After nearly half a year of on-again, off-again combat operations with Iran as of this writing, the United States is still struggling to find a way to conclude war on terms Americans find acceptable. It has been politically painful for the Trump administration as it oscillates between incentives and disincentives with the unreliable leadership in Tehran. This has tested the patience of war-weary Americans concerned about the price of gas, groceries, and inflation in general, and wondering if they will be stuck in yet another “forever war.” This whole ordeal has given us occasion to once again revisit the strategic insights of Clausewitz and to contemplate the wisdom of his American expression: the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. Let’s review their relevance to the ongoing war with Iran.
First, Clausewitz tells us that major powers generally favor stability over instability within the international order because they can often achieve their strategic goals through various means of pressure or coercion without waging war or using force. Major powers, by virtue of their international standing, generally set up the “rules” of interplay and often can get what they want simply by “asking” or offering deals on terms favorable to them because those inferior nations receiving these requests know that if they don’t agree, they may face diplomatic and/or economic sanction or possibly even military force. Given these marked advantages, major powers generally perceive waging wars of choice as risky because it’s hard to improve on already superior international standing and starting an armed conflict could set off a chain of events that diminishes one’s position and/or hurts one’s national security interests. For that reason, the Weinberger-Powell doctrine states that the U.S. should generally only wage war (or use force) as a last resort, when all other means to achieve our strategic aims have been tried and failed.
With regard to Iran, the U.S. generally has two major national security aims: First, prevent them from perfecting (and being capable of delivering) a nuclear weapon, and second, to thwart their ability to export their revolutionary ideology, terrorize our friends, and disrupt the global economy. Throughout the U.S. there is widespread support across the political and ideological spectrum to pursue these goals.
While acknowledging that a number of administrations over the past several decades have tried and failed to secure these strategic objectives through peaceful means, as frustrating as that has been, we still did not need to go to war right now. We still had more diplomatic, economic, and covert options at our disposal. Moreover, according to the Trump administration, the June 2025 strategic bombing operation against Iranian nuclear facilities (Operation Midnight Hammer) was an unqualified success, with the president asserting we had “obliterated” their enrichment program, significantly disrupting their ability to perfect a nuclear bomb. Moreover, according to open-source reporting, Iran’s long-range missile program does not have the capability to reach our soil even if they had a bomb. Thus, the Iranian nuclear program did not pose an imminent threat to Americans. Understandably Israel viewed this differently given their proximity to Iran and considering Iran’s previous statements expressing a desire to destroy their country, but given the massive damage done by Midnight Hammer, the U.S. still had options short of war to prevent Iran’s attack of Israel.
To begin with, the extensive regime of economic sanctions emplaced before the war had effectively isolated Iran and severely damaged their economy. Those dire conditions and the regime’s mishandling of them sparked huge protests in Iran in January 2026. The regime viewed these protests as an existential threat to their power as evidenced by their willing to risk further international isolation with their ruthless crackdown which killed tens of thousands of people, including many opposition leaders. Given the significant unrest in Iran, the U.S. was in a strong position to continue to press the regime and possibly cause their downfall through a combination of economic and diplomatic measures, especially if those were coupled with covert operations supporting the Iranian opposition. Those covert operations could have included intelligence sharing, logistical support, electronic communications facilitation, training and leader development, and highly targeted kinetic raids by U.S. Special Operation Forces to kill/capture key Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders and to destroy or neutralize some of their essential capabilities. These options would have been better than launching a new war.
Military planners in the Pentagon likely viewed a war of choice as risky for multiple reasons. To begin with, it could give cause for the regime to completely shut down the internet, the only realistic means for the opposition to mobilize and support itself, and if that occurred, the government would be the only source of information regarding how any potential war with the U.S. was going, and they would be sure to spin that in their favor. Additionally, without any transparency, the regime would have the cover to methodically hunt down the rest of the opposition leadership and to intimidate anyone who might be contemplating joining it. For the rest of the Iranian people (over 90 million strong), they would be more likely to support the regime once their country was attacked by “the Great Satan.”
Pentagon planners also likely knew that given the U.S.’s enormous military advantage, Iran probably would maximize asymmetric warfare tactics and strategy. Rather than trying to match the Americans in air combat, Iran was more likely to focus on causing as much global economic pain and disruption as possible as they endeavored to terrorize the populations of Middle Eastern countries, actions which they hoped would pressure the U.S. to stop any war initiated. As far as the Americans, should war come, the Iranians would likely try to inflict as many casualties as possible knowing that they were fighting an administration that had previously pledged to its people, “no new wars.”
Once the war was launched, there were few surprises. As expected, Iran proved no match for the U.S. on the battlefield, and the Iranians suffered massive operational losses from American air power and missiles. Also as expected, Iran responded by attacking American installations and personnel stationed in the Middle East and neighboring countries in the region and these asymmetric actions achieved some effect. To the surprise of some, however, Iran was also able to significantly disrupt commerce transiting the Strait of Hormuz, on most days completely shutting it down. Approximately 10% of the world’s shipping transits this strategic waterway (about 20% of energy), so the disruption to the global economy was profound. Energy prices immediately spiked, increasing inflation which had just settled down and was getting close to pre-Covid levels. Meanwhile, the American attack increased domestic support for the Iranian regime (which likely started at less than 20%) as a wave of nationalism swept over the country, further isolating and demoralizing the Iranian opposition.
The decision taken by the administration in July specifically to target critical civilian infrastructure (i.e., power, water, transportation, and communications facilities) to date has only exacerbated this trend, strengthening popular support for the regime. A development we should not be surprised with, especially given Clausewitz’s insight that “war is the continuance of politics by other means.” In this case, it’s generally bad politics to kill the people you are trying to help and to destroy those facilities that they need to survive.
Faced with these daunting realities, the Trump administration has sought to pressure the Iranian regime for peace on acceptable terms. But they have found the Iranians loath to give up their leverage, especially since as an authoritarian regime, they are not subject to the same domestic pressures as Western countries. This is the liminal state we now find ourselves in—in a protracted conflict with no end in sight and unable to effectively enforce temporary cease fire terms.
Both Clausewitz and Weinberger-Powell inform us that if you go to war, you should have clear and achievable objectives, the support of the American people for those goals, and the capability and will to see the operation through to success. The U.S. did not lack stated strategic objectives prior to commencing this war, but our national leaders created confusion when they did not speak with one voice when communicating them to the American people. Indeed, during that first week of the war we heard from the President, Secretaries of War and State, the U.N. Ambassador, various administration spokespeople, and the lead negotiators. At times these leaders cited different war aims, among these were eliminating the Iranian nuclear program, regime change, destroying the Iranian navy, air force, Quds Force, and ballistic missile program, and preventing Iran from exporting violence. Later, ensuring free and unfettered access through the Strait of Hormuz was added, a concern we did not have prior to the war. When members of Congress and our allies sought clarity, the administration’s responses only further clouded the issue.
As far as achievable goals, early on the administration seemed more focused on timelines than on achieving strategic objectives, stating at several critical junctures that the war would be over “in two weeks.” Obviously, they hoped these statements would minimize the adverse political impacts by allaying a war-weary American people that the war would soon be over and things back to normal. But when that didn’t happen, the political fallout was more acute and this dynamic quickly undermined the credibility of the entire effort. The take-away here is that it’s better to keep these comments focused on progress towards securing strategic objectives rather than promising timelines that are unrealistic and can’t be achieved.
Regarding popular support for the war, the administration made no effort beforehand to mobilize the American people and the Congress to get behind it. In contrast, during the lead up to Operation Desert Storm, President George H.W. Bush used the debate in Congress to build popular support. Then, when Congress voted to authorize the operation, which was followed by the UN passing several resolutions supporting the war aims, there was strong domestic support for the Persian Gulf War. That support was sustained until the war was completed on favorable terms. The Trump administration chose a different path, and as a result, domestic support for the war started well below 50% and has only declined since then. As of this writing over two-thirds of the American people oppose the war, including a sizable number of self-identified Republicans. The lack of domestic support for previous wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, played a major role in them being concluded without having achieved their stated strategic aims. Moreover, the current unpopularity of this war is weakening the hand of our diplomats who are working to secure acceptable peace terms from the Iranian leadership who are very aware of the war’s unpopularity in the U.S. and the upcoming November elections.
Both Clausewitz and Weinberger-Powell state that when superpowers go to war, they should use overwhelming force to ensure that the stated strategic aims are achieved swiftly and decisively. Here, the confusion surrounding which of the many stated strategic objectives were of highest priority detracted from properly matching the size and composition of U.S. forces necessary to secure those stated goals. For example, if regime change was truly sought (as President Trump initially stated), then a sizable ground force was needed to seize decisive terrain (likely Tehran), depose the Iranian leadership, and to replace it with an interim government. If the strategic aim was to eliminate the Iranian nuclear capability, then we needed to deploy a ground force to seize those facilities and subsequently fully dismantle the program so it could not be resurrected. While Israeli intelligence provided detailed information to guide the IDF’s initial series of attacks on known scientists involved with the Iranian nuclear program, the United States likely would also need to eliminate the intellectual capability needed to restart the program, meaning we would have to find and detain/deport those scientists who contributed, or could contribute, to that program. This also was not done.
As it stands, by starting a war which we have not quickly and decisively concluded, we have strengthened the hand of the inferior power and given them a boost of confidence to continue to fight. Moreover, to date, as I previously mentioned, even the bombing of critical civilian infrastructure has not changed the strategic calculus, and if anything, has inadvertently strengthened the hand of the regime as they seek to isolate their political opposition. All of this has created a situation where the Iranian regime now thinks it can stop and regulate traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, including demanding a tax for safe transit. This is completely unacceptable to Americans and the rest of the Western world.
This leaves us with several bad options:
- continuing the current path (including the bombing campaign as necessary), pressing for a peace agreement with acceptable terms while hoping something changes the strategic calculus (e.g., that the will of Iranian leadership to sustain the fight collapses or that we get lucky during one of our combat strikes killing those in leadership who want to fight on, bringing to the fore new leaders who are more inclined to accept our peace terms);
- escalating the war by launching a major ground operation to seize Tehran to put in place a new regime who agrees to conclude the war on our terms;
- ending the war immediately and accept a loss (essentially allowing Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz and possibly the resumption of their nuclear program).
Given this “Hobson’s choice,” I recommend course of action 1, because losing carries unacceptable economic costs and significant strategic risk. If we allow Iran to keep control of the Strait of Hormuz and to continue its nuclear program, the American and global economies will significantly suffer, U.S. credibility will decline, and deterrence will be weakened. Likewise, escalating carries marked risk for the U.S. economy, U.S. national security interests, and global stability. Accordingly, at this point the United States should continue to strike Iran and use covert operations to pressure regime leadership into accepting our terms that include no Iranian interference in the Strait of Hormuz and the end of their nuclear program (with a rigorous UN oversight program to ensure compliance).
Some recent open-source reporting suggests the misery experienced by the Iranian people is demoralizing them and if these feelings become more widespread it could help the opposition regain its footing in the nearer-term, a development which could influence the regime to accept American peace terms.
Perhaps the most important factor regarding how long the regime can holdout is to what extent are Iranian drone and missile replenishment operations keeping up with the losses being inflicted by American attacks? The answer is not clear from current open-source reporting. In any case, if course of action 1 prevails and peace is reached, the U.S. should immediately increase its efforts to support the Iranian political opposition and moderate elements within the regime. Domestic pressure within Iran is the best way to ensure the regime complies with any agreement they make. Even the specter of resumption of American attacks is only significant to the extent that the regime feels an existential threat that they could be deposed from within as a result.
Even if we continue to pursue course of action 1, however, we must recognize that there is a real chance it may not work—we cannot sustain the status quo indefinitely. This on-again, off-again war is depleting our munition stocks and potential adversaries (especially China) are closely watching. Moreover, if prices continue to stay high and the war grinds to a stalemate, the American people will demand an end, which essentially means accepting a loss, the costs of which are addressed above and prohibitive.
Thus, although I strongly opposed starting this war in the first place, at this point, it would be prudent for the United States to plan for the possibility that we may need to send in a sizable ground force to seize Tehran and depose its leadership so that the war may be concluded on our terms. Still, considering the significant strategic risk (i.e., further economic disruption, a changing international strategic calculus possibly aiding China, and the real possibility that an insurgency could rise in Iran, thereby thwarting our efforts to conclude peace with any new regime, etc.), this course of action should only be taken as a last resort.
Sadly, once again we find ourselves struggling with protracted conflict stemming from a war of choice, and it was a bad one. Nations ignore the wisdom of Clausewitz at their peril. The ghosts of Weinberger and Powell are also whispering to us, but we are not listening. If the situation was as dire as the administration stated in February, we should have aided the Iranian opposition in January, and even possibly used covert operations to support them. If, in the President’s judgment, war had to be pursued, he should have mobilized the American people, Congress, and our friends and allies behind such a monumental action beforehand. He also should have unified us behind a smart plan with clearly crafted and communicated strategic aims and matched that with the overwhelming force necessary to quickly and decisively achieve them. The wisdom of Clausewitz and Weinberger-Powell make clear, if we are not ready to do all that, then don’t start a war. Use other approaches and exercise patience until you have achieved your strategic goals.
When will we ever learn?
Chris Gibson, a decorated Army combat veteran and former Member of Congress from upstate New York, is a Senior Fellow and Professor of Practice with the Hannah Arendt Center at Bard College. A past president of Siena College with a Ph.D. from Cornell, Gibson is a former Hoover National Security Affairs Fellow, a current participant with Hoover’s Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict, and the author of The Spirit of Philadelphia, a book published by Routledge in May 2025.
