NMD ON TARGET? National Missile Defense

Tuesday, November 28, 2000

Should the United States build a national missile defense (NMD) or not? What are the technical challenges that NMD must overcome in order to be effective? Would a working missile defense system protect against large-scale attacks from a nation like Russia or China? Or would NMD only work against a limited strike by a smaller rogue nation or terrorist group? Is NMD worth the money it would cost or does it needlessly destablize our relationship with Russia?

Recorded on Tuesday, November 28, 2000

Peter Robinson: Welcome to Uncommon Knowledge. I'm Peter Robinson. Our show today, A National Missile Defense. Currently the United States has no protection against ballistic missiles. If such a missile were ever launched against us, there would be nothing that we could do about it. Literally nothing except wait for it to land.

President Reagan considered this situation unacceptable so he proposed building a shield against ballistic missiles. He called his program The Strategic Defense Initiative but it soon became parodied and(?), better known as Star Wars. President Reagan and every president since has devoted billions of dollars to researching a national missile defense and this past autumn, President Clinton was scheduled to decide whether to begin deployment of a national missile defense. In the end, President Clinton decided not to decide which, of course, means that now it's up to the new president.

Opponents of a national missile defense argue that it would cost tens of billions of dollars and that, even then, there would be plenty of ways for terrorists to get around or, as the case may be, under the system. For example, simply by hiding a nuclear weapon on a freighter and sailing it into an American port. Proponents of the national missile defense say that may well be true but a national missile defense could still come in mighty handy against a rogue state such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq. So what should the new president do?

Joining us three guests, Frank Gaffney is President of the Center for Security Policy. Jonathan Granoff is Vice President of the Lawyer's Alliance for World Security and Dean Wilkening is at the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Title: Good Defenses Make Good Neighbors

Peter Robinson: In September of 2000, President Clinton decided not to deploy a national missile defense but not to stop research on the program either. I quote the president, "I simply cannot conclude with the information I have today that we have enough confidence in the technology. We need more tests and more simulations." Did President Clinton make the right decision? John?

Jonathan Granoff: Yeah, he--absolutely. We've never tested it with decoys and with all of the foolery that an adversary would use if they were shooting in missiles at us.

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: So don't decide to deploy it but don't decide to stop research. Decide not to decide.

Jonathan Granoff: We--we should be doing research but we shouldn't deploy it. Even if we could do it, it's destabilizing.

Peter Robinson: Frank Gaffney, did President Clinton make the right decision?

Frank Gaffney: I think the president made the wrong decision in deferring for one more day the most rapid deployment possible of missile defenses. I happen to disagree with the approach that he was embarked upon but, I think, the idea that we don't need a missile defense is a very mistaken idea and--and one that we should not be perp--perpetuating.

Peter Robinson: Dean?

Dean Wilkening: Yeah, I think it was the right decision for the simple reason that, of the three tests that they had, that they were using for their decision criteria, two of them had failed. One of them had worked to some extent. And so I think with that limited test experience, the pentagon, the Defense Department was under no position to go ahead at that point.

Peter Robinson: As I understand it, this is what happened so any--any of the three of you please correct me. We have satellites in space that detect the launch of the ballistic missile. In fact, we already have that and that's worked well for years and years and years. That's not controversial. So we have satellites that detect the launch and then we have ground-based interceptors under the Clinton plan, they would have been in Alaska and the idea is that they fire what? A missile? High energy beam? What is it that they fire?

Frank Gaffney: A non-nuclear war-headed interceptor that is a missile designed to put its payload, this non-nuclear kinetic kill vehicle, they call it, into the path of and intercept and destroy…

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: And strike it where? In space?

[Talking at same time]

Jonathan Granoff: It actually has to hit…

[Talking at same time]

Jonathan Granoff: It actually has to collide with the vehicle. There was a time in which we would--in which we were deploying, in the 1970's, a totally different system in which we would ex--exper--in which we were--were exploding things in space. This actually has to hit the bullet with the bullet.

Peter Robinson: The notion of an explosion is you could ex--explode somewhere near…

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: …it would be--be the shotgun rather than the rifle? All right so you…

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: This really is a bullet hitting a bullet.

Jonathan Granoff: A bullet hitting a bullet…

Peter Robinson: Extremely difficult.

Jonathan Granoff: A bullet hitting a bullet and in the tests, they didn't have any of the decoys or--or--or foolery that can fool the system.

Dean Wilkening: The technology is impressive and I think we are right at the brink where this technology's going to begin to work on the test range, at least. The question of counter measures is a more complicated one but it's extremely impressive technology to be able to hit an incoming missile warhead traveling ten thousand to fifteen thousand miles an hour with another ballistic missile and collide within a foot.

Peter Robinson: And that we have done? That has happened.

[Talking at same time]

Dean Wilkening: It has succeeded once and I think that technology, whether one calls it mature, ready to go or whether it needs a little more testing to iron out some of the engineering problems…

Peter Robinson: We did it…

Dean Wilkening: …we could quibble about but basically that technology is here and ready to go.

Peter Robinson: So a bullet can hit a bullet…

Peter Robinson: Dean says the technology to shoot down missiles is almost ready. But how would it handle counter measures?

Title: Show Me the Dummy

Peter Robinson: The union of concerned scientists, I quote, "The National Missile Defense System under development by the United States would be ineffective against even limited ballistic missile attacks." How come? Because they can throw up a lot of decoys. How do you answer that problem?

Frank Gaffney: Well two ways. One is you try to equip the interceptor with the discrimination technology that is able to tell it which is the real kill vehicle and which is the chaff or decoys or whatever.

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: Is it feasible?

Jonathan Granoff: We don't know. We have to test with--we have to test in that kind of real condition and, you know, we would be--if some adversary were attacking us with intercontinental ballistic missiles, they wouldn't be telling us when they're launching, they wouldn't be telling us when they're launching. They wouldn't be telling where they're--where they were launching and we wouldn't know all the counter measures they would have.

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: Yes but the when and the where…

[Talking at same time]

Jonathan Granoff: So we have to test…

Peter Robinson: Okay, the counter measures but the when and the where, that's easy. We have that already. Right, we know any time there's an explosion of a certain magnitude…

Jonathan Granoff: Yes that makes sense.

Peter Robinson: …anywhere on the face of the planet, we know that in nanoseconds. Don't we already know…

[Talking at same time]

Jonathan Granoff: Ab--absolutely. We do know that but we don't know what counter measures they would use. We don't know which they would use against us.

Frank Gaffney: The second way though that you can work against this is to go back to the approach that we did use, that we did deploy and that the Soviet Union deployed and that the Russians still deploy, which is to have this explosive device on the front end which blows up both the kill vehicle and these other things that might be used to…

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: A nuclear device…

Frank Gaffney: It could be.

[Talking at same time]

Dean Wilkening: One second. The issue you're raising about counter measures…

Peter Robinson: Right.

Dean Wilkening: …or that the Union of Concerned Scientists raised is the central…

Peter Robinson: At this point?

Dean Wilkening: Absolutely.

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: Right, we know that a bullet can hit a bullet. The question now is counter measures, right?

Dean Wilkening: Counter measures is--have been the traditional Achilles heel of missile defense systems. The question is, how well will this new technology work in the future. And I just want to add, it is not principally an issue of the interceptor. It is all the sensors, radar, optical sensors that observe this threat cloud, as they call it, approaching the United States. So it's not so much what's on the interceptor. It's the radars, the infrared sensors that track and try to discriminate this stuff. Now there are a number of sophisticated technologies, ex band radars, the long wave infrared sensors, they plan to deploy in space that are going to be challenging for an opponent to defeat with counter measures. So to perhaps split the difference between these two gentlemen, deploying counter measures that will be effective against the Alaskan architecture, as envisioned, is not simple. It'll be challenging but, over the long run, I think there are reasonable questions about how effective those counter measures may be.

Peter Robinson: Jonathan…

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: …let me ask you this, a bullet can hit a bullet, we've next moved to this notion that the counter measures, defeating the counter measures is the crucial question and what I want to know is, from the scientific point-of-view, is that an insoluble problem, in principle, or is it simply an extremely difficult problem? And if it's an extremely difficult problem, the general technique is, you throw more resources at it, more money, more scientists, more work. Right? What--so what--which kind of category would you place that in?

Jonathan Granoff: I would say that it's…

Peter Robinson: Insoluble or very tough.

Jonathan Granoff: …principally insoluble because you can never test it in real life conditions but we could come to a very high degree of confidence but if we didn't have complete confidence, it would not be something we could rely on.

Frank Gaffney: The reality is if you can create an profound uncertainty in the minds of a would-be attacker as to whether that attack is going to work or not, whether it's going to be intercepted or whether it is going to actually create a situation in which their homeland is for sure attacked and their attack on us has failed. This is, I believe, is exactly what deterrence is about and we dis--established in Desert Storm, where we would up putting very crude, in fact, completely untested missiles into the field in the event they didn't work as well as some of us had hoped and as initially we thought. But they had a…

[Talking at same time]

Frank Gaffney: But they had a profound strategic effect from the beginning. They were a comfort to our allies and to our own forces and I think there's no doubt about it, they helped keep Israel out of the war, which might have profoundly affected the strategic environment beyond that. So it's a--it's not clear that not having perfect defenses means that they're worthless. I think they're--that's not true.

Peter Robinson: Yes.

Dean Wilkening: Before we go into some of the strategic implications, I think this discussion's important. To finish the technical discussion, the question about whether it'll work, it's a deceptively simple question one has to ask, against whom? It is perfectly reasonable to s--to come to the decision that this system will work against a North Korea but not against China or Russia? So one has to decide, what's the purpose of this system? If it is, in fact, for states like North Korea, we have a technical advantage. We have financial advantage over them. We may have better intelligence as to what North Korean missiles are. So one could come to the conclusion that it would work against a very limited adversary for small attacks. If you turn around and say, will it work against China, you could have exactly the opposite answer. China may have…

Peter Robinson: Let's leave aside Russia and China for the moment and look at the missile threat posed by smaller countries.

Title: Conquest of the Irrational

Peter Robinson: The Rumsfeld Commission--Rumsfeld Commission is made up of democrats and republicans alike. It came up with a unanimous finding that, I quote the findings, "Ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States." The Commission also found that within five years of making a decision to develop a ballistic missile capa--capacity, North Korea and Iran could have one and that within a decade, ten years of making that decision, Iraq could have one and that, again I quote, "during several of those years the United States might not be aware that such a decision had even been made." The Rumsfeld Commission issued its report two years ago. So a ballistic capability on the part of North Korea or Iran is conceivably only two or three or four years away.

Frank Gaffney: Well actually, right after that report was…

Peter Robinson: It got worse…

Frank Gaffney: …issued, North Korea launched a missile, which demonstrated it had the capacity to use staging technology. It used it on a relatively primitive and relatively short-range missile but, having demonstrated that capability, it's basically just a function of adding fuel before you have a--an intercontinental ballistic missile.

[Talking at same time]

Frank Gaffney: Iran is buying these kinds of capabilities from…

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: So--so isn't it worth a little…

Jonathan Granoff: The technological capacity to deliver a suitcase bomb, the technological capacity to put a bomb in a bail of marijuana, the technological capacity to take a ship into any of our harbors or nuclear device into a ship in any of our harbors, those technological capacities already exist and they're open and--and they're available. The issue is how do we get control of the fissile materials that are needed to make those devices? How do we create an international legal regime to--to--to diminish those real…

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: The answer is…

Jonathan Granoff: …issues that we face today.

Peter Robinson: The answer is you can't.

[Talking at same time]

Frank Gaffney: Of course you can't. And--and--and the--and the basic point is…

Peter Robinson: The Russians don't even know where all their--their uranium…

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: This stuff is disappearing right, left and center. It's gone already.

Jonathan Granoff: That's the real risk.

[Talking at same time]

Frank Gaffney: Since you can't do it…

Jonathan Granoff: You can't give up on that.

Frank Gaffney: …since you can't do that, you really do need to work aggressively to mitigate the danger of bails of marijuana or other devices being used to smuggle these weapons in. The difference is, ballistic missiles on the sovereign territory of a threatening nation has, again, strategic import. They can use it, they're using it today. China, North Korea, Russia, to varying degrees, are using it to threaten us right now. And it is translating into political consequences that I think we need to be trying to mitigate every bit as much as we need to mitigate these suitcase bomb threats by having a ballistic missile…

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: Can I--can I just put it to you that both of these problems scare me plenty…

Jonathan Granoff: Yes.

Peter Robinson: …and I would be quite willing to increase the defense budget of the United States by quite a large number of billions of dollars to work on both of them. Why is the notion that a terrorist can walk into the World Trade Center with a nuclear bomb in his suitcase, which I grant you is mighty frightening, but why does that preclude working on another mighty frightening threat which is a ballistic missile…

Jonathan Granoff: Because in--in order to address the real threats that we have of this arsenal of Russia pointed at us today and the arsenal of China pointed at us today and the…

Peter Robinson: Excuse me. That--that's a very important premise. That China and Russia are more threatening than North Korea, Iran or Iraq?

Jonathan Granoff: Absolutely. They have--they have missiles pointed at us as we speak.

Peter Robinson: You're not worried about ballistic missiles in the hands of North Korea, Iran or Iraq?

Jonathan Granoff: I'm not worried about they're having intercontinental ballistic missiles because they have a return address. I am worried about the non-state actors, the terrorists. I am worried about criminal syndicates having nuclear weapons available and threatening us. I'm very worried about that.

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: Would you please cast the deciding vote here?

Dean Wilkening: I just want to make one distinction that capability doesn't automatically translate into a threat. A state could have ballistic missiles. France has ballistic missiles. We're not worried about them being targeted against the United States. The likelihood that they will be launched against the United States is a question of deterrence, retaliatory deterrence, a--a variant of the issue Frank raised earlier. The likelihood that North Korea, Iran or Iraq would launch missiles against us is a debatable proposition. Personally I don't think the likelihood's very high because, as the gentlemen mentioned, they have a return address. That is to say, you know what country launched against you. We would re--the United States would retaliate with devastating effect, conventional and/or nuclear retaliation, the if chemical, biological or nuclear warheads landed on U.S. soil.

Frank Gaffney: The same logic would have held…

Dean Wilkening: So I think…

Frank Gaffney: …that Japan should not have attacked us either.

Dean Wilkening: No I understand.

Frank Gaffney: And Japan did attack us for reasons that made sense to them that still don't make very much sense to us. And the effect on their country was devastating.

[Talking at same time]

Dean Wilkening: Frank raises a good point that deterrence is not a guarantee that you won't be attacked. It may fail. It could fail under certain circumstances. History is full of examples, classic examples of the failure of deterrence. So it--to many people, it's an uncomfortable strategy for the United States to rely upon for the emerging missile states like…

[Talking at same time]

Frank Gaffney: We need more insurance and the kind of environment where there are clearly people we're not sure we can deter. So the point is, how much does the insurance cost? Is the premium reasonable? Does it help prevent some eventuality that may seem irrational but it was highly undesirable if it were to occur?

Peter Robinson: According to the…

Peter Robinson: Frank and Dean have called national missile defense an insurance policy. Is the insurance worth the premium?

Title: Get a Piece of the Rocket

Peter Robinson: According to the Congressional Budget Office, deploying a national missile defense would cost about forty-nine billion dollars, that's billion with a "b" as in bomb, forty-nine billion dollars by the year 2015. That turns out to be about two percent, actually a little under two percent of the projected defense outlays between now and 2015. Two percent to develop a system that has the prospect of sowing at least doubt in the minds of Saddam Hussein and Kim Il Jong…

(?): Jong Il…

Peter Robinson: Jong Il. Is that worth two percent of our defense budget?

Jonathan Granoff: Sowing doubt in their minds that an ICBM could--could hit the United States, is that the…

Peter Robinson: Yes.

Jonathan Granoff: …is that the doubt? Well then they would simply use another device which is what the national--is what the National Intelligence estimate said, that they would use more accurate, more reliable, cheaper means of delivery.

Peter Robinson: I'll give you…

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: …two percent more to deal with that problem.

Jonathan Granoff: You're increasing--you're increasing--you're increasing the risk by doing that.

Peter Robinson: Okay I'm now going to preclude from you the option saying either/or because I am now, by an act or magnificent largesse going to give you one hundred and fifty billion dollars and tell you, Jonathan, that over the next fifteen years, you get to spend fifty billion on a national missile defense, fifty billion building up the defense community to--to guard against terrorists with nuclear bombs and another fifty billion to come up with a--would you go for missile defense in that case?

[Talking at same time]

Jonathan Granoff: Abs--absolutely not. I would not…

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: Why not? I'm giving you the money.

[Talking at same time]

Jonathan Granoff: …ask me the question why not? Because the issue is, at the end of the day, is the United States going to be more secure by maintaining the strategic stability that the ABM Treaty, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty…

Peter Robinson: Okay.

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: We'll get to the ABM Treaty…

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: …in just a moment, I promise you we will.

Jonathan Granoff: …the web of treaties--the web of treaties that we have…

Peter Robinson: Well hold onto the web.

Jonathan Granoff: …that's the key.

Peter Robinson: If I gave you a hundred and fifty billion and let you spend fifty here, here and here on fissile material regimes and on anti-terrorist regimes but I said fifty of that a hundred fifty billion has to be spent on a national missile defense, would you spend it?

Dean Wilkening: I wouldn't today but for reasons that are different than Jonathan. I think when you ask the question, is it worth the cost, is the insurance policy worth the cost, it is financial cost and it's not the sixty billion dollars for the national--that's affordable in the context of the defense budget and the American economy. There are opportunity costs. That money--the defense budget is not going to increase that much. That money could be spent for other conventional force monitorization, readiness, etc., which may--I say maybe, I don't know the exact answer, may be more useful and finally the political costs that Jonathan's talking about. What are the consequences, the long-term consequences to U.S. security if we unilaterally go ahead and deploy the system? It's not an AMB treaty issue

Peter Robinson: Okay. Hold on. Let me--let me ask you…

Dean Wilkening: It is the capability we put out there will appear threatening to some people…

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: We're about to move on to--to the web of treaties and the ABM and all that. But, Frank, why would you spend it? You'd spend it. That's clear. Why--why would you do it?

Frank Gaffney: I would probably give you money back because I would go back to the beginning of the program where you said the only thing that really needs to be resolved is whether we're going to go ahead with the Clinton Missile Defense Program.

Peter Robinson: Right.

Frank Gaffney: We would actually, I believe, end up doing it differently than Clinton talks about. We would use the existing infrastructure the country has already bought and paid for and has operating all over the world today which is the Navy's EGIS(?) (ERIS is what I found but he pronounces it EGIS) Fleet Air Defense System, which provides you with mobile platforms, which provides you with launchers into which missiles that are now being adapted, perfected, can be placed with sensors, with communication systems, with even the people to operate them. Taking advantage of that infrastructure reduces dramatically the amount that you have to pay to go build a new infrastructure, which frankly won't be as flexible, won't be as useful in Alaska. My point is this, whatever the amount of money is, I am willing, as you say, to put on the table right now. The country will have a missile defense. The only question really is, do we have it before we need it or after because after…

Peter Robinson: Let's look at the question of whether a missile defense will destabilize our relationship with Russia.

Title: We Will Barrier You

Peter Robinson: Igor Ivanov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs writing in Foreign Affairs magazine, quote, "Only when international relations, first of all among the superpowers," that would be us and them I think…

Frank Gaffney: He thinks.

Peter Robinson: …he thinks, "becomes stable and predictable can the post Cold War world be managed." I continue to quote him, "By planning to deploy a National Anti Ballistic Missile System prohibited by the ABM Treaty," this is the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, continue the quotation, "the United States is heading in the opposite direction."

Jonathan Granoff: Exactly.

Peter Robinson: Tell us the threat.

Jonathan Granoff: The threat is…

Peter Robinson: That we'll make them angry by defending ourselves?

Jonathan Granoff: Oh by no means. The logic of the ABM Treaty was to insure strategic stability and, by that, it was meant that both sides would know that if either side attacked first, the other side would have a retaliatory capacity thus insuring a no-first strike, thus insuring the ability to bring down the level of weapons.

Peter Robinson: Which worked?

Jonathan Granoff: Which has worked and we have indeed through the start process brought the level of weapons down. Additionally it's--the ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of the web of treaties controlling nuclear weapons, the most important one of which is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to which a hundred and eighty--seven countries are signatory. Now in that treaty, a hundred and eighty-two countries have pledged not to have nuclear weapons. If we put at risk the ABM Treaty, we end up putting at risk the nuclear non-proliferation regime because a hundred and eighty-two countries will say, we don't have confidence in the United States' commitment to non-proliferation.

Frank Gaffney: Can I get a word in edgewise here? The 1972 bipolar world is unrecognizable as we look around the planet today. There isn't a country on the face of this earth, I believe, that we worry about that isn't pursuing a nuclear weapons whether they're a signatory to this non-proliferation treaty or not. The black--backsliders are prodigious. Some of them have been detected. None of them have been stopped, not even North Korea. The question is, is this the kind of environment…

[Talking at same time]

Frank Gaffney: …is this the kind of environment--is this the kind of environment in which you want to have the United States remain defenseless against threats that are clear and emerging that didn't exist in 1972, at a time when the Russians can't afford to maintain the strategic arsenal they have…

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: You guys are heading…

[Talking at same time]

Peter Robinson: …I'm just going to be referee.

Jonathan Granoff: You're stating conclusions that we have not curtailed the spread of nuclear weapons under the NPT and that's simply not true.

Frank Gaffney: We may have postponed it. We haven't stopped it.

Jonathan Granoff: We have--we have--not only have we curtailed it but out of the--out of that you--you have a nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America, a nuclear weapons free zone in Africa, a nuclear weapons free zone in the South Pacific.

Peter Robinson: Right.

Jonathan Granoff: We--the only way that we can move toward a world in which we have eliminated the threat of the use of a nuclear weapon is to strengthen the treaty regimes in which cooperation becomes the norm.

Peter Robinson: My own immediate reaction is…

Jonathan Granoff: To cringe at that idea, right?

Peter Robinson: …is to cringe at that because we have seen ample evidence of what the Catholics who call original sin in--throughout human history, cooperation, that is just pie-in-the-sky, Pollyanna…

Dean Wilkening: Oh by no…

Peter Robinson: Am I not correct?

Dean Wilkening: The debate often polarizes into an approach that relies heavily on arms control and one that eschews arms control and thinks it's naïve, etc. Neither particularly persuasive. Arms control is an important vehicle but no country, certainly not the United States, should rely on arms control alone for its security. That would be Pollyannaish. On the other hand, I think the treaties that Jonathan mentioned have had an important effect and we--the United States should be careful about undoing or undermining the effectiveness of them.

Peter Robinson: It's television. We've got to wrap it up. I've got one last question to ask and that--and I'm afraid that's all the time we have. Eight years from now, will the United States or will it not have deployed a rigorous National Missile Defense? Dean?

Dean Wilkening: I would have said yes except for the rigorous. I'm not sure how extensive the missile defense will be but I think it's likely…

Peter Robinson: Something will go up?

Dean Wilkening: …some form of limited national missile defense will probably be deployed.

Peter Robinson: Frank?

Dean Wilkening: For better or worse.

Frank Gaffney: I think within the next eight years, it will certainly have started. I hope it will have completed it because we will almost certainly have needed it by that point.

Peter Robinson: Jonathan?

Jonathan Granoff: I think we'll listen to our NATO Allies, every one of them, which says don't--don't--don't do that. It's risky. It's destabilizing. It's dangerous. I think we may have a very limited missile defense but it will only take place in the context of strengthening the treaty regimes that we are committed to. We are a country based on the rule of law. We are a country based on verification that never diminishes our power. It only strengthens it.

Peter Robinson: Jonathan, Frank and Dean, thank you very much.

Frank Gaffney: Thank you.

Peter Robinson: All our guests agree that sometime, during the next decade, in one form or another, we're going to get a National Missile Defense. That being the case, let's hope that Frank Gaffney is right and we get it before we need it and not after. I'm Peter Robinson. Thanks for joining us.

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