T.V. Soong
In Modern Chinese History
A look at his role in Sino-American relations in World War II

Tai-chun Kuo and Hsiao-ting Lin
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Foreword

In March 2005 the Hoover Institution Archives announced a new initiative, the Modern China Archives and Special Collections, which includes archives and special materials about the Republic of China from 1911 to 1949, Taiwan from 1949 to the present, and the evolution of mainland China from 1949 to the present.

Hoover Institution undertook this initiative because, for many decades, the Hoover Institution Archives has collected and preserved a rich collection of Chinese, Japanese, and Western documents related to the above periods. Those documents consisted of the private papers of individuals and the personal documents and official records of leaders and statesmen, government officials, missionaries, and engineers. In 2003 many of those rare materials describing the rise of the Communist and Nationalist Parties in mainland China and the rise of an opposition party in Taiwan were transferred from the Hoover Institution’s former East Asian Collection to the Hoover Institution Archives. As special materials, few or no copies of them existed in the public domain and thus were, rarely, if ever, revealed to the public. Those materials have now been classified, placed on the Hoover website, and preserved for researchers to use in the Hoover Institution Archives.

In April 2004, the Hoover Institution opened nineteen boxes of the restricted personal papers of T. V. Soong, a leading official in the Nationalist government from the late 1920s to 1949, along with two thousand documents donated by Soong family. At the same time the Hoover Institution and the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, agreed to preserve those records and make them available for researchers. In late 2005 Chiang Kai-shek’s family placed his diaries and those of Chiang Ching-kuo in the Hoover Archives.

To encourage researchers to use this new collection, we have established a new essay series of which this is the second monograph (the first is The Modern China Archives and Special Collections). The series introduces new documents from our collections and suggests interpretations of events that may differ from those advanced earlier, especially as they relate to major turning points and significant historical changes in China’s recent history. (These essays reflect only the opinions of the authors.) The essays also identify and discuss special materials that users might find of interest and assistance and provide an impetus for researchers to consult the Hoover Institution’s expanding Chinese archives and special collections.

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Introduction

In World War II, the United States joined with a non-Western country, China, to defeat an Asian power: the empire of Japan. The Sino-American alliance was a troubled one, caused, in part, by the bitter relationship between the American representative, General Joseph W. Stilwell, and the leader of Nationalist China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

At first, Washington's leaders welcomed this alliance and provided China with loans, economic and military materials, and personnel assistance to help China become a stronger and more effective ally against the Japanese imperial army. But China's image as a great power began to fade in Washington, particularly after the Cairo Summit in November 1943. Disillusioned with Nationalist China's limited ability to engage Japanese troops, the U.S. government criticized Chiang Kai-shek, his administration, and his armed forces for ineptitude and corruption. In fact, historians have concluded that corrupt and inept Chinese leadership brought about the Nationalist government's eventual defeat, not the limited economic and military aid that the United States had given China or the postwar Soviet and North Korean aid to the Chinese Communist forces.

The U.S. government tried to pressure Chiang Kai-shek to use Communist troops in the fight against Japan. In the Yalta conference of February 1945, the leading powers, without the presence of Chinese delegates, further agreed that Soviet Russia would secure its special interests in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia after the war. In later Sino-Soviet negotiations in Moscow, Washington declined China's request for support to counter Moscow's tough bargaining. Thus, the Sino-American relationship deteriorated during China's civil war. Without Washington's support, Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist government finally collapsed and retreated to Taiwan in 1949, only four years after the Allied victory over Japan.

Some Western scholars have tried to explain “who lost China?” Many accused Chiang Kai-shek and his in-laws, namely T. V. (Tse-ven) Soong and H. H. (Hsiang-hsi) Kung, as being responsible for the communist reunification of the Chinese mainland. However, recently released T. V. Soong personal papers in the Hoover Institution Archives tell us much about the U.S.-China

relationship during World War II. They reveal close, friendly relations between Washington officials and Soong, a top representative of Chongqing (Chungking; Nationalist China’s wartime capital in Sichuan Province) in 1940–43. They also describe in detail the financial and military aid to China that had been agreed upon by leaders in Washington and Chongqing, and arranged by T. V. Soong. Close Sino-American relations involving Soong even helped elevate Nationalist China’s international status to become one of the “Big Four.”

How did Chongqing leaders like Soong, in only a few years, convince the United States and its allies to place their trust in Nationalist China? If Soong’s role was so important, why was this period of trust and friendship so short-lived? Did Chinese leaders like T. V. Soong make a difference? If so, then how?

**A T.V. Soong Profile**

**The Scholarly Attention** paid to T. V. Soong, one of the most influential political figures in modern Chinese history, is scanty. Most of the existing accounts describe T. V. Soong as privileged, corrupt, and money-hungry. His unique family relationship with Chiang Kai-shek earned him much censure for Nationalist China’s defeat in 1949. Sterling Seagrave’s best-selling work of 1985, *The Soong Dynasty*, was a bombshell that criticized the entire Soong family. Only recently have Chinese scholars begun to reevaluate Soong’s role in modern China history, such as the establishment of a modern financial system and his influence upon Sino-American relations.

T. V. Soong began his political career as Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s secretary, which would link him with Nationalist China’s most powerful leader, Chiang Kai-shek. Born into a wealthy family of Shanghai Christians in December 1894, the son of Charles Soong and a brother to the eminent Soong sisters, T. V. Soong obtained a B.A. in economics from Harvard University in 1915. In 1917 he returned to China and became a secretary in the famous Han-Yeh-P’ing Iron and Coal Company. In 1923, he joined Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary campaign to unify China, thus launching his political career. After serving as Sun’s private secretary, he held high positions in Sun’s Canton government, including Central Bank manager and finance minister. After Chiang Kai-shek completed his Northern Expedition in 1928, Soong joined the KMT-led Nationalist government, serving as minister of finance (1928–33), governor of the Central Bank of China (1928–34), and acting premier of the Nationalist government (1930, 1932–33). During the early years of Nationalist rule, T. V. Soong simplified the tax system, increased tax revenue, and established China’s first bond and stock markets in Shanghai. In 1931 he helped establish the National Economic Council (which in 1934 became the China Development Finance Corporation) to supply credit for China’s industrialization and attract foreign capital to China.

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3 The Soong family began donating its materials to the Hoover Institution Archives in 1976 followed by additional papers in April 1980, and again in the spring of 2004. Thirty-nine boxes had been made available for research in the Hoover Institution Archives in the 1970s. The other nineteen boxes, restricted during the lifetime of Soong’s sister Madame Chiang Kai-shek, were opened in April 2004. In March 2004 the family made available more than 2,000 documents, in eight boxes. Please visit: www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf3g5002qh for T. V. Soong Archive inventory and related information.


But in 1934, Soong resigned from most of his government positions. Rumor had it that Soong and Chiang Kai-shek had quarreled over government spending levels; Chiang wanted more state funds to expand his military campaigns against the Chinese Communists while taking little action against the Japanese military. After Soong’s fourth official resignation attempt from the Nationalist government between 1928 and 1934, it was obvious that he could no longer agree with Chiang’s policies. It is noteworthy that, in the early 1930s, Soong had been a keen advocate of the theory that China should ally itself with the United States and Great Britain to block Japan’s growing military power, whereas Chiang Kai-shek and many KMT high officials preferred the policy of pacifying the interior before fighting the Japanese. Soong did not agree with this strategy, and he gradually became a solitary, dissident warrior in KMT political circles. This might be why he chose to leave the political arena in 1934.

T. V. Soong founded the China Development Finance Corporation in 1934. Supported by the prominent political figures and financial magnates such as H. H. Kung, Chang Kai-ngau, and Chen Guangpu, the CDFC became China’s major access to foreign investment, and its influence became widespread. In the summer of 1940, three years after the Sino-Japanese war began, T. V. Soong was assigned to Washington as Chiang Kai-shek’s personal representative to the U.S. government. Chiang wanted him to work with the U.S. government and win President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s support for China’s war with Japan. Until late 1943, Soong negotiated substantial loans from the United States to support the Chinese war effort. In December 1941, immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Soong minister of foreign affairs (but he remained in Washington) to manage China’s alliance with the United States and Great Britain.

In December 1944, Soong was appointed deputy premier of the Nationalist government as well as foreign minister, and in April 1945 he led the Chinese delegation to the first United Nations conference in San Francisco, where he was one of four cochairmen. That same spring, Soong twice visited Moscow and negotiated a treaty with Stalin to clarify China’s boundaries in Central and North Asia. He resigned as foreign minister in July 1945 because he could not prevent Outer Mongolia from being detached from China.

In 1946, Soong fought the postwar hyperinflation and tried to revive China’s war-ravaged economy. In March 1947, he left the Executive Yuan and, a few months later, served in his last official post as governor of Guangdong Province. After the defeat of the Nationalists in 1949, Chiang and his KMT administration withdrew to Taiwan. Soong then moved to New York, where he lived a quiet, comfortable life. He died in San Francisco in 1971 at the age of seventy-seven.

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8 These resignations were due to his unwillingness to compromise on certain political issues. See Wu Jingping, “Song Ziwen Zhengtan Chenfu,” Zhuanji Wenxue (Taipei) 60, no. 5 (November 1992): 127–40.
A Powerful Chinese Envoy in Washington

THE OUTBREAK OF THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR in the summer of 1937 confirmed the validity of Soong’s strategy of allying with the West against Japan. When Chiang Kai-shek appointed Soong as his personal representative to the United States, he informed President Roosevelt: “I have designated Mr. T. V. Soong as my representative to the United States, who has full power to speak in China’s name.”

Soong now took charge of Chinese efforts to work closely with the U.S. government and win Roosevelt’s support and friendship. His task was not easy. By mid-1940, the idea that the United States might declare war against the Axis, or even threaten to do so, was unrealistic. In the autumn of 1940, Roosevelt was telling the American people that his administration would make every effort to keep the United States out of war, and because the State Department, under Cordell Hull, still believed that any American aid to China would only provoke Japan to take rash actions, any aid had to be minimal. The U.S. government and its people preferred isolationism.

But Soong spared no efforts to build the U.S.-China alliance. With his political skills and Chiang’s trust, Soong brought his talents into full play. He gave speeches and wrote articles for newspapers; he tried to make friends and build alliances. His hard work and public relation skills soon paid off. Within six months, the network for China’s lobby to obtain more U.S. aid was in place. Soong had acquired access to the White House, the Treasury, the War Department, and other related organizations. Among his important friends were Stanley K. Hornbeck, William Youngman, Thomas Corcoran, William Pawley, Claire L. Chennault, and Joseph Alsop.

On December 4, 1940, Soong reported his progress to Chiang Kai-shek: “I was helpless for the first six months here in Washington, but in the past two months I began to get the knack.”

Soong first negotiated for a $25 million secured loan. In August 1940, Soong was struggling to find a way to persuade Henry Morgenthau, the U.S. secretary of the Treasury, to approve a loan to satisfy China’s most urgent needs. When Soong learned that the U.S. government was planning to purchase tungsten ore from China, he realized that ore could be used as collateral to obtain U.S. loans for China. He telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek and asked the Chongqing government to delay the sale in order to request the U.S. government to negotiate with Soong.

Soong’s strategy worked. On October 22, 1940, Soong represented China in signing an agreement with the U.S. government to receive a credit of $25 million for the Nationalist government. Soong considered this a good beginning, and in a series of telegrams to Chiang Kai-shek, he expressed confidence that, in addition to the $25 million loan, he could secure more financial support for China to minimize its wartime financial difficulties.

Soong’s efforts to win Washington support continued after Japan joined the Axis powers and then recognized the Chinese puppet regime, headed by Wang Jingwei, in late 1940. American officials believed that the Japanese military was determined to destroy Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist government and that war with Japan was inevitable. Washington now changed its isolationist stance and gave more financial aid to China.

10 Ibid., pp. 254–60.
13 On Soong’s activities at the early stage of his stay in the United States, see T. V. Soong Archive, esp. Boxes 11, 12, and 59, Hoover Institution Archives.
14 Qin, Zhonghua Mingqiu Zhongyao Shiliao Chubian, p. 288.
15 Soong to Chiang, September 23, 1940, T. V. Soong Archive, Box 59.
16 Soong to Chiang, October 22, November 27 and 29, 1940, ibid.
Soong, taking advantage of the changing situation, urged Secretary of Navy Frank Knox to submit a proposal for aiding China. Secretary of State Cordell Hull also pressed Roosevelt, who responded positively to Chinese requests. When Roosevelt instructed Morgenthau to negotiate the details with Soong, Soong proposed that Washington combine all loans into a lump sum loan of $100 million. President Roosevelt accepted. Excited by the good news, Soong did not forget to remind officials in Chongqing that “more efforts should be done in order to secure trust and sincere friendship from the United States.”

The $100 million loan was divided into two parts. The first, signed in Washington on February 2, 1941, provided credit of $50 million to China in exchange for China’s export of tin and tungsten. The second, signed on April 25, 1941, between Soong and Henry Morgenthau, was a $50 million Stabilization Fund to enable Nationalist China to stabilize its currency; that same day, Soong signed a similar agreement with the British for 10 million pounds. These loans undoubtedly helped China’s deteriorating finance, and improved Sino-American relations.

The Relentless Lobbyist

EDWARD STETTINIUS, then in charge of American lend-lease aid to the Allies, once described Soong as “one of China’s most eloquent and powerful spokesmen.” Barbara Tuchman wrote that Soong was “the most unembarrassed and untiring lobbyist of this time.” Soong’s work in Washington was never easy. The Chinese historian Wu Jingping has noted that Chiang Kai-shek put all his

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17 Memorandum by Soong to Knox, November 12, 1940, ibid., Box 11; Soong to Chiang Kai-shek, November 12, 1940, ibid., Box 59.
18 Soong to Chiang, November 30, 1940, ibid., Box 59.
19 Ibid.
20 Soong to Chiang, February 4, 1941, ibid.
21 Soong to Chiang, April 25, 1941, ibid.
hope for receiving more American aid on Soong’s negotiations, whereas the Washington leadership expected Soong to persuade Chongqing’s officials to agree to American demands and restrictions. According to Wu, Soong “had to mediate between officials in Washington and Chongqing, whose concerns and interests were usually conflicting.”

How well did Soong perform in Washington? Historians hitherto have known little about his opinions regarding Sino-American relations and how he persuaded his American partners to support China. But from the T. V. Soong papers we learn that Soong played a crucial role in obtaining aid when China desperately needed it.

Soong tried to strengthen U.S.-China cooperation in other ways, as seen in the example of the Flying Tigers. By late November 1940, Soong sensed that high officials in Washington were beginning to recognize China’s new importance if war broke out with the Axis. He submitted to Henry Morgenthau a proposal drafted by himself and Claire Chennault advocating a preliminary draft plan for strategic bombing. They argued that, if Chennault and Nationalist China “were given a 500-bomber force that was piloted, supplied, and maintained by the United States,” the Nationalist government “could virtually annihilate the Japanese forces within China and neutralize Japan’s naval striking ability.” According to Soong, this “special air unit” could “operate independently in attacking Japan proper,” and would “surely undermine Japanese public morale.”

Soong’s ingenious suggestion persuaded Morgenthau, and one week later, on December 8, Morgenthau informed Soong that he had reported the proposal to Roosevelt, who now became very interested in “turning China into an air base for bombing Japan.” Morgenthau mentioned that although the grant of 500 bombers was impossible at this moment, “a substantial number might become available sometime in 1942.” Encouraged by Morgenthau’s positive response, in early December, Soong sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek in which he strongly urged Chongqing to “select 2,000 best Chinese pilots to be trained in the U. S. as the first step to the grand project of developing and strengthening China’s air defense.”

But Soong’s proposal soon met strong opposition from the U. S. War Department. High officials in the Chiefs of Staff and the department, such as George Marshall and Henry Stimson, vehemently opposed any diversion of limited bombers and crews to China that would deprive the British of more airpower. Their thinking was understandable, since the concept of “Europe first” was deep-rooted in the minds of most high military authorities in Washington; American officials were not yet ready to bomb Japan from China. Therefore, the U. S. Chief of Staff was only willing to order the British to transfer 100 P-40 fighter planes, not bombers, to China. Moreover, the P-40s still had not been delivered to London.

Although disappointed, Soong refused to give up, but he soon drafted another project. To have U.S. officials avoid combat and still help China, Soong’s new scheme was to create a nongovernment, volunteer air force to fly and fight for China. These officers would resign their official tasks and sign contracts as civilian agents. U.S. government leaders quickly agreed.

By early 1941, Soong and Chennault, assisted by the White House, had worked out a plan to establish the American Volunteer Group (AVG) in Washington. With the consent of President Roosevelt, the AVG began to recruit pilots and sign contracts with them as agents of the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation (CAMCO), a Chinese government entity. As an initiator and creator of the AVG, Soong named these energetic fighters the “Flying Tigers.” In a letter to Chennault, Soong said that China’s air force, with the assistance of AVG crews, would be greatly enhanced, “just like a tiger [which] gets two wings.”

In the eyes of the Flying Tigers, Soong was AVG’s “old friend and protector.”

CAMCO organized all American volunteer pilots in China and managed military procurement and supply; using CAMCO, Soong transferred funds from the U. S. lend-lease aid to expand China’s air force. By late September 1941, more than one hundred Flying Tigers and mechanics had signed contracts with the Chinese government. After the United States formally declared war on Japan following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Flying Tigers were transferred to the 10th Unit (and later the 14th Unit) of the U. S. Air Force in the China theater.

25 Memorandum by T. V. Soong for Morgenthau, November 30, 1940, T. V. Soong Archive, Box 6.
26 Ibid.
27 Memorandum of conversation between T. V. Soong and Henry Morgenthau, dated December 8, 1940, ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Soong to Chiang, December 1940 (n.d.), ibid., Box 59.
31 See Soong’s personal correspondence with Chennault, May 1949 (n.d.), T. V. Soong Archive, Box 62.
32 See Claire Chennault Archive, Box 6, Hoover Institution Archives.
CDS and the China Lobby

AS AMERICAN MILITARY and financial aid to China was drastically expanding, the Chinese aid mission in Washington, the Universal Trading Corporation (UTC), had to be reorganized. Soong seized this opportunity to create a new agency in Washington aiming at “establishing helping hands around President Roosevelt to ensure the aid policy will practically meet China’s needs.” China Defense Supplies, Inc. (CDS) was established in early 1941 as a joint Sino-American enterprise to manage military aid and lend-lease between the United States and China, leaving the UTC to handle commercial procurements. The CDS soon replaced the UTC and became an active and influential arm of the Nationalist government in the United States.

Core members of CDS included influential Americans, such as Claire Chennault, Joseph Alsop, William Youngman, Thomas Corcoran, William Pawley, and other U.S. officials and successful businessmen. At Soong’s invitation, President Roosevelt’s uncle, Frederic Delano, became its chairman. Through CDS, Soong extended his network to include the White House, Treasury Department, War Department, and other U.S. governmental organs. Soong reorganized his personal staff to coordinate this new Washington bureaucracy and the American military-industrial complex. Soong’s personal papers describe how this informal network functioned.

Soong and CDS grasped every possible opportunity to support China’s war against Japan. In a November 1941 letter to the journalist Joseph Alsop, a core member of CDS, Soong urged Alsop to airmail all his influential friends and explain to them the new air force project, Chennault’s role, and CDS’s urgent need for American personnel and materials. As Soong saw it, these efforts put the CDS on the right track.

Soong increased his efforts to expand military cooperation between Washington and Chongqing. In July 1941, at Soong’s request, the U.S. government agreed to set up an American military mission in Chongqing to support China in its war with Japan. Stationing a U.S. military mission in China’s wartime capital was supposed to help boost Chinese public morale. By August 1941, around $600 million worth of military equipment had been approved for transfer to the Nationalist government, although much of the supplies would not be available before 1942.

In 1943, Soong further helped establish the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) through which American and Chinese military intelligence officers jointly worked in the Japanese occupied area for information gathering and organizing attacks on the Japanese army.

Soong also helped to elevate China’s strategic importance in the Allied command structure. In August 1943, he attended the Quebec Summit. Soong recognized the political difficulties and military significance of this new Allied

35 Using American credit given to China between 1938 and 1940, the UTC purchased supplies in the United States Soong had previously operated as a UTC agent. See Wang Zhenghua, Kangzhan Shiqi Waiguo dui Hua Junshi Yuanzhu (Taipei: Universal Book Ltd., 1987), pp. 189–98.
36 Soong to Chiang, April 15, 1941, T.V. Soong Archive, Box 59.
37 Valuable source materials on the CDS and its activities in the early 1940s can be found in ibid., esp. in Boxes 11, 16, 28, 54, and 64.
38 Soong to Alsop, November 12, 1941, ibid., Box 10.
39 Soong to Chiang Kai-shek, July 24, 1941, ibid., Box 59.
40 Soong to Chiang Kai-shek, August 15, 1941, ibid.
command structure, and he strongly argued with Churchill and Stilwell, stressing the importance of the China theater and emphasizing China’s urgent need to open the Burma Road. He also defended Chiang’s strategy for the Burma campaign. According to Soong, the Quebec Summit achieved little positive result except that the Allies had agreed that China would be an important base for future long-range bombing of Japan.

After the summit, Soong took the initiative to discuss with President Roosevelt how China might play a future role in the alliance. In a new proposal submitted to the White House on September 15, 1943, Soong argued that the appointment of Lord Mountbatten as supreme commander of the Southeast Asia theater made it unnecessary for General Stilwell to be the proposed commander of Allied troops in Southeast Asia, particularly in Burma. In memoranda to Chiang Kai-shek, Soong stresses that ‘Stilwell should be replaced by a Chinese general who should have authority over the Air Transport Command in the China-Burma-India theater, as well as over all other military units of whatever nationality operating in China.’ Soong also insisted that China should be included in the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Munitions Control Board and have equal status with its American and British allies. He wanted the U.S. government’s assurance that there would not be any change in Chiang Kai-shek’s position as supreme commander in the China theater. Soong’s ultimate goal was to have China, Burma, and Thailand under Chiang’s control, with the Nationalist government controlling all lend-lease materials.

President Roosevelt agreed to Soong’s proposal. And in a confidential telegram to Chiang on September 29, 1943, Soong briefed Chiang about his meeting with Roosevelt and the agreements they reached:

I have just discussed various important matters with President Roosevelt. Please allow me to report the details to you when we meet later in Chungking [Chongqing]. The following are some brief conclusions:

1. There is no change in the China theater, which will continue to encompass Vietnam and Thailand. Although Mr. Churchill intends to transfer the above two nations to Lord Mountbatten’s direct command, the U.S. Government will not agree to such a rearrangement.
2. There won’t be any unpopularity caused by the entry of Chinese troops into Burma.
3. General Stilwell should be recalled at any cost.
4. President Roosevelt is considering the institution of a Pacific Joint Chiefs of Staff to be headquartered in Washington, with China included. With regard to this matter, please let me discuss it with you after I go back to China.
5. The China theater will be reorganized according to my proposed ideas.

Chiang had a different opinion about restructuring the Allied command system. Instead of joining the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Munitions Control Board, Chiang preferred to create a new Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Asia-Pacific region with China taking the lead. After receiving Soong’s proposal, Chiang

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42 Soong to Chiang, August 24, 1943, T. V. Soong Archive, Box 61.
44 Soong to Chiang, September 8 and 16, 1943, T. V. Soong Archive, Box 61.
45 Ibid.
46 Soong to Chiang, September 29, 1943, ibid.
urged Soong to accept his advice.\textsuperscript{47} Soong, however, did not believe Chiang's opinion was sound, and he insisted that his original plan was best for China's future relations with the Allies. Chiang eventually agreed.\textsuperscript{48}

Others in Washington observed how Soong's network reached deep into the U.S. government, the War Department, and the Congress. Some officials even mused "whether these [CDS] officials were working for President Roosevelt or for T. V. Soong?"\textsuperscript{49} Very likely, Soong's network was the beginning of the famous Nationalist government "China Lobby." That lobby continued to work for the Nationalist government after it retreated to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{50}

Soong's ongoing strategy to win American support during the war was to present to the government and people of the United States a positive, new image of China so as to "help the Americans realize what China is doing and what China needs from the Americans."\textsuperscript{51} As early as 1940, he described this strategy to Chiang as follows:

"Public relations and propaganda are not enough to win total American support. It is necessary to approach celebrities in every political circle and to make them understand that:

1. It is the most opportune time for the U. S. to aid China. In the future if the transportation were to be cut off by the Japanese, the U. S. Government will have no way to assist China.

2. China understands and respects Washington's policy that its main focus is on the European war. However, if a small portion of aid can be transferred to China, the effect will be several hundred times more than the same amount given to the British.

3. China is able to make the best of use of the airplanes assigned by the U. S. Government, and the Chinese people are technically capable and will not damage those planes.\textsuperscript{52}\"

An illuminating episode of Soong's activities shows his diligent and skillful lobbying for China. In August 1941, when China was suffering from repeated Japanese bombings and the delivery of U. S. airplanes had been delayed, Soong wrote a letter to William J. Donovan, then coordinator of information of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), expressing China's desperate need for airplanes: "We need and need desperately is the actual appearance on the Chungking front NOW of aircraft that have been promised us…. Remember, Colonel, we have proved that we can fight longer than any other people who are fighting on the democratic side—that given the arms we can really finish the job. We have stuck for five years. Please help us stick now."\textsuperscript{53}

Donovan, impressed by Soong's earnestness, passed the letter to Captain James Roosevelt (a son of FDR), a junior officer of the OSS. James Roosevelt submitted Soong's letter to Harry Hopkins, then special assistant to President Roosevelt, with a note in which he stated: "The most tragic part of the letter for the Chinese mind are the promises and telegrams specifying numbers and amount all of which turn out to be just so much bunk."\textsuperscript{54} This episode underscores Nationalist China's difficult pursuit of American aid and Soong's delicate approach to U. S. officials.

Wellington V. K. Koo, Nationalist China's ambassador to the United Kingdom during the war, highly appreciated Soong's strategy of soliciting American sympathy and support by promoting mutual understanding between Washington and Chongqing. Koo pointed out that there was no substantial difference in national interests between the two nations. Most of the friction resulted from different perceptions of how to solve problems. Koo believed that Soong understood this and was devoting himself to eliminating those misunderstandings.\textsuperscript{55}

After Soong returned to Chongqing in October 1943, Sino-American relations began to deteriorate. Soong was particularly shocked by Roosevelt's death in April 1945, and he expressed his fears to Wellington Koo that China's mission in the United States would henceforth be more difficult. Soong had spent more than four years cultivating relations with President Roosevelt, and now China had to do this all over again with a new president.\textsuperscript{56} As Soong had predicted, China was not able to have that same friendship and trust with the new Truman administration. Misunderstanding and tensions between Washington and Chongqing gradually worsened.
The Chiang-Stilwell Dispute

DESPITE T. V. SOONG’S ACTIVE LOBBYING in Washington, the evolving military and allied relationship between Chongqing and Washington was poisoned by the Stilwell issue, which ultimately greatly damaged wartime U.S.-China relations. Many publications have described the troubled Chiang-Stilwell disputes. The new T. V. Soong papers not only document many details of the issue but also reveal a Chinese perspective not mentioned by Tuchman and others.

In early 1942, in order to effectively coordinate the war effort, top leaders of the Allied nations had agreed upon a unified command structure, with British general Sir Archibald Wavell as supreme commander of the Far East front of the member nations of the ABDA (Agreement among the Governments of Australia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Chiang Kai-shek would serve as supreme commander of Allied forces in a separate China theater, having command over all land and air forces of the United Nations “which are now or may in the future be operating in the Chinese theater.”

Soong, who had observed how the new command system evolved, was fully informed of the War Department’s decision to appoint General Stilwell as Chiang’s new chief of staff in the China theater. According to various War Department documents, Stilwell would supervise and control all U.S. defense aid affairs for China, serve under Chiang as his chief of staff, and command all U.S. forces in China and such Chinese forces as might be assigned to him. In addition, Stilwell would speak for the U.S. government on any international war council in China, and he would control and maintain the Burma Road in China.

Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang warmly received Stilwell when he first arrived in Chongqing in March 1942. The Soong papers reveal that, as early as June 1942, just a month after the Allied defeat in Burma, Chiang and Soong had already discussed whether they should replace Stilwell with another American representative more willing to support Nationalist China’s strategic interests and lead the Allies to defeat imperial Japan in Southeast Asia and China.

Chiang had given Stilwell his two best divisions to defend Burma, but the result was a disaster. The fall of Burma in May 1942 meant that Nationalist China was isolated from the rest of the world. Chiang and his military advisers firmly believed that the Burma defeat was mainly because Stilwell was arrogant and had ignored much of Chiang’s advice, thus sacrificing Chiang’s divisions when retreating from Burma.

Between June 1942 and October 1943, Chiang and Soong twice considered replacing Stilwell. At first, Soong urged Chiang to express his dislike of Stilwell but still try to cooperate with him, but when Soong later insisted on replacing Stilwell, Chiang refused. Why were Chiang and Soong so hesitant to replace Stilwell, even though they disliked him?

At first, when Chiang found it difficult to cooperate with the arrogant American general, he complained to Soong who then suggested that he would work with the White House to replace Stilwell. Chiang hesitated. In a telegram dated June 12, 1942, Soong, puzzled at Chiang’s indecision, urged Chiang to express his true feeling about Stilwell. Otherwise, said Soong, he would be in a difficult position to deal with officials in Washington. Soong put it to Chiang in this way: “I have been following Your Excellency for two decades, and you should know that I have a conscientious and frank temper. It is not my nature to shift my responsibilities to others or to become negligent in fulfilling my duties. Yet I could not but have to offend you once again by asking Your Excellency to let me know clearly what your true attitude toward Stilwell is... I must understand your true perceptions toward Stilwell and vice versa, so that I can be in a position to watch closely for the opportunity and deal with related matters here in the United States.”

Four days later, in another telegram to Chiang, Soong reported that he had guarantees from top U.S. officials that they would recall Stilwell if Chiang made such a request. But Soong also cautioned Chiang because he was convinced that Stilwell could still be useful in helping Nationalist China obtain more military aid from Washington. Soong suggested that Chiang should exercise his authority over Stilwell: “Also it is my opinion that as General Henry Stimson has expressed his willingness to recall Stilwell, and as top U.S. officials from President Roosevelt on down have agreed that Stilwell should submit to Your Excellency, you may

57 Apart from Tuchman’s Stilwell and the American Experience in China, treatment of the Stilwell issue can also be found in the following works: Fred Eldridge, Wrath in Burma: The Uncensored Story of General Stilwell and International Maneuvers in the Far East (New York: Doubleday, 1946); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1953).
58 Memorandum by Stephen Early, dated January 3, 1942, T. V. Soong Archive, Box 63.
59 Ibid. See also Soong to Chiang, January 23, 1942, ibid., Box 60.
feel free to treat him as your fellow subordinate and need not regard him as your honorable guest. Nevertheless, you may try to make good use of Stilwell's current networking to urge the U.S. War Department to give us more support.\textsuperscript{64}

Chiang agreed and shelved the idea of replacing Stilwell. Yet the Stilwell dispute did not end there. Different ways of thinking and solving problems between the American general and Chinese leaders continued and tension worsened, leading to a Chiang-Stilwell showdown in the autumn of 1944. Their conflicting perceptions boiled down to four elements.

First, Nationalist China's leaders always believed that China had been victimized by foreign imperialism, and they welcomed the Allied alliance as a means of using countries like the United States to defeat Japan, regain China's lost territories, and build a new, modern China that could deal with the foreign powers on an equal basis.\textsuperscript{65} Stilwell perceived the reality of China and World War II very differently. He observed a China at constant war with itself; he was familiar with the weak, corrupt nationalist government, and his earlier experiences gave him little hope for China's democratization and reform. Nonetheless, he appreciated the remarkable capabilities and creativeness of the Chinese; he merely believed those unique qualities, constrained by age-old customs and a singular, conservative mind-set of the Nationalist government, could never be adopted and applied by China's leaders.\textsuperscript{66}

Second, Stilwell's priority was to stop the military advance of the Japanese in Burma. He focused on the defense of Burma and also pressed Chiang for more resources. Chiang, however, as a national leader, needed to defend China as a whole and could not worry solely about Burma.\textsuperscript{67}

Third, their strategies of how to defeat Japan were also different. For China, the top priority in its war with Japan was to recover lost territories and unite the whole nation, whereas Washington's major concern was to assist the Nationalist government to keep China in the war. The Allies realized only too well that if China surrendered to Japan, Japanese military power would be diverted from the China theater to fight elsewhere.

Fourth, Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders were deeply frustrated in their dealings with Stilwell. Stilwell repeatedly pushed Soong to request Chiang to “appoint a real commander, give him real authority, and hold him responsible for results.”\textsuperscript{68} Stilwell looked down upon Chiang's generals. He complained to Chiang of the poor qualities of Chinese military leaders. He referred to one Nationalist general as “a second-rate man” and warned Chiang that if he continued to entrust large forces to such a general “the effort will be wasted; worse than that, “it will give China a black eye in America and Britain.”\textsuperscript{69}

It is not surprising that Stilwell's relations with the Nationalist leaders were poor and grew worse. In many communications between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek, as well as between Stilwell and Soong, Stilwell repeatedly expressed his strong dislike of KMT generals and his poor relationship with them.\textsuperscript{70} Soong's personal papers indicate the extent to which Chiang and Soong had to endure Stilwell's litany of complaint.

By 1943 the disputes between Chiang and Stilwell had worsened, and tensions between the two nations also increased. Chiang was particularly angry when he learned about Stilwell's efforts to contact the Communists in Yan'an and invite them to participate with Nationalist government troops to fight the Japanese. Chiang regarded this suggestion as “going over the top,” violating the taboo shared by KMT officials that there would not be any project to strengthen Chinese

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{66} On Stilwell's experiences in China and his perceptions toward this country, see Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*.

\textsuperscript{67} Stilwell Diary, March 18–25, 1942, Joseph Stilwell Archive, Box 44, Hoover Institution Archives.

\textsuperscript{68} Stilwell's memorandum to Soong, dated December 23, 1942, T. V. Soong Archive, Box 62.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
These disagreements reached a new level in late spring 1943 over the use of American airpower and the appropriate strategy for using military power to recover Burma for the Allies. Chiang vigorously argued that airpower be used in Burma as well as in China, but Stilwell opposed him, with strong support from General Marshall.

The new Soong papers document that, as Chiang became even more furious about Stilwell’s arrogance and ignorance, Soong again lobbied hard in Washington to replace Stilwell. In a confidential dispatch to Chiang on September 29, 1943, about his meeting with Roosevelt, Soong reported that he had reached several important agreements with the U.S. government, including the removal of Stilwell “at any cost.”

When Soong accompanied Lord Mountbatten, the Allies’ new supreme commander in the Southeast Asian theater, to Chongqing in October 1943, he confirmed to Chiang the “good news” and urged him to telegraph President Roosevelt at once.

But Chiang Kai-shek again changed his mind. Recognizing Stilwell’s solid connections with the U.S. War Department and his new position as Lord Mountbatten’s deputy, together with the overall situation in the China-Burma-India theater, Chiang decided to keep Stilwell for reasons that are still unclear. Soong, by now, felt humiliated and betrayed. In mid-October, Chiang and Soong had a bitter quarrel. Chiang, infuriated, reportedly threw a rice bowl on the floor; Soong, also angry, slammed the door when leaving Chiang’s residence.

For the next three months, T.V. Soong was left cooling his heels in his residence in Chongqing. He was not allowed to participate in official events, or to return to Washington, and he was not invited to join the Cairo Conference with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang, although he had worked hard in Washington for Chiang’s participation in the conference. On December 23, 1943, in a humble, restrained, and tactful way, Soong wrote to Chiang:

In the past two months I have lived solitarily doing nothing but repent. My faults and recalcitrance are numerous, and there is no limit to my pain and regret. Officially, my relationship with Your Excellency is one of leader-and-subordinate; but ours is more like a family relationship, as between brothers. In everyday life what I am always cautiously prompting myself to do is to pledge my loyalty to Your Excellency…. I am such a foolish and naive person, and my behavior is always coupled with rashness and foolhardiness. When it comes to coordinating in a general situation, I am always too careless and incomplete. I have been spoiled by your overprotection and excessive affection toward me, so that in whatever I advocated I was always too bigoted in my own opinions and candid to the point of doing harm…. I bow down and beg Your Excellency to believe in my honest sincerity, and give me your clear instruction. Only by doing so can I have a better idea of what I should be doing in order that Your Excellency’s unhappy state of mind will somewhat be alleviated.
Conclusion

Despite disputes and disagreements, Washington’s relationship with the Nationalist government during 1940–43 was friendly and based upon trust. As the relationship improved, Soong was able to secure American military and financial aid for China at a time when Nationalist China was desperately resisting Japanese military expansion.

The T. V. Soong papers show why and how the Sino-American relationship was revitalized in 1940–42. Soong developed access to the center of power, namely, the White House, and he was able to convince President Roosevelt to factor China into his strategic thinking. In addition, Soong was able to build up a small airpower force within Nationalist China’s military that helped promote modernization of China’s military forces and strengthen the Chinese will to fight the Japanese. Soong believed that American technology and organizational innovations could help save China and induce it to reform itself. He combined Chinese networking and strategy skills with mass media and public relations skills, and in so doing impressed officials close to President Roosevelt to render assistance to Nationalist China. Soong also had learned from the West a strong appreciation of the importance of airpower.

Sino-American relations declined precipitously after Soong left Washington at the end of the war. We cannot answer the question of whether the relationship would have improved if Soong had remained involved in Washington in the final war years and immediate postwar period.

The now expanded Soong collection is important to future studies because of Soong’s personal correspondence with Chinese and Western leaders such as Chiang Kai-shek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Henry Morgenthau, Harry Hopkins, Joseph Stilwell, Claire Chennault, William Youngman, and Joseph Alsop as well as between members of the Soong family. Not only do documents relate to important events in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s but the large amount of private correspondence increases our understanding of Sino-American relations in the first few years of that relationship. T.V. Soong, by making the case to Roosevelt and others close to him that Nationalist China was important for the United States and the Asia-Pacific region, significantly improved that relationship, only to see the relationship retrogress because of serious disagreements with Chiang Kai-shek over the Stilwell problem and strategic issues related to how Nationalist China should continue to build trust with America’s top leaders.

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This letter, contained in the Soong papers, was Soong’s conciliatory plea to Chiang to end their quarrel. Whether or not the letter was sent to Chiang is not known, but Soong resumed his official activities in the spring of 1944.

Chiang’s refusal to replace Stilwell did not improve Sino-American relations, and his reluctance to do so probably made things worse. In September 1944, Chiang finally requested that President Roosevelt recall Stilwell. Many historians have long believed that the troubled Chiang-Stilwell relations so damaged Sino-American relations after 1943 that they never recovered until after the Nationalist government finally fled to Taiwan in 1949 and the Korean War began.78

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T. V. Soong Biographical Chronology

1894 December 4 Born, Shanghai, China
1915 B.A., Harvard University *
1915–1917 Graduate studies, Columbia University, New York
1917–1923 Secretary, Han-yeh-p’ing iron and coal complex, China (Hanyang steel mill, Tayeh iron mines, Pinghsiang coal mines). Also involved in trade and banking circles, Shanghai
1923 Manager, Salt Administration in Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces
1924 Manager, Central Bank, Canton
Member, Committee for Food Control
1925 Minister of Finance, National Government, Canton
1926 Member, Central Executive Committee
Minister of Commerce
Member, National Government (State) Council
1927 Minister of Finance, Wuhan Government
Member, Standing Committee, Government Council
Member, Military Council
Member, Kuomintang Political Council
1928 Minister of Finance, Nanking Government
Governor, Central Bank of China, Shanghai
1932–1933 Acting President, Executive Yuan, Nanking
1933 Head of Chinese Delegation to the World Economic Conference, London
Resigned government posts, except National Economic Council
1934 Founder, China Development Finance Corporation
1938 Acting Chairman, National Aeronautical Affairs Commission
1940–1942 Personal representative of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Washington, D.C.
1942–1945 Minister of Foreign Affairs
1944 Acting President, Executive Yuan
1945 Head of Chinese Delegation, United Nations Conference, San Francisco, California
Elected as one of four chairmen of United Nations Conference
1945–1947 President, Executive Yuan
1947–1949 Governor, Guangdong Province
1949–1950 President, Bank of China, Taiwan
1971 Died, San Francisco. Interred, New York

* T.V. Soong also received two honorary doctorates, from Columbia University and Yale University