- Middle East
Introduction
For international policymakers and audiences, one of the foremost concerns regarding the post-Assad order in Syria is the status of the country's minorities and how they fit into this order. Their situation is seen as key to determining whether the new order can be pluralist and representative of all the country's ethnic and religious groups, forging an inclusive national identity that leads to genuine "civil peace" (Arabic: al-salm al-ahli, to borrow a concept frequently invoked by the transitional government) and long-term stability. What, then, is the nature of the post-Assad order and how do the country's minorities relate to it? In general, when considering this issue, one can divide minority communities into two categories: (i) minority communities that are more or less geographically isolated, and (ii) minority communities that form substantial populations spanning a more or less contiguous region. It concludes by considering the policy implications of the assessment, suggesting that constructive but critical engagement is needed to ensure that a lasting order emerges to which minority communities can meaningfully relate.
Continuity with the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham-led Order in Northwest Syria
Although the 'Victory of the Revolution' conference in January 2025 announced the dissolution of all military factions and some meaningful steps have been taken to merge the various armed groups that deposed the prior regime into the new military and security forces (such as shedding their names and banners), the order established in the form of the transition government bears continuity in many ways with the order that existed in Idlib and its environs in the northwest of the country and was led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the period 2019-2024.
During that period, HTS' leader Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani (Ahmad al-Sharaa) functioned as the ultimate sovereign, and HTS was the hegemonic faction, imposing an authoritarian order in which other factions were tolerated provided they acknowledged subordination to HTS and did not form rival or autonomous projects of their own. Elections, insofar as they existed, were exercises in elite self-selection and not popular sovereignty. HTS figures were responsible for the most important portfolios of the military, public security, the justice system and external relations, even as the group was willing to outsource many day-to-day administrative functions to technocrats who were not formally affiliated with HTS and served in the HTS-backed 'Salvation Government.' HTS also focused on cementing Turkish acceptance of its hegemony in the northwest and 'neutralising' international powers that were hostile to it and capable of doing the group harm: foremost the United States, which continued to class HTS as a 'terrorist' organization but refrained from targeting its leaders, viewing the group's crackdown on both the Islamic State and the al-Qaeda-loyalist Hurras al-Din as useful for counter-terrorism purposes.
Ideologically, HTS distanced itself from aspects of Salafi jihadist ideology that would prove most problematic to its acceptance on the international stage: foremost among them Salafi jihadism's rejection of the international order of nation-states and ideas of waging jihad beyond Syria's borders should the regime fall, though in 2023-2024 the group did play to populist Islamic rhetoric about the Palestinian cause and 'liberating al-Aqsa' from Israeli/Jewish control. The group also showed a willingness to engage in outreach to the Christian and Druze communities in Idlib, making amends in restoring property that had been confiscated from them. However, the group still framed itself in sect-centric terms as a force representing the Sunnis in Syria and fostered an environment that continued to promote anti-Shia and anti-Alawite rhetoric, and no meaningful steps were taken prior to the fall of the regime to clamp down on such sectarian sentiments, whether within the ranks of HTS or among the wider Sunni population and support base in the northwest. Further, in relation to the Druze minority in Idlib, the group did not formally announce the cancellation of the policy of forced conversion to Sunni Islam that had been imposed by HTS' predecessor, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, in 2015. However, clerics affiliated with the Salvation Government privately told residents that conversion should be a matter of choice and that the prior conversions had been carried out in an erroneous manner.
Many of the features of the HTS-led order that existed in northwest Syria map out onto the transition government, both in terms of its structure and overall performance. al-Sharaa serves as supreme sovereign in occupying the presidency and has strong executive powers in accordance with the interim constitution. His closest allies within HTS also occupy the same key portfolios in the government: Muzhhar al-Ways (a key clerical figure in HTS) serves as Justice Minister, Anas Khattab (who served in the HTS security apparatus) serves as Interior Minister, while Asaad Shaybani (a key liaison figure in HTS' external relations) serves as the Foreign Minister.
The transition government has been willing to delegate less important administrative roles at both the national and local level to those who were not affiliated with HTS, including some members of minority communities. For example, in localities inhabited by minority communities, members of the minorities may occupy the position of head of the town or municipal council. Further, the transition government currently has a Christian woman (Hind Kabawat) serving as Social Affairs and Labour Minister, while a Druze from al-Suwayda' (Amjad Badr) occupied the position of Minister of Agriculture until recently.
However, the hegemony of al-Sharaa and his closest associates within the government's structure remains clear. In addition, recent talk and speculation of a major reshuffle within the transition government in order to reduce the influence of Sharaa loyalists and HTS cadres proved to be mistaken. In fact, the reshuffling was smaller than expected, and if anything has increased the role of HTS-loyalist and Salvation Government veterans in the administration: most notably, media minister Hamza al-Mustafa (who served as director of Syria TV, which is Qatari-funded and was aligned with the opposition to Assad but was by no means an HTS mouthpiece) was replaced with Khalid Zarour. Likewise, Amjad Badr was replaced with Basil al-Suwaydan, who was also in HTS and has notably filled a number of roles simultaneously within the transition government, including the position of deputy agriculture minister and head of a 'Committee to Combat Illicit Gain'- a body intended to secure deals with businessmen tied to the former regime and expropriate their assets.
Both negative and positive aspects of the HTS-led order are mirrored in the transition government. On the positive side, the government has proven successful in ending Syria's international isolation and seeks to have good or at least productive relations with neighbours as far as possible and genuinely wishes to prevent the country from being used as launching pad for militant operations abroad. Not only is the government sincere in seeking to counter the Islamic State (which has declared the government an 'apostate' entity and has claimed multiple attacks against it), but it is also engaged in active efforts to clamp down on what remains of Hezbollah's weapons smuggling networks and has made clear that Syria will not be used as a base for Palestinian militant activity against Israel.
On the negative side, the HTS leadership never repositioned itself clearly in a doctrinal sense and did not formally renounce the group's Sunni-centric worldview. Whatever nice-sounding rhetoric al-Sharaa or other figures of the transition government may issue about a national identity and the need for 'civil peace', a Sunni populist mood has gained strength among the government's support base, invoking the legacy of the Umayyads (the dynasty that ruled a caliphate spanning from Spain to India with its centre of power in Damascus) and asserting that Syria should rightfully be ruled by the Sunni majority, or more specifically the Sunni Arab majority.
This populism at best offers toleration of minorities on condition that they acknowledge the Sunni and 'Umayyad' character of the state, but at worst holds minority communities- whether at the national or local level- responsible for Sunni suffering during the war and seeks to exact retribution or simply holds minorities in contempt on the grounds of being 'disbelievers.' For its part, the Islamic State has sought to exploit disillusionment among those within HTS' support base who may feel that the government is too soft towards minorities or not doing enough to implement an Islamic system of government, calling on such disillusioned people to 'repent' and join its ranks.
With this overall picture in mind, we can explore how minority communities have interacted with the new order in Syria.
Isolated Communities: Towards 'Conciliation' with the New State
The main minorities that can be considered as generally scattered in isolated communities are the Christians, Twelver Shia and Ismailis. There are, of course, members of other minorities that live in isolated pockets, most notably the Druze of Idlib (discussed above), but these other minority populations generally constitute communities spanning contiguous regions.
Generally speaking, the isolated minority communities are simply unable to organize their own political projects and find that they must adapt to the new order for survival purposes and thus adopt a 'conciliatory' approach to the new state and their immediate neighbours, even if those minority communities were previously aligned with the Assad regime and became significant sources of manpower for its army and various auxiliary formations tied to the regime and its foreign allies. As such, they are compelled to show support for the new state, even if just prior to the fall of the regime they had been waving the old Syrian flag and openly declaring loyalty to the old order.
A useful case illustration of this phenomenon is the Twelver Shia villages of Nubl and al-Zahara' in north Aleppo countryside, surrounded to the northwest by Kurdish villages of the Afrin region and on all other sides by Sunni Arab localities. The two villages were besieged by the insurgents in the 2012-2016 period and were a source of local manpower for expeditionary fighters working with Iran and Hezbollah alongside regime forces in Aleppo city. Fighters from Nubl and al-Zahara' also worked alongside Iran and Hezbollah in other parts of Syria (e.g. securing the Homs desert and the town of Albukamal on the border with Iraq).
The regime and its allies cleared a route to the two villages in 2016 that involved extensive damage to several Sunni localities (including Mayer, which is located just opposite Nubl on the Gaziantep-Aleppo highway), and in 2020 a direct route to the two villages via the highway was established, entailing further displacement and damage to nearby Sunni villages like Hayyan, Bayanun and Anadan. It is accepted on both sides that some people from Nubl and al-Zahara' took advantage of the displacement to loot the properties of people in the neighbouring Sunni villages, taking out iron from homes (for example) and selling it or repurposing it.
As the regime rapidly collapsed in late 2024, the people of Nubl and al-Zahara' had justifiable fears that they would be subject to reprisal killings, and so with the exception of a few individuals, virtually the entire population fled with the aim of reaching Homs or Damascus. A smaller contingent also became holed up in the locality of al-Safira. Despite many years of promoting anti-Shia rhetoric, the leadership of the insurgent offensive issued messages of reassurance to the people of Nubl and al-Zahara' that they would not be harmed if they chose to abandon the regime and return home. In addition, some of those who worked with the Iranians in Aleppo but defected to the insurgent side as part of the offensive- primarily the Baqir Brigade, which recruited from Beggara tribesmen- supposedly worked to secure a guarantee of safety for the people of Nubl and al-Zahara'.
Following the regime's collapse, most of the people who fled Nubl and al-Zahara' eventually chose to accept the assurances of safety and return home rather than face a fate of indefinite exile. As part of the return, weapons were surrendered to the new authorities while former military personnel not wanted for crimes underwent taswiya ('regularisation of status'). For its part, the government installed a police station in Nubl and deployed personnel from the 'Public Security Apparatus' both inside Nubl and al-Zahara' and to man checkpoints at the main entrances to both villages via the Aleppo-Gaziantep highway. Further, on occasion, additional checkpoints are deployed within the villages. In addition, both localities have local councils that are led by people from the villages.
These arrangements do represent a step forward from the days of HTS in that the authorities are seeking to protect the people from Nubl and al-Zahara' from external harm. The process of disarmament has also had the positive effect of leading to better security in comparison with the days of the former regime, where multiple armed groups existed within the two villages while the police was effectively powerless. As explained by an imam from Nubl, the days prior to the fall of the regime were 'chaos' in terms of security, while disarmament has led to better internal security. Indeed, in contrast with other areas of Syria, no notable security incidents like shootings, armed clashes, bombings or murders have been recorded inside the two villages.
But this arrangement is not without its drawbacks, and there is still the suspicion and hostility towards Shiism that existed in the HTS days. For one thing, all the people who worked with the former regime's military and forces affiliated with Iran and Hezbollah suddenly found themselves without work and have been unable to enlist in the country's new military and security forces. Indeed, in the two villages, none of those responsible for managing local security are from Nubl and al-Zahara', or even Shia, nor have any efforts been made to recruit locals. For instance, two of the leading security officials in Nubl, stationed at an office just next to the cultural centre, are from Homs and Idlib. Nor is the director of the Nubl district (nahiya- an administrative division that is affiliated with a mantaqa/region) from Nubl or al-Zahara'.
In addition, within Nubl and al-Zahara', locals no longer hold public celebrations outside the mosques or their own homes to mark various Shia religious occasions. Conflicting accounts have emerged as to whether this is the result of local notables' initiative or a prohibition imposed by security officials, but the evidence suggests the latter is more likely. At an earlier stage, the local authorities sought to ban both the Shia call to prayer issued from the mosques' minarets and Shia religious instruction in the hawza (seminary) in Nubl and al-Zahara', but subsequently relented.
Further, while security inside the two villages may be good, people from Nubl and al-Zahara' face security risks travelling outside. On more than one occasion, people from the two villages travelling outside have been killed in attacks targeting them. Some of the perpetrators may be from the neighbouring Sunni villages and seeking 'revenge' against people from Nubl and al-Zahara', while others may be members of Islamic State cells that target Shia for no other reason than their being Shia. In the latter case, attacks on Shia have been claimed by the Islamic State in both the Homs and Damascus area, the most recent being the assassination of the imam of the Sayyida Zaynab Shia shrine in early May. Restrictions have also been placed on displays of Shiism in the Sayyida Zaynab area, with the shrine administrators having been forced to remove the 'Oh Zaynab' banner from the shrine last year and prohibit photos and video filming inside the shrine. Both measures were taken out of the local authorities' concern about antagonizing Sunni sentiment.
More broadly, there have been few efforts to bring about meaningful reconciliation between Nubl and al-Zahara' and the surrounding Sunni villages. Interactions that do take place are mostly at the elite level- for example, between the heads of the local councils for matters of services- and have not fostered broader interactions between the communities. Instead, resentment exists in the surrounding villages at the perceived lack of accountability for people from Nubl and al-Zahara' implicated in the destruction of these villages. This resentment is likely to be increased by any project to improve services in Nubl and al-Zahara', most notably talk of plans to connect the two villages to the Turkish electricity grid that was already extended to areas of north Aleppo under rebel control prior to the fall of the regime.
Finally, some Shia communities have faced a worse situation than the people of Nubl and al-Zahara'. Most notably, the Shia of al-Fua and Kafariya- two originally Shia villages in Idlib whose inhabitants were besieged for around 3 years and were evacuated in 2018 in a deal brokered by Iran- have found themselves unable to return to their homes which are being occupied by both displaced Sunnis who cannot return to their own destroyed homes and foreigners (in particular Uzbeks) who joined the insurgency against the Assad regime. The government has not made any guarantees for their return, and there is strong resentment against the Shia of al-Fua and Kafariya in the Sunni localities immediately surrounding the two villages, such as Binnish, which is located just south of al-Fua. A number of Shia who were living in villages in Homs countryside near the border with Lebanon have had their homes and lands confiscated and have become displaced to neighbouring Lebanon. This is particularly the case for Shia from these areas who worked with Hezbollah and Iran. Most recently, the government demolished a Shia village in Homs (Mazra'a) on the grounds of building violations, displacing the inhabitants to other Shia villages like al-Thabatiya.
In comparison with the Twelver Shia, the Ismailis and Christians have generally fared better under the new authorities, one likely reason being that as a whole these two communities were not as closely associated with the former regime and Iran and Hezbollah in particular. In the case of the Ismailis, who are primarily based in the town of Salamiyah in eastern Hama and its environs, it should also be noted that the community has a single religious leadership embodied in the figure of the Aga Khan. Further, although Salamiyah formally remained under the control of the regime throughout the war, there was a current of opposition to the regime within the town: for instance, in relation to the recent trial in the Netherlands of Rafiq Qutrayb, who served as a leading figure in the Salamiyah branch of the National Defence Forces (NDF: an auxiliary militia of the regime), local media highlighted the story of two brothers from Salamiyah who were disappeared by the NDF.
As the insurgents advanced through Hama countryside, the Ismaili leadership and notables were quick to coordinate a surrender to the new authorities with taswiya for former army personnel and members of auxiliary militias, with no mass displacement of the population having taken place. Unlike the Twelver Shia, the Ismaili community in Salamiyah appears to enjoy more freedom in celebrating its identity and occasions like Imamate Day, which commemorates the anniversary of the accession of the current Aga Khan to his position. Similarly, Christian communities did not undergo mass displacement as the insurgents advanced and do not face the prospect of the local authorities prohibiting the public celebration of religious occasions like Easter and Christmas. In addition, neither Ismailis nor Christians have been forced to alter their social customs- such as the fact that the women of these two communities do not dress as conservatively as their Sunni neighbours- on account of pressure from the authorities.
But the generally better relations that these two communities enjoy with the new government have been marred by instances of violence targeting these constituencies. Some of those incidents reflect an ideological angle, whatever pretexts might be invoked. The deadliest such incident was the suicide bombing that targeted a church in the Damascus area in June 2025- claimed by a group called 'Saraya Ansar al-Sunna', which is said to have originated as a break-off from HTS and declares its support for the Islamic State. Although the group framed the attack as retaliation for Christian opposition to Salafi proselytization in their area, the Islamic State's own ideology dictates that all Christians who either refuse to convert to Islam or become dhimmis (second-class citizens under an Islamic state) should be targeted.
Other instances do have more of a local angle to them but are nonetheless linked to an imbalance in which minority communities are expected to disarm while Sunni communities generally retain their weapons and feel empowered to resort to mob violence when aggrieved. For instance, in late March, the Christian town of al-Suqalabiya in Hama countryside was subject to mob violence by Sunnis from the nearby town of Qalaat al-Mudiq, after locals in al-Suqaylabiya confronted youths from Qalaat al-Mudiq who were reportedly harassing Christian girls in al-Suqaylabiya. The youths from Qalaat al-Mudiq responded by bringing their friends and associates who smashed Christian shops and other property. Some of the animosity between inhabitants of the two towns undoubtedly stems from the fact that they were on opposite sides during the civil war. al-Suqaylabiya remained under regime control throughout the war and served as a centre for pro-regime militias (most notably the NDF, which received Russian backing), while Qalaat al-Mudiq was controlled by the insurgents and suffered extensive damage, becoming virtually depopulated by 2019. Although the government claimed to have quickly de-escalated the incident and framed it as an example of 'local social tensions', the mob violence was of sufficient concern to prompt a decision among the Christian community to cancel public celebrations of Easter outside churches and homes.
In addition, there are concerns surrounding attempts by some local authorities to restrict the sale of alcoholic drinks and negatively associate alcohol sale and consumption with the Christian community, fostering a sense of separation and alienation from neighbouring Muslim populations. The foremost case of this phenomenon is a decision issued by the head of the Damascus governorate executive office, Maher Idlibi (who served as a key judicial figure in the Salvation Government and is an in-law of al-Sharaa) in mid-March to regulate the sale of alcoholic drinks, banning the sale of alcoholic drinks in restaurants and night-time venues in Damascus city and restricting the sale of alcoholic drinks in sealed containers to three areas of the city known for their Christian communities. Amid controversy including criticism that the decision cements divisions between Christians and Muslims, the governorate then issued a clarification statement that did not constitute a retraction of the decision but rather specified that venues licensed by the Ministry of Tourism (e.g. hotels) and selling alcoholic drinks would not be affected, and that the governorate would review the possibility of exempting restaurants that are popular with tourists. Since then, the status of implementing the decision does not remain wholly clear, yet it does not appear to have been cancelled outright. Rather, it appears that the decision is being slowly implemented. Most recently, reports have emerged of the local authorities forcing a number of bars and restaurants in old Damascus to sign a pledge that they will not offer alcoholic drinks in glasses for sale, though the owners of these restaurants and bars complain that the municipal office is not authorised to implement this decision.
Contiguous Minority Communities
In contrast with isolated minority communities, members of minorities that form significant populations across more or less substantive contiguous areas have formulated and developed political projects that seek autonomy on an ethnic basis and tend to be skeptical of or outright opposed to the government in Damascus.
In the case of the Kurds, a well-established autonomous political project already existed on the ground prior to the fall of the regime in the form of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition that was led by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party/PKK) and its armed wing (the 'People's Protection Units'- YPG). The SDF had developed a comprehensive 'Autonomous Administration' that spanned the north and east of Syria, while the enclave of Afrin in Aleppo province was seized by Turkish-backed insurgents in 2018.
The Druze of the southern province of al-Suwayda'- where they constitute a demographic majority- had come to experience some sort of autonomy prior to the fall of the regime because the regime adopted a generally light-handed approach to the province, maintaining a rather limited security and military presence, with the gap being filled by Druze armed groups of a variety of orientations: some loyal to the regime, others of a 'third-way' and foremost concerned for Druze interests, and others still more inclined to open opposition to the regime. As the living situation in regime-held areas deteriorated, Druze sentiment in the province shifted against the regime, culminating in an anti-regime protest movement from August 2023 onwards. With the collapse of the regime, Druze factions in al-Suwayda' dismantled what remained of the regime in the province.
In contrast with the Druze and Kurds, the Alawite community was seen as closely associated with the former regime on account of the ruling Assad family's Alawite origins and the disproportionate role that Alawites played in the military and security apparatuses. Alawite fears of the insurgency as an existential threat were cemented by anti-Alawite rhetoric and massacres of Alawite communities in Latakia countryside in 2013 and in the Alawite village of Ishtabraq in Idlib countryside in 2015.
Alawites: Between Engagement and Rejection
The rapid collapse of the Assad regime without the occurrence of large-scale massacres initially provided a basis for Alawite optimism about engagement with the new government, and indeed, in some Alawite localities such as al-Bahluliya in Latakia province, a conciliatory stance has been maintained in which weapons have been surrendered and locals generally maintain good relations with the security forces. More generally, the government has also appreciated the fact that it needs to co-opt certain prominent Alawite figures in a broader outreach to the Alawite population. The two most notable Alawite figures working with the government in this regard are Fadi Saqr (a former commander of the NDF in Damascus) and Khalid al-Ahmad, a businessman who was reportedly a childhood friend of al-Sharaa. During the early years of the war, al-Ahmad served as an unofficial advisor to Assad, but he subsequently defected. While both figures are very controversial among the government's Sunni support base, with Saqr in particular accused of involvement in the Tadamon massacre in 2013, it is notable that both of them essentially promoted the softest image possible of the Assad regime, championing 'reconciliation' deals that sought to secure defection or departure of insurgents but offered no broader political vision beyond Assad remaining in power indefinitely. Both men also reputedly played a role in the rapid collapse of the Assad regime, supposedly ensuring that Alawites would not mobilise in large numbers for a bloody final defence of the regime.
Even so, reports emerged from the outset of attacks on Alawite shrines, harassment of Alawites at security checkpoints, assassinations and abductions of Alawite individuals, and kidnappings of Alawite girls. These reported incidents- together with dismissals of Alawites from military and security roles on account of the dissolution of the old army and security apparatuses- quickly led to the growth of skepticism among many Alawites towards the government and support for the Alawite cleric Ghazal Ghazal Ghazal was by no means the overall spiritual leader of the Alawite community but established the Supreme Alawite Islamic Council in Syria and Abroad soon after the fall of the regime in a bid to assert such a status. The cleric has called for a federal model and for international protection of the Alawite community and also sought to cultivate the idea of an 'alliance of minorities' comprising Kurds, Druze and Alawites.
While Ghazal does not explicitly call for armed action to achieve Alawite autonomy, a number of Alawite insurgent groups opposed to the government portray themselves as acting on his orders or at least accord him spiritual and political authority. But these groups and the figures behind them are by no means a unified entity even if they share hostility to the present government. For example, figures in 'Coastal Shield'- the most prominent Alawite insurgent brand- have expressed support for Iran and the 'resistance axis' and alignment with the former regime, whereas Mudar Ali (a former member of the Republican Guard) who heads the 'Alawite Resistance' has expressed rejection of both the former regime and Iran and Hezbollah. Some groups have expressed alignment with Suhayl al-Hasan (who headed the Russian-backed 'Tiger Forces' that became Division 25 in the regime's army), whereas Abu Ali Sumer- leader of 'Quwat Azra'il al-Jabal'- had once declared his affiliation with Suhayl and declared that he was even willing to accept help from Israel should it be willing to support Alawites. However, he has since shifted his stance on such matters, declaring that he cannot stand with any side actively waging war against those who say 'Oh Ali!' (i.e. Shia powers and entities such as Iran's government and Iraq's Hashd Shaabi), while also criticising Suhayl as a figure restricted by Russia, which is pursuing constructive relations with the new government. Abu Ali has also criticised Iran and the 'resistance axis' for supposed silence on persecution of Alawites in Syria.
Alawite insurgent action against the government reached its peak in March 2025 with a coordinated attack by Coastal Shield and other groups on government positions on the coast. In response, government forces and pro-government militiamen mobilized en masse towards the coast, rapidly suppressing the insurgent action but also committing massacres against Alawite civilians who plainly had no involvement in the insurgency's actions. In addition, the Alawite population of a locality in Hama was subject to a massacre and expulsion. The violence led to large numbers of Alawites fleeing to Lebanon. Although the government has publicly expressed commitment to holding the perpetrators of the violations against Alawite civilians accountable, it has had little to show in terms of real accountability, and, if anything,has tried to draw an equivalence between the actions of anti-government insurgents and those who committed violations against Alawite communities.
This lack of proper accountability for the massacres- together with the ongoing reports of violations (especially kidnappings of Alawite girls- a phenomenon the transition government has repeatedly downplayed- and confiscation of Alawite land in Hama province by Sunnis seeking retribution)- has continued to keep alive Alawite skepticism towards the government, even as the government has had some success in clamping down on Alawite insurgent activity towards the government.
The Druze of al-Suwayda': A Rejectionist and Separatist Consensus
When the regime initially fell, there was a general consensus among the Druze of al-Suwayda' on a sense of belonging to Syria, with the various Druze factions waving the flag of the new Syria. However, a division emerged early on between a very small minority of Druze who were firmly aligned with the government (principally represented in the figures of Layth and Fahd al-Balous and Sulayman Abd al-Baqi), those open to cautious engagement with the government with a view to securing some kind of decentralization arrangement (foremost embodied in the factions of Rijal al-Karama and Liwa al-Jabal), and those who took a more hardline, skeptical stance towards the government, primarily because of the Islamist and Salafi background of leading figures like the president. While exact proportions and numbers cannot be given, the second trend likely represented a plurality if not majority of opinion in al-Suwayda'.
The skeptical trend was foremost embodied in Hikmat al-Hijri- one of the three mashaykh al-'aql (hereditary positions that essentially amount to a spiritual leadership among the Syrian Druze, especially in al-Suwayda')- and factions declaring loyalty to him, such as the Military Council of al-Suwayda', which received Israeli backing early on. Essentially, Hijri and his supporters were unwilling to make any concessions unless the government guaranteed decentralization, secularism and local management of security. Since the resolution of final status issues required the consensus among all three mashaykh al-'aql, opposition by Hijri to an agreement with the government would prove the obstacle.
While the Druze more willing to engage with the government considered Hijri's positioning to be obstructionist and problematic, sympathy with Hijri grew for a number of reasons. The massacres of Alawites, for example, aroused considerable consternation. The interim constitution was seen as problematic for concentrating too much power in the hands of the presidency and promoting an Islamist vision given the stipulation of Islamic jurisprudence as the main source of legislation. A significant turning point in favour of Hijri's positioning occurred at the turn of April-May 2025, when an audio clip blaspheming Islam and attributed to a Druze shaykh spread on social media, prompting a mobilization of pro-government forces towards Druze populated suburbs of Damascus. Druze factions mobilized in al-Suwayda' with a view to supporting their brethren in the suburbs, clashing with government forces in the process, which entered the northwestern peripheries of the province. Although Druze notables in the suburbs were able to reach an agreement with the government for the deployment of Ministry of Interior forces, reports of violations against Druze and their property in the suburbs and on the peripheries of al-Suwayda' hardened skepticism towards the government.
This skepticism was further reinforced by regular incidents of shelling of the peripheries of al-Suwayda' by unidentified armed elements in the period leading up to July 2025, likely conducted by Bedouin tribesmen who were being encouraged if not supported by the government as a means of pressuring the province to come to an agreement for central government security control. Indeed, tensions between Bedouin and Druze escalated into full-blown clashes within the province after a Druze businessman was accosted on the Damascus-al-Suwayda' highway.
Having apparently thought that Israel would not intervene and having cancelled negotiations with Druze factions more willing to engage with the government, Damascus used the opportunity to try to impose control by force. It also seems likely that Damascus thought its two main Druze supporters- Layth al-Balous and Sulayman Abd al-Baqi- would be able to mobilise their own networks in the province to facilitate a swift government takeover. But these calculations proved mistaken. The government's campaign actually prompted widespread local Druze resistance, even among the small numbers of Druze in the province who were officially affiliated with the government's security apparatus. Even so, the advancing government forces seemed overwhelming, and Druze spiritual and faction leaders initially accepted an agreement for the government to impose central security control.
However, amid reports of violations against Druze civilians and property, Hijri quickly withdrew his endorsement of the agreement and widespread fighting resumed. Sustaining heavy losses from Israeli airstrikes, government forces initially appeared to withdraw, but in fact the government condoned a further wave of attacks on the province by Sunni tribal militiamen, leading to further fighting that led to a stalemate that still persists today in which Druze factions control much of the center and south of the province, while government forces retain control of the northern and western countrysides. The July events- which led to massacres of Druze and other violations against them (including kidnappings and destruction of property) by government forces and pro-government tribal militiamen- firmly shifted the consensus in favour of Hijri's rejection of the government. Hijri, for his part, renamed the region 'Bashan' in reference to the Biblical name for a region encompassing southern Syria, likely as a way of currying Israeli support. He has openly declared the notion of an alliance with Israel, either seeking Israeli annexation of southern Syria (i.e. Deraa, Qunaytra and al-Suwayda' provinces) or the notion of an Israeli-backed independent Druze state, though it is clear that Israel is not working towards either of these goals. Most Druze factions- including those that had previously been working with the government- proceeded to nominally unite under the Hijri-endorsed National Guard, though not all of them are on board with the idea of Israeli annexation or a separate state. In particular, the statements of Rijal al-Karama's leadership point to a continued identification with Syria, even as the group denounces the government.
To this day, no meaningful progress has been made towards a dialogue between the two sides with a view to reaching some kind of compromise. A key problem is that as in the coastal massacres, the government is generally unwilling to demonstrate real accountability for the massacres and violations against Druze, likely out of fear of upsetting the Sunni support base. This is evident in the public trials for a select group of accused perpetrators of violations. Unlike the cases of 'regime remnants' arrested by the government, neither the photos nor names of the accused are publicised. In addition, much of the messaging of the government and its supporters tends to focus on portraying Hijri and his followers as the primary villains of the entire saga, accusing them of being in league with 'regime remnants' (because of the fact that some Druze former regime army officers work with the National Guard) and the leading producers of Captagon in Syria, essentially brushing aside the massacres as though they were merely an unfortunate side consequence of a good faith attempt to impose state control. In so far as the government has a strategy, it appears to be playing a waiting game in which it exploits its control of the flow of aid and goods into al-Suwayda' while also trying to attrite the Druze forces with periodic clashes on the frontlines, apparently hoping that the coalition will eventually collapse and the Druze will make a deal out of desperation.
The Kurds: Setbacks for the SDF and Kurdish Autonomy
While it would be a mistake to conflate all Kurds with the SDF, it is true that the SDF came to monopolize Kurdish political representation in Syria prior to the fall of the regime. This state of affairs persisted in the aftermath of the fall of the regime. Both the massacres on the coast and in al-Suwayda' only strengthened the belief among many Kurds in northeast Syria, including those not aligned with the SDF's political project and philosophy, that only the SDF could protect them and secure their interests. In contrast, a number of Kurds from the Afrin region came to accept the reality that SDF control was not coming back and sought to return to their homes following the fall of the regime, with the transition government establishing a mechanism for return of property that had been confiscated by displaced Sunni Arabs and Turkish-backed factions. There have been genuine large-scale returns to the Afrin region and meaningful steps have been taken to integrate the region into the Syrian state (especially at the security and military level). A few originally Kurdish localities in Afrin remained Turkish/Syrian military zones to which the original inhabitants could not return, but assurances have been given to displaced inhabitants and progress is being made to remove the Turkish military presence and allow the inhabitants to return to their homes
For its part, the SDF essentially sought to preserve its system of governance and territorial control insisting that the government grant formal recognition of its autonomous military forces and administrative system instead, the government has asserted its right to central control and rejects autonomous or rival political projects. Indeed, it is clear that the original March 2025 agreement- reportedly mediated by the U.S.- was oriented towards subsuming the SDF and its institutions under the central state. However, the SDF did not interpret the agreement this way, and the two sides were unable to achieve a breakthrough in negotiations because of their conflicting expectations.
What the SDF did not properly prepare for was a scenario in which the U.S. would effectively withdraw its protection and support for the SDF as the main counter-Islamic State partner in the country- something that Sharaa worked towards by courting the Trump administration and portraying his own government as a reliable partner for that very purpose. Eventually, the central government decided to apply military pressure on the SDF in January 2026 as a means of forcing it to make compromises, attacking both the SDF's isolated outposts in the neighbourhoods of Ashrafiya and Shaykh Maqsud in Aleppo city and the SDF's positions in Raqqa and Dayr al-Zur provinces, exploiting local Arab resentment of the SDF. The SDF's positions in these areas rapidly collapsed and the coalition more or less retreated to its original core of Kurdish fighters. Faced with such losses, the SDF's leadership was forced to negotiate, having lost much of its leverage in terms of territory and resources. In addition, the SDF could no longer seek negotiation over Kurdish citizenship and cultural rights as Sharaa had already issued decrees prior to the offensives for granting Syrian nationality to all Kurds living in Syria, while also recognizing Kurdish as a 'national' (but not official) language and recognizing Newroz as a public holiday.
With U.S. mediation, the spirit of the original March 2025 agreement was reaffirmed on 29 January 2026. This marked the effective end of the SDF as an autonomous project, even if that end is not necessarily proving to be swift. The central government has been gradually asserting its authority over the northeast through control of border crossings and oil fields, as well as establishing central state institutions in the Kobane and Jazira regions. The government has also attempted to integrate some SDF figures into the military and security forces and political structure by offering them positions, such as appointing Sipan Hamo (a veteran of the PKK) as assistant defence minister for the 'eastern region' of Syria. A leading figure in the Asayish (SDF's internal security forces) was likewise appointed deputy commander of internal security forces in Hasakah province, and Nur al-Din 'Isa Ahmad (an SDF figure) was appointed as governor of Hasakah province. A select number of SDF fighters have also received training as part of brigades to be incorporated into the army. These steps, however, still fall short of a complete integration of the SDF and its institutions, which remain very visible in the main Kurdish towns of Qamishli and Kobane, where security and administration remain dominated by SDF institutions.
Conclusion: Policy Recommendations
U.S. engagement with the new government has tended to focus on security stabilization and consolidation in the name of realizing stability in the short-term. Although this focus is understandable, there are real questions about the long-term trajectory of the country, which increasingly looks to be an authoritarian, Sunni Arab-centric order in which Sharaa retains power indefinitely, while minorities are officially afforded toleration but are made to feel and acknowledge Sunni supremacy in the new order. In such a scenario, abuses against members of minority communities- such as assassinations and attacks on non-Sunni religious sites- are likely to continue, and minorities may increasingly be inclined to leave the country as they feel they have no future in the new order or identification with it.
Policy-makers should continue to engage constructively with the new government but do so in a more critical manner, first and foremost by urging the government to implement real accountability for those implicated in violations against minorities. The government should be called out on its inconsistency where it readily names Assad-era figures or Islamic State cell members when they are arrested but has more or less refrained from naming members of its own security and military forces implicated in massacres and violations against Alawites and Druze. Policy-makers should also do more to encourage the government to take consistent measures against sectarian incitement against minorities and discourage Sunni-centric populism, while urging the authorities to commit to free elections and to develop a long-term vision of the country in which belonging is based on citizenship regardless of ethnicity or religion. The long-term vision should be a democratic political system that allows for competing political parties but is devoid of sectarian identity politics where positions of power are apportioned on the basis of ethnicity and religious sect.
