Epic Fury And The Turks

• Middle East
• US Foreign Policy
• International Affairs

• Determining America's Role in the World

Operation Epic Fury and Israel’s parallel Operation Roaring Lion have reinforced five core views in Ankara about the contemporary Middle East. Namely that 1) partnership with the U.S. is necessary but insufficient for Turkish security needs 2) Israel and Iran both destabilize the region and undermine Turkish interests intentionally 3) Turkish hard power must maintain parity with both of those states  4) Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has a particular interest in conflict with the Turks and dynamics may well change should he lose office and 5)  increasing cooperation with regional Sunni powers provides an effective framework to balance and respond to these elements. It is too soon to consider Ankara a “winner” or “loser” from the Iran war as of September 2026, but not too soon to see that the Turks have applied a consistent theory of the case based on these five diagnostic elements - and it seems to be working. The Turks have played a careful hand and gradually strengthened their deterrent power, their regional standing, and their cooperation with the U.S.

Problematics of American Alliance

Epic Fury seems terribly familiar to Turks as an American war that was launched against Ankara’s preferences, in Ankara’s immediate neighborhood, without a credible political strategy for long-term success. Unlike Desert Storm (Kuwait 1990/91) and Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan 2001) but echoing Iraqi Freedom (2003) and Odyssey Dawn (Libya 2011), Epic Fury proceeded without a broad regional coalition or realistic linkage of military operations to a political end state. Fool me once shame on you, the saying goes, fool me twice shame on me: the Turks have learned and adapted to the unilateral exercise of American power near their borders, and have developed a more patient approach to helping mitigate and shape such operations rather than openly opposing or simply suffering.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his advisors have learned that the U.S. has great power but little patience; consequently, prudent strategy means staying out of the crosshairs but planning for shifts in U.S. policy as costs and uncertainty mount. Once Washington encounters unexpected costs, there will be opportunities for Ankara to make geopolitical bargains that appeal to U.S. interests and strengthen Ankara’s hand.  The short-term cost, conversely, is that U.S. decision makers will willingly expose regional allies and partners to great risk until geopolitical data demonstrates second and third order effects.

Perhaps most importantly, Ankara has learned over a quarter century that even when the going gets tough the U.S. retains two key assets: unmatched resources and the flexibility to change course. These render the U.S. a difficult friend but a far worse enemy. All this means the wise policy is to maintain U.S. alliance and avoid U.S. antagonism, but hedge both to maintain other alliances and to avoid fully demonizing the chosen targets of the U.S. - because Washington may change on a dime, and usually will.  

Inverse Pottery Barn

Epic Fury’s impact on Turkish views of the U.S. have been of a reinforcing nature but on views of Israel more profound.  The combination of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s aggressive regional policy (occupying parts of Syria, continuing the war in Gaza, and especially conducting an attack in Qatar, a Major Non-NATO ally of the U.S.) have led to serious revision in both popular and elite views of Israel. In the three years since Erdogan and Netanyahu shook hands in New York and talked energy deals, Israel’s new doctrine of zero tolerance for potential threats - most visible in Roaring Lion - has unnerved much of the region.

Since October 7^th 2023 Israel has shifted to a pre-emptive stance against any perceived possible threats, even U.S. allies, and the Turks have taken note. Israeli ministers portray Türkiye as an enemy and analyze how to attack Turks regionally without triggering a NATO response. Netanyahu’s heavy hand in Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon have led Ankara (and Riyadh and even Cairo) to view Jerusalem as fueling regional war and instability in ways comparable to Tehran’s endless proxy wars within and against Sunni states. August 2026 attacks in northern Syria were a message against Turkish support to Syria’s recognized government, and were roundly condemned across the region.

Former U.S. General and Secretary of State Colin Powell once asserted that in war, great powers are responsible for stabilizing and revitalizing areas they have struck or occupied (the “Pottery Barn Rule” of you break it, you buy it). The gist of Turkish strategic thinking since 2023 is that Tehran and Jerusalem are both pursuing a sort of inverse precept of “we break it so someone else must buy it.” Much of the “breakage” has occurred in Sunni states, so a rational conclusion for Sunni-majority powers has been that given a) U.S. policy variability and b) Israel’s penchant for regional attacks, those powers must do more on their own to ensure collective security and deterrence against both Iran and Israel..

Regional Veto Power

Another precept confirmed or reinforced by Epic Fury has been the need for Ankara to maintain hard power assets sufficient to unilaterally overturn regional initiatives that threaten Turkish national borders. Collective security mechanisms may be mature enough in Europe for effective burden sharing and resource pooling, but to Türkiye’s north, east and south security is an entirely national responsibility and overmatch against threats cannot be assumed. Security planning under such conditions means pursuing capabilities equal to or surpassing perceived threats in all domains of warfare: air, land, naval, space, cyber and military-political.

Turkish defense industries between 2001-2023 developed significant new capabilities in all these domains. The growth of Turkish long-range strike, reconnaissance, air defense, battle command and other technologies have combined with existing geographic, demographic, and military institutional strengths to birth a modern Turkish way of war effective at foiling foreign faits accompli in areas of concern. Syria, Libya, the Caucasus, the eastern Med, the Gulf and other geographies have all witnessed successful Turkish military vetoes against the plans of rivals, including great powers.

Epic Fury has starkly re-affirmed the reality that the Turkish military and security establishment must be equal to the task of deterring or defeating a neighbor with advanced military capabilities - possibly Iran, more likely Israel - on its own should that neighbor decide to target the Turks or their regional partners. Epic Fury brings an era of requiring simultaneous mutual deterrence against Iran and Israel, requiring a step up in the political, diplomatic, and military heft in play.    

Bibi and the Next Iran

The Turks have come to believe in the wake of Epic Fury that Prime Minister Netanyahu has latched onto perpetual war in the Middle East as the key to his survival as a wartime leader. Israeli government failures contributed to the debacle of October 7^th, his relentless and ever-expansive targeting of potential regional enemies extends his political life and defers his personal accountability. The Turks thus become in Likud narrative “the next Iran,” a massive military, economic, and diplomatic threat to “the West” that is more inevitable than potential.

For observers who value U.S. ties with both Israel and Türkiye (author included), it is a relief that the Turks have not risen to the bait. Unlike the current Iran, the purported “next Iran” has never sought to destroy Israel or cut diplomatic relations - and in fact has a long history of pragmatic and sometimes positive ties. That the Turks hold Bibi and the right wing of Israeli politics responsible for worsening ties rather than Israelis or Israel gives the lie to accusations of fundamental enmity and similarity to Iran. Ankara’s restraint in the wake of Israeli airstrikes on an airbase in northern Syria on the grounds (disputed by U.S. intelligence) of imminent Turkish military occupation of the base is a great example of not joining Netanyahu in a cycle of mutual escalation.

The Trump Administration has also not fallen for the manufactured crisis. In keeping with the tone of President Trump’s previous admonitions to Bibi about getting along with Turkey, Ambassador Tom Barrack has emphasized the futility of Netanyahu stoking a war in Syria either to deter the Turks or to preserve absolute freedom of maneuver in the skies over a fledgling state. The Israeli opposition has also recognized the risks of Bibi’s risk-seeking behavior with the Turks; prospects for rapprochement improve with the prospects for political change, because the tensions are situational rather than fundamental.

Hang Together or Hang Separately

To Turkish strategists the combination of American inconstancy, Iranian and Israeli strategic nihilism, regional and power imperatives, and growing antagonism from the Israeli right has rendered cooperation among major Sunni powers necessary and urgent. For over two years Turkish diplomats worked with Saudi and Pakistani counterparts to forge a formal mutual defense mechanism with potential to expand to Egypt, Qatar, and elsewhere. The Mecca Agreement that emerged built on previous Saudi-Pakistani talks to serve three purposes: help fill security gaps from U.S. inaction, to raise costs of either Israeli or Iranian strikes on member states, and to decrease vulnerability of these countries to isolation or coercion from outside powers.

The Mecca Agreement links a nuclear power with two economic great powers and a military power capable of operating in multiple regions simultaneously. Ideology and diversity of threats may limit the degree of coherence this arrangement produces in broad strategic terms, but it certainly can be an effective deterrent alliance. As with NATO, member countries will have diverse interests beyond the core mission - but there is now a core commitment to protect one another and pursue coordinated regional policies.

New Regional Strategic Paradigm

The post-October 7^th regional environment and especially the open-ended instability created by Epic Fury and Roaring Lion have lent credence to both Ankara’s diagnosis and its prescription. Sunni states must organize to deter both Iran and Israel while keeping onside with Washington. This approach reflects a true multipolarity in the region: Israel and its allies and supporters, Iran with its proxies and external partners, and the Mecca Agreement members as an emerging third power to self-protect and stabilize Arab regions amid persistent conflict between the other two.

The war and the response to it thus have weakened the prospects of an Israeli-centric regional order based on Arab quiescence, “hard containment of Iran, soft containment of Turkey, and de-emphasizing the Palestinian issue.” Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other regional countries have seen too little security, too much economic loss, too many threats, and too few off-ramps in this new era - and appear to find the local alternative represented by the Turkish approach a safer bet. Ironically, Israel’s pursuit of security by unilaterally pre-empting perceived threats in places like Syria is driving greater mobilization and coordination in response. Along with demonstration of Iran’s ability to withstand Western attacks, this new regional order has been one of the most tangible and geopolitically weighty outcomes of Epic Fury. It may be hoped that proper deconfliction mechanisms will result -particularly in Syria - but only time will tell.