreneurs is generally not considered exploitative income.” He goes on to say, “As long as these people uphold the law, pay taxes according to the law, treat their workers well, and themselves participate actively in management labor and are enthusiastic about public affairs--based on these concrete circumstances, and taking cognizance of the complexity of the ranks [of entrepreneurs] at this stage--I think a portion of them should be called workers [laodongzhe].”27 If this
were the approach taken, it would eclipse in audacity Deng’s inclusion of “intellectuals” as part of the working class in the early 1980s.

Practical Impact

The way such theoretical issues are dealt with will indicate the support Jiang and his followers can muster at the highest levels of the party. In recent months, Jiang has been harshly criticized by the “Old Left” (orthodox Marxist-Leninists) for abandoning Marxism, by the “New Left” (social critics who focus on issues of social justice) for condoning the vast cleavages that have emerged in Chinese society in recent years, by liberals for not going far enough in embracing the rule of law and political democratization, and by political opponents for seeking to perpetuate his personal authority. The “resolution” of these different perspectives will affect party policy on such issues as party reform and broader political reform--accelerating it, retarding it, or steering it in new directions.

On a very practical level, the resolution of such theoretical issues will affect the CCP’s handling of “capitalists.” It appears that after Jiang’s July 1, 2001, speech, there was such controversy (as well as confusion) that the Central Organization Department of the CCP sent down guidance that private entrepreneurs were not to be admitted into the party until specific guidelines had been worked out, though certain localities were permitted to experiment with admitting entrepreneurs. A year later, it appears that no guidance governing admission of private entrepreneurs has been issued. Thus, a recent article, after invoking Jiang’s call for recruiting entrepreneurs into the party, stated, “The crucial question now is to implement as quickly as possible how they are to join and in what manner they are to join [the party].” The party congress will no doubt set a tone (even if it does not fully resolve theoretical issues such as the labor theory of value) that will permit the Central Organization Department to finally draw up internal guidance governing the admission of private entrepreneurs.

Conclusion

Prior to the convening of the congress, only tentative conclusions can be reached. Our judgments about the state of elite politics, the degree of political institutionalization, and the issues over which political actors agree and disagree will have to remain speculative until the conclusion of the congress--and perhaps for a significant period after that. Nevertheless, at this time, we can say that policy continuity--for better or worse--appears likely. The issues with which China must deal--regional inequality, economic restructuring, corruption, and so forth--are well known, and one can expect continued, incremental efforts to deal with them. Perhaps the biggest concern is whether the gradual generational transition that appears to lie before us (assuming Jiang’s influence remains significant) will create a degree of policy paralysis or timidity that will engender great costs in the future.

October 24, 2002
Notes

1 Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, on the basis of apparently confidential documents, wrote a two-part article in the New York Review of Books arguing that Jiang would retire from all posts, that all the personnel arrangements had been made months ahead of time, and that rumors of conflict within the party’s upper echelon were baseless. At the same time, Susan Lawrence reported about Jiang Zemin’s efforts to cling to power. See Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, “China’s New Rulers: 1. The Path to Power,” and “China’s New Rulers: What They Want,” New York Review of Books 44, no. 14 (September 26, 2002): 12-16, and no. 15 (October 10, 2002): 28-32; and Susan V. Lawrence, “Jiang Finds It Hard to Let Go,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 12, 2002, 34-36.

2 The five who died, in order of their deaths, are Wu Yixia (d. September 1998), Xie Fei (d. October 1999), Yunbulong (d. June 2000), Guo Chaoren (d. June 2000), and Huang Qizao (d. December 2000). They were replaced by Ou Zegao, Yue Haiyan, Huang Zhiquan, Wang Zhengfu, and Tang HONGLGao.

3 My thanks to Cheng Li for providing this figure.


6 There are two Central Military Commissions, one party and the other state. The membership in the two commissions is identical but, under the principle that the party commands the military, it is the party CMC that matters. Assuming that Jiang gives up his post as head of the party CMC in November, he will continue to hold the position of chairman of the state CMC until the NPC meets next spring.


13 Ye Duchu, “Zenyang shi dangzhang,” 34.


16 As my article in China Leadership Monitor 2 (winter 2002) pointed out, Jiang Zemin’s July 1, 2001, speech was careful to list six different new strata, including “private entrepreneurs,” that have emerged in recent years and to say that “outstanding elements from these strata [not classes] should be permitted to join the CCP.” Thus, Jiang carefully avoided using the term “capitalists.”
20 Liu Kegu and Zhang Guiwen, “Shenhua dui laodong he laodong jiazhi renshi de jidian si kao” (Some thoughts on deepening our understanding of labor and the labor theory of value), *Lilun dongtai* 1562 (May 10, 2002): 16.
21 Wu Yifeng, “Laodong shi chuangzao jiazhi de weiyi yuanhuan” (Labor is the sole source of the creation of value), *Dangdai sichao*, 2001, no. 2 (February): 2-3.
22 Cited in Li Zhongjie, “Zenyang renshi xin xingshi xia de laodong he laodong jiazhi wenti (zhi yi)” (How we should understand labor and the labor theory of value under the new conditions, part 1), *Banyuetan neibuban*, 2002, no. 7 (April 15): 16.
23 “Jiang Zemin zai qingzhu jiandang bashi zhounian dahui shang de jianghua” (Jiang Zemin’s talk at the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the founding of the party), [http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/16/20010702/501591.html](http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/16/20010702/501591.html), 9.
29 I make this statement on the basis of interviews conducted in China.
30 Wei Lei, “Fazhan xinde shehui jieceng zhong de youxiu fenzi rudang gongzuo tantao” (An exploration of the work of bringing outstanding elements of newly emerging social strata into the party), *Neibu canyue*, 2002, no. 31 (August 16): 13.