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Due Diligence And The U.S. Defend Forward Cyber Strategy

by Eric Talbot Jensen, Sean Wattsvia Lawfare
Tuesday, October 20, 2020

As its name implies, the 2018 US Department of Defense Defend Forward strategy is principally reactive. The strategy assumes that the United States will continue to suffer harm from competitors and malign actors through cyberspace. Accordingly, it outlines US reactions in order to preempt threats, defeat ongoing harm, and deter future harm. 

Due Diligence And The US Defend Forward Cyber Strategy

by Eric Talbot Jensen, Sean Wattsvia Aegis Paper Series
Thursday, October 15, 2020

This paper analyzes the international law principle of due diligence and its potential role in the United States’ emerging Defend Forward cyber strategy. The authors begin with a brief review of due diligence and recount recent efforts to apply due diligence in cyberspace. They then review past US experience with due diligence and conclude that renewed recognition of this principle might complement the Defend Forward strategy in cyberspace, if appropriately tailored.

Covert Deception, Strategic Fraud, And The Rule Of Prohibited Intervention

by Gary P. Cornvia Lawfare
Thursday, September 24, 2020

If information is power, then the corruption of information is the erosion, if not the outright usurpation, of power. This is especially true in the information age, where developments in the technological structure and global interconnectedness of information and telecommunications infrastructure have enabled states to engage in malicious influence campaigns at an unprecedented scope, scale, depth, and speed. 

Covert Deception, Strategic Fraud, And The Rule Of Prohibited Intervention

by Gary P. Cornvia Aegis Paper Series
Friday, September 18, 2020

The Digital Revolution and the evolution of the information environment have ushered in an unprecedented era of information conflict, with revisionist states using hostile, disinformation-based influence campaigns to subvert democratic governance and the rule of law. International law has struggled to keep pace. This essay argues for an interpretation of international law that would consider strategic, covert deception as a form of prohibited coercion in violation of the rule of nonintervention.

Persistent Aggrandizement? Israel's Cyber Defense Architecture

by Elena Chachkovia Lawfare
Monday, August 31, 2020

Since 2011, the Israeli government has worked to centralize and streamline cyber defense authorities and responsibilities. It has established a new civilian national security agency to oversee cybersecurity preparedness and monitor and respond to cyber threats. The government has also advanced comprehensive draft legislation in broad consultation with a variety of relevant stakeholders from the private sector and civil society to regulate the authorities and operations of that new agency.

Persistent Aggrandizement? Israel’s Cyber Defense Architecture

by Elena Chachkovia Aegis Paper Series
Wednesday, August 26, 2020

This essay compares Israel’s cyber defense architecture and recent reform with key concepts in current US strategy: Defend Forward and Persistent Engagement. It finds that the Israeli equivalent to Defend Forward is far less regulated than its US parallel, and that the Israeli version of Persistent Engagement at home allows domestic action and harnesses the private sector in ways that the US approach does not contemplate.

The Domestic Legal Framework For U.S. Military Cyber Operations

by Robert Chesneyvia Lawfare
Wednesday, August 5, 2020

Conventional wisdom holds that Congress has abandoned its duty regarding the government’s war powers. It is not hard to understand why. Between the agelessness and flexibility of the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMFs) and periodic unilateral uses of military force in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, the executive branch appears to act largely at its own discretion when it comes to conventional military operations.

Defend Forward And Cyber Countermeasures

by Ashley Deeksvia Aegis Paper Series
Tuesday, August 4, 2020

Understanding when and how states may lawfully deploy countermeasures is critical for states operating in the cyber arena—not only to understand their own options when injured but also to anticipate the responses that their cyber activities may trigger from other states. This essay examines the role that countermeasures may play in the US cyber strategy of Defend Forward and argues that some states are developing a lex specialis of cyber countermeasures.

The Domestic Legal Framework for US Military Cyber Operations

by Robert Chesneyvia Aegis Paper Series
Wednesday, July 29, 2020

With little fanfare, Congress and the executive branch have cooperated effectively over the past decade to build a legal architecture for military cyber operations. The resulting framework is not a familiar one to most observers, especially when compared to the parallel frameworks associated with conventional military operations and with intelligence activities. Yet it is no less important and worthy of study, particularly in light of the Pentagon’s commitment to the “defend forward” operational model.

Aegis: Security Policy In Depth

via Aegis Paper Series
Wednesday, May 27, 2020

Aegis explores legal and policy issues at the intersection of technology and national security.  Published in partnership with the Hoover Institution National Security, Technology and Law Working Group, it features long-form essays of the working group, examines major new books in the field, and carries podcasts and videos or the working group’s events in Washington and Stanford.

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Aegis explores legal and policy issues at the intersection of technology and national security.  Published in partnership with the Lawfare Blog, it features long-form essays of the Hoover Institution National Security, Technology and Law Working Group (the Aegis Paper Series), examines major new books in the field, and carries podcasts and videos or the working group’s events in Washington and Stanford.