The Historic and Irrelevant May 7 UK Local Elections

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As we await the June 18 Makerfield parliamentary by-election, which could lead to Greater Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham deposing Keir Starmer as prime minister, we should consider what the May 7 elections say about the state of the parties.

On that day, a variety of contests took place across the UK that were collectively labeled the “local elections.” They received tremendous media coverage and pundit commentary, with many arguing they represented a generational disruption in British politics. This essay therefore reviews the election results, discusses the successes and failures of the political parties, and asks whether the outcomes are as consequential as many have claimed.

Hot Takes

Because the power of British subnational governments is constricted by Westminster (the British equivalent to “Washington”), we might question whether the results deserved all the subsequent attention. The answer is that they matter more for politics than for policy. The commentariat needs clicks and views, and elections of any type are irresistible. Furthermore, the outcomes allowed the media to continue its two long-standing forms of sensationalistic coverage: hyping Nigel Farage and his populist-right Reform Party and criticizing Prime Minister Keir Starmer.

There is no denying that Reform won the largest number of seats in the English local council elections, as discussed in more detail below. The populist-left Green Party also made gains. Two social democratic nationalist parties, Plaid Cymru in Wales and the Scottish National Party (SNP), were the top performers in their regions. The two “major” parties, the Conservatives and especially Labour, suffered considerable losses across the country. However, the more centrist Liberal Democratic Party (Lib Dems) continued its multiyear trend, largely ignored by the media, of winning local and national elections.

One common piece of post-election conventional wisdom is therefore that the traditional party system is breaking up, with some claiming that Reform is on an unstoppable path to majority or plurality status. Some believe Labour and the Conservatives may collapse, break apart, or become junior coalition partners to the populist parties of the left and right. If the center is disappearing, then centrist parties may well go with it.

A second popular hot take is that Labour’s woes are the responsibility of Keir Starmer. A variety of charges are made against him, ranging from his leadership style to inadequate preparation to a lack of “the vision thing.” The media and pundit classes, who have developed a thirst for intrigue and coups, are beside themselves with joy at the prospect of yet another prime ministerial regicide, which they are both reporting and encouraging.

There is no reason to uncritically accept these bits of conventional wisdom, however. The election results were more complicated, and the UK’s political future is less predictable, than the bulk of the commentary suggests. For example, because local offices have little power in the UK, they can attract many protest votes and may therefore have few implications for future meaningful elections. And third parties have previously made gains for unimportant offices that did not translate into success in the next parliamentary election.

In addition, the personalization of politics mistakes causes for effects. Starmer did not create Britain’s problems, and his divided party cannot be unified by mythical political saviors. The current attempt to dislodge him, a low-budget version of Game of Thrones, is “embarrassing” for Britain and is turning the nation into “a global laughing stock,” not to mention potentially causing economic damage. In the meantime, efforts to addresses Britain’s serious economic, defense, regulatory, and social welfare challenges are once again postponed into a future that never seems to arrive.

These elections may therefore prove to be both historic but also irrelevant. The scale of the Reform and Green victories in England, as well as the strength of nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales, is unprecedented. On the other hand, the elections may prove inconsequential for local governance as well as a poor guide to the 2029 parliamentary elections.

“Local Elections”

The offices up for election were quite varied, and some were not local at all. They included a selection of English local authorities (similar to US city and county governments), the Scottish and Welsh parliaments (slightly parallel to state legislatures), and some England mayors. These contests not only use multiple electoral systems but also are held on varying cycles. For more information about local governmental structures and the electoral systems in place, see here, here, and here.

Despite the considerable media focus on the outcomes, such governments can only do what Parliament allows. Many are burdened by semifunded mandates and limited taxation authority. Some—including Birmingham, the second largest city in the UK—are so financially squeezed that they have essentially declared bankruptcy.

Elections to these offices are therefore classic opportunities for protest voting; because only Parliament can make consequential decisions, voters are free to support any local candidate and party with little consequence. The low stakes also reduce the incentives to use tactical voting, which is becoming increasingly common in parliamentary elections (as in the recent Gorton and Denton by-election). While the consequences are real for the politicians involved, the winning and losing parties have less to cheer and fear than the media coverage suggests.

In addition, the next parliamentary election is unlikely to occur until 2029. Three years is an eternity in politics, and nobody can predict the state of the nation or world at such a distant point. The May 7 electoral gains of Reform, the Greens, and the Lib Dems do not necessarily say anything about the next parliamentary contest.

What Happened?

English Council Elections

The Reform Party was undoubtedly the main winner. It received the highest share of votes, the largest number of seats gained, and the most councils won. It was followed by the Greens and the Liberal Democrats, who both made gains across all three dimensions.

The Reform Party picked up 1,452 seats, and the Green Party followed up its recent Gorton and Denton by-election victory by securing 441 more seats. The Lib Dems emerged as the only mainstream, centrist party to make gains (+155). By contrast, the Labour Party lost 1,498 seats and the Conservatives lost 563.

Table 1: English councillor results

Party	Change	Won
Reform	+1,452	1,454
Greens	+441	587
Liberal Democrats	+155	844
Conservatives	−563	801
Labour	−1,498	1,068
Independent/Others	+35	213
Residents Association	−31	36
Aspire	+9	33

Source: BBC

In addition, Reform won the majority of fourteen councils while the Greens gained five and the Lib Dems gained one. Labour lost thirty-eight and the Tories lost six. Nevertheless, the biggest winner was “no overall control,” which was the status of twenty-three more councils after the election. This could portend a fragmented political future in which the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system is no longer able to generate governing partisan majorities.

Table 2: English council results

Party	Change	Won
No Overall Control	+23	64
Reform	+14	14
Greens	+5	5
Liberal Democrats	+1	15
Conservatives	−6	9
Labour	−38	28
Aspire	+1	1
Independent/Others	0	0
Residents Association	0	0

Source: BBC

On the other hand, the 26% estimated vote share for Reform was four percentage points lower than in the 2025 local elections, a decline rarely reported by the media. Labour’s percentage fell even less, from 20% to 17%, yet this produced a very different outcome.

The Greens moved from 11% in 2025 to 18% in 2026, while the Lib Dem vote declined slightly, from 17% to 16%. The Conservatives actually gained two percentage points, which also went largely unreported.

Table 3: English council projected vote share

Party	Percent	Change
Reform	26	−4
Greens	18	+7
Liberal Democrats	16	−1
Conservatives	17	+2
Labour	17	−3

Source: BBC

This points out the complex way in which FPTP translates votes into seats; how votes are geographically distributed can matter more than the total number of votes a party receives. One prominent recent example is the 2024 parliamentary elections, in which Labour won about a third of the popular vote but about two-thirds of the seats.

Consequences?

As this suggests, while the outcomes were good for Reform, the Greens, and the Lib Dems, the trends are not entirely consistent with the media hype of the Reform Party as the inevitable next party of government.

The most important consequence of these elections may be the fourteen councils now run by Reform and the five now run by the Greens. Opposition is easier than governing, and the public will discover what populist rhetoric means in practice. If Reform is focused on banning “woke lanyards” and the Greens on Gaza declarations, while garbage piles up and libraries close, they may develop a reputation for incompetence and irresponsibility. As the FT reported, “Reform UK ran a council for a year. Things went badly.” The Labour and Conservative parties will undoubtedly be watching closely the new crop of populist councillors, who may find positive change a difficult task given all the constraints.

In addition, the story of a Nigel Farage party performing well in a not-very-meaningful election is not new. In the 2019 elections for the European Union (EU) Parliament, the Brexit Party won 30.5% of the vote and twenty-nine of seventy-three seats. The Lib Dems placed second (19.6%), followed by Labour (13.6%), the Greens (11.8%), the Conservatives (8.8%), and SNP (3.6%). A BBC story noted that “It was a tough night for both Labour and the Conservatives. The Brexit Party swept across Britain, and the Liberal Democrats and Green Party also made gains.” With a few edits, this headline could have been seen after the recent local elections.

In the parliamentary election later that year, while the Brexit Party did not run candidates in Conservative constituencies, it did contest 275 seats and won only 2.01% of the vote. Granted it was an unusual election, given Boris Johnson’s “Get Brexit Done” theme, but politics is an unusual business, and no election outcomes are preordained. The UKIP and Reform parties subsequently won few councillors in the local elections of 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024. Such results are a warning to observers who try to extrapolate recent returns to future contests.

Scottish Parliament (Holyrood)

In the United States, the states have legitimacy and authority. They predate the union, are incorporated into the very name of the nation, and retain all powers not explicitly given by the Constitution to the national government. In practice, the federal government has grown considerably over time, but a great deal of consequential taxing, spending, and regulating is done by the states (and their localities).

By contrast, the national legislatures of Scotland (Holyrood) and Wales (Senedd) have no constitutional right to exist. The process of devolution saw the national government creating these bodies and giving them certain (but somewhat different) powers, but crucial reserved powers are retained by Parliament. In addition, any law passed by the Welsh or Scottish governments can be overturned by Westminster, although this has happened only once.

In 2026, all 129 seats in the Scottish Parliament were up for election. Votes were cast using the additional-member system, which means that voters choose an individual at the constituency level as well as a party through list voting (at regional levels).

The incumbent Scottish National Party lost six seats but remained the largest party (58) by a wide margin, an outcome one observer termed a “crushing plurality.” As in the English council elections, the Reform Party (+17), Greens (+7), and Lib Dems (+6) all gained seats, although since the first was competing for the first time, votes cannot be compared over time.

It was a bad day for both mainstream parties in Scotland, as in England. Labour lost five seats and retained seventeen, while the Tories lost nineteen and ended up at twelve.

When the unit of analysis is broad ideological grouping, the center right and populist right (Tories and Reform) should have little impact on lawmaking, as the combined center left and populist left parties will have eighty-eight seats, which is twenty-three more than needed for a majority.

Welsh Parliament (Senedd)

This election used a proportional representation system, with a closed list and sixteen six-person constituencies. Adopted in 2026, it replaced the additional-member system, and this change complicates comparisons over time.

In the new system, voters choose parties, not individual candidates, and the winning candidates are selected from party lists (by constituency) according to their vote share (by constituency). Because such PR systems are ideal for third parties, as popular vote share is much more closely connected to seat outcomes than through FPTP, it was no surprise that Plaid Cymru and Reform made substantial gains.

Plaid Cymru is a Welsh nationalist party in the progressive-left space that officially favors independence but does not appear to be in a hurry about it. It has promoted Welsh language and culture and pushes for additional powers from Westminster.

The party increased its representation in the Senedd by thirty seats, with a new total of forty-three. While this is six votes short of a majority, it will likely have few policy differences with the nine Labour Party members (−20), two Green Party members (+2), and single Lib Dem (no change). As in Scotland, the center right and populist right parties may prove mathematically irrelevant. The thirty-four Reform (+34) and seven Tory legislators (−6) are unlikely to derail many votes, although the former may help to shape debates.

When Wales and Scotland are considered together, we see that while Reform made gains in both nations, it was the progressive-left national parties—SNP and Plaid Cymru—that won working pluralities. The Conservatives and Labour both saw their numbers drop considerably. Whether these outcomes should be considered victories for the left side of the political spectrum, or victories for populism and nationalism, or maybe both, is unclear. For instance, Welsh politics could simply replace its traditional Red-Green alliance (Labour + Plaid) with a Green-Red alliance, and the SNP could carry on largely as before. Although Reform made impressive gains, this may ultimately translate into little policy influence.

Conclusions

The State of the Parties

Taken together, the 2026 local elections saw five parties able to claim some type of victory.

I will start with the Liberal Democrats, as no other observer will. This overlooked party continued a pattern of steady gains at local levels, which began almost a decade ago, not to mention its resurgence in the 2024 parliamentary elections. Any other party with such a sustained record of success at two levels of government would receive considerable media attention and pundit interest, but because the Lib Dems are considered quiet, responsible, community oriented, and antipopulist, they are largely ignored unless the party leader, Ed Davey, engages in stunts.

This practice distorts political reality as it sidelines aspects of the center that are growing in favor of hyping populist trends. There is clearly a constituency for a centrist party, and while it may not extend across the nation, the Lib Dems can win in the old Liberal Party heartlands of the Celtic Fringe (particularly Scotland and Southwest England) and the South (the Southeast and London). The Tories should pay heed, as the Lib Dems are knocking down its blue wall.

Even if the Lib Dems stay at seventy-two MPs in the next election, the party could play a decisive role in the next Westminster government if party fragmentation continues. They might even prove to be the largest centrist party if Labour and the Tories lose their own core supporters by trying to chase Reform.

The Reform Party can justifiably point to the English local council results as evidence of political gains. Nevertheless, its popular vote dropped by four percentage points in comparison to last year’s local elections (albeit for different seats), and current voting patterns may not hold up in a future parliamentary election where the stakes are high and tactical voting is more likely. The 2019 EU elections indicate how victories for unimportant offices do not necessarily translate into subsequent meaningful wins. And can Reform effectively govern its new councils, a difficult task for any party in light of the many fiscal constraints?

The Green Party must be encouraged by the first half of 2026; first there was the Gorton and Denton parliamentary by-election victory and then winning over 400 new councillors, gaining control of two councils, and wins in the Senedd and, to a lesser degree, Holyrood. The party may not have done quite as well as it had hoped, but the momentum is positive.

Plaid Cymru and the SNP should be happy about the outcomes. Although neither achieved a legislative majority, both are in a position to form a minority government.

Both parties benefited from two factors: They are progressive and nationalist parties, which means they can position themselves as different from politics as usual. And because the combined left numbers are clearly more than the combined right numbers in both the Senedd and Holyrood, these parties should be able to govern on most questions.

The Scottish and Welsh results also complicate the media hype around Reform, but the London media care little about these regions, so the commentariat will pay them little heed (except to highlight Reform gains and Labour losses).

Labour and the Tories, by contrast, will be picking through the rubble and looking for small consolations. One FT story suggested that “although the scale of Labour losses weren’t [sic] as bad as some of the predictions, it was still considerable. No government has done as badly at this point in the parliament and gone on to win.” At the moment, many in the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP, i.e., the backbenchers) believe the solution is a change of leadership, possibly in the form of Andy Burnham, although some think this would scare the markets and not solve the underlying problem of a divided party.

For the Conservatives, they did win back Westminster Council and achieved some gains and holds in other parts of London. And their leader, Kemi Badenoch, has “successfully shored up support among MPs and donors over the past year” and seen her public approval ticking upward.

But the party is at a crossroads: Should it move to the populist right to chase Reform voters or stick to the traditional center-right? The local elections provide no certain answer, but if the party can convince itself that the outcome was not so bad, then this may provide some much-needed hope. A bit of delusion can be helpful in politics, and the Tories need to generate enthusiasm among volunteers, donors, elected officials, and potential candidates in the run-up to the 2029 elections.

Unite the Right (or the Left)?

Lastly, the “Lego-block” theory of elections suggests that if “right” and “left” parties simply united, then the result would be additive: for example, Reform (26%) + Conservative (17%) = 43% in local elections. The reality is more complicated, as there is no guarantee that such voters would support a formal or informal coalition. It may be, for example, that Reform voters are fed up with the Tories and would see a “Unite the Right” coalition as a form of betrayal. And Tories in Southern England might rather vote Lib Dem than support a party allied with Farage and Reform.

In addition, the Brexit issue has complicated partisan allegiances in ways that reverberate a decade after the referendum. As Sara Hobolt points out, Reform did best in the recent local and devolved elections in leave areas, “suggesting that Reform’s success reflects not simply dissatisfaction with the government, but a deeper realignment rooted in the political divisions exposed by Brexit.” Creating a unified “conservative” vote out of disparate partisan parts may prove more challenging than Lego-block logic suggests.