Angelo M. Codevilla


Angelo M. Codevilla, a native of Italy, is a professor emeritus of international relations at Boston University. He was a US naval officer and Foreign Service officer and served on the Senate Intelligence Committee as well as on presidential transition teams. For a decade he was a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is the author of fourteen books, including War Ends and Means, The Character of Nations, Advice to War Presidents, and most recently, To Make and Keep Peace Among Ourselves and with All Nations. He is a student of the classics as well as of European literature; he is also a commercial grape grower. Video: Angelo Codevilla on the importance of history in current policy decisions.

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Time To Dump The Baby—And The Bathwater

by Angelo M. Codevillavia Strategika
Monday, October 31, 2016

The premise that the current foreign policy’s major features (e.g., Iran deal, tergiversation regarding ISIS, etc.) are peculiar to the Obama administration is mistaken. In fact, these policies are manifestations or extrapolations of attitudes longstanding and pervasive among U.S. policymakers of both parties. As such, they are sure to transcend Obama. They will characterize U.S. foreign policy unless and until these officials, academics, and media figures are replaced by persons with different mentalities.

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Terrorism From Within

by Angelo M. Codevillavia Strategika
Monday, August 15, 2016

On September 11, 2001, specifically the moment passengers on UA93 learned that three other hijacked liners had been crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the U.S. forever ceased to be vulnerable to such hijackings. Never again would passengers follow the FAA’s regulation not to interfere with hijackers. Not ISIS or anyone else can change that.

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NATO In The Baltics: And Then What?

by Angelo M. Codevillavia Military History in the News
Monday, July 25, 2016

On July 24, 1941, Secretary Of War Henry L. Stimson, reacting to yet another rise in tensions with Japan, ordered that U.S. forces in the Philippines be reinforced. Subsequently, the Philippine Commonwealth Army was called into direct U.S. service. Douglas MacArthur was recalled to active duty and placed in overall command.

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Peace Through Predominance

by Angelo M. Codevillavia Military History in the News
Wednesday, July 13, 2016

On July 8, 1853, Commodore Matthew C. Perry sailed into Tokyo Bay with four ships to deliver a letter from U.S. President Millard Fillmore proposing peaceful commercial relations. The Japanese refused to accept the letter, until Perry made it clear that this would result in a cannonade from his ships that would have devastated downtown Tokyo.

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Ending America’s Civil War, And Restarting It

by Angelo M. Codevillavia Military History in the News
Thursday, July 7, 2016

Between June 29 and July 4, 1913, some 53,000 Union and Confederate veterans of the Civil War gathered at Gettysburg, where many had shot and bayonetted each other fifty years earlier. They embraced—often tearfully—dressed in Blue and Gray, surrounded by the flags under which each side had fought. President Woodrow Wilson told them, “We have found one another again as brothers and comrades in arms, enemies no longer, generous friends rather, our battles long past, the quarrel forgotten—except that we shall not forget the splendid valor.”

Analysis and Commentary

Strategika: Issue 33: The Strategic Ramifications Of A Fractured EU

by Andrew Roberts, Angelo M. Codevilla, Josef Joffevia Strategika
Wednesday, July 6, 2016

The latest issue of Strategika is now online.

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Unity, Strategy, And Will

by Angelo M. Codevillavia Strategika
Friday, July 1, 2016

The meaning of any nation’s membership in or departure from any “union” or alliance, especially with regard to geopolitical strategies, depends entirely on the nature and degree of that unity or alliance—in short, on the extent to which these represent a common will. History teaches that international organizations, ranging from formal “unions” to informal alliances, tend to obscure the members’ differing wills, and to be hindrances to rational strategizing, individual and collective.

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Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, The South China Sea, And Offensive Use Of Defensive Positions

by Angelo M. Codevillavia Military History in the News
Friday, July 1, 2016

On July 3, 1863, as General George Meade’s Union troops were pouring rifle and artillery fire from behind their redoubts onto George Pickett’s Virginians charging up Cemetery Ridge on the last day of the Battle of Gettysburg, they yelled: “Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!” That is because, on December 13, 1862, Union troops had suffered the Civil War’s most one-sided defeat when they had charged against Confederates dug in on Marye’s Heights.

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Are Traditional US Security Guarantees Still Sufficient?

by Angelo M. Codevillavia Analysis
Thursday, March 24, 2016

To defend allies against nuclear-armed nations we must become able to protect ourselves against missile attack. Our missile defense programs are not serious about that and cannot lead to that. To avoid defending ourselves, we defend allies badly. The United States has shelved the technologies that make for seriousness in missile defense: launching surface-based interceptors on the basis of data from orbit and striking missiles as they rise into space with orbit-based lasers. Taking these technologies off our shelf before others develop them is essential if our guarantees are to safeguard rather than endanger all concerned.

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America Entered Into A Raw Deal With Iran

by Angelo M. Codevillavia Strategika
Monday, March 14, 2016

On January 16, 2016, governments in Europe and America ended the sanctions they had imposed on Iran (the U.S. since 1979, Europe since 2007 and increasingly since 2012) for reasons internal to themselves. Iran had not changed the behavior that had led to the imposition of sanctions—neither its nuclear program nor its leadership of the Shia side in the current round of the Sunni-Shia war.