The PLA and the “Three Represents”: Jiang’s Bodyguards or Party-Army?

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In July 2001, Jiang Zemin gave an important speech at the Central Party School, formally introducing the concept of the “three represents,” which calls for some dramatic changes in inner-party democracy and ideology. Even before this speech, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had been one of the strongest institutional proponents of these new concepts. This article examines the PLA’s interpretation of these ideas, as well as the civil-military dynamic driving their praise of Jiang Zemin as the author of the concepts.

Jiang Zemin and the Three Represents

Since the important features of the three represents have been analyzed in great detail in previous issues of China Leadership Monitor, a brief summary will suffice as an introduction to the PLA’s views on the matter. As discussed at length in Jiang Zemin’s July 1, 2001, speech to the Central Party School and subsequent commentary, the three represents (representing the demands for the development of the so-called “advanced productive forces,” representing the direction of the “advanced culture,” and representing the “fundamental interests of the greatest majority of the people”) outline a fundamental modification of some of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) core tenets. Most important is the invitation for new classes of citizens, notably entrepreneurs and other new social classes, to join workers, peasants, and intellectuals as members of the party. As the following passage suggests, the new criterion for membership is ideology, not class origin:

The criterion for determining whether a political party is advanced, whether it is the vanguard of the proletariat, is primarily whether or not its theory and program are Marxist, whether or not it represents the correct orientation of social development, and whether or not it represents the fundamental interests of the broad masses of the people.

Second, the speech highlighted the need for the CCP to transform itself from a “revolutionary party” (gemingdang) waging class struggle to a “ruling party” (zhizhengdang) enforcing “procedural regularity and institutionalization.” Third, Jiang’s remarks repeatedly emphasized the theme of “inner-party democracy,” which appears to be a code word for greater pluralism within the context of single-party rule and thus “an alternative to Western-style democratization.” Specifically, this concept appears to include the strengthening of party congresses as genuinely democratic bodies. Taking these elements together, Joseph Fewsmith has argued that the three represents constitute a “program of significant political reform,” focused on modifying single-party rule in China to make the exercise of political power “less arbitrary and more predictable.”

As presented above, the three represents clearly mark a profound shift in core thinking within the party, and the anticipated adoption of this ideology at the 16th Party
Congress would reflect its broad acceptance by the leadership. In the early days of the ideology’s presentation, however, the real import of the three represents was not fully grasped in some quarters, and attention was focused instead on Jiang Zemin’s personal stake in promoting them. It was believed by some, for instance, that Jiang was quixotically trying to immortalize himself in the pantheon, hoping to elevate the three represents to a status equal to that of “Mao Zedong Thought” and “Deng Xiaoping Theory.” Some observers in Beijing and around the world went so far as to assert that Jiang’s aggressive propagation of the three represents, and the corresponding proliferation of triptychs of Mao, Deng, and Jiang in heroic poses, were beginning to resemble a “personality cult.” As will be argued in greater detail below, the loudest court herald for Jiang’s attempts at securing a celebrated posterity was the Chinese military, whose public fealty to the concepts of the three represents often blurred over into declarations (biaotai) of personal loyalty to Jiang.

The PLA and the Three Represents

Long before Jiang’s July 1 speech, the PLA was aggressively lauding the three represents, but the speech itself was followed by a well-coordinated torrent of General Political Department (GPD)-approved praise of the concept as well as individual statements of support from key PLA leaders. This propaganda push was sustained by intense GPD propaganda coverage of Jiang’s unpublished August 31, 2001, speech to senior military cadres at the National Defense University, his January 2002 speech to the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, and his May 31, 2002, speech to the Central Party School. For analytic purposes, it is helpful to break the PLA’s support down along five lines: (1) How did the PLA decide to organize its internal propaganda campaign for the three represents? (2) What is the military view of the implications of the three represents for the party? (3) What is the military view of the implications of the three represents for the PLA itself? (4) What do official statements tell us about the PLA’s “institutional” view of Jiang Zemin? and (5) What do the individual statements of senior PLA leaders tell us about military politics and party-army relations at the elite levels?

Organizing the Campaign. The PLA’s response to Jiang’s July 1 speech followed the natural progression of previous propaganda campaigns. On the day of the speech, the General Political Department released a circular to all units, declaring that “earnestly studying and implementing General Secretary Jiang’s important speech is of great and far-reaching significance in educating all officers and soldiers.” Within days, an authoritative “commentator” article appeared in Liberation Army Daily, clearly prioritizing this campaign by pointing out that “studying and carrying out this important speech made by comrade Jiang Zemin is the utmost important task for party committees and political institutions at all levels for the present and the coming period.” Until proper study materials could be prepared, the commentator article makes it clear, the speech itself would be the primary text for units at all levels:

All military forces should regard this speech as a fundamental textbook and should use this textbook to answer officers’ and soldiers’ ideological and theoretical questions in the educational campaign. All military forces
should study and formulate methods and measures for carrying out the essence of the speech in party-building, continuously improve overall personal qualities of party members, and raise party-building in the military to a higher level.¹²

After only a few months, the July 1 speech was formally incorporated into teaching materials.¹³ Predictably, the General Political Department soon produced a series of “model cadres” to serve as exemplars of the spirit of the three represents. Within one month, Fan Kuangfu, deputy political commissar of the Zhejiang Military District and political commissar of the Jinhua Military Subdistrict, was identified as just such a cadre.¹⁴ Previous model cadres were redrafted into service as models, and new “Lei Fens,” such as Wen Xuefeng, postgraduate student at the National Defense University for Science and Technology,¹⁵ continued to appear well into the following spring. Just as it had in the PLA-led “little red book” campaign that presaged the Cultural Revolution, the PLA clearly relished its vanguard role as the leading proponent of the three represents. In an article in the party theoretical journal Qiushi, Chief of the General Staff General Fu Quanyou insisted that the “army should always walk in the forefront of the whole society.”¹⁶ Likewise, Central Military Commission Vice Chairman General Zhang Wannian declared that “in studying and practicing the ‘three represents,’ the military should lead society at large.”¹⁷

What is the military view of the implications of the three represents for the party? In its public statements, the PLA fully accepts the centrality of the three represents to the party’s future course, proclaiming that “party-building under the banner of the ‘three represents’ is a long-term strategic task.”¹⁸ The three represents ideology is capable of leading the party to the future because it is a “programmatic document”¹⁹ that “profoundly and comprehensively answers those fundamental questions about party-building,” including “the party’s historical missions and objectives for the new century.”²⁰ In the eyes of the PLA, these objectives are nothing less than the development of a “prosperous, powerful, democratic, civilized, modern socialist country and… the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”²¹ The statements of the military press also underscore the difficulty of this task and seem to implicitly accept the party’s need to balance competing demands (especially limits on resources for military modernization), asserting that the three represents help the PLA to “understand the weighty task the party shoulders in light of complicated international struggles and the arduous practice of reform and construction.”²² For its own part, the PLA has concluded that its primary task in this mission is to get its own house in order, warning the rank and file that “the army ought to think of danger in time of peace and maintain a stronger sense of urgency in improving party-building [within the army], implement the new policy of managing the party strictly, and solve the new questions and handle the new situations in party-building.”²³

What are the implications of the three represents for the PLA itself? From the PLA perspective, the three represents appear to have three major implications: in military affairs, party-army relations, and military modernization.
Military Affairs. In terms of military affairs, Jiang’s speech outlines a clear relationship between the new goals of party work and the day-to-day functioning of the PLA. Within one day of the speech, even the most remote PLA propaganda outlets proclaimed that the speech “fully affirmed army-building” and that it “plays an important guiding role in party- and army-building.” Chief of the General Staff General Fu Quanyou confirmed this link in People’s Daily the following spring, asserting that “the important thinking of the ‘three represents’ plays a fundamental and far-reaching role in guiding military affairs.” For Fu, the three represents serve as “an inexhaustible source of strength for fulfilling our military mission,” including such “sacred” tasks as “building powerful national defense, safeguarding state sovereignty and territorial integrity,… and accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland.” In terms of specific tasks, articles appeared after July 1, 2001, offering specific examples of units attempting to use the three represents in their training and other work. Among the many examples provided, a “certain airborne unit” used the speech as the “driving force” to “brilliantly accomplish a parachuting training task,” the Fujian Military Command claimed the speech was a “guide for the building of our military units, militia, and reserve forces,” the military court apparatus used the speech to reform military legal work, and the editorial staff of the new military encyclopedia were “guided” by the three represents in their compilation work. In September 2002, to commemorate the promulgation of the new “Military Training Regulations,” General Fu made the broadest statement yet on the subject, asserting that the three represents were the “fundamental guiding ideology for all military training” in the PLA.

Party-Army Relations. In his July 1, 2001, speech, Jiang Zemin unambiguously reaffirmed party control of the army, declaring that “our People’s Liberation Army under the party’s leadership is the firm pillar of the people’s democratic dictatorship and is the great wall of steel defending the motherland and an important force for building socialism.” The PLA propaganda apparatus and the senior leadership immediately responded to this call with equally unambiguous fealty to the party. The authoritative commentator article on July 3, 2001, made the link between the speech and party control, asserting that the three represents should guide the PLA to “understand [that] the party’s absolute leadership over the military is the fundamental guarantee for the development and growth of the people’s army and its everlasting military spirit.” Narrowing the gap even further, Chief of the General Staff General Fu Quanyou offered his own biaotai, stating that “the three represents [concept] is the fundamental cornerstone for upholding the absolute leadership of the party over the army.” Yet, PLA propaganda statements also reveal that party-army relations in China face many challenges, mainly from the sociopolitical changes occurring in China. According to Fu, “adherence to the ‘three represents’ is the inevitable requirement for withstanding the test of complicated environments and for forever maintaining the true political color of the people’s army,” since it can “help prevent military units from losing their bearings in complicated military struggles.” In this changing environment, the PLA’s response is to strengthen party-building within the army to better defend the party itself: “[The PLA must] uninterruptedly strengthen party organizations’ cohesiveness, fighting power, and creativity so as to provide solid institutional guarantees for upholding the party’s absolute leadership and for accomplishing the various tasks entrusted to us by the party.”
Because the ideology can foster this unity, the PLA propaganda machine concludes that the three represents are the key to ensuring the status quo of single-party rule in China, as “the thinking of the ‘three represents’ is the foundation for the building of our party, the basis of our ruling power, and the source of our strength.”

**Military Modernization.** The authoritative July 3, 2001, commentator article identified a clear link between the three represents and military modernization, asserting that the three represents will help the PLA in “adapting...to the requirements of the new situation and new tasks, further advancing new projects regarding party-building, and accelerating national and military modernization construction.” In his August 2001 article in the party theoretical journal *Qiushi*, Chief of the General Staff General Fu Quanyou was blunter, arguing that “the ‘three represents’ [ideology] is a scientific guideline for pushing forward the modernization of army.” The following April, he spoke more expansively on the subject:

> Only by firmly establishing the guiding status of the important “three represents” thinking in the military field can our armed forces seize the strategic initiative in the fierce competition of world military development, withstand the test of complicated struggles in the ideological and political fields, remain invincible in future high-tech local warfare, and fundamentally address and resolve the major issue of what kind of an army to build and how to build it in the new century.

With this statement, Fu reemphasized the “bottom line” for modernization outlined in an important PLA editorial in August 2001, which declared that the “proof of meeting the requirements of the ‘three represents’” was “winning a high-tech war.” Fu’s *Qiushi* article also began to describe some of the specific features of the three represents guidance to modernization, highlighting the importance of “science and technology.”

According to an earlier editorial:

> For the army’s science and technology experts to implement the three represents, they must be the trailblazers of the arms and equipment modernization, acquire new knowledge, meet new challenges, make breakthroughs in new and difficult projects, strive to achieve new results, and make positive contributions to speed up the modernization construction process of the army’s arms and equipment, to safeguard the state’s security, and to maintain the motherland’s unity.

Director of the General Armaments Department General Cao Gangchuan was more concrete, declaring two days after Jiang’s speech that “China’s armed forces will definitely use General Secretary Jiang’s important July 1 speech as its armament guideline.”

**What do official statements tell us about the PLA’s “institutional” view of Jiang Zemin?** PLA propaganda documents discussing the July 1 speech also reveal interesting features of the army’s institutional attitudes about Jiang Zemin himself and
provide a window into the nature and quality of Chinese party-army relations. In general, propaganda outlets appeared to be competing with one another to find increasingly fulsome words of praise to describe both Jiang and the three represents. At the apex was the August 20, 2001, Xinhua News Agency article describing a senior military cadres meeting that concluded: “General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s July 1 speech is the latest fruit of our party’s theoretical innovation and the scientific crystallization of the integration of Marxist tenets with China’s reality.” The key element in this sentence is the use of the word “crystallization” (jiejing) to describe the nature of Jiang’s contribution, foreshadowing a key theme in later party propaganda. Other PLA propaganda lauded Jiang in equally lofty terms, asserting that Jiang was personally responsible for a “scientific” “theoretical breakthrough” that “enriches and develops Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory,” and that Jiang himself possessed “great vision and farsightedness.” Jiang’s May 31, 2002, speech to the Central Party School was met with similar enthusiasm. PLA press coverage averred that that later speech “provides rich connotation, profound ideas, and insightful expositions,” which “sum up implementation of the requirements of the ‘three represents’ in a more concentrated, concise, clear-cut, brilliant, and thorough manner than those in the July 1 speech.” In a final burst of hyperbole, the GPD apparatus declared that “the speech once again demonstrates the tremendous courage of the party’s third generation leading collective, with comrade Jiang Zemin as the core, to constantly open up new vistas for Marxist theoretical development, its political wisdom to grasp the overall situation and open up the future, and its outstanding ability to administer the party and state.”

PLA documents also were quick to state their opinion on the controversial issue of whether Jiang’s three represents were equal or subordinate to the theories of Mao and Deng, asserting that PLA cadres “should combine the study of the July 1 speech with studying Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory, with studying comrade Jiang Zemin’s consistent thinking, and with studying and grasping comrade Jiang Zemin’s stance, viewpoint, and method in observing, studying, and resolving major issues in China today.” Further, “practice has fully proved that the party’s third generation central leading collective with comrade Jiang Zemin as its core is the loyal and reliable successor to China’s socialist cause initiated by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping and an energetic and promising pioneer.” By using this type of language, the PLA is at least assured that it is successfully “maintaining the prestige of the third generation of leadership of the party Central Committee with comrade Jiang Zemin as the core,” though the institutional view is not nearly as sycophantic as the statements of individual PLA leaders (see below). To back up this support, PLA press reports were replete with statements of fealty to party control, although they made sure to specify a personalistic attachment to Jiang rather than a more general commitment to the party as an organization. For example, the propaganda apparatus often employed the stock phrase “the army will resolutely follow the command of the CCP Central Committee with comrade Jiang Zemin at the core,” though some added the superlative statement “at any time and under any circumstances.”
What do the individual statements of senior PLA leaders tell us about military politics and party-army relations at the elite levels? For their part, senior PLA officials have also competed with one another to profess the wisdom and brilliance of the three represents, and in some cases they excessively praise Jiang Zemin personally in sycophantic terms.

The prize for most excessive praise of Jiang falls to Central Military Commission Vice Chairman General Zhang Wannian, who can be credited with the following supplications:

General Secretary Jiang’s important speech stands at a historical, epochal, and strategic high plane, and uses a proletarian politician’s grand boldness of vision and daring combined with superior judgment--as well as using the profound insight and enormous theoretical courage of a brilliant Marxist--to carry out a systematic, scientific, and incisive exposition toward a series of significant questions regarding the future prospects and fate of the party and the nation.60

Chairman Jiang’s important July 1 speech is a brilliant example of integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with the practice of contemporary China…[and constitutes] the third leap forward of the theories of our party.61

A close second is awarded to Central Military Commission Vice Chairman General Chi Haotian, who got off on the wrong foot by calling the three represents a “manifesto by the greatest Marxist political party in the world,”62 and crediting Jiang Zemin only with having “completely and penetratingly elaborated the scientific significance” of the concept rather than having authored it.63 But Chi made up for lost time with these gems:

Ever since Chairman Jiang took over the undertakings of the center and the military commission, he has inherited, enriched, and developed Mao Zedong’s military thought and Deng Xiaoping’s thinking on building the army, and put forth a series of brilliant expositions on building the reservist force for national defense during the new era.64

Standing on the high plane of history and the times, General Secretary Jiang’s speech has scientifically analyzed the developments and changes of the international situation and China today and brilliantly expounded numerous theoretical and practical issues concerning the implementation of the requirements of the three represents.65

No doubt eyeing his prospects for remaining on the Central Military Commission after the 16th Party Congress, Director of the General Armaments Department Cao Gangchuan gushed, “In this speech, Chairman Jiang stands at the height of progress for our era and history, and gives ardent expectations to our youth.”66 And then, in a paean to the type of
scientific omniscience usually reserved for Mao Zedong and Kim Jung-il, Cao related an anecdote about Jiang’s contribution to China’s manned space program:

Chairman Jiang has attached great importance to the building of weapons and equipment and personally made policy decisions on important issues and directed major scientific research experiments. During the current launching test of the Shenzhou III spacecraft, Chairman Jiang personally went to the launch site to direct the operation and made important instructions. 67

Not to be outdone in the propaganda field, Director of the General Political Department General Yu Yongbo equated Jiang with Mao and Deng, declaring that the PLA supported “the party leadership with Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin at the core, respectively.” 68 Yu referred to the three represents as a “milestone in the development of Marxism” with “great political value, ideological value, and theoretical value” 69 that not “only upholds Deng Xiaoping Theory, but [also] further promotes this theory’s creativity and development in practice.” 70

Chief of the General Staff General Fu Quanyou showed more restraint, exhorting the PLA on numerous occasions to “resolutely obey the command of the party central leadership and the Central Military Commission” 71 without calling for obeisance to Jiang personally, and praising “the third generation of the collective central leadership” for its “mastering of the overall situation under various complex circumstances and the super art of leadership,” which “has won the heartfelt support and great trust of the people in the whole country.” 72 Yet even General Fu could not resist one fawning tribute: “Based on his keen insight into major changes in the world military arena, Chairman Jiang Zemin put forward a whole set of strategic thinking on ways for our armed forces to adapt to military developments in the world and step up modernization.” 73 Bringing up the rear, although possibly constrained by a lack of opportunities to laud the speech as much as his more senior colleagues, was General Logistics Department Director General Wang Ke, who offered the more tepid claim that the July 1 speech was merely “guided by Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory.” 74

Conclusions

All in all, PLA attitudes about the three represents raise troubling concerns about the state of party-army relations in China, particularly the repersonalization of army loyalty in the late Jiang period. This development, combined with the PLA’s less-than-desultory cooperation with the civilian apparatus during the EP-3A crisis, 75 strongly suggests that the current system is dysfunctional. This is not to say, however, that the PLA is becoming more interventionist. In fact, the opposite is true, as the PLA’s institutional and personal channels of influence decline and the institution continues to withdraw from non-defense-related interests to focus almost exclusively on military affairs and only the most essential foreign policy issues. 76 Instead, we should closely watch the 16th Party Congress in November to see whether the PLA’s obsession with Jiang and the three represents is merely a tactical exercise that does not represent deep
support for Jiang’s public ambitions to upset party norms, or whether the PLA has thrown in its lot with Jiang to such an extent that it would support Jiang’s retention of the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, potentially fatally undermining Hu Jintao.

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**Notes**

1. This section draws heavily from Joseph Fewsmith’s seminal analysis in the second issue of *China Leadership Monitor* (winter 2002), titled “Rethinking the Role of the CCP: Explicating Jiang Zemin’s Party Anniversary Speech.”
4. Ibid., 7.
5. Ibid., 9.
12. Ibid.
18. Yu Yongbo, “Further Study and Apply.”
24. Yu Yongbo, “Further Study and Apply.”
Fu Quanyou, “Promoting Military-Building in Accordance with the ‘Three Represents’ Requirements,” 
Renmin ribao, April 2002, 9.
27 Ibod.
28 Fu Quanyou, “Studying and Practicing.”
30 Liu Yanan and Yu Zhenghui, “Fujian Military Command Studies Jiang Zemin’s July 1 Speech,” Fujian 
31 Li Jian, “Yu Yongbo Urges Judges to Implement ‘Three Represents’ Important Thinking, 
Enthusiastically Offer Legal Services to Rank and File; Xu Caibou Present on Occasion,” Jiefangjun bao, 
July 9, 2002, 1.
32 Bao Guojun and Lin Xingan, “Fu Quanyou Urges Taking Important Thinking of ‘Three Represents’ as 
Guide, Keeping Abreast of Times, and Forging Ahead in Compiling Military Encyclopedia,” Jiefangjun 
33 Yang Guang, Yang Huicheng, and Su Ruozhou, “Conscientiously Implement Military Training 
Regulations, Industriously Open Up a New Phase in Governing Training in Accordance with the Law--Fu 
Quanyou Answers Reporters’ Questions on Issues Related to the ‘PLA Military Training Regulations,’” 
Jiefangjun bao, September 13, 2002.
34 “Full Text of Jiang Zemin’s Speech.”
35 “Programmatic Document.”
36 Fu Quanyou, “Studying and Practicing.”
37 Fu Quanyou, “Promoting Military-Building.”
38 Liu Yanan and Yu Zhenghui, “Fujian Military Command.”
39 Fu Quanyou, “Promoting Military-Building.”
40 “Current Politics: PLA General Department Issues Circular.”
41 “Programmatic Document.”
42 Fu Quanyou, “Studying and Practicing.”
43 Fu Quanyou, “Promoting Military-Building.”
44 “Editorial: Comprehensively Promote Army-Building according to the ‘Three Represents’ 
Requirements,” Jiefangjun bao, August 1, 2001, 1.
45 Fu Quanyou, “Studying and Practicing.”
46 “Army Studies.”
47 Su Kuashan and Fan Juwei, “Cao Gangchuan Points Out: Take the July 1 Speech as Guide for 
48 “Study and Discussion Course.”
49 “Programmatic Document.”
50 Ibid.
51 Liu Yanan and Yu Zhenghui, “Fujian Military Command.”
52 “Chengdu Military Region.”
53 Huang Guozhu and Cao Guoqiang, “The Whole Army.”
54 Wei Fang, Zhong Youguo, and Wang Yongqing, “Central Group of Guangzhou Military Region Party 
Committee Studies General Secretary Jiang’s Important Speech to Enhance Consciousness in Practicing 
55 Luo Yuwen, “General Political Department Holds Forum on Studying, Implementing General Secretary 
56 “Study and Discussion Course.”
57 “Editorial: Comprehensively Promote Army-Building.”
58 “Programmatic Document.”
59 “Army Studies.”
60 Luo Yuwen, “‘Study “July 1” Speech, Put into Practice “Three Represents”’ Zhang Wannian, Chi 
Haotian Emphasize at Forum with Segment of Theoretical Workers from Military Conscientiously 
Studying and Implementing General Secretary Jiang’s Important Speech, Going Further to Promote 
61 Wu Ruihu and Chen Wanjun, “While Inspecting Naval Units, Zhang Wannian Urges the Entire Armed 
Forces to Gain a Deep Understanding of the Spirit of Chairman Jiang’s Speech at a Theoretical Session for

62 Luo Yuwen, “‘Study ‘July 1’ Speech.’”


68 Yu Yongbo, “Further Study and Apply.”


70 Ibid.


72 Fu Quanyou, “Studying and Practicing.”


75 See my contribution to the inaugural issue of China Leadership Monitor, titled “Civil-Military Relations and the EP-3 Crisis: A Content Analysis,” China Leadership Monitor 1 (fall 2001), which can be found pending publication at http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20011/20011JM1.html.