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There is one sure-fire way to prevent adversaries and enemies from weaponizing chokepoints against the United States: Maintain an economy that does not require goods and commodities to pass through them.
The United States is not especially reliant on narrow waterways. Many goods arriving or departing the U.S. over water cross the Pacific without passing through chokepoints.[1] And Washington is working hard to reduce reliance on China, especially in strategic sectors. The U.S., blessed with abundant energy and food, can re-industrialize and reduce the need for seaborne imports. In any event, America is a trade-deficit nation and might actually benefit from a reduction in foreign trade.
Finally, American trade this decade has been migrating to countries where goods and commodities cross only land borders. For instance, trade among the members of the USMCA pact is increasing. Mexico replaced China as America’s biggest trading partner in early 2023, and Canada is now No. 2. In short, the U.S. economy is already reducing reliance on ships passing through dangerous passageways.
Not many American goods sail through the world’s busiest chokepoint, the Strait of Malacca, where last year more than 102,500 vessels transited. Goods to and from India transit that chokepoint, but India is only America’s 11th-largest trade partner. Also, not many U.S. imports or exports flowed through the world’s most-famous waterway at the moment, the Strait of Hormuz, before its closures this year. Similarly, not much Suez Canal or Bosporus-Dardanelles traffic is America-related.
Nonetheless, the United States is reliant on other chokepoints, in particular the Panama Canal, the English Channel, and the Strait of Gibraltar.
So, what should America do about them?
With regard to the Panama Canal—the most important chokepoint for U.S. commercial and military traffic—President Trump’s National Security Strategy for his second term adopts an historic shift by prioritizing the Western Hemisphere.
Trump meant it. From the first days of his second term, he has worked to remove China’s enterprises from the Canal Zone, most famously ejecting Hong Kong’s CK Hutchison Holdings from port operations at both the Atlantic and Pacific ends of the zone. Yet Trump still has a lot of work to do, especially ending China’s concession to build the fourth bridge over the Canal.
The other important chokepoints involve England, France, Spain, and Morocco. A good way of protecting chokepoints is maintaining strong partnerships with countries that border them. Trump’s relationship with Spain is rocky—as it should be—but he deserves great credit for upgrading ties with Rabat during both his first and second terms.
A model initiative in establishing partnerships with chokepoint states is the Department of War’s April 13 Major Defense Cooperation Partnership with Indonesia, which the Pentagon stated will serve “as a guiding framework to advance bilateral defense cooperation.”[2] Indonesia, the world’s largest archipelagic state, is a needed partner: The Indonesian island of Sumatra forms the southern side of the Malacca Strait. “Given the renewed importance of strategic sea line chokepoints, like the Strait of Malacca, this U.S.-Indonesia defense pact ensures the free flow of maritime traffic,” James Fanell of the Geneva Center for Security Policy told me after the inking of the agreement.[3]
And what about the Strait of Hormuz? Although America does not directly rely on the waterway for goods or commodities, the chokepoint has impacted American gas prices, as Vice President JD Vance made clear on August 13 when he said that America’s “goal No. 1” in the Iran war was keeping “oil and gas cheap for Americans all over our country.”[4]
Trump’s solution to this standoff is simple: Defeat Iran and annex the strait. On August 14 in a speech in New York he said he would soon claim the waterway as “a territory of the United States.”[5]
Iran’s regime reacted with derision, but last December its president declared that his country was at war with America.[6] One of the consequences of losing a war is losing territory. There’s no basis for annexing an international waterway, but the U.S. can annex Iranian territory on the north side of the strait. That’s one way of preventing Iran from blocking the chokepoint.
On the topic of the U.S. possessing territory bordering a vital waterway, the melting of Arctic ice is creating a new shipping route that will substantially reduce transits through the Strait of Malacca, the Bab al-Mandab, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Gibraltar. That new chokepoint, which ships traveling to and from East Asia and Europe will ply, is the 51-mile-wide Bering Strait. America’s 49th state sits on its eastern side.
—Gordon G. Chang
Gordon G. Chang is the author of Plan Red: China’s Project to Destroy America and The Coming Collapse of China. Follow him on X @GordonGChang.
[1] Ships traveling between America’s East Coast and East Asia pass through the Panama Canal, but at times of emergency they can of course be loaded or unloaded at West Coast ports.
[2] “Joint Statement on Establishment of the U.S.-Indonesia Major Defense Cooperation Partnership,” U.S. Department of War, April 13, 2026, https://media.defense.gov/2026/Apr/13/2003911810/-1/-1/1/READOUT-OF-SECRETARY-OF-WAR-PETE-HEGSETH-MEETING-WITH-INDONESIA-MINISTER-OF-DEFENSE-SJAFRIE-SJAMSOEDDIN.PDF.
[3] James Fanell, e-mail message to author, May 11, 2026.
[4] “The Will Cain Show, Thursday, August 13,” Fox News, August 13, 2026, https://www.foxnews.com/video/6403369630112.
[5] Tom Howell Jr., “State of Hormuz? Trump Jokes About Annexing Middle East Waterway at Heart of Iran War,” Washington Times, August 14, 2026, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/aug/14/state-hormuz-trump-jokes-annexing-middle-east-waterway-heart-iran-war/.
[6] Gregory Svirnovskiy, “Iran at War with the West and Israel, Says Iran’s President,” POLITICO, December 27, 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/12/27/iran-war-israel-trump-00706976.
