Wait a minute, isn't this the 21st?...
George Shultz on how to understand China’s future.
Why Hanoi was not a failure; and whether the focus of the US-China trade deal should be on the theft of American inventions instead of tariffs and trade deficits.
The Coronavirus, Taiwan Elections, and the Trade Deal.
Can the US Hold China Responsible for the Pandemic?
The Coronavirus Cannot Lockdown Power Politics in Asia .
Misha and John Talk with a Congressional Leader on China.
Why Here, Why Now? Why Did The United States Enjoy Dramatic Improvements In The Standard Of Living During The Last Century?
Hoover Institution economists John Cogan, Lee Ohanian, Terry Anderson, and George Shultz examine the causes for and the reasons behind so many improvements being made to the quality of life in the United States over the past century. They analyze the role that free markets, property rights, innovation, regulation, taxes, and national security played in these remarkable achievements.
Will China benefit from the Coronavirus disruption?
Behind the headlines lies an old and basic question: in the clash between Islamism and the nation-state, who will win? By Charles Hill.
According to the standard wisdom in international relations, authoritarian states hold an advantage over democratic states because they can act more quickly and decisively. Yet over the last several centuries, every extended rivalry between an authoritarian state and a liberal one has been won by the liberal state: the Dutch revolt against Spain (late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries); the 125-year rivalry between England and France (1689-1815); the Anglo-French-American rivalry with Germany (late nineteenth through mid-twentieth century); and the American/Allied rivalry with the Soviet Union after World War II.
This paper shows why liberal democracies have a long-term advantage in international competition with authoritarian states. We argue that this reflects the greater ability of liberal states to establish credible limited government. This ability has both long-term advantages for growth and substantial short-term financial advantages during periods of intense international conflict. The financial advantages allow a liberal democracy to raise massive funds through debt, thus financing larger and longer wars. After developing the theoretical perspective, we study two cases, the 125-year rivalry between England and France and the more recent cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The family dynamics at play in Pyongyang and possible changes to American diplomacy post-November election.
How the conflict still shapes our world at the remove of three-quarters of a century.
China has come to Africa. Can U.S. policy makers find ways to mesh, not clash, with Beijing’s interests? By Christopher C. Starling.
A new military command takes a broad, sophisticated view of the U.S. role in a neglected continent. Its job won’t be easy. By James J. Hentz.
For almost three decades the U.S. embargo of Cuba was part of America's cold war strategy against the Soviet bloc. It should have been lifted after that ‘‘war’’ ended since Castro ceased to threaten the United States and its neighbors and adopted the standard rules of international behavior. But inertia, a powerful Cuban American lobby, and misguided politicians set new demands: democracy, improved human rights, and economic reform. When Castro demurred we tightened the sanctions in 1992 and again in 1996 with the Helms-Burton Law. The United States has never committed the resources necessary to overthrow Castro, however, and the pressures we have applied have utterly failed to advance the three objectives. Worse yet, in the post–cold war world the policy and political outlook that sustain it have become a strategic liability. They promote conflict, both within Cuba—where a crisis might draw in the U.S. military—and abroad, as occurred in 1999–2000 after the arrival in Florida of the rafter boy, Elián González. They allow pressure groups to stand in the way of the policy-making process of the U.S. government. For example, the lobby manipulated wishy-washy politicians in 1998–1999 and got the president to turn down a widely supported proposal for a bipartisan commission to conduct the first comprehensive evaluation of the policy in four decades. Finally, the imperialistic Helms-Burton Law alienates allies worldwide and will poison relations between the United States and Cuba for decades to come. Castro will benefit no matter what we do, but on balance he gains more if we maintain the sanctions because they provide a scapegoat for his own repression and economic failures even as they enable him to maintain his cherished global image as the ‘‘scourge of U.S. imperialism.’’ Castro can wage a worldwide campaign against the embargo to bolster his image knowing Washington is too inflexible to change it. Indeed, whenever Washington has lightened up, Castro has tightened up and effectively prevented further improvement. Lifting sanctions need not mean establishing friendly relations with Castro—which he would reject in any event—or supporting his efforts to get international aid without meeting standard requirements. The ultimate responsibility for maintaining this antiquated and potentially dangerous policy falls on politicians who either do not understand the need for, or for political reasons are afraid to support, a new policy to benefit both Americans and Cubans in the post–cold war world.
To succeed in the war on terror, Philip Bobbitt insists, the West needs an entirely new conceptual framework.
By Peter Robinson.
Timothy Garton Ash discusses Europe, China And The World After COVID-19.
Matt Ridley, author of The Rational Optimist, insists that we humans must face the truth about ourselves—no matter how good it might be. An interview with Peter Robinson.