- China
- Confronting and Competing with China
Every few months, critics proclaim that Donald Trump has “gone soft” on China over Taiwan. Their latest evidence is an alleged pause in a second major arms package ahead of Xi Jinping’s expected visit to Washington this fall—it is “alleged” because the U.S. government has never officially announced, let alone notified Taipei of such a pause. To them, the alleged pause proves Taiwan has become a bargaining chip sacrificed for better U.S.-China relations.
The critics are right about one thing and wrong about everything else. Taiwan is indeed a bargaining chip. It always has been. But it has never been America’s concession to Beijing at the expense of Taiwan. It has been America’s leverage over Beijing.
That has been the logic of U.S. Taiwan policy since diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China in 1979. It is embedded in the Taiwan Relations Act, reinforced by Ronald Reagan’s Six Assurances, and has guided successive administrations of both parties. The current administration’s handling of arms sales reflects that longstanding strategy rather than a departure from it.
Recent criticism assumes that delaying a reported $14 billion arms package before a U.S.-China summit signals appeasement. It mistakes timing for surrender.
The record suggests otherwise. Under the Trump administrations, Taiwan remains America’s largest foreign recipient of approved arms sales. In December 2025 alone, Washington authorized more than $11 billion in military sales—the largest single package ever approved for Taiwan. The world’s largest arms export country does not abandon the world’s largest buyer of its arms. In other words, governments preparing to abandon partners do not simultaneously provide them with the largest arms package in history.
More fundamentally, the criticism misunderstands the purpose of American arms sales.
Since 1979, U.S. policy has viewed arms sales not merely as military transactions but as instruments of statecraft. Congress did not simply promise to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons. The Taiwan Relations Act established a strategic framework under which continued U.S.-China relations rest upon the expectation that Taiwan’s future will be determined peacefully. It declares that any attempt to decide Taiwan’s future by force or coercion constitutes “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific” and “a grave concern to the United States.”
The Act therefore commits the United States both to provide Taiwan with defensive arms and to maintain the capacity to resist coercion. Those commitments are not acts of charity. They are instruments of deterrence and strategic bargaining.
Washington does not arm Taiwan simply to strengthen Taiwan. It does so to shape Beijing’s calculations. Taiwan receives the weapons. Beijing is the intended audience.
Ronald Reagan made this strategy unmistakably clear.
Much attention has focused on Reagan’s Six Assurances, especially his pledge that the United States would not consult Beijing before deciding arms sales. Yet many critics overlook an equally important document issued the very same day. In his August 17, 1982 memorandum accompanying the U.S.-China Joint Communiqué, Reagan explained the broader strategic logic: “The U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC differences.” He then added the sentence that has received far less attention: “The linkage between these two matters is a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy.” Those words remain one of the clearest statements ever issued by an American president on Taiwan policy.
They also clarify an important distinction often lost in today’s debate. Not consulting Beijing is not the same as refusing to bargain with Beijing. Consultation invites a veto. Bargaining imposes consequences.
The United States has never asked Beijing for permission to sell weapons to Taiwan. It alone determines whether, when, and what arms Taiwan receives. What Beijing can influence is not the American decision-making process but the strategic environment in which those decisions are made.
If China genuinely reduces military pressure and pursues a peaceful resolution, Washington may judge that the pace of additional arms sales can be moderated. If Beijing escalates coercion, expands military exercises, intensifies gray-zone operations, or threatens invasion, Washington has every reason to provide Taiwan with more—and more capable—weapons.
Seen through that lens, a temporary pause before a summit is neither unusual nor alarming. Preserving an unsent arms package before negotiations may increase American leverage rather than diminish it. The package remains available if Beijing refuses to moderate its behavior.
Meanwhile, Taiwan is hardly standing still. It already possesses substantial quantities of advanced American equipment, while additional systems continue moving through the delivery pipeline. Defense spending has increased significantly. Indigenous weapons production is expanding. Reserve mobilization is being reformed. Conscription has been extended. Investments in drones, missiles, sea mines, and other asymmetric capabilities continue to accelerate.
Taiwan’s greatest challenge today is less the availability of American support than the demanding task of integrating these capabilities while overcoming domestic political divisions that have slowed portions of its defense modernization.
For nearly half a century, the central objective of U.S. policy has remained remarkably consistent: deter Chinese aggression while preserving peace across the Taiwan Strait. Arms sales have never been an end in themselves. They have been one of Washington’s most effective instruments for influencing Beijing’s behavior while strengthening Taiwan’s capacity for self-defense.
The current administration has not altered that fundamental strategy. If anything, it has applied it more explicitly than many previous administrations.
Those who interpret every adjustment in the timing of arms sales as evidence of abandonment misunderstand how American Taiwan policy has long operated. They mistake tactical flexibility for strategic retreat. They mistake diplomacy for concession. Above all, they mistake bargaining for consultation.
The United States has never asked Beijing whether Taiwan should be armed. It has always made that decision in Washington. The only thing that Beijing has always controlled is whether its own conduct persuades the United States to arm Taiwan even more.
That was the logic of the Taiwan Relations Act.
That was Reagan’s doctrine.
It remains the logic of American Taiwan policy today.
