Looking at international relations and security (IR&S) and foreign policy (FP) issues through the eyes of an innovation studies researcher presents a dialectic challenge. On the one hand, it is always restricted by the natural lack of knowledge about IR&S theories and facts; on the other, it may reveal some hidden tendencies on the crossroads between technology and IR&S/FP. In the case of emerging technologies1, this problem is further aggravated by the fact that most of them are in the relatively early stage of development. Considering these two problems, the text below should be considered as a trend- and problem-identifying effort rather than a scrupulous analysis of already clear and formed events and processes.
IR&S were always strongly influenced by emerging technologies and disruptive innovations – both directly (weapons, technology alliances in support of FP goals, etc.) and indirectly (economic and defense potentials, soft power and other).2 Be it new means of transportation and communications, nuclear arsenals or drugs against HIV – technology, like gravitation in physics, is constructing or reshaping spaces of IR&S/FP and influencing the pace of processes.
The current situation in technology development is challenging for IR&S. Not considering high-tech advances in traditional weaponry, like hypersonic missiles, we witness the rise and multiplication of emerging technologies with potentially transformative effects for the economy, politics, culture – and IR&S.
Among the most well-known3 are several umbrella high-tech domains: Artificial Intelligence (AI) and associated group of digital technologies like Internet of Things (IoT) and Big Data, blockchain, quantum computing, advanced robotics, self-driving cars and other autonomous systems, additive manufacturing (3D-printing), social networks, the new generation of biotech and genetic engineering and many others.
Technology-driven transformations of IR&S could be analyzed from three points of view:
- Technology-centric, where IR&S impacts are considered via the prism of emerging technologies’ features and trajectories (analogous to a “technology-push” approach in innovation studies).
- IR&S actor–centric, with the focus on challenges arising for elites and states, as well as for other actors (“demand pull”).
- Problem-centric – analyzing possible impacts of emerging technologies on some of the most important IR&S challenges and trends.
The new generation of emerging technologies are moving fast and step by step transforming our lives and IR&S. However, except for a few cases (drones, some cyber issues), review of their impact on IR&S still deals with potential futures, rather than actual scenarios, and is concentrated on what is technologically possible, rather than on what is politically or defense/security rational or desirable from a dominating paradigm (although in the era of tech “booms”, the line between these two realms appears to be blurry).
Undoubtedly, the most transformative potential for the IR&S (as well as for global economy) is offered by AI4 and, to a lesser extent, the IoT – with some supportive advanced Information Technologies (IT). We can envision at least several layers of it.
The most obvious is in the defense, security and intelligence area, where smart and interconnected systems may cause critical superiority and projection of power. Partly this is also true for classic diplomacy and foreign policy, where AI- and IT-enhanced activities may eventually cause higher speed and better national interest realization. There is an open question whether newcomers, using some “killer” - most disruptive - technologies may reverse the existing balance of power. From a current perspective, this group of solutions seems to be status-quo enhancers, since all of them require significant competences, investments and technology/industrial base.
Amid supporting leadership of the “haves”, these technologies also form several major IR&S challenges.
Most important come from speedy and sophisticated algorithms of advanced AI/IoT.5 Ignoring theoretically possible but unlikely scenarios of Skynet or The Matrix-style machine domination, we see the higher reliance of humans on machines in different important IR&S processes, with step-by-step delegation to AI of some key IR&S responsibilities. One challenge here is the ethics of the process – which will inevitably ignite both intra- and international debates. The other is that due to the greater speed of AI/IoT processes, the synchronization and efficiency of eventual human/socio-technology systems will be reduced, while the faults will become more likely - because decision-makers, defense and security personnel and other human part of these new systems are and will be just humans. Thus, growing reliance on AI/ IoT may cause problems of losing control over and/or growing number of faults in important, even critical IR&S processes – reinforced by the rising phantom menaces (see later) of emerging technologies. This may lead to major IR&S and FP dilemmas, including diplomatic tensions or even FP/military conflicts. Hopefully, this group of risks would be actual only for a transit period between current state and future digitalized IR&S, but this transit period may be quite lengthy due to inertia of institutions, psychology and other limitations.
Growing delegation of decision-making to machines in defense, and in future also in FP and other areas contains some other international challenges. Aside from a gap between “haves” and “have-nots” (which has historically proved to be a conflict provocative factor) this is about general peace and stability issues. Nuclear non-deployment between superpowers during the Cold War illustrated that in a situation where defense systems indicate attacks, human decision-makers and operators of critical “doom machines” proved to be very conflict- and strike-avoidant in their actions. Whether it would be so in a world of fighting AI swarms and killer robotic systems, which follow digital logic and predefined algorithms, or able to gain some own experience - and not consider broader political, ethical and humanitarian issues – is still an open question.6 Similarly unclear is whether the disruptive consequences of mistakes in an era of emerging technology warfare would be less or more if human decision-makers and IT-specialists provide a possibility of this broader spectrum of factors for AI algorithms.
On the contrary, the most debated threats – like devastating cyber-terror, a cyber-Cold War, digital Pearl Harbor or cyber-Hobbesian realm – looks highly unlikely from a system perspective. This is because at least much of the new cyber arsenals (excluding cyber espionage and, to a much lesser extent, cyber-sabotage) amid defensive high-tech solutions may be offset by growing interdependence of economies. Smart infrastructures (Smart Cities, Smart Grids, Smart Roads, etc.), e-government and digitalization of other processes and objects may create, if not seamless, then still globalizing cyber spaces. Altogether with further development of global value chains this makes any major conflict irrational. This pro-peace stance may paradoxically be supported by the development of cyber weapons. Possible asymmetric responses, massive cyber retaliation attacks, strong and almost unpredictable rebound effects of any malicious offensive cyber actions will, in our eyes, play a role in a new cyber-deterrence, codes of conduct and other rational behaviors. Stuxnet, alleged hacking or infiltrations of malicious software in infrastructure, banking and other systems, mutually proclaimed by Western and Russian officials, may signal not a dark cyber future, but of a relative immaturity and yet small scope of diffusion of AI/IoT in economies.
An important technology-driven IR&S trend is rising public exposure and national/international community engagement in IR&S processes by the means of social networks, mobile internet solutions and some other technologies.
To some extent this process is just a further realization of trends, set by electronic media at least 50 years ago, but the demographic change plays a growing role in this process. The 3rd generation of Internet users and 1st “smartphone generation” may have a totally different view of policy and politics, presumably much more as a kind of an app or interactive “e-content”, enhanced by number of “views” or “likes”, then a distant “serious life”, determined by “responsible” and powerful political heavyweights, bearing some great IR&S wisdoms. The most visible part of this trend is Twitter diplomacy7 and, partly, content wars between Russia and Western officials and media, but it is also well illustrated by the popularity of digital whistleblowers like Edward Snowden or Julian Assange.
Another issue is e-political mobilization (the new and more “serious” incarnation of flash mobs?), demonstrated in the Arab Spring revolutions, “Occupy” movements, 2016 anti-Trump events and other cases.
From a formal point of view, we may see a rise of direct democracy in IR&S and beyond, where personal engagement of a citizen is enhanced by the convenient and familiar Internet means, while the practice and culture of engagement is supported by already existing social and consumer practices (i.e. Facebook/Twitter and Amazon/Alibaba as responsible citizen generators). In this realm democracy and IR&S realizes itself as a kind of an affordable online-service.
Rising IR&S public e-engagement, however, poses some important questions (which are true also for general politics).
The most obvious is a problem of opinion manipulations using Big Data and AI. The role of Cambridge Analytica in the Donald Trump campaign and multiple other cases, including alleged Russian infiltration in the 2016 US elections (actual or otherwise), shows that this problem is real. Amid the classic impact on national FP and security elites, we may theoretically envision the rise of influence and lobbying power of different IR&S actors - from digital corporate giants or foreign powers to some new opinion leaders or proactive communities. The other challenge, also brilliantly demonstrated in Henry Kissinger`s World Order, is no less important: from violent minority domination or polarization of positions (enhanced by a so-called alignment dilemma in social networks)8 up to challenges for long-term optimal decision-making by elites, dependent on the number of “likes”.9The final block of the most important emerging technologies in IR&S consists of drones (for the purpose of this article, defined as distantly operated robotized systems) and advanced robotics/autonomous weapon systems (AWS, including Lethal AWS known as “killer robots”).
Not mentioning already reviewed AI challenges, one of the most important issues associated with further developments in this area is the rising acceptability of war.10 Use of drones and (L)AWS presents almost zero risk to military personnel – and theoretically may result in lesser military and civilian casualties on the opposite side due to more targeted use (in comparison with bombers or tanks). Thus it represent a next step in the humanization of war for public opinion, public alienation from war (in line with extensive use of aviation and high-precision weaponry in small wars) and gamification of war. And let us not forget that even the most advanced drones and (L)AWS cost less than jets, tanks and other major military hardware. Altogether, these factors lower the psychological threshold for engagement in military actions, supporting major international ethical debates and provoking some limited IR destabilization. The extensive use of these technologies also stimulates further differentiation of conflicts (war, limited operations, humanitarian intervention, etc.) in order to raise their legitimation and ease of engagement.
Separately it should be noted that emerging technology offers enhancement of terrorism and extremism – with potentially important, if not disruptive international effects. Critical digital vulnerabilities together with the ease of creating malicious software, rising affordability of commercial “kits” that could be used to prepare chemical, bio- or bacterial weapons even in the kitchen, 3D-printed plastic guns, children’s drones with explosives and other striking cases indicate that at least security and at worst IR stability may be challenged in the very near future – even without the most sophisticated and costly solutions. But the scope and novelty of these threats are questionable. To create a really powerful and disastrous Internet virus, one still needs a team of highly competent professionals and a large number of working hours. Bio- and bacterial weapons are deadly, but not that convenient and not always successful – as shown by the US anthrax attacks and general history of pandemics.11 3D-guns or drone attacks pose a major public security problem but are not more dangerous than heavy-duty trucks or regular explosives in the hands of terrorists.
And on the contrary, less obvious risks may be more threatening or disruptive. The most visible illustration of a "collateral" emerging technology risk is modern terror itself, which more and more appears to be an electronic media and (now) Internet phenomenon. The core of it is not the terrorist act itself, but its coverage and emotional effects on the audience – be it fear influencing decision-making and national strategies, or inspiration for recruitment and support of followers.12 From this point of view, the riskiest effects of emerging technologies are still in the future. For now they may even be jammed on the analytic’s “radars” by impressive, but secondary solutions.
In search of strategy: Russia and other international actors in the emerging technologies realm
The basic interests of major international actors (not counting terrorist groups and other “disruptive” forces) in the emerging technologies realm are quite predictable and may be grouped in four basic strategies, defined by resource and competences availability, economy and national innovation system development and general foreign and defense policy factors.
- Technology and innovation superiority. This approach supposes mutually enhancing advanced development of both defense-related and commercial emerging technologies sectors, where the latter guarantees a broader leadership – be it global market-winning high-tech solutions, standards, digital platforms, rise of multinationals and soft power, or defense applications of civilian technology (reversed spin-off).13 The key actor here is still the USA (Third Offset Strategy,14 DoD -supported technology and innovation institutes of the National Network for Manufacturing Innovations,15 other DoD, DARPA, InQTel, IARPA and HS-ARPA actions). The same strategy but in a catching-up logic is realized by China (illustrative is the case of the “Made in China – 2025” program).16
- Selective symmetric/asymmetric response. For nations with a limited resource/competitive base, achieving selective leadership or parity in emerging technologies in a few important areas may guarantee nullification of opponents’ superiority (a kind of “tech-deterrence”) and/or support ambitions for correction, rebalance or revision of regional or world orders. The problem here, however, is linked to a focus of efforts: it could be balanced, with support of both defense and commercial development, or only defense. Russia fits the second case, despite extensive efforts to support commercial emerging technologies and innovations in the last 10 years. This is mostly explained by persisting challenges of suboptimal economic institutionalisation and national innovation system and (presumably) uncritical extrapolation of the 1950s-1960s experience – with its leading role of the defense and security community in development of breakthrough technologies. This imbalanced approach in current global settings, where R&D expenditures and diversity of technologies in the commercial sector dwarfs any defense actions,17 seem to be less sustainable in a long-term perspective, while still relevant if reduced to some very specific IR&S tasks. A good illustration is robotics and drones: not considering prospective startups, the Russian robotics industry still lags behind all advanced nations both in volumetric and technological dimensions, while several defense developments – also positioned as a “response” to the West – seem to be moving faster.18 A more balanced approach is demonstrated by India, despite its strategy also being challenged by general economic and institutional limitations.
- Asymmetric disruptive response. This strategy is realized mostly by non-state actors. Setting aside terrorist groups, we should mention here NGOs, multinationals and some other actors. As a result, there is a potential to reshape, if not “reboot”, the global system.
In general, all strategies and their exact realizations could be placed on a double-digit matrix (see below).
Enhancement of current power
Asymmetric advantage (game-changers)
Disruption (unknown and/or unpredictable)
Global IR&S actors (Superpowers and Emerging Challengers)
Regional IR&S actors (states)
Non-state IR&S actors
Multinational corporations, NGOs, sub-states, alternative (terror nets, communities, etc.)
Emerging Technologies as problem-setters
Actor’s strategies, the specifics of emerging technologies and the stage of their development (the eve of technological revolution) brings to life a set of important IR&S problem and challenges.
Arms race(s) and neo-proliferation. Considering the superiority issue, a new form of arms or dual-use tech-race seems to be inevitable – everyone dreams of being on the cutting edge and/or obtaining ultimate wunderwaffe. Especially troublesome is the regional level, where tensions sometimes are much more acute, than that of the superpowers. This "democratization of destruction"19 poses even more risks since new solutions are neither regulated by international norms, nor are as complex or costly as nuclear and missile technologies. Meanwhile, the expected unilateral nature of other limited attempts to prevent emerging technology transfer and proliferation to opponents (new COCOMs) may cause some major international trade turbulences and other negative effects.
Dissemination/loss of power – innovation and technology are important for IR&S because they provide power to those who control them. This is why proliferation is such a troublesome issue for the established powers. But emerging technologies may cause further redistribution of power towards non-state elites and IR&S actors.20 It could be said that constant appeals in IR&S discussions to terror networks, NGOs, multinationals, internet-enhanced global communities and other new actors from a Freudian point of view signal the fear of power loss from established elites and the supporting expert community. However dubious in its radical form and in medium-term perspective, a post-Westphalian IR&S system realizes itself step-by-step. For example, multinational corporations are already comparable with medium-sized economies, influencing some IR&S actions via lobbying and economic power. Other actors are much weaker. But modern terrorism - symbiotic with electronic media and the internet – indicates that emerging technologies may change this in the future. These ideas are partly supported by recommendations21 to redistribute security (and possible other IR&S issues) to other national, sub-national (regions - which already have FPs) and private entities.
Degradation of confidence,22 preventing actors from resolving the most troubling contradictions and realizing fruitful cooperation. One of the reasons is information asymmetry, enhanced by the uncertainties of the technological development and ubiquitous nature of emerging technologies. This problem results also in the rise of phantom menaces, inspired by technology-induced fears. One of the best example seem to be discussions over hybrid wars and Russian cyber infiltrations. Whatever the initial reason, the scope of alleged attacks and other actions seem to be a strong exaggeration, explained by hysteria and perceptions of what is possible, rather than what is technically feasible and politically rational. And classic geopolitical, economic, international and other tensions between different parties only inflame debates and suspicions.
International rules and regulations. There is a rise of global anxiety over major IR&S risks, posed by the emerging technologies, including humanitarian aspects. In this realm the formation of new institutions and norms,23 whether fixed or informal (like “gentlemen’s agreements”), for the normalization and securitization of their development becomes crucial. As for now efforts are minor – for example UN expert discussions on drones.24 The problem is that the challenges of emerging technologies (due to the early stage of development) are often not taken seriously, while regulation attempts sometimes appear to be part of a more complex IR&S game, discrediting the process. For example, some regulation activities may be aimed at legally binding the technological development of superior nations or losing their control over critical technologies. This could be the case of Russian attempts to regulate the Internet since the 1990s and some other efforts. Historically the global and international normative and institutional system of IR&S proved to be very adaptive, so eventually there will be an inevitable change of IR&S institutions and norms, as well as diplomatic communication and coordination mechanisms. Hopefully this change will appear before some major technology-induced crisis occurs, and at an acceptable price for all actors and the global community.
An open question is power and neo-colonialism in the emerging technology era. Despite rising research, development and innovation competences and high-tech industries in emerging and other developing nations, most science and technology advances still appear in a very small number of advanced nations. Be it development of AI, biotech, robotics or 3D printing, except for China (in some areas) other nations mostly play the role of technology acceptors or, at best, niche leaders. Extrapolating current technology, innovation and economic trends, we can forecast both the Matthew effect in the emerging technology realm, and growing reliance of the majority of nations on the technology exports and services of a small group of leader economies. Since liaisons and interdependence between the provider and consumer of most important technologies are strong, it could be converted into IR&S influence or “red lines”. And even if this influence would be distributed among a set of IR&S actors, including multinational corporations, in the realm of a new technological revolution we may face a much more complicated and subtle domination/submission and power lines in IR&S. However easy would be that yoke and however light the burden, this adds some new accents to an old question about power and dependence, especially in the North-South relations.
The vaguest but most troublesome issue can be labeled (after Donald Rumsfeld’s famous saying) as “unknown unknowns” – i.e. unintended disruptive consequences of some emerging technologies in the hands of some revisionist or counter-system actor. Even being hypothetical, this possibility should be kept in mind as a classical “joker” or “black swan” scenario.
Recommendations for Russian foreign policy
Despite de facto formulated strategies, most nations – and Russia is no exception – appear to be surprisingly unprepared for the future. One problem is that decision-makers either seem to treat ongoing IR&S changes driven by emerging technologies as business-as-usual (BAU) or, conversely, exaggerate some of its prospects and effects while ignoring others. This factor is aggravated by high level of uncertainties, related to the emerging technologies and associated IR&S changes, and inertia of national and global institutions and actor’s cultures and practices.
Not mentioning the obvious necessity of further national S&T development, in a more balanced way, the above mentioned limits indicate that the first block of Russia’s actions in the area of emerging technologies and IR&S should deal with lowering information asymmetries and the formulation of a more concise and elaborated strategy, including future global actions and transformation of actorship.25An initial and most important step here should be the support of a cross-disciplinal internationalized expert community, which may play a triple role:
- Source of important information and analytics in support of S&T and IR&S policy measures. These efforts should be international from the very beginning – and not be viewed as “Russian analytics”. Firstly, because Russia needs to use extensive global talent and competence pool in emerging technologies. Secondly, since Russia wants to form a more safe and secure future for emerging technologies in IR&S, it should not be the only “customer”, but rather an initiator of community building and part of a more global concert of concerned nations. The key importance of this activity is explained by the fact that as for now both the scope and essence of problems and trends and the needed actions seem to be unclear or doubtful for all policy actors. Let us mention that since this task goes well beyond established Russian foresight practices or Science and Technology Councils, more traditional for Russia, serious efforts for planning and institutionalization of this policy action are needed.
- Overcoming the gap of trust and confidence-building in a bilateral and multilateral dialogue – even without (considering the current situation) compromising confrontational FP rhetoric of Russia and the West. Cold-war practices, despite their formally distant nature, proved the importance of both science diplomacy and prominent scientists’ actions for peace (from Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs to the achievements of nuclear scientists in formulating pro-peace public positions both in the USA and USSR, and the role of IR experts in informal dialogue of superpowers).
- In perspective, enhancing the role of the S&T community as a collective actor in further global discussions on emerging technology IR&S impacts, and the formation of global political actions above the existing network and results of expert discussions. Modern protest actions of concerned science and innovation communities against LAWS26 and some other facts indicate that at least to some extent these process will match rising global awareness. Some support for this scenario may appear from already existing self-regulation practices of research (especially in bio-research) and corporate communities.27
Considering some technical dimensions of this process, an important block of activities is linked to the enhancement of Russia’s international science and technology cooperation practices and programs – both on the established lines (mostly with Germany and other Western European S&T institutions), and on relatively new or weaker ones (USA, Japan and RoK, BRIICS, other Asian and Latin American).
Paradoxically, in the current geopolitical setting an important factor of success in all these areas should be the depoliticization and moderate alienation of actions from official diplomatic and, especially, security institutions. Among entities on the Russian side best positioned for the tasks of expertise and network building, may be named both the Russian Academy of Sciences and some of the largest universities. On the international side their first counterparts are also clear –foreign Science Academies and societies (like the Helmholtz association in Germany), the largest S&T centers (like French CNRF) and universities.
Considering the global nature of emerging technologies and their IR&S impacts, the second block of Russian activities relates to initializing discussions and consequent actions to form new global institutions, norms and, possibly, IOs for the securitization of emerging technologies’ IR&S dimension.28 (Taking distant Cold War analogues, anew OSCE and UNCTAD). Here relatively weak Russian S&T positions which prevent the country from realization of a full-scale superiority strategy, paradoxically appear to be a positive policy factor, since Russia could not face suspicions of hegemonic ambitions in this area.
Amid (once again) important confidence building measures29 and rising diplomatic coalitions, Russia needs to focus on innovative approaches and solutions: in line with Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, emerging technologies in the IR&S area need new principles and architecture of global governance subsystem. Several requirements are already seen, while others are still to be defined.
Among the former is engagement with a much broader spectrum of actors30 – reflecting the complex nature of emerging technologies and arising IR&S problems. Aside from the above-mentioned organized S&T community, critical is the participation of corporate entities, the technology and innovation community, regional governments, NGOs, etc. Since there have been relatively successful actions of this kind, despite being more limited in scope– like the UN Global Compact – this proposition does not seem fantastic.
In a long-term perspective there is also a place for emerging technology use in global institutional and normative processes. In the most futuristic view we can envision the use of advanced internet and AI-platforms in support of national/international discussions, expert/public engagement and rising awareness, blockchain diplomacy (secure dialogue results and Smart Contracts for the resulting agreements and codes of conduct - instead of “paper treaties”) and more.31Effective Russian diplomatic efforts require also aligning emerging technology regulation with general international discussions, for example, on Grand Challenges, reforms of major existing IOs, etc. Only in a broader context can these actions become globally important and successful.
For Russia, the formation of new global regimes and institutions, as well as the harmonization of emerging technologies development is unavoidable and necessary, considering both the asymmetry of potential and major disruption risks. But this goal is important for all other actors as well – considering possible IR&S challenges of emerging technologies, as well as humanitarian, environmental and other threats. Despite history giving us few reasons for optimism, the global community still has a chance to prevent disastrous scenarios before, rather than after major disruptions happen. Special responsibility here lies with the expert community, which, presumably, must take a stand to instigate further diplomatic actions and broader discussions.
Ivan V. Danilin is head of innovation policy at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, and associate professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations.
 1 On the terminology see: Rotolo D., Hicks D., Martin B. What Is an Emerging Technology? // Research Policy. 2015. Volume 10. Issue 44. P. 1827-1843. In many aspects it is close or analogous to the General Purpose Technologies: Jovanovic B., Rousseau P.L. “General purpose technologies” // Aghion, P., Durlauf, S.N. (Eds.). Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 1B. Elsevier B.V. 2005. P. 1181-1224
2 See for example ideas in: Fritsch S. Technological Ambivalence and International Relations // E-International Relations. 2016. Feb 24.URL: http://www.e-ir.info/2016/02/24/technological-ambivalence-and-international-relations/
3 See, for example: Disruptive technologies: Advances that will transform life, business, and the global economy. McKinsey Global Institute. 2013. URL: https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/disruptive-technologies; Hammes T.X. Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance // Joint Force Quarterly. 2016. Issue 81, 2nd Quarter. P.76-85. Available at: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-81/jfq-81.pdf
4 See, for example: De Spiegeleire S., Maas M., Sweijs T. Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Defense. Strategic Implications for Small and Medium-Sized Force Providers. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2017. URL: https://hcss.nl/sites/default/files/files/reports/Artificial%20Intelligence%20and%20the%20Future%20of%20Defense.pdf
5 Bradley P. Army Warns that Future War with Russia or China Would Be ‘Extremely Lethal and Fast’ // Defense One. 2016. Oct.4. URL: http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2016/10/future-army/132105/; Kaspersen A., Eide E.B., Shetler-Jones P. 10 trends for the future of warfare // World Economic Forum. 2016. Nov.3. URL: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/11/the-4th-industrial-revolution-and-international-security/; Altmann J., Sauer F. Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability // Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. 2017. Vol. 59. N.5. Available at: https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2017-579b/survival%E2%80%94global-politics-and-strategy-october-november-2017-7ccd/59-5-10-altmann-and-sauer-0e2f
7 Digital Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. Ed.by Bjola C., Holmes M. - N.Y.: Routledge, 2015; see also: Kluz A., Firlej M. The Impact of Technology on Foreign Affairs: Five Challenges // Foreign Policy Association. 2015. Dec.22. URL: https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2015/12/22/the-impact-of-technology-on-foreign-affairs-five-challenges/
10 Partly is shown in discussion on: Drones: The Future of War? Chatham House. 2013. Apr.8. URL. https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/189617
12 See, for example: NacosB.L. Terrorism—A Global Challenge // United Nations University Global Seminar Second Shimame-Yamaguchi Session. 5-8 August 2006 Terrorism/Counterterrorism and Media in the Age of Global Communication. URL: http://archive.unu.edu/gs/files/2006/shimane/Nacos_text_en.pdf; Hoffman B. Inside terrorism. N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2006.
13 For AI and other IT see, for example: Simonte T. AI Could Revolutionize War as Much as Nukes // THe Wired. 2017. July 19. URL: https://www.wired.com/story/ai-could-revolutionize-war-as-much-as-nukes/
14 See, for example: Dyer G. US military: robot wars // Financial Times. 2016. Feb.7. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/849666f6-cbf2-11e5-a8ef-ea66e967dd44; Pellerin C. Deputy Secretary: Third Offset Strategy Bolsters America’s Military Deterrence // DoD News, Defense Media Activity. 2016. Oct. 31. URL: https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/991434/deputy-secretary-third-offset-strategy-bolsters-americas-military-deterrence/
15 See brief review and analysis in: Otraslevye instrumenty innovacionnoj politiki [Industrial instruments of Innovation Policies] (in Russian). Ed.by N.Ivanova. Moscow: IMEMO, 2016. P. URL: 30-34 https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/publ/2016/2016_023.pdf
16 See: Made in China -2025. The State Council. The of People`s Republic of China. URL: http://english.gov.cn/2016special/madeinchina2025/; Kennedy S. Made in China 2025. Center for Strategic and International Studies. June 1, 2015. URL: https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025; Danilin I., Glotova M.China Searching New Ways of Development: Can Technology Innovation Solve All the Problems? // Conference Paper. ISA International Conference 2017, Hong Kong. University of Hong Kong (HKU), Hong Kong. 2017. June 15th - 17th. URL: http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/HKU2017-s/Archive/a2192261-bf28-43e5-950c-016c16387978.pdf
17 See, for AI case: Cummings M. L. Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare. Chatham House. 2017. URL: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2017-01-26-artificial-intelligence-future-warfare-cummings-final.pdf
18 Vladimiru Putinu pokazali boevogo robota-avatara v dejstvii [Vladimir Putin was shown the fighting robot avatar in action] (in Russian) // Russia Today. 2015. Jan. 20. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UPh7uFMLmSw; Stanavov A. Zheleznaja gvardija: samye opasnye boevye roboty Rossii [Iron Guard: the most dangerous combat robots of Russia] (in Russian) // RIA Novosti. 2017. Oct.15. URL: https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20171015/1506649786.html
19 Krepinevich A. Get Ready for the Democratization of Destruction // the foreign policy. 2011. Aug.15. URL: http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/15/get-ready-for-the-democratization-of-destruction/; Eide E.B. WEF. As technology advances, how do we make sure it isn't being weaponized? security // World Economic Forum. 2016. Dec.13. URL: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/how-do-we-stop-tech-being-turned-into-weapons/; see also: Simonte T. Op.cit.; Kaspersen A., Eide E.B., Shetler-Jones P. Op.Cit.; See, for example: Cummings M. L. Op.Cit.
20 Guéhenno J.-M. The Cybersecurity Paradox. International Crisis Group. 2016. 19 February. URL: http://blog.crisisgroup.org/worldwide/2016/02/19/the-cybersecurity-paradox/
21 Guéhenno J.-M. The Cybersecurity Paradox.The International Crisis Group.2016. Feb. 19. URL: http://blog.crisisgroup.org/worldwide/2016/02/19/the-cybersecurity-paradox/
22 Drones: The Future of War? Chatham House. 2013. Apr.8. URL. https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/189617; Kaspersen A., Eide E.B., Shetler-Jones P. Op.Cit.;
24 See official Web-site of the UN expert group on LAWS: 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). United Nations Office at Geneva. URL: https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/F027DAA4966EB9C7C12580CD0039D7B5?OpenDocument. See also: Jacobson B.R. Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: Mapping the GGE Debate. DiploFoundation. Policy Papers and Briefs – 8, 2017. URL: https://www.diplomacy.edu/sites/default/files/Policy_papers_briefs_08_BRJ.pdf
25 See a hint on that in: Kaspersen A. 8 emerging technologies transforming international security // World Economic Forum. 2015. Sept.5. URL: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/09/8-technologies-transforming-international-security/
26 See, for example: Autonomous Weapons: an Open Letter from AI & Robotics Researchers. URL: https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons/; Elon Musk leads 116 experts calling for outright ban of killer robots // The Guardian. 2017. Aug. 20. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/20/elon-musk-killer-robots-experts-outright-ban-lethal-autonomous-weapons-war
27 Salisbury M. For Genome Editing, Self-Regulation Beats A Government Ban // Forbes. 2015. June 11. URL: https://www.forbes.com/sites/techonomy/2015/06/11/for-genome-editing-self-regulation-beats-a-government-ban/#4f3ee6371f4c; Gregorowius D., Biller-Andorno N., Deplazes-Zemp A. The role of scientific self-regulation for the control of genome editing in the human germline // EMBO Reports. 2017. Volume 18, Issue 3. P. 355–358; Krepinevich A. Op. cit,; Kaspersen A. Should we ban weapons that don't even exist yet? // World Economic Forum. 2016. Jul. 20. URL: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/07/should-we-ban-weapons-that-dont-even-exist-yet
30 Schaub H. Rise of Sub-State Actors in Digital Diplomacy // The Brookings Institution. 2014. Sept.23. URL: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2014/09/23/rise-of-sub-state-actors-in-digital-diplomacy/; Kaspersen A. Should we ban weapons that don't even exist yet? World Economic Forum. 2016. Jul. 20. URL: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/07/should-we-ban-weapons-that-dont-even-exist-yet; Eide E.B. Op.Cit.; Guéhenno J.-M. Op.cit.; Kaspersen A., Eide E.B., Shetler-Jones P. Op.Cit.; Fey M. 3D Printing and International Security. Risks and Challenges of an Emerging Technology. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). 2017. URL: https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/prif144.pdf