- Military
- History
- Revitalizing History
It should not surprise that Iran sought to close the Strait of Hormuz when hostilities began in February 2026, or that it would use the Strait as leverage in negotiations. Controlling vital sea-lanes, particularly strategic chokepoints, is not a new dimension of warfare or coercion. Whether the Strait of Gibraltar in the Punic Wars, the Turkish Straits in World War I, used to block shipments to Russia; the Strait of Malacca, essential to Japan’s war effort in World War II; or now the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, vital chokepoints shape the battle space and the economic and political dimensions and consequences of conflict.
The ways of controlling and blocking chokepoints have evolved. They have progressed from ships and cannon to sea mines and, in World War I, to shore-based torpedo batteries in the Turkish Straits. Submarines came of age in World War II, and a chokepoint’s funneling of shipping makes the submarine’s mission of hunting and killing easier. Today, missiles and drones add to an adversary’s quiver.
Except for the Panama Canal, the world’s vital chokepoints are in Eurasia. Each is different yet the same. The Strait of Gibraltar, the Turkish Straits, the Suez Canal and Bab al Mandab, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca differ in the geography that forms the chokepoint and the shore topography that advantages control. Shipping traffic congestion, prudent transit speeds, and ease or difficulty of navigation vary in each.
What is common when sailing through Eurasia’s chokepoints is that their respective value and importance to global and regional trade become strikingly apparent. Tallying the numbers of ships that pass through each day does not capture the congestion and massive flow of shipping that funnel through these strategic waterways. Their global dimension is reinforced by the plethora of national flags and the variety of accents on ship-to-ship radio channels as ships’ masters coordinate and pass maneuvering intentions.
The means of controlling chokepoints have changed; geography will not. For the foreseeable future, seaborne commerce will prefer the efficiency of Eurasia’s chokepoints. Alternatives, such as the rush to build oil and gas pipelines from Gulf Arab states to Red Sea ports to avoid the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, may provide some relief and comfort. However, those pipelines are equally, if not more, susceptible than shipping to missile and drone attacks and sabotage. Nor will pipelines match the volumes moved by sea. The ice-diminished Arctic is hailed as a new Asia-Europe sea lane, but it remains highly seasonal and navigationally challenging even during optimal months and therefore lacks the predictability of non-Arctic routes.
So, what’s to be done and not done?
First, think beyond the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab and consider all of Eurasia’s chokepoints. The U.S. must be unequivocal in its support of the legal right of foreign ships and aircraft, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to freely travel through all international straits.
While fees may be appropriate to maintain the infrastructure and services for the Panama and Suez canals, the U.S. must stand firm against any fees, charges, etc. levied for passage through international straits.
As methods to impede shipping in chokepoints have evolved, we must prioritize more effective and less costly ways to defeat them. The speed of installation of those systems on ships and aircraft must match the speed of research and development. We must enable, not hinder allies’ and regional coalition partners’ adoption of systems we develop, and be open to rapid adoption of effective systems developed by our allies.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, beyond disrupting global commerce, has shown our overreliance on logistic hubs within the Persian Gulf. As is frequently the case, we must not allow logistics, particularly contested logistics, to be an afterthought. We must reassess our logistic contingencies in maritime Eurasia, with particular attention to chokepoint interruptions or closures. We must routinely assess and relentlessly exercise the movement of supplies and ammunition to these new locations.
Keeping chokepoints free and open demands persistent credible regional naval presence. The smaller U.S. Fleet demands serious consideration of foreign basing of ships and aircraft, and assured access to relevant maintenance and repair facilities to support those operations. Absent foreign basing or a larger fleet, we must make regional arrangements for nearby rest-and-relaxation ports for extended deployments. Ideally, those locations would align with maintenance and repair locations.
Above all, we must not step away from America’s role as guarantor of freedom of the seas and the unimpeded flow of maritime commerce. That comes with a cost, but the cost is far greater if we cede that privilege to another.
