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Charles Calomiris


Charles Calomiris is the Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions at the Columbia University Graduate School of Business and a professor at Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs. He is a member of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, was a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and is a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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Recent Commentary

“Too Big to Fail”? The Problem Is Still With Us

by Charles Calomiris, Allan H. Meltzervia Hoover Digest
Wednesday, July 9, 2014

Dodd-Frank was supposed to ensure that individual institutions could no longer threaten our entire financial system. Yet Dodd-Frank itself has failed. We don’t need more regulations; we need deeper bank equity.

Houses of Cards

by Charles Calomiris, Stephen Habervia Hoover Digest
Monday, April 21, 2014

The mortgage market came tumbling down because activists, regulators, and lenders laid such a wobbly foundation.

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The Illusion of Reform and the Next Housing Crisis

by Stephen Haber, Charles Calomirisvia e21, Economic Policies for the 21st Century
Tuesday, February 25, 2014

This article is adapted from the authors’ new book, Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit (Princeton Universi...

Bank of America
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The Blight of Bank Bailouts

by Charles Calomiris, Stephen Habervia Washington Examiner
Monday, February 24, 2014

Is there hope for reform? Perhaps not, at least until we recognize a major source of the world's government debt. When economists and politicians talk about the problem of unsustainable government debt, they often focus on the need to rein in government budgets and entitlement policies. 

Bank of America
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How Dodd-Frank Doubles Down on 'Too Big to Fail'

by Charles Calomiris, Allan H. Meltzervia Wall Street Journal
Thursday, February 13, 2014

The Dodd-Frank Act, passed in 2010, mandated hundreds of major regulations to control bank risk-taking, with the aim of preventing a repeat of the taxpayer bailouts of "too big to fail" financial institutions.

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Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit

by Stephen Haber, Charles Calomirisvia Princeton University Press
Thursday, February 6, 2014

Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.

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The Housing Crisis: What's the Fed's Excuse?

by Stephen Haber, Charles Calomirisvia News Hour
Thursday, February 6, 2014

The massive increases in risky mortgages and thin bank capital requirements underlying the financial crisis wouldn't have been possible without the Fed’s willing participation. But the Fed doesn't act alone. In this adaptation of their forthcoming book, Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber argue that the Fed is the product of legislation and politicking that have made the banking system fragile by design. Continue reading →

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Strange Bedfellows at the Bank

by Charles Calomiris, Stephen Habervia National Review Online
Tuesday, February 4, 2014

Leftist activists, with lawmakers’ support, worked with megabanks to lower lending standards for all.

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Why Banking Systems Succeed -- And Fail

by Stephen Haber, Charles Calomirisvia Foreign Affairs
Tuesday, December 17, 2013

People routinely blame politics for outcomes they don’t like, often with good reason: when the dolt in the cubicle down the hall gets a promotion because he plays golf with the boss, when a powerful senator delivers pork-barrel spending to his home state, when a well-connected entrepreneur obtains millions of dollars in government subsidies to buil

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An Insurance Policy Against Inflation

by Charles Calomirisvia Wall Street Journal
Monday, March 12, 2012

The Fed should increase its cash reserve requirement for banks in order to prevent excessive credit creation...