the United States and the European Union through the United Nations and ideally Latin American countries as well. If no progress is made in peace negotiations, military action would be directed at the holdout party. This approach would give the supreme commanders in each insurgent group an incentive to apply their own pressures to clean their own ranks of uncooperative elements in order to seek political office by winning elections.

Finally, U.S.-backed policy must address the social causes of the Colombian conflict as well as the drug-related sources feeding the insurgency. Colombia may prove to be a lost cause, but it needn’t be. An integrated program will require serious, committed, honest, and objective calculated international support on all levels, not just the criticism and procrastination that have been common up to now. It will also require the support of frustrated Colombians. Failure will make inevitable the continuing deterioration of the social fabric and state legitimacy in Colombia and the spread of such decay to much of the rest of the hemisphere.

Notes


4. An article in the most widely read Colombian weekly gives precise accounts of these events. See “Exodo,” editorial, Semana, 28 June 1999.

5. Echandía has found a clear relationship between regional income inequal-
ity and civil unrest driven by guerrilla activities in different Colombian regions. See Echandía, “Grado de Concentración,” pp. 25–27.


11. Ibid., pp. 12–24, and Buscaglia, “The Links.”


16. On the enormous variety in Colombia, see Camilo Echandía Castilla, El Conflicto Armado y las Manifestaciones de Violencia en las Regiones de Colombia (Bogotá: Presidencia de la República y Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 1999).


18. It is estimated that the number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) per capita in Colombia is three times greater than the region’s average. Yet these NGOs are simply interest groups.

19. Mercedes Ortiz Cañón et al., Descentralización y Participación Ciudadana (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1997), p. xii.

20. Humberto de la Calle Lombana and Jorge Mario Eastman Robledo, En
Defensa de la Descentralización y de la Autonomía Territorial (Bogotá: Colombia, 1996), p. 129.


25. Survey of 1,500 individuals stratified by gender, wealth, and education among the local populations in Putumayo, Caqueta, and the northern departments of Bolivar and Norte de Santander conducted as part of the ongoing study by Edgardo Buscaglia. “Study of Informal Institutions in Colombia’s War Zones,” April 2000 to February 2001, unpublished paper.


29. Adding to previously approved U.S. assistance to Colombia of over $330 million, the legislation provides $818 million as an emergency supplemental for fiscal year 2000 and $256 million in additional funding for fiscal year 2001. Refer to Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, 19 July 2000. U.S. State Department.

30. See Fact Sheet, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, State Department, 19 July 1999.

31. See State Department Fact Sheet. It is noteworthy that the role of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USIAD), traditionally the U.S. government agency channeling this type of aid, has been put into doubt. An increasing majority of U.S. officials and international sponsors have requested that American NGOs have a more active role in deciding how funds should be allocated.


34. See Huellas de Paz: Los Desmovilizados y Su Participación en los Escenarios de Elección Popular (Bogotá: Dirección General para la Reinserción, 2000).

35. See Gómez Perdin, “Las Zonas de Cultivo.”


37. Enchandia, “Grado de Concentracion.”


