The Defense of Taiwan: A Matter of Willingness, not Capability

Taiwan lies within the United States’ defense umbrella out of strategic necessity. It is the critical link in the First Island Chain. If the chain is broken, China will be able to roll up U.S. defenses, attacking Japan and the Philippines from their exposed, Pacific-facing flanks. Moreover, Taiwan is China’s most likely target, given these geostrategic realities and the threat that Taiwan’s democratic, capitalist regime poses to the Chinese Communist Party. The U.S. does have the means to defend Taiwan, particularly if it chooses to fight forward and engage China before it can envelop the island. U.S. submarines and island-based missiles can disrupt likely People’s Liberation Army pincer movements, and U.S. carrier strike groups, ground-based fighters, and strategic bombers can support Taiwan during an air campaign. The question is not whether Taiwan is within the Unites States’ defense perimeter, or whether the U.S. is capable of defending it. The question is whether the U.S. is willing to commit to Taiwan’s defense, and the possibility of a broader conflict with China.