

that factor will count far less for justifying their future military buildups along the Taiwan Strait. Just as negotiations are taking place between nations involved in the divided Korea issue, so should negotiations between Taiwan and mainland China help to normalize their relations.

Our history of the Taiwan–mainland China regime rivalry reveals that political negotiations are possible. Beijing’s new one-China principle provides the only basis for nurturing a cooperative framework between the two regimes. The U.S. government and Congress should insist that this principle serve as the basis for negotiating a commonwealth federation formula by which both sides can cooperate as one China and yet be independent. U.S. interests will be best served by cross-strait negotiations rather than by encouraging a military buildup along the Taiwan Strait and committing to defend Taiwan under any circumstances.

Twentieth-century history has brought enormous tragedy to the Chinese people. Taiwan’s people were spared some of that suffering because, as a colony for a half century, they were isolated from the turmoil on the China mainland. But Japanese colonialism and many decades of Nationalist government rule created a complex society with ethnic tensions. Expanding cooperation between the ROC and PRC regimes can heal ethnic rivalry in Taiwan and improve their economic and social integration, helping to preserve regional peace and prosperity. Despite the differences that now characterize these two Chinese societies, they share much in common. Prolonged and creative negotiations are the only way both regimes can build a cooperative framework to peacefully coexist in the future as equal partners of one China.

NOTES

1. Lee Teng-hui, “Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1999, pp. 9–14.
2. This was the worst earthquake in Taiwan since 1935 in terms of human casualties and property loss. See Anthony Spaeth, “The Day Taiwan

Crumbled,” *Time*, October 4, 1999, pp. 22–29; Myra Lu, “Coordination at All Government Levels Key to Quake Relief,” *Free China Journal* 16, no. 40 (October 8, 1999): 1. We refer to divided China as the ROC (Republic of China) regime and the PRC (People’s Republic of China) regime only because each side has defined itself since 1949 and 1950 in those terms. Taiwan is not an independent state separate from China. Taiwan is part of China, and this is the reason we title our essay as we have done.

3. The ARATS’ letter to SEF on September 24 was reported in *Renmin ribao*, September 24, 1997, p. 1.
4. For Taiwan press editorial, see *Lian hebao*, September 23, 1999, p. 23. Jason Hu also criticized Tang Jiaxuan for “asking the UN and other nations to help Taiwan but first to consult with the PRC.”
5. For an excerpt from the White Paper, see the *New York Times*, February 22, 2000, p. A-10.
6. Editorial, *Zhongyuan ribao*, February 25, 2000, p. 1.
7. Erik Eckholm with Steven Lee Myers, “Taiwan Asks U.S. to Let It Obtain Top-Flight Arms,” *New York Times*, March 1, 2000, pp. 1 and A-12.
8. Jane Perlez, “Warning by China to Taiwan Poses Challenge to U.S.,” *New York Times*, February 27, 2000, pp. 1 and 10.
9. *New York Times*, March 1, 2000, pp. 1 and A-12.
10. Stanley O. Roth, “Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,” March 25, 1999,” in Paul H. Tai, ed., *United States, China, and Taiwan: Bridges for a New Millennium* (Carbondale: Public Policy Institute, Southern Illinois University, 1999), p. 184.
11. Lyman Van Slyke, “The Chinese Communist Movement during the Sino-American War 1937–1945,” in John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, eds., *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 13, *Republican China 1912–1949*, Part 2 (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 609–722.
12. Steven I. Levine, “Mobilizing for War: Rural Revolution in Manchuria as an Instrument for War,” in Kathleen Hartford and Steven M. Goldstein, eds., *Single Sparks: China’s Rural Revolutions* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1989), pp. 151–75. Also Steven I. Levine, *Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1948* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

13. Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxuan Yanjiushi (The research section on materials of the Communist Party's central headquarters), *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* (The writings of Mao Zedong since the founding of the People's Republic of China) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxuan chubanshe, 1979), pp. 14–15.
14. See “The Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895),” in Hungdah Chiu, ed., *China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis* (New York: Praeger Publications, 1973), p. 197.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 209.
17. Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), chaps. 3 and 4.
18. Hungdah Chiu, *China and the Question of Taiwan*, pp. 221–22.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 228.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 245–46 and pp. 250–52.
22. Zhang Zanhe, *Liangan guanxi bianjianshi* (A history of the changing circumstances regarding cross-strait relations) (Taiwan: Zhouzhi wenhua shiye gufen yu gongsi, 1996), pp. 119–20.
23. “Yi yi jiefang Taiwan” (We definitely must liberate Taiwan), *Renmin ribao*, July 23, 1954, p. 1.
24. Michel Leiris, *Journal de Chine* (China diary) (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), p. 50. The French novelist Leiris visited mainland China in 1955 and reported seeing these banners in every state-owned factory that he visited.
25. The CIA covert operations directed against the offshore islands of Fujian province have been described in Frank Holober, *Raiders of the China Coast* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999).
26. For the best account of America's efforts to rein in the ROC government from provocative military ventures in mainland China, see Steven M. Goldstein, “The United States and Taiwan, 1949–1998: The Sometime Allies,” in Michel Oksenberg, ed., *American Security Relations in the Pacific: Past, Present, and the Future* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming).
27. Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the Na-

- tional People's Congress, *Constitution of the People's Republic of China* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1994), p. 5.
28. Government Information Office, Republic of China, 1999: *The Republic of China Yearbook* (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1999), p. 679.
 29. Our discussion is based on John W. Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 258–62, whose interpretation so far has not been challenged.
 30. Zhang Zanhe, *Liangan guanxi bianjianshi*, p. 161.
 31. See “Taiwan Relations Act, 1979,” in Hungdah Chiu, ed., *China and the Taiwan Issue* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. 267.
 32. Zhang Zanhe, *Liangan guanxi bianjianshi*, pp. 254–55.
 33. Jun Zhan, *Ending the Chinese Civil War: Power, Commerce and Conciliation between Beijing and Taipei* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 32.
 34. *Ibid.*, pp. 32–34.
 35. Zhang Zenhe, *Liangan guanxi bianjianshi*, p. 258.
 36. *Ibid.*, p. 278.
 37. Hsin-Hsing Wu, *Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 176.
 38. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
 39. *Ibid.*, pp. 180–81.
 40. *Ibid.*, pp. 186–87.
 41. *Ibid.*, pp. 192–92.
 42. Zhang Zhenhe, *Liangan guanxi bianjianshi*, p. 282.
 43. For examples, see A-chin Hsiau, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000).
 44. For a good chronology of these events, see Winberg Chai, “Relations between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan: Overview and Chronology,” *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 26, no. 2 (summer 1999): 64–77.
 45. See Guidelines for National Unification in Mainland Affairs Council, the Executive Yuan, the Republic of China, *MAC News Briefing, Volume 1* (No. 0001No.0054) November 11, 1996–December 22, 1997 (Taipei: MAC).
 46. Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, *The First Chinese Democracy: Political*

Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 172.

47. See Gallup Organization, *Taiwan di qi minchong kan liangan jiaoliu minyi diaocha baogao* (A public opinion survey report on how the people of Taiwan area regard cross-strait exchanges) (Taipei: Gallup Organization, USA, 1990), p. 46.
48. Hungdah Chiu, "The Koo-Wang Talks and Intra-Chinese Relations," *American Journal of Chinese Studies* 2, no. 2 (October 1994): 226.
49. Mainland Affairs Council, the Executive Yuan, *MAC News Briefing: Volume 1 (No. 0001–No. 0054) November 11, 1996–December 22, 1997* (Taipei: MAC, 1999), p. 217.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
51. Hungdah Chiu, "The Koo-Wang Talks," pp. 228–29.
52. Nanjing daxue Taiwan wenti yanjiusuo, comp., *Haixia liangan guanxi jizhi, 1949–1998* (A chronology of cross-Taiwan strait relations, 1949–1998) (Beijing: Jiuzhou tushu chubanshe, 1999), p. 494.
53. *Ibid.*
54. See Winberg Chai, ed., *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 26, no. 2 (summer 1999): 77–92.
55. Interview with Wei Yung. See also Yung Wei, "The Unification and Division of Multiple-System Nations: A Comparative Analysis of the Basic Concepts, Issues, and Approaches" (paper presented to a Symposium on Functional Integration of Divided Nations, Seoul, Republic of Korea, October 6–7, 1980); and Y. Wei, "From 'Multi-System Nations' to 'Linkage Communities': A New Conceptual Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations," *Issues and Studies* 35, no. 10 (October 1997): 1–19.
56. Our account is based on interviews with Taiwan journalists who were in Beijing at the time and from the following Chinese sources: the Hong Kong *Da gong pao*, January 17, 1995, p. 1, which describes Jiao Renhe's sudden change of mind when he confided that he could not sign the two agreements. This scene occurred on the 10th floor of the Diaoyutai, where waiters already had posted a large banner celebrating the signing of the two agreements. See also *Zhongguo shibao*, January 27, 1995, p. 2, and *Gongshang ribao*, January 30, 1995, p. 2. Again, on January 29, 1995, a report appeared saying that both sides had convened for another six days of discussions to agree on the fishing jurisdiction issue but failed to do so

because “they were constrained by the larger political issues involved”; see *Da gong bao*, January 29, 1995, p. 1.

57. Winberg Chai, *Asian Affairs*, pp. 100–101.
58. Wu Xinxing, *Zhenghe lilun yu liangan guanxi zhi yanjiu* (Studies of general theory and cross strait relations) (Taipei: Wunan tushu chubanshe, 1999), p. 213.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
60. See Suisheng Zhao, “Military Coercion and Peaceful Offense: Beijing’s Strategy of National Reunification,” *Pacific Affairs* 72, no. 4 (winter 1999/2000): 495–512.
61. Chao and Myers, *The First Chinese Democracy*, p. 292.
62. Winberg Chai, *Asian Affairs*, p. 74.
63. *Ibid.*
64. *Ibid.*, pp. 101–2.
65. Impressions gleaned from interview with Taiwan experts in Beijing.
66. Zhang Zenghe, *Liangan guanxi bianjianshi*, p. 370; President Lee’s speech in Chinese is cited in Wu Xinxing, *Zhenghe lilun yu liangan guanxi zhi yanjiu* as *Min chi soyu, hang-zai wo-xin* (The people’s aspirations are always in my heart), pp. 513–21.
67. Wu Xinxing, *Zhenghe lilun yu liangan guanxi zhi yanjiu*.
68. You Ji, “Making Sense of War Games in the Taiwan Strait,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 6, no. 15 (July 1997): 287–92.
69. See “Inaugural Address: Lee Teng-hui, President, Republic of China, May 20, 1996,” mimeo issued by the ROC Government Information Office, p. 4.
70. Chen Zujian, *Maishang liangan tampan* (Toward détente between mainland China and Taiwan) (Hong Kong: Taipingyang shiji chubanshe, 1998), p. 411.
71. Christopher Hughes and Robert Stone, “Nastion-Building and Curriculum Reform in Hong Kong and Taiwan,” *China Quarterly*, no. 160 (December 1999): 985–86.
72. Taifa Yu, “Relations between Taiwan and China after the Missile Crisis: Toward Reconciliation?” *Pacific Affairs* 72, no. 1 (spring 1999): 46–48.
73. See Wang Daohan, “Liangan heping di zwei xinjiyu” (The most recent

favorable opportunity for peace across the Taiwan Strait), *Yazhou Zhoukan* (Asian weekly) April 19–25, 1999, pp. 18–19.

74. By 1998 the MAC polls showed the share of people identifying as only Taiwanese as 38 percent compared to nearly 17 percent in September 1992 and January 1993. The share identifying as only Chinese had fallen to 12 percent compared to 46 percent in 1992–93. Meanwhile, those regarding themselves as being both Taiwanese and Chinese was around nearly half in October 1998 compared to around one-third in 1992–93. Thus a subtle shift in the pattern of cultural identity has taken place in the 1990s. See the Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, “Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China,” November 1998.
75. Mainland Affairs Council, *Taipei Speaks Up: Special State-to-State Relationship: Republic of China’s Policy Documents* (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, 1999), pp. 1–2.
76. Richard Halloran, “Taiwan’s President Wages Stealth Campaign to Sway Clinton,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 19, 1999, p. 4.
77. Hungdah Chiu, ed., *China and the Taiwan Issue* (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 249.
78. For arguments critical of the U.S. government’s one-China policy and efforts to engage China, see the following recent publications: On abandoning the one-China principle, see Eliot A. Cohen, “‘One China’ Policy Is Obsolete,” *Asian Wall Street Journal*, March 22, 2000, p. 10; for supporting a democratic Taiwan, William Pfaff, “The West Lacks a Clear Rule on ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’” *International Herald Tribune*, March 23, 2000, p. 8; on selling advanced weapons to Taiwan, see Stephen J. Yates, “Why Taiwan’s Security Needs to Be Enhanced,” *Heritage Foundation Executive Newsletter*, no. 632 (October 25, 1999); on defending Taiwan against the PRC’s use of force, see press release from office of Congressman Tom Delay, March 16, 2000, at <http://www.majoritywhip.house.gov>; see also the statement signed by twenty-three leading conservatives and foreign policy experts on August 24, 1999, calling for the U.S. government to “declare unambiguously that it will come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack or a blockade” issued by the Heritage Foundation *News* (<http://www.heritage.org>), titled “Leading Conservatives, Foreign-Policy Experts Call for Defense of Taiwan.”
79. *Ibid.* In the MAC opinion polls for issues such as the pace of cross-strait

exchanges, prioritizing foreign and cross-strait relations, views on pragmatic foreign policy, and so on, the responses are not categorized according to groups favoring the status quo, independence, and so forth.

80. See *Haixia liangan guanxi jiji, 1949–1998*, p. 644.
81. Throughout the 1990s the MAC's public opinion polls have repeatedly found that more than 70 percent oppose Beijing's one country, two systems definition for resolving the divided China problem.
82. Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party, *China Policy White Paper* (Washington, D.C.: National Press Building, 1999), 16 pages. For the DPP's conditions to engage in "positive negotiations," see p. 4.
83. Paul Eckert, "Zhu Rongji Warns Taiwan Voters," *China Post*, March 16, 2000, p. 1.
84. "'Yige Zhongguo' weibi shizhi 'Zhonghua renmin gongheguo'" (One China does not necessarily mean the People's Republic of China), *Shijie ribao* (World journal), May 10, 2000, p. 1.
85. For Chen Shui-bian's speech in Chinese, see *Shijie ribao* (World journal), May 20, 2000, p. A3.
86. For Beijing's reaction to President Chen's speech see "Beijing buman Chen Shuibian bi yi Zhong yuanzi" (Beijing is not satisfied that Chen Shui-bian ignored the one-China principle), *Shijie ribao* (World journal), May 20, 2000, p. A1.
87. Joseph Kahn, "China Indicating Caution on Taiwan: Tells U.S. That It Will Maintain a 'Wait and See' Attitude," *New York Times*, April 2, 2000, pp. 1 and 6. This information had appeared a week earlier in the *China Press* but was now confirmed by the top Chinese leaders' speaking to Samuel R. Berger, President Clinton's national security adviser. Meanwhile, in Taiwan a senior DPP official said on March 26 "that the President-elect has been very careful about every word relating to cross-strait relations—out of concern he could cause the currently fragile honeymoon with Beijing to break off soon." See Brian Hsu, "Cross-Strait Ties in Honeymoon, but Nerves Taut," *Taipei Times* 1, no. 287 (March 27, 2000): 1 and 3.