Williamson Murray

Williamson Murray


Williamson Murray serves as a Minerva Fellow at the Naval War College. He graduated from Yale University in 1963 with honors in history. He then served five years as an officer in the US Air Force, including a tour in Southeast Asia with the 314th Tactical Airlift Wing (C-130s). He returned to Yale University, where he received his PhD in military-diplomatic history under advisers Hans Gatzke and Donald Kagan. He taught two years in the Yale history department before moving on to Ohio State University in fall 1977 as a military and diplomatic historian; in 1987 he received the Alumni Distinguished Teaching Award. He retired from Ohio State in 1995 as a professor emeritus of history.

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Have We Forgotten the Middle East?

by Williamson Murrayvia Strategika
Saturday, February 1, 2014
Is our NATO ally Turkey emerging as a regional power that is hostile, neutral, o

The Case for Optimism in Turkey

by Williamson Murrayvia Strategika
Thursday, December 12, 2013

Williamson Murray on why Turkey’s prominent role in the Middle East will actually redound to America’s benefit.

Hoover Institution Archives Poster Collection, RU/SU 196
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The U.S. Should Be Thankful for Turkey

by Williamson Murrayvia Strategika
Sunday, December 1, 2013

The emergence of Turkey as the most powerful regional player in the Middle East should not surprise Americans. Of all the Middle Eastern Islamic nations, it is the only one that has adapted to the modern world with any degree of success.

Hoover Institution Archives Poster Collection: IR 54
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Sanctions and Iran

by Williamson Murrayvia Strategika
Wednesday, May 1, 2013

A MILITARY MAKEOVER: Transforming the Military

with Williamson Murray, James Wirtzvia Uncommon Knowledge
Monday, December 15, 2003

Despite overwhelming victories by our armed forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States military establishment is caught up in a major debate on the structure of the military. On one side are traditionalists who emphasize the importance of large ground forces. On the other side are reformers who want our forces to be lighter, smaller, faster, and more high-tech. What are the lessons of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq? Who's right, the traditionalists or the reformers?