The United States’ superpower monopoly endures, but only in the western hemisphere. There is no regional military or economic competitor, and ideological challengers have failed or remain strategically marginal. Elsewhere, the emerging model is regional bipolarity coincident with global economic tri-polarity (United States, China, European Union).
This is the most important portrayal of war that remains untranslated into English. A profound study of how military behavior, values, and entire societies degenerate under the stress of extended warfare, this is a book that shaped the reviewer’s thinking for the past forty years.
This unique book has never gotten the broad recognition it deserves. The finest available study of the late-czarist Russian army as an institution, it analyzes bureaucratic and cultural problems that continue to afflict Russian forces today.
.Yes, it’s a novel, but this is the finest book, fiction or non-fiction, ever written about the United States Army. Regulations have changed, as have accepted behaviors, technologies, uniforms, rations…yet, today’s soldiers remain these soldiers.
This classic work in three volumes fills a crippling gap in the knowledge of Euro-American strategists. Edward Gibbon’s irrational vilification of the Byzantines has obscured the empire’s glory and importance for English-speaking readers, as well as neglecting the military challenges and triumphs of commanders too often starved of funds as the empire fell into its long decline.
A massive study of a magnificent soldier—and sailor—this relentlessly fascinating biography finally does justice in English to a brilliant campaigner (from Latin America to Italy) unaccountably slighted by military historians.
In the greatest film ever made about the human dimensions of strategy, director Stanley Kubrick’s Cold-War masterpiece, Doctor Strangelove, an excited strategic bomber pilot speaks of “noo-cullar combat, toe-to-toe with the Russkis.” But the lengthy annals of Americans and Russians tramping on each other’s feet followed a brief interlude when we danced the light fantastic to our mutual benefit, with neither side’s dancing shoes scuffed.
Pakistan’s military and intelligence leadership—the country’s decisive elements—view the United States as a danger to be managed and a resource to be exploited. Its approach to bilateral relations is predicated on three things: The (correct) belief that U.S. interlocutors do not understand the region; the conviction that, eventually, the U.S. will leave Afghanistan; and Pakistan’s need for hegemony over Afghanistan—not only to check India’s strategic moves but, more importantly, to guarantee Pakistan’s internal cohesion.