

A Smooth Ride Despite Many Potholes:
The Road to Crawford

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The last several months since Hu Jintao's visit to Washington have been very good ones in Sino-American relations. This is true not because the relationship was without sources of friction, but precisely because there were so many such sources, yet they produced little heat. One might draw the conclusion that this state of affairs means a permanent maturing of Sino-American relations. Unfortunately, one would have to base this assessment on scant and perhaps mercurial evidence, since there are so many domestic and international reasons for Beijing and Washington to cooperate in the near term. That word of caution having been voiced, the Bush administration and Jiang Zemin's government have chosen to build on areas of common interest and to minimize areas of conflict without backing away from core elements of their security policies and without ignoring the large differences that they still have over arms proliferation, relations across the Taiwan Strait, and the U.S. approach to the war on terrorism. So, the cooperation is more than cosmetic, even if it is too soon to call it "deep." Whether this level of constructive engagement survives the transition in Beijing and the developments in Iraq over the next several months is a question to which we will have to return in future issues of *CLM*.

Since the Bush administration is focused on the war on terrorism and on its Iraq policy, it is not surprising that U.S. leaders are acting to prevent Taiwan from becoming yet another major distraction at the White House. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has its own reasons for cooperation. Regardless of how much power he retains after the transition process is completed, President Jiang will be stepping down from some key posts. As a result, not only was Beijing hoping for a positive atmosphere before the Crawford summit, but President Jiang also almost certainly wanted to portray the U.S.-China and cross-Strait portfolios as in very good order before his departure. Anything less would hurt his legacy and reduce the chances for the promotion of his supporters at the 16th Party Congress, thereby reducing his political influence as paramount leader emeritus. Finally, revelations regarding North Korea's nuclear dissembling provided a rare opportunity for public images of security cooperation between Beijing and Washington. However upsetting the news, the timing was perfect for both capitals. Beijing and Washington often disagree strongly on how to persuade Pyongyang to abide by its international agreements, but they apparently agree entirely on the goal of preventing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) from creating an effective nuclear arsenal. In fact, there is no area of consensus on security issues that has been more robust and consistent than this one for the past nine years.

Early Sources of Friction: The West Point Speech and Government Reports

As the last issue of *CLM* made clear, from all accounts, the discussions between Vice President Dick Cheney and Vice President Hu Jintao in early May were frank and constructive. I mean that in the normal use of those terms, not in the diplomatic code.

Important issues were raised directly by both sides. According to Chinese media reports, Vice President Hu predictably raised the issue of Taiwan and secured assurances from Vice President Cheney that the United States would stand by its traditional “one China policy” and would not support Taiwan independence. The same reports mention that Vice President Cheney raised concern about proliferation and that Vice President Hu agreed to future dialogue and cooperation on these issues.² None of this content is earth-shattering, and how much meaning these messages carry will be revealed by the implementation of subsequent policies, but these exchanges do show a mutual willingness to clarify each side’s core concerns and to reassure each other that conflict over these core issues is far from inevitable.

However, in the next two months, two U.S. government reports on China were released: the congressionally mandated yearly report from Congress on Chinese military power, and the compiled hearings of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission, the latter representing the views and hearings since June 2001 of an independent commission created by Congress. Partially because these documents were released at nearly the same time, and partially because both the Pentagon and the commission have been associated with the conservative wing of the Republican Party, the two were often treated as of a piece in Chinese press and academic circles. They were seen as examples of Washington’s tendency to embrace “China threat” theories.³

In early June, President Bush spoke at the graduation of the cadets at West Point, and outlined his vision for an aggressive, preemptive U.S. national security strategy. Following the leak earlier in the year of the “Nuclear Posture Review,” which posited the use of small nuclear weapons in preemptive strikes, the West Point speech created some worry in Beijing. The president’s West Point speech previewed aspects of the “National Security Strategy,” published on September 20, 2002. Predictably, this series of statements and documents raised strong concerns among Chinese security analysts.⁴ The only thing more provocative than a U.S. nullification of China’s deterrent through missile defenses would be the introduction of offensive, preemptive methods of achieving such nullification. Since conflict with China over Taiwan is not just a wild, science-fiction hypothesis, Chinese security experts were not thinking simply in terms of the implications of the new doctrine for international law or for other parts of the globe. In fact, the “Nuclear Posture Review” mentions a conflict over Taiwan as one scenario in which nuclear preemption might be possible.⁵

Dangerous Development: President Chen’s “One Country on Each Side” Speech

What makes the warm climate in U.S.-China relations all the more remarkable are the provocative statements of Chen Shui-bian on August 3, 2002, when he addressed a group of overseas Taiwanese in Japan via teleconference from the Presidential Palace in Taipei. Chen stated that there is one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait (*yi bian yi guo*), and that the future determination of Taiwan’s sovereignty should be handled through popular referendum. This formulation arguably goes further than Lee Teng-hui’s “special state-to-state” formulation (*liang guo lun*), which could be interpreted as two governments negotiating on an equal basis inside one notional country. Because he refers

to “China” and “Taiwan” separately, Chen’s statement cannot be interpreted in any way but that Taiwan is a country, especially after the Taipei authorities offered the official translation of the speech with the word “*guo*” given as “country,” not “state.” (The Chinese character “*guo*” is ambiguous on this score.)⁶

This event led to quick condemnation from the mainland. For example, one leading Chinese newspaper on international affairs published an article, titled “Taiwan’s ‘Referendum’ Would Mean a Declaration of War,” which excoriated Chen.⁷ Other articles accused U.S. “anti-China” forces and past Bush administration policies of giving Chen the “guts” (*danzi*) to push his agenda so brashly by allowing Chen to transit through New York City, by increasing arms sales to Taiwan, and by upgrading U.S. defense coordination with Taiwan’s military.⁸ Although the official response in Beijing has been widely categorized as mild, the Chen speech apparently had one important long-term impact on cross-Strait relations. As previous issues of *CLM* have reported, there had been an ongoing debate in Beijing regarding Chen’s nature as a politician. Some had argued that Chen is a pragmatist, and therefore would not take brash actions that would hurt his economy or risk war, thereby hurting his party’s electoral chances. Those analysts advocated a policy of “listening to its [Taipei’s] words, and watching its actions.” Others believed that Chen is a fundamentalist and that he would eventually find a time and place to push an independence agenda, especially if China were to ease pressure on him. In an authoritative statement after Chen’s August 3 remarks, a leading Chinese Communist Party (CCP) advisor on Taiwan affairs, Zhou Mingwei, declared this debate dead. In Beijing Chen is now firmly labeled an independence activist.⁹ The importance of these conclusions in Beijing over the long run should not be underestimated. They might strongly color CCP attitudes about another Chen victory in the 2004 Taiwan presidential elections, for example.

That having been said, the CCP reaction was indeed relatively muted and moderate compared to the harsh attacks on Lee Teng-hui in the past and, especially, the militarized diplomacy of the 1990s. Moreover, one sensed very little tension in U.S.-China relations as a result of Chen’s remarks. This fact was all the more remarkable because, at the time, the Bush administration was criticized roundly in Chinese strategic circles for expanding the war on terrorism to Iraq in a unilateral fashion (prior to President Bush’s September 12 appeal to the U.N. for a Security Council resolution on Iraq).¹⁰

The Bush administration’s reaction to President Chen’s speech may go a long way toward explaining CCP moderation on Taiwan in August. The administration quickly expressed its displeasure with President Chen both for the provocative content of his speech and for the way he sprung the speech on his unsuspecting quasi ally in Washington.¹¹ A key factor sparking U.S. anger was the timing of the Taiwan action. With the United States fighting the war on terrorism and gearing up for potential conflict in Iraq, President Bush did not want a China-Taiwan “in-box” at this time. Taipei and Beijing also must have noted that prominent Taiwan visitors, such as Mainland Affairs Council Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen, were criticized strongly at meetings in Washington, even by think-tank experts traditionally known for their staunch support for Taiwan’s

security. Finally, further statements were made by Bush administration officials reiterating that the United States does not support Taiwan independence.¹²

The continuing economic difficulties on the island and the persistent trend of growing Taiwanese dependence on the mainland economy were additional factors that might have reduced Beijing's concerns over Chen Shui-bian's diplomatic initiatives.¹³ In 2002 Taiwan's economic troubles were manifesting themselves in new ways with real implications for cross-Strait security relations. The Republic of China (ROC) defense budget was dropping in real terms, and the Legislative Yuan was struggling to decide whether to purchase certain advanced weapons systems being offered by the United States.¹⁴ Since 1979, Beijing has seemed most concerned about what Washington would agree to sell to Taipei. If Taipei is unwilling to buy, those concerns might abate to a large degree.

The Beijing trip of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in late August was also surprisingly positive in tone, when one considers the earlier Taiwan difficulties and the fact that Beijing was clearly nervous about U.S. policy in the Middle East. Foreshadowing its future "yes" vote in the U.N. Security Council, Beijing apparently surprised the Iraqi foreign minister, who was visiting at the same time as Deputy Secretary Armitage, by raising tough demands that Iraq comply with Security Council resolutions and allow the return of weapons inspectors. The PRC also moved to address a major U.S. concern, curbing weapons proliferation, by announcing domestic "PRC Regulations on the Export of Missiles and Related Materials and Technologies" (*Zhonghua renmin gong he guo daodan ji xiangguan wuzhi he jishu tiaoli*). For Washington's part, Armitage hailed China's cooperation in the war on terrorism, and removed a real sore point in Beijing: He branded as "a terrorist organization" the East Turkestan Independence Movement, which militantly opposes Beijing's rule over Xinjiang. Finally, Armitage repeated the Bush administration's position that the United States does not support Taiwan independence.¹⁵

Given the importance of the issues discussed and the potential for real friction over events in the region and the world, the constructive nature of these meetings was truly striking. At least for now, Beijing seems to be willing to take the Bush administration at its word when it evokes the one China policy or claims that it does not support Taiwan independence. This willingness is impressive given the Bush administration's arms sales policies, defense contacts with Taipei, and political statements regarding Taiwan since early 2001.

President Bush's Transformation from Unilateralist to Champion of the United Nations

In this author's opinion, the Bush administration performed a brilliant piece of political jujitsu at the United Nations on September 12, 2002. Widely reviled in caricature as a unilateralist who would not listen to the opinions of even his own State Department, President Bush took his case for a tough stand on Iraq to the United Nations. This speech was potentially a watershed event for the U.N. and for U.S. foreign policy. Rather than circumventing the U.N., President Bush chose to speak very respectfully of

the organization, its principles, and its potential role in the world. But he insisted that if it were not willing to back up its own resolutions and enforce its own peace treaties, the U.N. would render itself irrelevant in the manner of the ill-fated League of Nations in the 1930s. Moreover, Bush expressed a willingness to accept robust and unfettered inspections in Iraq and the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) without “regime change” in Baghdad. Regime change was thus characterized as a possible means of enforcing United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraqi disarmament, rather than as an end in and of itself.¹⁶

Despite the weeks of haggling that would follow and the several compromises on the wording of the Security Council resolution that were necessary to gain a unanimous vote on November 8, 2002, President Bush got what he wanted at the U.N.: broad international support for unfettered inspections with a largely explicit threat of the use of force if Baghdad were to remain in “material breach” of its international obligations. This language strongly suggests that the United States would have the right to put together a “coalition of the willing” to attack Iraq. Despite earlier French attempts to make this a two-stage process, the final resolution requires no second U.N. Security Council vote to mandate the use of force. Rather, future meetings will simply decide whether Iraq’s noncompliance is in continued material breach of existing resolutions.

This Bush administration strategy very possibly put the U.N. back on the map as an international player, an ironic result for an allegedly unilateralist administration. It also allowed Beijing the necessary cover to support U.S. efforts without appearing to violate its own principles and national interests. First, when regime change drops out as a goal and becomes one possible means of enforcing U.N. resolutions, Beijing no longer has to worry about supporting the overthrow of a sovereign regime. Second, by evoking the cease-fire agreement from the first Gulf War, President Bush was rooting any future attack on Iraq not in the unilateral, preventive war language of his 2002 “National Security Strategy,” but in the multilateral language of international law and enforcement used by important U.N. Security Council resolutions. Third, by appealing to the Security Council for authority, the Bush administration was strengthening the only institution in which China is both a leading global power and an equal player with other such powers. It became very clear after President Bush’s speech at the U.N. that the likelihood of PRC opposition to U.S. efforts fell precipitously and that the chance for PRC approval of an ultimate U.N. resolution was high, as long as the resolution did not explicitly call for the use of force or for “regime change.”¹⁷ Especially during a transition in power in Beijing, Jiang Zemin did not want to face off with the United States. President Bush’s strategic approach at the U.N. allowed Jiang a graceful way to avoid this potential confrontation, resulting in a positive PRC vote on the U.N. resolution.

North Korean Nuclear Weapons

In 1994 and 1995, one of the common topics that arose in conversations about regional stability with CCP experts was the problem of North Korean nuclear weapons production. It became very clear to me in those discussions that Beijing was strongly opposed to Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons. One interlocutor stated that

no country wants its neighbor to build a nuclear weapon, no matter how friendly relations may be with that neighbor, and relations between Beijing and Pyongyang were hardly warm in the waning years of Kim Il-sung's life and in the early years of Kim Jung-il's rule.¹⁸ Beijing opposes North Korean nuclear development in part because it does not want a future united Korea to inherit the weapons and in part because it worries that a Korean nuclear threat might spur a nuclear-capable Japan to weaponize its latent potential. Ever wary of hurting its reputation as an ally of the DPRK and as an opponent of great-power interference in the internal affairs of another country, Beijing did not advertise its cooperation with the United States on this issue loudly, but people in the know in Washington regularly confirm that preventing North Korean nuclear weapons development is an area of real common interests between Washington and Beijing and that there has been some significant backroom cooperation between the United States and China on this issue.

There have been significant areas of disagreement, however, between Washington and Beijing on just how developed Pyongyang's nuclear program is and just what should be done about North Korean violations of the country's commitments to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a nuclear-free Korea, and the 1994 Agreed Framework. Experts in Beijing had often argued that Washington exaggerates both the sophistication of the North Korean program and the extent of the immediate danger of such a program if it indeed were as developed as Washington feared. Most importantly, Beijing did not believe that economic and military sanctions were constructive, instead contending that they would only serve to destabilize the peninsula with negative consequences for all.¹⁹

When Assistant Secretary of State James Kelley led an entourage to Pyongyang in early October 2002, he confronted the North Koreans with what apparently was incontrovertible evidence that North Korea was attempting to produce enriched uranium for weapons in violation of all three agreements mentioned above. After initially balking, Pyongyang surprised many observers by admitting that it had such a program and that it was going to scrap the Agreed Framework, which had, among other things, prevented Pyongyang from utilizing plutonium from spent fuel rods for the purpose of making nuclear weapons.²⁰ The revelation must have been a bit embarrassing in Beijing, especially since the North Korean plant was apparently assisted by Pakistan, an ally of China and a recipient over the years of Chinese assistance related to nuclear weapons development.²¹ Moreover, the revelation demonstrated that U.S. concern about North Korean nuclear weapons was warranted and that China at best had been caught off guard by events in a country that Beijing purportedly knows more about than does any other capital in the world.²²

The Bush administration, however, made this new problem a point of pride for Beijing, rather than an occasion for embarrassment. Rather than consulting only with U.S. regional allies about the North Korean problem, the administration also sent a high-level entourage to Beijing in mid-October, thus publicly portraying the PRC as a major player in any potential solution.²³ There were practical reasons to do so, of course, but it also constituted a fine diplomatic prelude to the Jiang-Bush summit in Crawford, for it would appeal to the PRC writ large and to Jiang Zemin in particular as a sign that Beijing

is viewed as a partner of the Bush administration in the battle against the spread of WMD. This respectful treatment of Beijing probably helped smooth the way for the PRC's support for the tough resolution on Iraqi WMD at the U.N. in November. Another helpful aspect of the North Korean situation may have been top administration officials' statements that the "National Security Strategy" does not demand a single template for how to deal with WMD development in all countries of concern to the United States.²⁴ Preemptive force is not viewed as an attractive option against North Korea because of allied opposition and the devastation that North Korea can already wreak against Seoul even without nuclear weapons. The Bush administration's different approaches to the two cases of WMD proliferation--Iraq and North Korea--probably suggest to Beijing that military action in Iraq may not have direct implications for future U.S. strategy in East Asia.

The Crawford Summit

All the issues discussed above provided the backdrop for the Crawford summit, which, by original design, appeared to be more for show than substance. However, the four most important issues in U.S.-China relations in 2002 were discussed: North Korea, Iraq, Taiwan, and proliferation.

First, there was the issue of North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, over which President Jiang expressed public surprise and concern. Presidents Jiang and Bush pledged to cooperate to dissuade North Korea from continuing with this development.

Second was the issue of Iraq. President Jiang's public statements were typically very close to the vest about this issue, but the total lack of criticism of the United States in those statements suggested that, at worst, China would abstain from the Security Council resolution.

The third issue was Taiwan, which President Jiang apparently raised. Significantly, for the first time President Bush publicly mentioned the three joint communiqués alongside the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), and publicly stated that the United States "does not support" Taiwan independence. Although none of these statements is fundamentally new, *CLM* readers will recall that President Bush publicly mentioned only the TRA during his February 2002 summit in Beijing, to the chagrin of many Chinese observers.²⁵ In Chinese press reports, President Bush was reported to have gone further at Crawford by privately stating that the U.S. "opposes" Taiwan independence. This would have been a significantly stronger statement than "nonsupport" and a break from the traditional U.S. China policy, which takes no firm position on Taiwan's ultimate sovereignty. Until we have further evidence, these Chinese press reports should be taken as apocryphal, as even informed Chinese interlocutors often fail to recognize the differences between U.S. and PRC positions, such as the U.S. "one China policy" and the PRC's "one China principle," only the latter of which takes a principled stand that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. Moreover, the official Chinese press had an incentive to exaggerate Jiang's success at Crawford. Jiang's feat in securing a breakthrough statement on Taiwan from the president of the

United States, rather than a mere reiteration of previous positions, would certainly fit this bill.²⁶

The fourth issue--proliferation--did not get as much coverage in the Western press, but one of the concrete results of the summit was an agreement to undertake formal vice ministerial dialogue on security issues, especially proliferation.²⁷ This agreement came in addition to a pledge to increase military-to-military contacts damaged by the EP-3 incident in March-April 2001 and an announcement that Vice President Cheney plans to visit China next year.

The vice ministerial talks on proliferation are important for a few reasons. First, the Chinese domestic regulations on exports of missiles, missile technology, and chemical weapons technology that were announced in August and September are still just paper and will need to be enforced with clear standards to make a difference.²⁸ We will have to see whether Chinese arms control officials continue to employ traditional loopholes in their nonproliferation commitments, such as the argument that the PRC needs to continue to honor agreements that had been made abroad before new policies or agreements on proliferation were adopted, or whether Chinese experts continue to discuss U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in the context of their proliferation talks, suggesting that China still views its proliferation cooperation and noncooperation as leverage for strategic goals.²⁹ Such tactics call into question the notion that China is mostly having technical difficulty monitoring and controlling its own far-flung weapons industries and weapons-related industries. If Beijing can boast of new, effective measures to counter proliferation at times when it wants to cooperate with the United States, we should not accept at face value the arguments that Beijing's failures to curb PRC proliferation in more normal times are the result of an insufficiently developed set of laws and institutions to enforce compliance with Beijing's wishes.

Proliferation is particularly sensitive to the United States after September 11, 2001. The notion that weapons could get from the PRC into the hands of terrorists is terrifying, even if they were to get there indirectly. Beijing need not be complicit in this process for it to happen. If widely accepted reports that China offered significant assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program are true, Beijing presumably had strategic incentives, among other reasons, to do so. The same holds true for the PRC sales of ballistic missiles to Pakistan. But even this strategic assistance to one close ally has caused a lot of potential problems for the United States. Pakistan's military and security agencies, including some nuclear weapons experts, had very close ties to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Moreover, public reports suggest that, beginning in 1998, North Korea obtained uranium enrichment technology from Pakistan in exchange for ballistic missiles.³⁰ China could hardly restrain North Korea from selling ballistic missiles to Pakistan, since China has a long track record of doing the same dating back more than 10 years. Moreover, Pakistan's nuclear expertise is also traceable in part to Beijing. Finally, and perhaps of greatest concern to the United States and the rest of the civilized world, at least one leading North Korea expert, Georgetown's Victor Cha, does not believe Kim Jung-il would have much hesitation in transferring nuclear weapons or fissile material to the highest bidder.³¹

If Chinese proliferation policies have contributed to real and potential outcomes that Beijing would not directly support--such as North Korean nuclear weapons development and the danger of proliferation of WMD or fissile material to terrorists and other third parties--U.S. representatives would be wise to point this fact out in future meetings with Chinese arms control experts. Such an approach can respect China's sensitivities about being labeled outside the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism while still pointing out the vital importance of improved control over Beijing's considerable military and technical know-how.

Conclusion

The Crawford summit was clearly a success for the United States, as was the unanimous vote in the United Nations Security Council on the Iraq resolution. The key question for the future is whether the cooperation in Sino-American relations can survive some very positive short-term conditions for cooperation: a CCP in transition; a summit viewed as an important achievement for the current leader's legacy; a superpower in need of cooperation in the U.N. and calm in East Asia as it ponders confrontation in Iraq; and a PLA still in the early phases of a multiyear buildup that began in earnest only in the late 1990s, rendering Beijing still unprepared to put concerted military pressure on Taiwan even given U.S. distraction elsewhere.

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Notes

¹ The author thanks Michael Glosny for expert research assistance.

² "Hu Jintao yu Meiguo Fuzongtong Qieni juxing huitan" (Hu Jintao and U.S. Vice President Cheney hold talks), *Jiefangjun bao*, May 3, 2002, via Xinhua News Agency.

³ The documents in many ways are actually quite different, and the Pentagon report itself hardly exaggerated China's overall military capability in relation to that of the United States. Instead it emphasized, for the foreseeable future, China's development of coercive potential over its adversaries rather than its ability to dominate the region, let alone the world. See U.S.-China Security Review Commission, *Compilation of Hearings Held before the U.S.-China Security Review Commission*, 107th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 2001-2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002); and U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China*, July 12, 2002. For a typical CCP reaction, see "'China Threat Theory' Cooked Up by U.S. Media 'Sheer Nonsense,'" *Guangming ribao*, July 26, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-0727-000015.

⁴ For the initial negative reaction to the "National Security Strategy" in September, see "Bush Sets Fighting Terrorism as National Security Goals," *People's Daily Online*, September 21, 2002, and Ren Yujun, "U.S. Issues 'First Strike' Strategy," *Renmin ribao* (Internet version--Chinese), September 24, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-0924-000050.

⁵ On the DOD's 2002 "Nuclear Posture Review," see William Arkin, "Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable," *Los Angeles Times*, May 11, 2002, 1. For Chinese reactions, see "China Summons U.S. Ambassador to Make Representations," Xinhua News Agency, March 16, 2002; "Where Lies the Mistake of Bush's Policy Toward Taiwan," *People's Daily Online*, April 28, 2002; "U.S.-Taiwan Secret Talks on Arms Sales: Analysis," *People's Daily Online*, March 18, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-0318-000088; and John Pomfret, "U.S.-China Relations Appear Headed for Shaky Ground," *Washington Post Foreign Service*, March 19, 2002.

⁶ "Chen Stresses Urgency for Referendum Legislation for Taiwan's Future," Taipei Central News Agency, August 3, 2002, and Taipei Office of the President, "Apparent Text of Chen Shui-bian's Speech on Taiwan's Future, Referendum" (in Chinese), August 3, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-080-300098. For the

CCP's official reaction, see "Text of Taiwan Affairs Spokesman's Remarks on Chen's Call for Referendum," Xinhua News Agency (Chinese), August 5, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-0805-00002.

⁷ Zhu Xianlong, "Taiwan 'gongtou' jiu shi xuan zhan" (Taiwan's "referendum" would mean a declaration of war), *Huanqiu shibao* (Global Times), August 8, 2002, 1-2.

⁸ Li Haiyin, "Chen Shuibian weihe danzi da" (Why is Chen Shui-bian so gutsy?), *Huanqiu shibao* (Global Times), August 19, 2002, 1.

⁹ For Zhou Mingwei's statement that the policy of "listening and watching is over," regarding Chen Shui-bian, see Ray Cheung, "Beijing Hardens Line after Chen's 'Harmful' Words," *South China Morning Post* (Internet version), September 30, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-0930-000056. While Chen's statements were bold, they were clearly well thought out and they may not have been so damaging from a domestic political point of view. The opposition parties in Taiwan were forced to adopt language similar to that of the CCP in criticizing Chen, and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was clearly poised to exploit this situation. The DPP news web site ran articles quoting and criticizing opposition party members who appeared to be appeasing Beijing by attacking Chen. See various articles from Taiwanheadlines.com from the first few weeks of August 2002.

¹⁰ For example, see Shi Taoli, "Bu shi gong yi he shi Dongshou" (When will Bush implement the attack on Iraq?), *Huanqiu shibao* (Global Times), August 5, 2002, 1. The article typically describes President Bush as looking for an "excuse" (*jielou*) to use force.

¹¹ See "U.S. Decides on Low-Key Response to President Chen Shui-bian's Speech," Taipei Central News Agency, August 6, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-0806-000078.

¹² The criticism at the Washington think tanks was reported to me by attendees of those meetings. For coverage of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz's statement earlier in the year that the United States "does not support" Taiwan independence, see Ts'ao Yu -fen, "U.S. Reaffirms That There is No Change in Taiwan Strait Policy" (in Chinese), *Tzu-yu shih-pao*, May 31, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-0531-000038. For an example of an official statement to this effect after the Chen speech, see "U.S. Reiterates It Does Not Support Taiwan Independence," Xinhua News Agency (English), August 7, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-0807-000182.

¹³ On this issue, see Thomas J. Christensen, "China," in *Strategic Asia, 2002-2003: Asian Aftershocks*, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg with Michael Wills (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research), 51-94.

¹⁴ See, for example, Wang Ming-I, "Lin Chong-pin: If Budget Does Not Match Arms Purchase, We Can Hardly Maintain Cross-Strait Superiority" (in Chinese), *Chung-kuo shih-pao* (Internet version), July 15, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-0715-000038; Ho Po-wen, "Military Purchases Top 700 Billion New Taiwan Dollars in the Next 10 Years" (in Chinese), *Chung-kuo shih-pao* (Internet version), May 17, 2002, 1, FBIS CPP-2002-0517-000032; and "Defense Minister Stresses Need to Buy Kidd-class Destroyers," Taipei Central News Agency, May 15, 2002.

¹⁵ For the treatment of the Iraqi envoy, see Greg Tordoe, "U.S. Woos a Reluctant Beijing to Support War against Iraq," *South China Morning Post*, September 6, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-0906-000054. For the official U.S. position on the Armitage visit, see U.S. Department of State, *Transcript of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage Press Conference--Conclusion of China Visit, Beijing, China*, August 26, 2002. For very positive Chinese coverage of the meetings, see Li Xuanliang, "Zhongguo daodan guande hen yan" (China severely restricts missiles), and Song Nianshen, "Meiguo shoi ci rending 'Dongtu' jiu shi kongbu zuzhi" (For the first time the United States maintains that "ETIM" is a terrorist organization), *Huanqiu shibao* (Global Times), August 29, 2002, 1-2. For an English version of the new regulations, see "Text of PRC Regulations on Control of Military Products Export," Xinhua News Agency (English), October 20, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-1020-000011.

¹⁶ For coverage of President Bush's speech at the U.N., see David E. Sanger and Elisabeth Bumiller, "Threats and Responses: The President," *New York Times*, September 13, 2002, 1.

¹⁷ For a similar analysis, see interview with Professor Jia Qingguo, Peking University, on BBC World Service, BBC Radio, November 7, 2002, and James Dao, "Closer Ties with China May Help U.S. on Iraq," *New York Times*, October 4, 2002.

¹⁸ Author interviews, Beijing, 1994.

¹⁹ Author interviews, Beijing, 1994-2002.

²⁰ David E. Sanger, "North Korea Says It Has a Program on Nuclear Arms," *New York Times*, October 17, 2002, sec. A, p. 1.

²¹ David E. Sanger and James Dao, "U.S. Says Pakistan Gave Technology to North Korea," *New York Times*, October 18, 2002, sec. A, p. 1.

²² Sanger, "North Korea," and Howard W. French, "North Korea's Confession: Why?" *New York Times*, October 21, 2002, sec. A, p. 6.

²³ Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton and Assistant Secretary for East Asia James Kelley traveled to Beijing in mid-October. See James Brooke, "North Korea's Revelations Could Derail Normalization, Its Neighbors Say," *New York Times*, October 18, sec. A, p. 6.

²⁴ Sanger and Dao, "U.S. Says Pakistan Gave Technology."

²⁵ David E. Sanger, "Bush and Jiang Vow to Cooperate on North Korea Issue," *New York Times*, October 26, 2002, sec. A, p. 8; "Jiang Zemin, Bush Jointly Meet Press at Crawford Ranch, 25 October," Xinhua News Agency, October 26, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-1026-000098; and Chris Cocker, "No Surprises for Taiwan from Bush-Jiang Summit," *China Post*, October 27, 2002.

²⁶ Lu Zhenya, "During Talks with Jiang Zemin, Bush Explicitly States for the First Time 'Opposition to Taiwan Independence'" (in Chinese), *Zhongguo xinwen she*, October 26, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-1026-000068. Jiang offered this formula himself. See "Jiang Zemin Says He, Bush Had 'Frank Exchange of Views' on Taiwan Issue," Xinhua News Agency (English), October 26, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-1026-00070.

²⁷ Lu Zhenya, "Jiang Zemin, Bush Agree to Maintain High-Level Strategic Dialogue" (in Chinese), *Zhongguo xinwen she*, October 26, 2002, FBIS CPP-2002-1026-00006.

²⁸ On the problem of coming up with clear standards for the new domestic regulations, see Li Xuanliang, "Zhongguo daodan guande."

²⁹ These tactics have been part of PRC diplomacy on this issue for quite a while. This author heard statements to this effect in scholarly discussions at a military think tank in Beijing in January 2002.

³⁰ Sanger and Dao, "U.S. Says Pakistan Gave Technology."

³¹ Author correspondence with Professor Victor Cha, Georgetown University.