Each U.S. presidential administration of the 21st century has attempted some version of a “Russian reset.” George W. Bush looked into Vladimir Putin’s eyes, Obama’s Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered Sergei Lavrov a physical “reset button,” and Donald Trump sought to form a congenial personal relationship with Putin throughout his presidency. Despite allegations of collusion, former President Trump was no more successful than his predecessors at stabilizing the relationship. For the third time in the 21st century an attempt to reset U.S.-Russian relations failed to overcome barriers that divide the two states. And for the first time in decades, the new presidential administration has made no allusions to a warming of relations or a reset of any kind.
However, the problem is not a “deterioration of relations.” It is a difference of interests. Putin’s Russia considers American power a much more urgent and critical threat to the security of the Russian government than anything China is currently doing. Only a change in the balance of fear in Moscow could lead to the opportunity of a real reset in its relationship with Washington, and any such change appears to be some distance off.
It is not hard to understand why so many American presidents have wanted to change the nature of the U.S.-Russia relationship. Peeling Russia off from China would change the Asian balance of power in ways that significantly benefit American interests and security. Cooperation with Moscow on issues like North Korea would simplify some of the toughest problems American policymakers face, while drawing Moscow closely and openly into the growing partnerships with India and Japan that the United States hopes will create a stable alliance system in Asia would be of immense benefit.
Beyond that, a real reset in the U.S.-Russia relationship would allow Americans to rethink their commitments in Europe, making it that much easier for the American military to address the large challenges of the Indo-Pacific theater.
However, Russia simply does not trust the United States—and with good reason. The government of the United States, as well as public opinion and its army of well-funded and globally active NGOs remain committed to the spread of democracy and will continue to support democratic groups within Russia’s borders or within the borders of Russia’s undemocratic allies. Friends of the current Russian system cannot help but see American power as a danger to the security of their state, whatever a given president may say.
Since the time of Catherine the Great, if not that of Peter, Russia has seen the extension of its influence in Europe as a vital national interest and a measure of its power and success. NATO is a military alliance that aims to keep Russia out of the principal issues in European security. The European Union is adamantly opposed to any revival of Russian political influence west of Minsk and Kiev. To the realists in the Kremlin, which is to say to the large majority of those who work there, the two organizations look like a concerted western effort to keep Russian influence in its neighborhood permanently constrained in ways that no Russian government can voluntarily accept.
For a U.S.-Russian anti-China entente to develop, the danger from China would have to become so acute that Russia’s problems with the United States appeared trivial by comparison. That day is unlikely to arrive anytime soon.
