

U.S. interference in Cuban affairs. In effect it gives him a veto over U.S. policy. Therefore the path of giving U.S. politicians a “way out” won’t in fact work because Castro will twist it to his interests. Better to just do it unilaterally on our own timetable.

For the time being it appears U.S. policy will remain reactive—to Castro and to Cuban American pressure groups—irrespective of the interests of Americans and Cubans as a whole. Like parrots, all presidential hopefuls in the 2000 presidential elections propose varying versions of the current failed policy. We have made much here of the negative role of the Cuba lobby, but we close by reiterating that their advocacy has not usually been different in kind from that of other pressure groups, simply much more effective. The buck falls on the politicians who cannot see the need for, or are afraid to support, a new policy for the post-cold war world.

NOTES

1. This presentation of the issues is based on but goes far beyond written testimony—“U.S. Cuban Policy—a New Strategy for the Future”—which the authors presented to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 24 May 1995. We have long advocated this change, beginning with William Ratliff, “The Big Cuba Myth,” *San Jose Mercury News*, 15 December 1992, and William Ratliff and Roger Fontaine, “Foil Castro,” *Washington Post*, 30 June 1993.
2. Cuba Commission supporters as of 11 December 1998 included U.S. senators: John W. Warner (R-VA), Rod Grams (R-MN), Christopher “Kit” S. Bond (R-MO), James M. Jeffords (R-VT), Chuck Hagel (R-NE), Richard G. Lugar (R-IN), Michael B. Enzi (R-WY), John H. Chafee (R-RI), Arlen Specter (R-PA), Gordon Smith (R-OR), Craig Thomas (R-WY), Barbara Boxer (D-CA), J. Robert Kerrey (D-NE), Dale Bumpers (D-AR), Jack Reed (D-RI), Rick Santorum (R-PA), Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT), Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), Dirk Kempthorne (R-ID), Pat Roberts (R-KS), Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT), Thad Cochran (R-MS), Pete V. Domenici (R-NM), Patty Murray (D-WA); House of Representative members Jon Christensen (R-2nd/NE)

and Charles B. Rangel (D-15th/NY); former undersecretary of state William D. Rogers; former assistant secretary of state Harry W. Shlaudeman; former secretary of defense Frank Carlucci; former ambassadors J. William Middendorf and Timothy Towell; former CIA deputy director of operations Max Hugel; and Lieutenant General (Ret.) Gordon Sumner Jr., among others. On the Internet, see uscubacommission.org.

3. See William Ratliff, "While We're at It, Let's End the Embargo," *Los Angeles Times*, 7 January 2000.
4. The embargo lobby is not to be confused with its opposite, the "Cuba lobby," which for decades has opposed U.S. policy toward Castro. Some embargo supporters today say longtime Castro critics who now call for an end to the sanctions have in effect "joined" the Cuba lobby. On this see Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Cuba Lobby Then and Now," *Orbis*, fall 1998.
5. Linda Robinson, "Cuba: Time to Rethink U.S. Strategy?" *Great Decisions*, 1998; Reuters, "Clinton favorece relajar el embargo a Cuba," *Miami Herald*, 6 November 1999.
6. See, for example, Rui Ferreira and Roberto Fabricio, "Graham y Gore convencieron al Presidente," in *El Nuevo Herald*, 10 January 1999; William Ratliff and Roger Fontaine, "Preparing the Ground for Election 2000," *San Jose Mercury News*, 24 January 1999.
7. Lincoln Díaz-Balart, Robert Menéndez, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Letter to President Clinton, 13 October 1998.
8. The Gallup Organization poll released on 24 May 1999. A major movement toward accommodation has occurred since 1994 when a Time/CNN poll found only 35 percent favored ending the embargo. The 1999 poll also found that 71 percent of Americans support reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba.
9. The present authors made several attempts over a six-year period to get the CANF to sponsor and publish a debate on the embargo among longtime critics of Castro, namely, ourselves and two other analysts of the foundation's choice who still support the policy. Although during the 1980s Ratliff published frequently with the foundation—and just over a decade ago even drafted the CANF's official statement entitled *Towards a New U.S.-Cuba Policy* (Washington, D.C.: CANF, 1988)—the suggestion was not accepted or rejected, just systematically ignored.

10. Henry Kissinger, "India and Pakistan: After the Explosions," *Washington Post*, 9 June 1998.
11. Sarah Carey and Richard Nelson, chair and director, "A Road Map for Restructuring Future U.S. Relations with Cuba," a policy paper, the Atlantic Council, June 1995; Bernard Aronson and William D. Rogers, cochairs, "Independent Task Force Report—U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 21st Century," Council on Foreign Relations Report, January 1999; and Edward González and Richard Nuccio, eds., *The RAND Forum on Cuba* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999). The Cuban American National Foundation's "Transition Program" deals primarily with change in Cuba rather than foreign relations, but it covers many of the issues discussed by those working on foreign policy.
12. In their detailed psychological analysis of Castro, Edward González and David Ronfeldt, in *Castro, Cuba and the World* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, June 1986), explain Castro's character as a fusing of hubris and nemesis. They summarize his "mindset" as "unrelenting ambition for power and . . . continuing animosity toward the United States," p. v. Also see Tad Szulc, *Fidel: A Critical Portrait* (New York: Morrow, 1986), and Georgie Anne Geyer, *Guerrilla Prince* (Boston: Little Brown, 1991).
13. See Rolando Bonachea and Nelson Valdés, eds., *Revolutionary Struggle, 1947–1958: Volume 1 of the Selected Works of Fidel Castro* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1972), p. 379. Also Carlos Franqui, *Diary of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1980), p. 338, and Hugh Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 278.
14. Hitler said: "You may find us guilty a thousand times over, but the goddess of the eternal court of History will smile and tear up the indictment of the prosecutor and the verdict of the judges. She will acquit us!" Quoted in Robert Quirk, *Fidel Castro* (New York: Norton, 1993), p. 59n. Also see Hugh Thomas, *The Revolution on Balance* (Washington, D.C.: Cuban American National Foundation, 1983), p. 19.
15. "Nominal" because Castro's "beliefs" have almost nothing to do with what Marx or Lenin said, aside from the latter's concept of the vanguard, and in Castro's case the "vanguard" is himself. One of the world's foremost scholars of Marxism and Leninism put Castro's "communism" into ideological and political perspective decades ago. In *Marxism: 100 Years in the Life of a Doctrine* (New York: Dial Press, 1964), pp. xv, Bertram D.

Wolfe correctly notes that “for intellectual purposes, we need not take [Castroism] too seriously,” though its “influence on political acts and passions may be serious indeed.”

16. In large part, this is the argument made in a talking paper prepared for a meeting of Catholic priests from the Eastern dioceses of the Cuban Catholic Church held in Santiago de Cuba. The document—“Cuba, su pueblo y su Iglesia de cara al comienzo del tercer milenio,” *El Nuevo Herald*, 27 September 1999—is a scathing critique of Castro’s “totalitarian” government. For an incomplete English translation, see “We Cannot Remain Silent,” *Miami Herald*, 24 October 1999.
17. On Castro’s greater tilt toward Mao, notwithstanding his often vituperative criticism of Chinese leaders, see below and William Ratliff, “Cuban Foreign Policy toward the Far East and Southeast Asia,” in Georges Fauriol and Eva Loser, eds., *Cuba: The International Dimension* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1990), p. 206ff; and William Ratliff, “Castro Eats Crow in China,” *Miami Herald*, 1 February 1996.
18. Castro’s health and education programs have been much praised and overpraised. On this see Jacobo Timerman, *Cuba : A Journey*, trans. by Toby Talbot (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1990); Department of State, *Zenith and Eclipse: A Comparative Look at Socio-Economic Conditions in Pre-Castro and Present Day Cuba* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 9 February 1998). Also see articles on Cuba in successive editions of the Hoover Institution’s *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, ed. Richard F. Staar. For a warm appreciation of Castro’s reforms in terms of economic benefits and social rights, even in the relative absence of political and civil rights, see Peter Schwab, *Confronting the U.S. Embargo* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
19. Juan Antonio Rodríguez Menier and William Ratliff, eds., *Inside the Cuban Interior Ministry* (Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 1994), p. 3. Also see Juan Antonio Rodríguez Menier and William Ratliff, “Protecting and Promoting Fidel,” mms. in Hoover Institution Archives.
20. Georgie Anne Geyer entitled her biography of Castro *Guerrilla Prince*. In her Introduction, after having thanked a string of psychiatrists who had helped her understand the Cuban leader, she remarked that after

1959 Castro “proceeded to transform [Cuba] with a wave of his ‘princely’ Machiavellian hand,” p. xv.

21. See Robert Packenham, “Cuba and the Soviet Union: What Kind of Dependency?” in Irving L. Horowitz, ed., *Cuban Communism: 1959–1995* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1995), pp. 141–71.
22. EFE, “No de Castro al llamado de apertura,” *El Nuevo Herald*, 17 November 1999.
23. For a good summary of this situation, see González and Nuccio, eds., *Forum*, pp. 3–11, and John D. Harbron, “Everyone (Even Castro) Is Preparing for Cuba after Castro,” *Miami Herald*, 6 August 1999.
24. See Juan Tamayo, “Average Cuban Says Economy Is Worse,” *Miami Herald*, 30 March 1998; Juan Tamayo, “Havana Challenges Talk of a ‘99 Exodus,” *Miami Herald*, 3 June 1999; Carlos Batista, “Mejora la economía de la isla, pero no para el pueblo,” *El Nuevo Herald*, 26 November 1999.
25. William Ratliff, “‘Socialism or Death’ in Havana,” *Washington Times*, 14 October 1997; James Anderson, “Castro Casts Spell over Caribbean,” Associated Press, 25 August 1998. British prime minister Tony Blair, who emerged as NATO’s chief cheerleader, wrote in “A Military Alliance, and More,” *New York Times*, 24 April 1999, that NATO must be prepared to “right wrongs and prosecute just causes” around the world.
26. Richard Nuccio quoted by Wayne S. Smith in “Our Dysfunctional Cuban Embargo,” *Orbis*, fall 1998, p. 536.
27. Michael Ranneberger, “U.S. Cuba Policy,” statement to U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Trade, 7 May 1998.
28. This and related dilemmas of U.S. foreign policy are discussed in a different context in David Fromkin, *Kosovo Crossing: American Ideals Meet Reality on the Balkan Battlefields* (New York: Free Press, 1999).
29. An interview with Condoleezza Rice by Geneva Overholser, “Profile of a Heavy Hitter,” *Washington Post*, 7 September 1999.
30. González and Nuccio, “The Cuban Conundrum,” pp. 32, 36–37.
31. Cuban American National Foundation, “FAQs on U.S. Policy toward Cuba,” www.canfnet.org/htm, 30 October 1999. Many of these points are made in other CANF releases, including “U.S. Policy Towards Cuba: A Defense,” 19 January 1998. This “defense” consists of seven unconvincing “answers” to seven unreal “assertions” of embargo critics, mostly the positions of “critics” who never really opposed Castro.

32. The year 1999 saw the first defection of an officer on duty in Fidel Castro's security team. Pablo Alfonso, "Ranking Castro Security Official Reportedly Defects," *Miami Herald*, 22 April 1999.
33. As Edward González notes in *Cuba: Clearing Perilous Waters?* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996), p. 90, Helms-Burton could lead to "growing civil strife, state repression, and direct U.S. intervention."
34. The best-known dissident in Cuba today is Elisardo Sánchez, who says that in 1996 his opposition to the embargo was a minority position among active dissidents, whereas in 1999 the majority have concluded the sanctions impede their activities. Juan Tamayo, "Cuban Human-Rights Activist Takes Center Stage," *Miami Herald*, 18 November 1999. Some activists reportedly support sanctions; see CANF, "FAQs on U.S. Policy toward Cuba."
35. William Hawkins, "Big Business vs. National Security?" *Cuba Survey* (CANF), February 1999.
36. Elliott Abrams, "When Trade Lets down the Flag"; and Mark Falcoff, "Is It Time to Rethink the Cuban Embargo?" *AEI Latin American Outlook*, March 1998.
37. Senator Helms is correct that not all of these sanctions are as sweeping as the embargo against Cuba, which is why it is appropriate to say "at various levels." Senator Jesse Helms, "What Sanctions Epidemic?" *Cuba Survey* (CANF), winter 1999.
38. Jeffrey J. Schott, "US Economic Sanctions: Good Intentions, Bad Execution," testimony to U.S. House Committee on International Relations, 3 June 1998. Gary Hufbauer, "The Snake Oil of Diplomacy," *Washington Post*, 12 July 1998. With Kemberly Ann Elliott, they are coeditors of *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (Washington, D.C.: IIE, 1990). Also see Rodríguez and Vásquez, "Cuba."
39. See Falcoff, "Reflections on a Dying Revolution"; Griswold and Lukas, "Trade Sanctions"; Wilfredo Cancio Isla, "Político logo pronostica una 'transición larga y trabajosa' en Cuba," *El Nuevo Herald*, 25 October 1999.
40. Jesse Helms says the "sanctions epidemic" is a red herring. Helms, "What Sanctions Epidemic?"
41. One exception is Daniel Fisk, for some years a member of the Republican Senior Professional Staff and an associate counsel of the Senate Com-

- mittee on Foreign Relations. In "How Sanctions Can Affect U.S. Policy Interests," a prepared statement for the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., 3 June 1998, he openly acknowledges that "it is impossible to hurt a national government without negatively impacting its citizens, and there is no way to help its citizens and not help the government."
42. See Lugar's speeches of 7 November 1997 and 25 March 1998 and the Lugar-Crane bill to limit the use of sanctions.
 43. Castro remarked in late 1999 that Cubans "have become accustomed to the blockade, we are immunized." AFP, "Castro dispuesto a restablecer relaciones a pesar del embargo," *El Nuevo Herald*, 29 October 1999. Ricardo Alarcón, the no. 3 man in Cuba, said the worst thing that could happen to the United States would be for its embargo to become irrelevant and disappear and "that, in a sense, is already happening." Romero, "Voces del Milenio: Ricardo Alarcon."
 44. For example, Jorge Mas Santos, "Remarks at Tulane University in October 1998," *CANF Foundation News*.
 45. Mark Falcoff, "Is It Time to Rethink the Cuban Embargo?" *AEI Latin American Outlook*, March 1998.
 46. Associated Press, "Cuba Calls for Sanctions against U.S. for 'Genocidal' Embargo," 14 September 1999; Reuters, "Cuba to File \$100 Billion Lawsuit over U.S. Embargo," 9 November 1999.
 47. President Clinton even suggested this at one point; see Reuters, "Clinton favorece relajar el embargo a Cuba."
 48. See Pablo Alfonso, "'Conspiración para asesinar' en el derribo de los aviones," *El Nuevo Herald*, 8 May 1999. On Cuban infiltration in Miami, see series of articles collected under title "Espionaje Castrista en Miami," *El Nuevo Herald*, consisting of articles between September 1998 and August 1999. Some of the counterproductive militancy of organizations in Miami may be attributable to these infiltrators.
 49. See Brothers to the Rescue Press Conference Statement, 15 September 1998; Associated Press, "Pilot Admits He Was Double Agent for Cuba," 27 February 1996.
 50. Some critics agree with Wayne Smith, "After 40 Years, Isn't It about Time for a Sensible U.S.-Cuban Policy?" *Los Angeles Times*, 9 January

2000, that “the hard fact is the Clinton administration has never tried to improve relations with the Castro government.”

51. Serge Kovalski, “Latin Leaders Meet in Cuba for 1st Time,” *Washington Post*, 16 November 1999.
52. John Rice, “Summit of Gains, Losses,” *Miami Herald*, 18 November 1999.
53. Andrés Oppenheimer, *Castro’s Final Hour: The Secret Story behind the Coming Downfall of Communist Cuba* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1992). The present authors were among the very early wishful thinkers—see Roger Fontaine and William Ratliff, “In Cuba, Swapping Bulls for Tractors?” *New York Times*, 19 November 1990—but never supported tightening the embargo.
54. Daniel Fisk, “How Sanctions Can Affect U.S. Policy Interests,” prepared statement for Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 3 June 1998.
55. See Helms-Burton Law Sections 2 and 3; Chelsea Carter, “Gingrich Defends Cuban Embargo,” Associated Press, 28 March 1998.
56. L. Jacobo Rodríguez and Ian Vásquez, “Cuba,” Section 50, in Edward Crane and David Boaz, eds., *Cato Handbook for Congress: Policy Recommendations for the 106th Congress* (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 1999).
57. See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, “Cuba’s Raft Exodus of 1994: Causes, Settlement, Effects, and Future,” North-South Agenda Papers No. 12, University of Miami, April 1995, p. 22; and Smith, “Our Dysfunctional Cuban Embargo,” p. 536.
58. Mesa Lago, “Cuba’s Raft Exodus,” p. 22, noted after the 1994 vote that “this third resolution puts the United States in an embarrassing situation that has made justification of the status quo increasingly difficult.”
59. Elliott Abrams, “When Trade Lets down the Flag,” *American Purpose*, spring/summer 1998.
60. The potential dangers of this policy were highlighted in September 1999 when the coast guard brutally prevented some would-be defectors from actually touching shore and thus winning asylum. See Andres Viglucci, “Clash at Sea Puts Coast Guard in Spotlight,” *Miami Herald*, 6 September 1999.
61. We have long criticized Castro and the longtime refusal of some inter-

- national human rights organizations to seriously and consistently condemn these violations. See, for example, William Ratliff, "Call It Amnesia International," *New York Times*, 20 March 1989.
62. Defense Intelligence Agency, "The Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security," released in May 1998, prepared in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the National Security Agency, and the United States Southern Command Joint Intelligence Center.
 63. Ann Davis, "Helms to Cuba: See You in Court," *National Law Journal*, 10 July 1995. Frank Davies, "Clash on Seizure of Cuban Assets," *Miami Herald*, 28 October 1999.
 64. Smith, "Our Dysfunctional Cuban Embargo," p. 535.
 65. Joaquín Roy, "The Helms-Burton Law: Development, Consequences and Legacy for Inter-American and European-US Relations," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, fall 1997, p. 83. Also see Daniel T. Griswold and Aaron Lukas, "Trade Sanctions," Section 56, *Cato Handbook for Congress: Policy Recommendations for the 106th Congress*.
 66. Fisk, "Testimony," June 1998. A State Department report of 30 August 1999 says, "Implementation of Title IV has had a significant negative impact on investment in the Cuban economy. Since enactment, as a result of the Department's investigations, including contacts with companies, firms from the various parts of the world have changed plans for investment in Cuba, or have pulled out altogether. Implementation has exacerbated the unstable and risky investment climate, and interest rates for projects in Cuba have been driven in excess of 20 percent." Quoted in *U.S.-Cuba Policy Report*, 30 September 1999, p. 2.
 67. Pablo Alfonso, "Congresistas en campaña contra la probable visita," *El Nuevo Herald*, 20 November 1999.
 68. William Ratliff, "Cuban Military Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Sergio Díaz-Briquets, ed., *Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1989), p. 43.
 69. Christopher Marquis, "Pentagon Calls Cuban Forces Weak," *Miami Herald*, 29 March 1998; Marquis, "Report Downplaying Cuba Threat Back for Review," *Miami Herald*, 8 April 1998.
 70. *Ibid.*
 71. Association of Former Intelligence Officers, *AFIO Weekly Intelligence*

- Notes, 28 June 1998. Also see William Ratliff, "La mordaza del exilio sobre el Pentágono," *El Nuevo Herald*, 14 de abril de 1998.
72. Steven Lee Myers, "The Pentagon Now Belittles the Menace Posed by Cuba," *New York Times*, 7 May 1998.
 73. William S. Cohen, transmittal letter addressed to Senator Strom Thurmond, undated accompanied by Department of Defense press release, "Secretary Cohen Forwards Cuban Threat Assessment to Congress," 6 May 1998.
 74. The United States too often tries to blame others for its own failures to keep its secrets secret. See William Ratliff, "Rebuilding Burned Bridges," *MSNBC on the Internet*, 13–20 September 1999.
 75. Frank Davies, "Anti-Drug Officials Downplay Cuba's Role in Trade," *Miami Herald*, 18 November 1999; George Gedda, AP, "Castro's Critics Say Administration Blind to Cuban Trafficking," 17 November 1999; Gerardo Reyes, "La Habana, pieza clave en el ajedrez de los narcos," *El Nuevo Herald*, 29 November 1999.
 76. Louis A. Pérez Jr., "Between Meanings and Memories of 1898," *Orbis*, fall 1998, p. 516; and Hugh Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution*, p. xxv.
 77. Mark Falcoff, "Reflections on a Dying Revolution," *Orbis*, fall 1998, p. 573.
 78. Rodríguez Menier and Ratliff, *Inside the Cuban Interior Ministry*, p. 62; González, *Cuba*, p. 49, says the Minint "will take whatever forceful measures are necessary to ensure regime survival."
 79. The poll by the Institute of Public Opinion Research at FIU consisted of 1,200 random interviews conducted between 30 May and 14 June 1997 in Florida's Dade County.
 80. Falcoff, "Reflections on a Dying Revolution"; González, *Cuba*, p. 84.
 81. Hufbauer, "The Snake Oil of Diplomacy."
 82. Elizabeth Gibbons, *Sanctions in Haiti: Human Rights and Democracy under Assault* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), pp. 92, 99.
 83. William Ratliff, "Fidel's Minint, or Institutionalizing Independence from Moscow?" in Robert Conquest and Dusan Djordjevich, *Political and Ideological Confrontations in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 129; and Rodríguez Menier and Ratliff, "Protecting and Promoting Fidel."

84. William Ratliff, "Is Invasion of Haiti a Test Run for Cuba?" *Insight*, 4 July 1994.
85. Gibbons, *Haiti: Human Rights and Democracy under Assault*.
86. Also see Fisk, "Testimony," June 1998.
87. The authors met with Fisk and another top member of Senator Helm's staff in 1996 to discuss the Helms-Burton Law just then coming into effect. When we stated that U.S. policy increased the chances of civil conflict in Cuba and thus the possibility of U.S. military involvement the "other" member of Helms's staff became furious, abusive, and stalked out of the room.
88. See Anabelle de Gale et al., "Decisions Inflamm Two Worlds," *Miami Herald*, 6 January 2000.
89. See Abrams, "When Trade Lets down the Flag." Also see Donald Kagan, "Honor, Interest, and the Nation-State," in Elliott Abrams, ed., *Honor among Nations: Intangible Interests and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1998), pp. 15–16.
90. Abrams, "When Trade Lets down the Flag."
91. Juan Tamayo, "Cuban-American Representatives Rip Policy on Rafters," *Miami Herald*, 14 July 1999.
92. David Fromkin, *Kosovo Crossing: American Ideals Meet Reality on the Balkan Battlefields* (New York: Free Press, 1999), cautions (pp. 162, 196) that Americans "should pause to meditate on the uses of power and on the achievability of goodness. . . . There are limits to our strength and wealth, and more important, there are limits to our knowledge and wisdom." While most U.S. and British publicists insisted on the virtue of the war against Yugoslavia, in most countries, "television viewers and newspapers readers watched American bombs and missiles raining down on Serbian cities and civilians, and concluded that Americans were the war criminals" (p. 186). Ratliff visited eight European and Latin American countries during and just after the bombing campaign and in talks with scores of people ranging from taxi drivers to government ministers never found one who approved of NATO's campaign.
93. Andres Oppenheimer, "Cuba Summit: A Shout in the Dark," *Miami Herald*, 24 October 1999. AP, "Agreements Reached at Cuba Summit," 16 November 1999.
94. Mark Falcoff, "Is It Time to Rethink the Cuban Embargo?" Also see

- Michael Radu, "Don't Reward Castro, Keep the Embargo," *Orbis*, fall 1998, p. 547.
95. CANF, "U.S. Policy towards Cuba."
 96. Rodríguez Menier and Ratliff, *Inside the Cuban Interior Ministry*, p. 61.
 97. "A la Opinión Pública: Mensaje de la Junta de Directores de la Fundación Nacional Cubano Americana," 11 de agosto de 1997.
 98. Tim Golden, "Cuba Bombings Provided Defendants with Quick Cash," *Miami Herald*, 15 January 1999; "Cuba Allows Guatemalans to Serve Prison Term at Home," *Miami Herald*, 7 October 1999.
 99. Catholic Church, "Cuba, su pueblo y su Iglesia."
 100. Wilfredo Cancio Isla, "Inundan Cuba con documento disidente," *El Nuevo Herald*, 25 October 1999; Juan Tamayo, "Dissidents Plan Various Disruptions of Cuba Summit," *Miami Herald*, 22 October 1999.
 101. Institute of Public Opinion Research, Florida International University, May–June 1997. The institute also conducted polls in 1991, 1993, and 1995. Falcoff, "Reflections on a Dying Revolution," p. 567.
 102. Catholic Church, "Cuba, su pueblo y su Iglesia." One report dated October 1999 by the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Directorate, "The Life and Freedom Fast in Cuba: A Preliminary Report," circulated by the International Republican Institute, concluded that a prodemocracy fast in mid-1999 had received important support from "the Cuban exile community" and "most importantly" had "confirmed the increase in civic defiance, and demonstrated how a sector of the population is overcoming its fear of repression."
 103. For a short history, see Rodríguez Menier and Ratliff, *Inside the Cuban Interior Ministry* and *Protecting and Promoting Fidel*.
 104. William Ratliff, "Military Affairs in Cuba," Hoover Institution Working Papers in International Studies, September 1989. Catholic Church, "Cuba, su pueblo y su Iglesia."
 105. Gonzalez and Nuccio, *Forum*, p. 7.
 106. Tamayo, "Cuban Human-Rights Activist Takes Center Stage"; Anita Snow, "Leaders Push Democracy in Cuba," *Washington Post*, 16 November 1999; John Rice, "Summit of Gains, Losses," *Miami Herald*, 18 November 1999.
 107. González, *Cuba*, p. 31; Catholic Church, "Cuba, su pueblo y su Iglesia."

108. Clinton's comment was made in Argentina and is quoted in Robinson, "Cuba: Time to Rethink U.S. Strategy?"
109. The embargo lobby reports on what it considers the greater funding and potential power of the Castro lobby, "that assortment of left-wing activists and think tanks whose agendas dovetail neatly with that of the Castro dictatorship . . . in advocating the unilateral lifting of U.S. sanctions against the regime." CANF, "Banking the Ca\$tro Lobby," May 1999. As noted earlier, the foundation refuses to acknowledge that the argument on the embargo is no longer themselves against the left but themselves against the world, including rightists, centrists, and leftists in the United States and throughout the world.
110. Catholic Church, "Cuba, su pueblo y su Iglesia."
111. Ernest Preeg, "A Look at Myths of Cuba: U.S. Embargo: The Illusion of Compliance," *Washington Post*, 1 November 1997; Bill Clinton, "Statement by the President," White House, 5 January 1999.
112. Prominent Cuban Americans who since the mid-1990s have privately admitted that the embargo should be lifted often will not say so in public for fear of seeming to betray their friends. Some Cuban Americans deny that this is the case, which reflects either their ignorance of the Cuban American community or their willingness to manipulate the truth for their own purposes, whatever those may be.
113. "Some Cuban Americans Feel Voiceless," *Miami Herald*, 21 July 1998. When one author told a prominent Cuban American leader and former U.S. government official about this letter from a student group that had been thrown out of the offices of two of the aforementioned Cuban American members of Congress, he said: "Yeh? Let them get their own representative," remaking the students' point. Although living in a democracy for many years, he still did not understand that it was not unreasonable for the young students who were raised in the United States to think that a member of Congress represents a district and should at least listen to constituents who disagree with him/her.
114. He previewed this line when he told South African parliamentarians they had to heal economic division with moderation and patience: "Such a dreadful legacy cannot be changed overnight." Paul Harris, "Castro: Patience Heals Economic Rift," *Miami Herald*, 5 September 1998.
115. One of the probable post-Castro leaders, Ricardo Alarcón, says nothing

will change when Fidel dies since though the revolution will lose a personality of “tremendous importance” it has already been “consolidated.” That is, Cuba has “revolutionary continuity and generational replacement” (*continuidad revolucionaria y un relevo generacional*). It remains to be seen if Alarcón actually believes this or simply is marking time while Castro lives. Ana Romero, “Voces del Milenio: Ricardo Alarcón,” *El Mundo*, Madrid, 21 November 1999.

116. Ratliff, “Cuban Foreign Policy toward Far East and Southeast Asia.”
117. Anita Snow, “Castro Salutes China Anniversary,” 29 September 1999.
118. “Castro Praises Deng for Consolidating Socialism,” Reuters, 20 February 1997; Ratliff, “Castro Eats Crow in China” and Ratliff, “Cuban Foreign Policy toward Far East and Southeast Asia.”
119. Rodríguez Menier and Ratliff, *Inside the Cuban Interior Ministry*, p. 10; González, *Cuba*, pp. 38–42.
120. In an April 1999 Gallup poll Americans opposed the use of U.S. troops in Cuba even if the people there attempted to overthrow Castro. Although Americans in general opposed U.S. military involvement (by 51 percent to 38 percent), Cuban Americans in the 1997 Florida International University polls overwhelmingly supported it. In conversations with U.S. military leaders, and in seminars at leading U.S. military academies, the authors have found most American military officers extremely reluctant to commit U.S. troops in Cuba.
121. González and Nuccio, “The Cuban Conundrum,” p. 45; also see González, *Cuba*, p. 96; Falcoff, “Reflections on a Dying Revolution,” p. 567.
122. Thomas L. Friedman, “A Deadly Embrace,” *New York Times*, 6 October 1999.
123. See Charles Lane, “First, Solve Desperation inside Cuba,” *Los Angeles Times*, 23 January 2000; see also Bronwyn Lance, “Cold War Hangover,” *Washington Times*, 14 January 2000.
124. A Gallup poll released on 12 January 2000 showed 56 percent of Americans thought the boy should go back to his father; 36 percent thought he should stay in America. See also Carol Rosenberg, “Where Should Rafter Boy Live? South Florida Split,” *Miami Herald*, 12 December 1999; Peter Kilborn, “Custody Case Is Overshadowing Shift among Cuban Immigrants,” *New York Times*, 16 January 2000; Carl Hiaasen, “U.S. Immigration Policy Is Inconsistent,” *Miami Herald*, 5 January 2000. Some

- Cuban Americans even say the majority of Cuban Americans are against the embargo and think the boy should return to his father, the misperceptions resulting from the fact that these Cuban Americans are not as well organized or vocal as other groups. See Alex Veiga, "Cuban-Americans Split on Elian," Associated Press, 24 January 2000.
125. See Ted Galen Carpenter, ed., *Nato's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War* (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 2000) and an analysis of the international impact of NATO's war by William Ratliff and David Oppenheimer in *Harvard International Review* later this year.
126. Reuters, "Highlights of Russia's Security Declaration," *New York Times*, 14 January 2000. For some of Castro's comments on this subject, see Anita Snow, "Castro Lashes Out at U.S. Gov't," AP report, 19 January 1999; Snow, "Castro Closes Economic Forum," AP report, 23 January 1999.
127. William Ratliff and Roger Fontaine, "Foil Castro, Lift the Embargo," *Washington Post*, 30 June 1993; Steven Gutkin, "Chavez in Asia: Testing Protocol," *Washington Post*, 18 October 1999; Andres Oppenheimer, "Chavez, Not Castro, Was the Scariest Speaker at Summit," *Miami Herald*, 21 November 1999.
128. Cardinal Jaime Ortega, the archbishop of Havana, told a San Francisco, California, audience in late 1999 that the pope's visit to Cuba in 1998 had raised hopes for religious freedom and the lifting of economic sanctions but that the dreams had not become reality. Associated Press, "La Iglesia aún carece de libertad, dice Ortega," 26 October 1999 and Agencia EFE, "Denuncian el deterioro de los derechos humanos," *Nuevo Herald*, 20 January 2000. Elisardo Sánchez says that after the Clinton administration slightly eased restrictions on Cuba, the government launched "one of the largest waves of political repression against the peaceful and small internal opposition in 20 years." Serge Kovalski, "Latin Leaders Meet in Cuba for 1st Time," *Washington Post*, 16 November 1999.