

against U.S. interests when a leader-specific threat is in place. Second, leader-specific policies encourage citizens to depose foreign leaders should these threats be insufficient.

Unfortunately, the successful enactment of leader-specific policies requires a bold and open declaration of U.S. intent. This element has been missing from U.S. policy, and without it the U.S. administration reduces the effectiveness of its policies. Unless the contingent nature of U.S. threats is known, citizens have fewer incentives to depose recalcitrant leaders; without this challenge to those leaders' grip on power, U.S. threats lack force. I do not advocate a more ambitious or expansive foreign policy. But rather when there exists a clear and present danger to U.S. interests, leader-specific policies offer the best opportunity for success. The effective enactment of these policies requires strong leadership.

NOTES

1. This essay draws on joint research with Fiona McGillivray (Yale University), "Trust and Cooperation through Agent Specific Punishments," forthcoming in *International Organizations*.
2. Comment to the BBC World Service, 20 July 1999.
3. Reuters, 8 September 1999.
4. Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Harper Collins, 1984).
5. NBC News, Washington, 11 June 1999.
6. Douglas Foyle, *Counting the Public In: President, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
7. Graham Allison's analysis of the Cuban missile crisis provides an interesting example of this phenomenon. In September 1962 President Kennedy declared he would never allow "offensive weapons" to be based on Cuba, a declaration he made only after being assured by intelligence that Russia had no plans to station missiles there anyway. When the missiles

were subsequently discovered he found himself committed by his earlier declaration, which shaped the U.S. goal of removing the missiles. See Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2d ed. (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999).