

The *Mishu* Phenomenon:
Patron-Client Ties and Coalition-Building Tactics

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China's ongoing political succession has been filled with paradoxes. Jockeying for power among various factions has been fervent and protracted, but the power struggle has not led to a systemic crisis as it did during the reigns of Mao and Deng. While nepotism and favoritism in elite recruitment have become prevalent, educational credentials and technical expertise are also essential. Regional representation has gained importance in the selection of Central Committee members, but leaders who come from coastal regions will likely dominate the new Politburo. Regulations such as term limits and an age requirement for retirement have been implemented at various levels of the Chinese leadership, but these rules and norms will perhaps not restrain the power of Jiang Zemin, the 76-year-old "new paramount leader." While the military's influence on political succession has declined during the past decade, the Central Military Commission is still very powerful.

Not surprisingly, these paradoxical developments have led students of Chinese politics to reach contrasting assessments of the nature of this political succession, the competence of the new leadership, and the implications of these factors for China's future. This diversity of views is particularly evident regarding the ubiquitous role of *mishu* in the Chinese leadership.

The term *mishu*, which literally means "secretary" in Chinese, refers to a range of people who differ significantly from each other in terms of the functions they fulfill, the leadership bodies they serve, and the responsibilities given to them. Important distinctions should be made between organizational (*jiguan*) and personal (*geren*) *mishu*, between chiefs of staff or secretaries-general (*mishuzhang*) and office directors (*bangongchu zhuren*), and between aides with high official status (*zhuli*) and clerks who usually do nothing but type and answer phones (*banshi yuan*).¹ During the first few decades of the People's Republic of China (PRC), *mishu* were often called clerks (*ganshi*).

A *mishu*, therefore, can be an office clerk who only handles mail and files documents, but can also be a gatekeeper who decides what his or her boss needs to know, whom the boss sees, and even what is scheduled. Certainly a *mishuzhang*, secretary-general or chief of staff, plays an important administrative role. While some leaders have worked as *mishu* only at certain stages of their careers, others have served as *mishu* for most of their political careers. Zeng Qinghong, a rising political star, for example, served as a *mishu* or *mishuzhang* at several periods of his political life; each of these periods led to other important appointments.

During the reform era, the post of *mishu* has commonly become a stepping-stone to leadership positions. A large number of the current senior leaders have served as *mishu* or *mishuzhang* during their political careers. The *mishu* phenomenon in the Chinese leadership is, of course, not new. Some *mishu* of top leaders have long become members of the Politburo or held other very important leadership positions. Examples include Mao's *mishu*, Chen Boda; Zhou Enlai's *mishu*, Song Ping; and Deng Xiaoping's *mishu*, Wang Ruilin.

The prevalence of *mishu* in the so-called fourth generation of leadership, however, is truly remarkable for three main reasons. First, it is the first time in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that the three most powerful figures of the new generation--Hu Jintao, Zeng Qinghong, and Wen Jiabao--all have work experience as *mishu*. In the cases of Zeng and Wen, their rise to prominence is largely due to their *mishu* backgrounds. Zeng, who is widely known as Jiang Zemin's "hatchet man," now enjoys enormous power. Wen will likely become the first *mishu*-turned-premier in the history of the PRC in March, when the 10th National People's Congress (NPC) convenes.

Second, as my study of those fourth generation leaders who served on the 15th Central Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has shown, approximately 41 percent of the 224 leaders have worked as *mishu*, *mishuzhang*, or office director.² Some of them will be among the candidates for seats on the Politburo of the 16th Central Committee.

Third, a large number of top provincial leaders--party secretaries and governors--have previously served as *mishuzhang* in their provinces. This pattern of elite recruitment seems to indicate that in the provincial leadership, the preferability of having a *mishuzhang* background has been institutionalized in the Chinese political system.

The increasing importance of the *mishu* leads to a host of questions. What are the implications of former *mishu* ascending to leadership positions in China? Does the prevalence of *mishu* clusters in the Chinese leadership undermine political institutionalization in the country? Will leaders' previous experience as *mishu* change the way Chinese politics operates? Research on Chinese politics in general, and on the new leadership in particular, will be invaluable if it can begin to address any of these questions.

Two Contrasting Assessments

In their seminal study of the *mishu* in the Chinese leadership, Wei Li and Lucian W. Pye argue that the ubiquitous role of the *mishu* reflects Confucian political culture, especially the "intensely personalized element in Chinese politics."³ This patron-client relationship, as Li and Pye characterize it, is based on the fact that "*shouzhang* [masters] depend on *mishu* for shelter, comfort and convenience in their lives and work; and *mishu* depend on *shouzhang* for status, prestige and career advancement."⁴ Li and Pye believe that with the growing importance of *mishu* in the Chinese leadership today, the Chinese political process has become even less institutionalized.

There is no doubt that the prevalence of *mishu* clusters is an indication of nepotism and patron-client relations. Paradoxically, however, *mishu* clusters usually do not form a monolithic organization or a formal network. Although *mishu* share political identity, they are loyal to their *shouzhang* (bosses) rather than their peers. Normally a senior leader lacks enough *mishu* to form a comprehensive political faction. In fact, the political interests of various *mishu* are not necessarily identical. According to this assessment, *mishu* may contribute to negotiation and interdependence among various factions, foster coalition-building, and increase political consultation and compromise in the Chinese political process.

In their recent study of the multifaceted role of *mishu* in today's China, James Mulvenon and Michael Chase observe that because *shouzhang* rarely meet with one another, *mishu* "handle communication and coordination between leaders, and even smooth over personal disputes or policy rifts."⁵ If their role is viewed from this perspective, *mishu* can expect their managerial skills, especially those developed in the process of coalition-building and consensus-making, to be very valuable when they later become *shouzhang* themselves. This practical advantage of having served as *mishu* might explain why elite selection in China today generally favors those who are skillful in coalition-building, why the three front-runners of the fourth generation (Hu, Zeng, and Wen) are all capable political tacticians, and why the upcoming 16th Party Congress, in spite of factional tensions, will likely feature compromise and power sharing.

Factors that Contribute to the Prevalence of Mishu

The rapid rise of *mishu* and the critical role they play in Chinese politics today are not coincidental. The phenomenon can be better understood if one places it in a historical context. Several situational factors have contributed to the *mishu* phenomenon in post-Mao China.

First, between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s, gerontocratic leaders--e.g., Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Wang Zhen, and Yang Shangkun--still held the real power in the PRC despite the fact that they were retired or semiretired; most of them often exerted their power and influence "behind the scenes." The well-established role of *mishu*, as Li and Pye note, made it possible for "nearly senile leaders to continue to perform as major political figures."⁶ Some of their *mishu* now serve in important positions. For example, Xu Yongyue, Chen Yun's *mishu*, is currently minister of state security.

Second, some princelings began their political careers by serving as *mishu* to senior leaders who were their fathers' old comrades-in-arms. Xi Jinping, now governor of Zhejiang, for example, served as *mishu* to his father's longtime friend, Geng Biao, who was minister of defense from 1979-81. Zeng Qinghong served as *mishu* to Yu Qiuli, chair of the State Planning Commission during the same period. Many of the princelings who will likely serve on the 16th Central Committee--for example, Bai Keming (party secretary of Hainan), Bo Xilai (governor of Liaoning), Wang Qishan (director of the Economic Restructuring Office of the State Council), Liu Yandong (executive vice head of the CCP United Front Work Department), Hong Hu (governor of Jilin), and Tian Chengping (governor of Shanxi)--served as *mishu* or *mishuzhang* earlier in their careers.

Third, throughout the history of the PRC, especially during the post-Mao era, China's top leaders have been concerned about the formation of region-based factionalism. To avoid this potential threat to the central leadership, Mao, Deng, and Jiang constantly arranged large-scale reshuffles of top provincial leaders and, more importantly, top officers in China's greater military regions.⁷ This policy has been aimed at weakening the power bases of local leaders. When top regional leaders, both civilian and military elites, moved to new regions, they could not take any of their old subordinates with them. Yet, they were often allowed to bring their personal *mishu* to their new posts.⁸ Ironically, the policy that was supposed to limit factional politics actually leads to close bonds between high-ranking leaders

and their aides, contributing to a more powerful role for *mishu* in the Chinese leadership. Not surprisingly, Deng's *mishu*, Wang Ruilin, and Jiang's *mishu*, Zeng Qinghong, have both wielded enormous political power.

The fourth situational factor is the increasing complexity of the government administration, especially during a time of rapid technological change and economic globalization. When China's reform started in 1978, senior leaders in both the central and provincial governments, who themselves were usually not well educated, often hired *mishu* with good educational backgrounds. As a result, people with technical backgrounds constituted a large proportion of *mishu*. They are often seen as their leaders' "brain trust," and many of them later become technocratic leaders themselves.⁹

In light of the growing complexity of public administration, even college-educated leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji have relied heavily on some of their top aides who are specialists in various fields. For example, Jiang has often brought several special assistants (*tebie zhuli*) with him when he travels both domestically and internationally. These assistants include Zeng Qinghong (Jiang's chief of staff), Hua Jianmin (Jiang's assistant on economic and financial matters), Teng Wensheng (Jiang's speechwriter), Wang Huning (Jiang's assistant on strategy and policy matters), and You Xigui (Jiang's assistant on security matters). All five will likely serve on the 16th Central Committee. Similarly, some of Zhu's top aides or former *mishu* now also hold important leadership posts, for example, Zhou Xiaochuan (chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission) and Lou Jiwei (executive vice minister of finance).

Perhaps the most important contributing factor to the *mishu* phenomenon is the shift in criteria for elite recruitment from revolutionary credentials, such as participation in the Long March and mobilization in socialist campaigns, to administrative skills such as coalition-building--both vertically and horizontally. Not surprisingly, provincial leaders, because of their functional requirement to both negotiate with Beijing and achieve consensus within their own provincial constituencies, have become the main source of the national leadership. It will not be a surprise if a number of current provincial leaders obtain seats in the new Politburo.

Provincial Chiefs' Experience as Mishu and/or Mishuzhang

Many rising stars in the provincial leadership have served as *mishu* and/or *mishuzhang* earlier in their careers. Table 1 lists 38 top provincial leaders who have had such experiences. They all serve as number one or number two top officials in one of China's 31 province-level administrations on the eve of the 16th Party Congress, and therefore all of them will most likely serve on the new Central Committee.

The table shows that 16 provincial party secretaries (52 percent of the total) and 22 governors (71 percent of the total) have previously served as *mishu* or *mishuzhang*. The table includes several executive vice governors or vice mayors--for example, Huang Huahua in Guangdong, Meng Xuenong in Beijing, and Han Zheng in Shanghai--who are expected to fill the current vacancies in the posts of governor or mayor in their respective provinces and cities.

The length of service, the level of leadership, and the career stage of their tenure as *mishu* or *mishuzhang* differ significantly among provincial officials. Some began their political careers as *mishu*, while others only recently held the posts of *mishu* or *mishuzhang*. Some only worked as *mishu* for a few years, while others spent decades on *mishu* careers. Some worked as *mishu* in other provinces or in the central government, while others got promoted step-by-step within the same provinces where they now serve as top officials.

Li Jianguo, for example, has spent most of his adult life (23 years, to be exact) as *mishu* and *mishuzhang* in Tianjin. Born in Shandong in 1946, Li attended Shandong University as a Chinese major between 1964 and 1969. He began his career as a clerk in both the cultural-educational department and the propaganda department at the county level of leadership in Tianjin. In 1976, he started to work as a *mishu* for the office of the Tianjin party committee. Five years later, at the age of 35, he met his most important mentor, Li Ruihuan, a rising political star who had just been appointed Tianjin's top leader.

In the following decade, Li Jianguo primarily served as Li Ruihuan's *mishu*, holding posts such as deputy office director and then director of the Tianjin party committee, and deputy *mishuzhang* and then *mishuzhang* of the Tianjin party committee. After Li Ruihuan became a member of the Politburo Standing Committee in 1989, Li Jianguo was promoted to the posts of member of the Standing Committee and deputy secretary of the Tianjin party committee. Li Jianguo was also an alternate member of the 14th Central Committee and a full member of the 15th Central Committee. Since 1998, Li Jianguo has served as party secretary of Shaanxi Province.

Similarly to Li Jianguo, several other leaders listed on the table also accelerated their political careers by serving as personal *mishu* to top provincial leaders. For example, Mayor of Tianjin Li Shenglin, Acting Governor of Shaanxi Jia Zhibang, Governor of Heilongjiang Song Fatang, Governor of Tibet Legqog, Governor of Gansu Lu Hao, Governor of Ningxia Ma Qizhi, and Governor of Qinghai Zhao Leji all served as *mishu* in municipal government offices, usually in the same provinces where they later served as top leaders.

Serving as a *mishuzhang* in a provincial party committee or a provincial government is particularly important for further promotion. For example, Mayor of Shanghai Chen Liangyu, Party Secretary of Jiangxi Meng Jianzhu, and Executive Vice Mayor of Shanghai Han Zheng all served as deputy *mishuzhang* of the Shanghai party committee before being appointed to top leadership positions in Shanghai. In fact, in June 2002, among the six highest-ranking leaders in the city (Party Secretary Huang Ju, and Deputy Party Secretaries Chen Liangyu, Liu Yungeng, Luo Shiqian, Han Zheng, and Yin Yicui), five had previously served as *mishuzhang* or deputy *mishuzhang* in the city government.¹⁰

Table 1 also shows that a number of top provincial leaders were transferred from the central government, where they had served as *mishuzhang* in the State Council. Both Governor of Yunnan Xu Rongkai and Governor of Guizhou Shi Xiushi served as deputy *mishuzhang* in the State Council prior to their current appointments. Governor of Jilin Hong Hu worked as *mishuzhang* on a central government committee.

All of these *mishu*-turned-politicians have at least a college-level education. Nine of them (24 percent) have a postgraduate education. Acting Governor of Zhejiang Xi Jiping and Governor of Henan Li Keqiang have doctoral degrees, in law and economics, respectively. Eighteen (47 percent) of the leaders listed on the table majored in engineering. It is unclear whether there is a correlation between training in a certain discipline and a *mishu* career. Perhaps it is a coincidence that a large number of *mishu* with technical backgrounds emerged in the 1980s at a time when many veteran leaders had become too old to govern and were thus in need of a *mishu*. Now these *mishu* are poised to take important posts. At the same time, technocrats have become a primary elite group in China.

However, among the 10 leaders who are 55 years old or younger (born after 1947), seven received a postgraduate education. Seven studied economics, social sciences, or humanities, and only three majored in engineering. Younger leaders seem likely to have received more advanced education, usually in economics.

All these 38 top provincial leaders with *mishu* backgrounds are men. This is so partially due to the fact that there is only one woman serving as a provincial chief (Governor of Inner Mongolia Uyunqing). But, this statistic also suggests that becoming a *mishu* has been a political shortcut largely for men only.

Table 1 does not include the category of assistant governors. Assistant governors may also perform the function of senior aide to top provincial leaders. Party Secretary of Liaoning Wen Shizhen, Governor of Jiangxi Huang Zhiqian, and Governor of Hunan Zhang Yunchuan, for example, all previously served as assistant governors (*shengzhang zhuli*). The work experiences of *mishu*, *mishuzhang*, or *zhuli* helped them all first establish their patron-client ties and then advance their political careers. Tracing the patron-client ties based on previous *mishu* work is not always easy, of course, because many leaders do not provide this kind of information in their official biographies.

Some political heavyweights in the fourth generation, however, have established broad patron-client networks by promoting their *mishu* or *mishuzhang* to important positions. As mentioned earlier, almost all rising stars in the so-called “Shanghai Gang” have served as a *mishuzhang*.¹¹

Another interesting case is Wu Guanzheng, a member of the 15th Politburo and party secretary of Shandong. Wu has not only had broad leadership experience in several provinces (Hubei, Jiangxi, and Shandong), but has also promoted many of his assistants and deputies to high offices. For example, among the other 61 current provincial chiefs, six previously worked under Wu.¹² No other provincial chief has had as many high-profile protégés at a high level of leadership as Wu does.

Mishu clusters, however, usually do not by themselves form an exclusive political faction. In fact, the political interests of holders of *mishu* positions are not necessarily identical. As stated previously, a main characteristic of *mishu* is their ability to contribute to negotiation and interdependence among various factions, foster coalition-building, and enhance political consultation and compromise in the Chinese political process. The best example is, of course, Wen Jiabao, a rising star in the fourth generation of leaders. Wen will most likely succeed Zhu Rongji as premier in March 2003.

Wen Jiabao's Mishu Career and Coalition-Building

Wen started his career as both a technician and a political *mishu* of Gansu Province's Geomechanics Zone Survey Team after his graduate studies at the Beijing Institute of Geology in 1968.¹³ During the following decade, he worked mainly in the grassroots-level leadership of this poor inland province.

In 1981, he was appointed deputy director of the Gansu Provincial Geology Bureau. His political career was expedited in 1982 when Sun Daguang, then minister of China's Geology and Mineral Resources Department, came to Gansu to inspect work there. According to one source, both the director and the party secretary of the bureau were *caobao* (blockheads) who did not know how to report their work to the minister. Consequently, they asked Wen to handle matters regarding the minister's inspection.¹⁴ This proved to be an excellent opportunity for the 39-year-old deputy director to display his talent and capabilities. Minister Sun was very impressed by the eloquence of Wen's oral presentations and his knowledge of Gansu. During his inspection, Sun praised Wen as someone who was like "a walking map of Gansu" (*huoditu*).¹⁵ When Sun returned to Beijing, he nominated Wen to the post of vice minister. One year later, at the age of 41, Wen was appointed vice minister and put in charge of the daily administrative details of the ministry.

In 1985, Wen was appointed deputy director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP. One year later, he became director of the General Office, serving as chief of staff to Hu Yaobang, then secretary-general of the CCP. In contrast to his predecessor, Wang Zhaoguo, Wen was often seen as a very accessible and low-profile leader.¹⁶ His "lack of a distinct faction affiliation" was also a main reason that Wen remained in this critically important post, whereas his two former bosses were purged. Meanwhile, Wen gained broad administrative experience--handling political crises such as the 1989 Tiananmen incident and coordinating power transitions.

Wen's personal touch was exemplified in two incidents that were widely telecast throughout the country. First, Wen accompanied Zhao Ziyang when he talked to student protesters at Tiananmen Square on the eve of the military crackdown. This incident, which showed sympathy among the party's liberal leaders for the students, left the whole nation with a lasting positive image of both Zhao and Wen.¹⁷ This action was appropriate for Wen because he assisted his boss at a time of crisis. It also earned Wen great respect from other political leaders, probably including Jiang Zemin.

The second incident occurred in the summer of 1998 while China was experiencing one of the biggest floods of the 20th century. The equivalent of the population of the United States--233 million people--were directly affected by the floods. Wen was appointed by Jiang and Zhu to coordinate all fronts of the flood mitigation measures in the country. During these difficult days, which attracted great public attention in China, Wen had a great deal of exposure in the media. He stood next to Jiang when the president spoke of the Chinese people's unity. Wen was also there when Premier Zhu expressed his outrage about the improper construction of the dike in Jiujiang of Jiangxi Province, which was washed away by the flood. But more often, Wen was seen in the emergency area actually implementing flood

mitigation measures. Wen's leadership and coordination with various regions and bureaucratic institutions, including the army, which responded to the disaster, left the Chinese public with an exceptionally good impression of him.¹⁸

While Wen's personal touch made him a popular politician, it was his versatility and ability that led Jiang and Zhu to give Wen a greater role to play in the national leadership. Since the late 1990s, Wen has assisted Zhu in both agricultural and financial affairs--two important sectors of the Chinese economy. The negative impact on the agricultural sector of China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the far-reaching changes resulting from financial liberalization are two daunting challenges for the Chinese leadership. Wen seems to be a fast learner and a self-taught economist. Wen's superb administrative skills and his role as a coalition-builder explain his legendary survival and success.

Wen's *mishu* experience and personal character may or may not be representative of other leaders with *mishu* backgrounds, but his career path has been exemplary. Both the remarkable ascent of Wen and the predominance of new leaders with *mishu* backgrounds demonstrate the great importance of *mishu* in Chinese politics today. Serving as a *mishu* is clearly a ladder to high office. Despite the patron-client nature of career advancement for *mishu*, the administrative experience and coalition-building skills that *mishu* gain may also contribute to China's institutional development. This contribution is especially relevant at a time when *mishu* clusters overlap with many other important political networks.

Conclusion: The Penetration of Mishu and Factional Interdependence

Having a *mishu* background often overlaps with involvement in other political networks. Hu Jintao, Liu Yunshan, Wang Zhaoguo, Song Defu, Li Keqiang, Du Qinglin, Zhang Fusen, Sun Jiazheng, and Qian Yunlu are prominent leaders who have backgrounds in the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL).¹⁹ Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Chen Liangyu, Zeng Peiyan, Meng Jianzhu, and Zhao Qizheng are leading members of the "Shanghai Gang."²⁰ Several *mishu* are princelings, including Zeng Qinghong, Bai Keming, Bo Xilai, Hong Hu, and Xi Jinping.²¹ Many, such as Hu Jintao, Huang Ju, Wu Guanzheng, Zeng Peiyan, Zhang Fusen, Xi Jinping, and Xu Rongkai, attended Qinghua University.²² These connections indicate that a large number of *mishu*-turned-prominent-politicians have associated with more than one political network.

Top leaders of various factions are engaged in coalition-building in their attempts to expand their power and influence. But in a broader sense, no individual, no faction, no institution, and no region can dominate power in present-day China. Everyone has to compromise, and those who are skillful in coalition-building are often favored. The coexistence of these political factions not only means the dispersion of influence and a balance of power, but can also contribute to a complex interdependence among various factions. As a result, political negotiation and compromise can occur more frequently.

This situation perhaps explains why, despite the tension between Hu Jintao and Zeng Qinghong, between the leaders with CCYL backgrounds and those who are members of the "Shanghai Gang," and between officials from the inland and those from the coast, no vicious power struggle has taken place during the past few years. The penetration of *mishu* clusters in the Chinese political system may further

contribute to coalition-building and political negotiation among China's various factions. The *mishu* phenomenon in China today deserves further scholarly investigation.

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Notes

¹ For a further discussion of the distinctions between various types of *mishu*, see Wei Li and Lucian W. Pye, "The Ubiquitous Role of the *Mishu* in Chinese Politics," *China Quarterly* 132 (December 1992): 916-25.

² Cheng Li, *China's Leaders: The New Generation* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 150-51.

³ Li and Pye, "The Ubiquitous Role," 915.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 930.

⁵ James C. Mulvenon and Michael S. Chase, "The Role of *Mishus* in the Chinese Political System: Change and Continuity," in *Chinese Leadership in the Twenty-first Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation*, ed. David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 141.

⁶ Li and Pye, "The Ubiquitous Role," 926.

⁷ Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping: Familiar Fealties and Technocratic Trends," *Asian Survey* 33, no. 8 (August 1993): 757-86, and Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin," *Asian Survey* 38, no. 3 (March 1998): 255-56.

⁸ For the policy concerning the reshuffling of military officers along with their *mishu*, see Li and Pye, "The Ubiquitous Role," 925.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 918.

¹⁰ <http://news.sohu.com>, June 18, 2002.

¹¹ For a discussion of the "Shanghai Gang," see Cheng Li, "Poised to Take the Helm: Rising Stars and the Transition to the Fourth Generation," in *Chinese Leadership in the Twenty-first Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation*, ed. David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 34-40.

¹² They include: Qian Yunlu (party secretary of Guizhou), who was Wu's deputy in Wuhan in the early 1980s; Wang Taihua (party secretary of Anhui), who was Wu's deputy in Jiangxi in the late 1980s; both Zhang Yunchuan (governor of Hunan) and Huang Zhiquan (governor of Jiangxi), who served as Wu's assistants in the provincial government of Jiangxi in the early 1990s; Song Fatang (governor of Heilongjiang), who served as Wu's deputy in Shandong between 1997 and 1999; and Chen Jianguo (party secretary of Ningxia), who served as Wu's deputy in Shandong between 1998 and 2002. Also see Cheng Li, "After Hu, Who? China's Provincial Leaders Await Promotion," *China Leadership Monitor* 1 (fall 2001).

¹³ For a detailed discussion of Wen Jiabao's political career, see Li, *China's Leaders*, 155-59.

¹⁴ Xiao Chong, *Zhonggong disidai mengren* (The fourth generation of leaders of the Chinese Communist Party) (Hong Kong: Xiafeier Guoji Chubangongsi, 1998), 56.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ For a description of Wang Zhaoguo's arrogance among his associates and subordinates, see Ren Zhichu, *Hu Jintao: Zhongguo kuashiji jiebanren* (Hu Jintao: China's first man in the 21st century) (Hong Kong: Mirror Books, 1997), 127-32; for an account of Wen's humble personality, see Mary Kwang, "'Capable and Pragmatic' Vice-Premier Wen Draws Wide Interest," *Straits Times* (Singapore), March 19, 1998, 22.

¹⁷ Kwang, "'Capable and Pragmatic,'" 22.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ For a further discussion of the factional network associated with the CCYL, see Cheng Li, "Hu's Followers: Provincial Leaders with Backgrounds in the Youth League," *China Leadership Monitor* 3 (summer 2002).

²⁰ For a further discussion of the "Shanghai Gang," see Cheng Li, "Shanghai Gang: Force for Stability or Fuse for Conflict?" *China Leadership Monitor* 2 (winter 2002).

²¹ For a further discussion of princelings, see He Pin and Gao Xin, *Zhonggong "Taizidang" (China's Communist "princelings")* (Taipei: Shih-pao Ch'u-pan Kung-ssu, 1992).

²² For a further discussion of the "Qinghua Clique," see Cheng Li, "University Networks and the Rise of Qinghua Graduates in China's Leadership," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 32 (July 1994): 1-32.

Table 1: Top Provincial Leaders with Experience as *Mishu* and/or *Mishuzhang*
(as of November 8, 2002)

Name	Position	Birth Year	Education Level	Major	<i>Mishu</i> and/or <i>Mishuzhang</i> Experience
Chen Liangyu	Mayor of Shanghai	1946	College	Engineering	Deputy <i>Mishuzhang</i> , Shanghai party committee, 1992
Meng Jianzhu	Party Secretary of Jiangxi	1947	M.A.	Economics	Deputy <i>Mishuzhang</i> , Shanghai government, 1992-93
Xi Jinping	Acting Governor of Zhejiang	1953	Ph.D.	Law	<i>Mishu</i> to minister of defense, 1979-82
Song Defu	Party Secretary of Fujian	1946	2-year College		<i>Mishu</i> to PLA army commander
Bai Keming	Party Secretary of Hainan	1943	College	Engineering	<i>Mishu</i> , Shaanxi Defense Industrial Office; <i>Mishuzhang</i> , CCP Publicity Department, 1993-94; Deputy Office Director, CCP General Office, 2000
Chen Kuiyuan	Party Secretary of Henan	1941	College	Politics	<i>Mishuzhang</i> , prefecture government in Inner Mongolia
Li Jianguo	Party Secretary of Shaanxi	1946	College	Chinese	<i>Mishu</i> to Li Ruihuan; Office Director and <i>Mishuzhang</i> , Tianjin CCP Committee, 1981-91
Yang Zhengwu	Party Secretary of Hunan	1941	2-year College		<i>Mishu</i> in grassroots-level party committee, 1962-70
Su Rong	Party Secretary of Qinghai	1948	M.A.	Economics	<i>Mishuzhang</i> , Jilin CCP Committee, 1993-95
Cao Bochun	Party Secretary of Guangxi	1941	2-year College	Engineering	Office Clerk, factory in Hunan, 1963-75
Wang Yunkun	Party Secretary of Jilin	1942	College	Engineering	<i>Mishuzhang</i> , Jilin government
Xu Youfang	Party Secretary of Heilongjiang	1939	College	Engineering	<i>Mishu</i> , grassroots-level CCP committee; Office Director, State Environmental Protection Commission, 1993-98
Chu Bo	Party Secretary of Neimonggu	1944	College	Engineering	<i>Mishu</i> , PLA General Logistics Department, 1969-75
Qian Yunlu	Party Secretary of Guizhou	1944	College	Economics	<i>Mishu</i> in prefecture government in Hubei, 1970-73
Tian Chengping	Party Secretary of Shanxi	1945	College	Engineering	Political Clerk, factory party committee,

					1970-73
Chen Jianguo	Party Secretary of Ningxia	1945	2-year College		Deputy Office Director, Yantai City, Shandong, 1976-80
Li Shenglin	Mayor of Tianjin	1946	College	Engineering	<i>Mishu</i> and Deputy <i>Mishuzhang</i> , Tianjin government
Li Keqiang	Governor of Henan	1955	Ph.D.	Economics	<i>Mishuzhang</i> , All-China Students Federation, 1983-88
Jia Zhibang	Acting Governor of Shaanxi	1946	College	Economics	<i>Mishu</i> to governor of Shaanxi, 1982-83; Deputy <i>Mishuzhang</i> , Shaanxi government, 1988-90
Niu Maosheng	Governor of Hebei	1939	College	Engineering	<i>Mishu</i> , Beijing Water Resources Bureau; <i>Mishuzhang</i> , State Flood Prevention Commission
Bo Xilai	Governor of Liaoning	1949	M.A.	Journalism	<i>Mishu</i> , CCP General Office
Hong Hu	Governor of Jilin	1940	College	Engineering	<i>Mishuzhang</i> , State Economic Reform Commission, 1987-91
Song Fatang	Governor of Heilongjiang	1940	College	Engineering	<i>Mishu</i> , Shandong government, 1967-74
Wang Xiaofeng	Governor of Hainan	1944	College	Engineering	Office Director in factory, 1970-80
Zhang Zhongwei	Governor of Sichuan	1942	2-year College	Party Affairs	<i>Mishu</i> in prefecture government in Sichuan, 1964-72
Zhao Leji	Governor of Qinghai	1957	College	Philosophy	<i>Mishu</i> , Qinghua Commercial Department, 1980
Shi Xiushi	Governor of Guizhou	1942	College	Engineering	<i>Mishu</i> , Office of State Council, 1988-96; Deputy <i>Mishuzhang</i> , State Council, 1996-2000
Xu Rongkai	Governor of Yunnan	1942	College	Engineering	Deputy <i>Mishuzhang</i> , State Council, 1998-2001
Legqog	Governor of Tibet	1944	2-year College		<i>Mishu</i> , Tibet government, 1975-80
Lu Hao	Governor of Gansu	1947	College	Engineering	<i>Mishu</i> to Gansu provincial party secretary, 1982-85
Li Zhaozhuo	Governor of Guangxi	1944	College	Engineering	<i>Mishu</i> , bureau office in Guangxi, 1975-80
Ma Qizhi	Governor of Ningxia	1943	College		<i>Mishu</i> , Ningxia government, 1974-79
Wang Hongju	Acting Mayor of Chongqing	1945	College	Mathematics	<i>Mishu</i> and Office Director, county party committee in Sichuan, 1976-83
Wang Jinshan	Acting Governor of Anhui	1945	M.A.		<i>Mishu</i> , Jilin prefecture party committee, 1976-82
Lu Zhangong	Acting Governor of Fujian	1952	College	Engineering	Office Clerk, provincial bureau in Zhejiang, 1982-85

Meng Xuenong	Executive Vice Mayor of Beijing	1949	M.A.	Engineering	<i>Mishu</i> , office of Zhejiang party committee
Han Zheng	Executive Vice Mayor of Shanghai	1954	M.A.	Economics	Deputy <i>Mishuzhang</i> , Shanghai government
Huang Huahua	Executive Vice Governor of Guangdong	1946	M.A.	Physics	<i>Mishuzhang</i> , Guangdong party committee, 1992-98

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