Since the dawn of recorded history, the insatiable human drive for military victory and domination has created a persistent dialectic between periods of offensively and defensively oriented technological innovation. Interestingly, this innovation dynamic seems to transcend warfare as it’s also present with broader evolutionary phenomenon found in nature. The scientist and philosopher Charles Darwin recorded as much in his Origins of Species, noting that natural selection points to dialectic adaptation throughout the animal kingdom and natural world. Think only of the evolution of the gazelle and the lion as they struggled to survive on the prehistoric savannah. Both species were fast, but the gazelles who survived evolved with horns to help defend off attacks from predators. In a similar way, the history of warfare records a constant dynamic between innovations in weapons and armaments to kill enemies more effectively which then lead to other innovations to protect against such attacks. For example, man invents the sword and spear only to be followed by perfection of armor to protect against them. Man develops the tank only to be followed by anti-tank systems and reactive armor.
This creative tension between innovation and reactive innovation can be affected by factors beyond technology. Indeed, Napoleon adopting mass conscription, and then linking those dramatic increases in manpower to the new offensive doctrine of “maneuver and epic battle” achieved decisive strategic effects, as witnessed at the Battle of Jena in 1806 when the overwhelming French victory led to the subjugation of Prussia. Napoleon’s dominance then catalyzed other technological innovations to balance this formidable capability. Such reactive energy was behind the perfecting of the repeating rifle, more effective artillery, and eventually, the creation of the machine gun. By the mid-to-late nineteenth century these technological developments significantly affected the dynamics of warfare punishing forces maneuvering in open terrain, providing significant advantage to the defender. That period of warfare culminated in trenches on the plains of Europe during World War I. The unprecedented devastating death tolls suffered during that war horrified the polite societies of western civilization. A “lost generation” of poets emerged, veterans of that conflict, and they helped move political thought towards idealistic notions of a long peace. Humanity even tried (unsuccessfully) to “outlaw” war with the Kellogg-Briand Act. Such fanciful notions were never to be. What we got instead was new doctrine, training, technology (specifically, tanks), and the advent of “Blitzkrieg.” The innovation cycle had gone full circle, and we were now back to the offensive mindset that Napoleon had exploited a century earlier. Instead of giving peace a chance, mankind got instead fascism, the failure of diplomacy, World War, the mobilization of the American fighting man and the American economy, Allied victory, and ultimately, over 60 million killed worldwide during World War II.
When the U.S. got involved in the civil war in Vietnam, America was not able to use its significant advantage in technology to overcome its foe. The conflict bogged down into insurgency and America did not have the will to fight a long war in that way, and eventually after a phase of “Vietnamization” where we turned over the fighting to the South Vietnamese, we withdrew. Saigon fell. Following our loss in Vietnam, Army leaders initiated a series of major reforms that cut across all levels of the force including doctrine, training, and technological innovation (including the fielding of the Abrams Tank, the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the Patriot Air Defense Systems, and the Apache Attack Helicopter, just to name several of the many new systems).
This new approach to warfare, which attempted to synchronize all aspects of emerging Joint force capabilities, was called “Airland Battle.” While ostensibly intending to seize the strategic initiative to strengthen deterrence against the Warsaw Pact, clearly it was also about revitalizing and reenergizing an Army that was demoralized and hallowed out by its traumatic experiences in Vietnam. It worked in both realms. The result was complete overmatch of our adversaries and decisive battlefield victories in Panama and the Persian Gulf War.
Keen observers of military history declared a new age where once again advantage tilted to the offense, especially to the U.S. which had simultaneously achieved a massive diplomatic victory with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. Going forward, few thought any nation would directly challenge the U.S. on the battlefield, anticipating the return of Vietnam-style insurgency warfare and other asymmetric approaches from would-be adversaries. And that’s exactly what happened in “phase IV” of post-major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To some degree surprisingly given our significant challenges in Vietnam, the U.S. military once again struggled to achieve its strategic aims in those conflicts. Like Vietnam, the U.S. eventually adopted savvy counter-insurgency methods, but similarly as with the previous conflict, America had a hard time translating positive developments in theater into long-term strategic effects.
These cycles of military innovation, which are as old as time, continue to this day.
Now, after several more decades of significant technological advances (e.g., Global Positioning Systems, ubiquitous information technologies, unmanned aerial aircraft a.k.a. drones, precision mortars, precision long-range artillery, precision-guided joint munitions, advanced scopes and night-firing devices, increased lethality of attack aviation, etc.) that have significantly enhanced the ability to identify, target, and kill enemy combatants, if history is any guide, we should expect to see new military technology development aimed at enhancing soldier protection systems (SPS), and similar technologies for ships and armored vehicles. Especially in America, where, as a post-modern democracy in the information age, we are especially conscious of causalities.
In some respects, we are already here. Indeed, the U.S. Army is now nearly done with its latest fielding efforts of SPS, which includes state-of-the art interceptor body armor (IBA) and other innovations to protect against ballistics from high-powered rifles and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).
Beyond these predictable innovations, we should also anticipate more asymmetric developments. We are already on the cusp of some. The Israeli military, for example, has fielded a reactive armor system which, in addition to protecting soldiers from enemy soldier attacks, is able to detect the exact location of the adversary, and then automatically fire deadly ordnance at the attacker. This has triple-effect; this system protects Israeli soldiers, kills would-be attackers, and serves as a deterrent to future adversaries. As in, “I better think twice before attempting to shoot at these Israeli soldiers for if I do, I may very well die.” Here, one begins to see the possibility of not only tactical advantages, but potential strategic effects that strengthen deterrence.
I anticipate more technological innovations such as these and for other imaginative developments to protect soldiers and systems. For example, just as artificial intelligence (AI) has recently produced “deep fakes” which now flood our social media posts, look for future protection systems to deploy similar approaches, such as deception targets and ways to trick enemy acquisition systems into believing soldiers and systems are inhabiting one 10-digit grid location, when in fact they are in another. I also expect continued research and development into jamming and deceiving enemy target acquisition systems, especially their drones and satellites. Moreover, as all of warfare becomes increasingly reliant on cyber capabilities, expect more sophisticated cyber-attacks as well. All will not be “high-tech,” however. As we are witnessing during the Gaza War, I also expect more use of tunnels, especially for countries and non-state actor forces in diminished capacities in relation to their potential adversaries.
Curiously, despite all these major technological developments over the past several decades which seemingly favor the offense, the battlefield in Ukraine looks more like World War I France than Persian Gulf War Iraq. We seem to be in an era of strategic parity between offensive and defensive capabilities. In the long run that may point to more offensive technology development in the offing, however, in the short term, it’s likely to mean more defensive-oriented developments. Fortunately, this could enhance deterrence. After all, Russia has already incurred staggering loses in Ukraine, a single country that is not considered a top-tier fighting force. By enhancing its SPS posture, NATO could convince Russia that invading NATO would only result in many, many more casualties for little, if any, potential gain.
Russia is already feeling the strategic effects of their massive losses in Ukraine. Their economy is underperforming, and they have significant popular unrest. Russia is also further isolated internationally. Therefore, by elevating SPS to a higher priority, NATO could strengthen deterrence and such a development could provide the opening for diplomats to make a dramatic breakthrough that changes the entire strategic landscape, securing peace and unifying Europe, allowing NATO to be reoriented to shape and check a rising China—the true civilizational challenge for the West.
Fortunately, the U.S. is well-positioned to lead in this effort. As Arthur Herman argues in Freedom’s Forge, the ingenuity and resolve of our industrial base played an instrumental role in the Allies winning World War II and it remains a particular strength for America to this day. Getting the most out of it in the coming years could have outsized strategic effects for us and we should pursue it now.
