

ization. This new dynamic could neutralize Taiwan nationalism and restart negotiations.

The recent political-ideological changes identified above reflect that a titanic struggle for the hearts and minds of the Taiwan people is underway in the first Chinese democracy. It is a struggle that cannot be understood in terms of wealth distribution, class structure, or social status. It is a struggle over ideas and passions that is dividing the Taiwan people and even splitting families. The real test for this young democracy's survival is whether tolerance and understanding of the different aspirations of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait can prevail and provide a settlement of the divided China problem.

Can enough of Taiwan's democrats insist that different visions of Taiwan's future coexist while engaging with mainland China under the one-China principle? That means having a dialogue between the Taiwan and mainland authorities to forge a new political partnership. That arrangement should preserve Taiwan's democracy and its current autonomy and assure Beijing's leaders and elite that Taiwan is still part of China, while both strive to develop a cooperative framework.<sup>15</sup>

Such a political partnership only can be established with the mutual affirmation of an equitable one-China principle in which both parties have equivalence and commit to the principle of equality under the sovereignty of a one China. The mainland authorities already have agreed to this interpretation of the one-China principle. The Taiwan authorities should now agree to negotiate under the same principle.

## NOTES

1. Government Information Office (compiler), *President Chen Shui-bian's Selected Addresses and Messages (1): A New Era of Peace and Prosperity* (Taipei: Office of the President, 2001), pp. 8–17.
2. For the significance of this important election in Taiwan's democratization and the bitter campaign of fall 1991 over Taiwan's destiny—either to accommodate mainland China or to pursue an independent path—see Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, *The First Chinese Democracy: Political*

## IMPLICATIONS OF THE TURNOVER OF POLITICAL POWER IN TAIWAN 15

*Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), chapter 10 and, for the election outcome, p. 237.

3. *Renmin ribao* (People's daily), January 6, 1991, p. 1. For the most thorough study confirming the agreement by the two sides to adopt different interpretations of one China in which Taiwan was part of China, see Xu Shiquan, "The 1991 Consensus: A Review and Assessment of Consultations between the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait and the Straits Exchange Foundation," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 23, no. 3 (June 2001): 121–40.
4. President Chen made this statement when meeting with the U.S. delegation of the National Committee on Foreign Policy. See *World Journal* (in Chinese), June 30, 2000, p. A1.
5. *New York Times*, September 1, 2000, p. A3.
6. "President Chen's National Day Message," *Taipei Journal* 18, no. 39 (October 12, 2001): 2.
7. Sandy Huang, "Tzeng Says Colleges Must Help Taiwanization Effort," *Taipei Times* 3, no. 124 (October 16, 2001): 2.
8. Catherine Hsieh, "New Taiwan Solidarity Union Gets Big-Name Support," *Taipei Journal* 18, no. 33 (August 24, 2001): 2.
9. Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan of the Republic of China, *Industry of Free China* 91, no. 11 (November 2001): 74.
10. *World Journal* (in Chinese), March 19, 2001, p. A4.
11. Quoted from the summary report of the Mainland Affairs Division of the Economic Development Advisory Conference, "EDAC Outlines Cross-Strait Ties," *Taipei Journal* 17, no. 35 (September 7, 2001): 3.
12. *Renmin Ribao*, January 6, 1991, p. 1. Another poll, taken by *United Daily News* of the Taiwan area during June 25–27, 2001, reported that 33 percent accepted the "one country, two systems" formula (it was higher if "China," signifying one country, was the ROC. A similar poll in 2000 reported only 18 percent accepted the "one country, two systems" formula. See *World Journal*, July 1, 2001, p. A1
13. Shelley Rigger, "Maintaining the Status Quo: What It Means, and Why the Taiwanese Prefer It," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 14, no. 2 (April 2001): 112.

14. *World Journal* (in Chinese), January 2, 2002, p. B2.
15. Two of the authors have previously described how this cooperative framework could be established between the two sides. See Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, *The Divided China Problem: Conflict Avoidance and Resolution*, Hoover Institution Essays in Public Policy no. 101, 2000. pp. 1–59.